


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
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Thomas Chalmers.


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A LECTURE

BY

THE REV. JOHN CAIRNS, D.D.

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## THOMAS CHALMERS.

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DR. CHALMERS needs no fresh annalist or critic. His life by Dr. Hanna is one of the masterpieces of full-length biography ; and the briefer sketches of Hugh Miller, John Brown, Isaac Taylor, David Masson, and many others hardly less conspicuous, have added to the blaze of its illumination. To re-write the story of a career so well known would be useless, and in this space hopeless : to set forth a new or deeper estimate of its worth and meaning presumptuous. I shall only attempt some scattered notices and rapid criticisms, proper to a passing lecture addressed to young men. The grandeur of the figure can hardly be abated by any treatment, and each fresh attempt to seize it gains something from that later point of survey, which, in the case of all great and epoch-making characters, is given with the very lapse of time. Time, indeed, has not yet done, in this instance, all its work. The life of Chalmers touches on living and excited controversies. But these do not interfere with its Catholic interest ; and, so far as it is necessary to speak of them here, they need not provoke strife, but only widen sympathy and enlarge forbearance.

The first and pervading impression caught from the life of Dr. Chalmers is that of *greatness*. Of this, the outward

signs are sufficiently striking. A native of the decayed Fife sea-port of Anstruther, born in 1780, and buried, apparently, in one of the obscurest corners of the same county as the minister of Kilmany, he comes forth, about his thirtieth year, to startle and convulse all Scotland with a new and electrical pulpit eloquence, which provokes from Scotland's greatest critic, Lord Jeffrey, a frequent comparison with Demosthenes, and equally subdues hearers like Mackintosh and Canning in London. He grapples for eight years with the gigantic home-mission work of two successive parishes in Glasgow, visiting neglected parishioners by the thousand, and making immense experiments in pauperism and evangelistic agency, yet retaining by honest effort his towering popularity, and laying himself open to the invasions of society on a scale unprecedented. He migrates to St. Andrews as Professor of Moral Philosophy, and kindles in another field the old enthusiasm, which he sustains as Professor of Divinity in Edinburgh for twenty years. He produces his Bridgewater Treatise, with writings on political economy, ethics, and theology, making five-and-twenty published volumes, with half as many more unpublished. He becomes the apostle of Church Extension in Scotland, and creates 200 new churches, at an expense of £300,000. He defends church establishments in London, amidst admiring princes of the blood, peers, bishops, and ministers of state. He fights the great battle of Non-Intrusion, and carries half the General Assembly with him into the Free Church. None but a great and leading mind—a mind great in many attributes and in many dimensions—could have achieved the vast and varied work implied in this simple enumeration.

In all this greatness there was *originality*. The very combination of powers usually separated gave his life a visible freshness and novelty. As of himself, he said, that he was the only man living who had been in one day on



the top of Boston Stump and Lincoln Cathedral ; and, as we may add, that probably no other man of his time had been on the top of all the cathedrals in England, so hardly any, if any, of his contemporaries united gifts and qualities so diverse and apparently irreconcilable. An intellect essentially and characteristically scientific, keen and fresh in observation, but instinctively reaching out to the widest laws and generalizations, and armed with the mathematical powers that open the secrets of the physical universe, was in him allied as in Plato, Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Kant, with that faculty of metaphysical speculation which broods over the ultimate data of mind, and still more with that intuition of moral genius which sounds the depths of human nature and the destinies of human society. He was thus a mathematician, a mental analyst, a moral philosopher, and a political economist, all in one, with a capacity of intellectual delight in all these fields amounting to a passion ; and an imagination that ranged over them at will, and illustrated one by the wonders of another, while its inspiration was continually renewed by familiarity with the *ipsa corpora* of nature, at home with the tender and the beautiful, but revelling in the vast and the sublime. These great gifts of intelligence and imagination might have made a philosopher or a poet, had they been lodged in a calmer temperament, or a purely idealizing spirit. But through a singularity of constitution, almost without parallel, they became the mere instruments and handmaids of more urgent sympathies and intense convictions, that turned the man of science and fancy into the man of work and conflict, made Plato and Newton give place to Socrates and Paul, and ended the development of the *savant* and the idealist in that of the orator, the reformer, the missionary, and, if need were the martyr. While practice thus carried it over speculation, the vanquished in some sense gave law to the

victor. The pulpit, the church-court, the mission-field, with their appropriate topics, were brought into unwonted juxtaposition with the French Institute and the British Association. The stars in their courses fought against infidelity. The Veto law was a new case of the problem of the Three Bodies. Territorial missions were illustrated by "parallelograms." And the planet Jupiter, "made up of infinitesimals," cast a fostering ray on the Sustentation Fund and the stipend of the minister of Ballahulish. These flights and sallies of what, to ordinary minds seemed transcendentalism, were reined in by keen sagacity, and tempered by stern devotion to the hardest work. This fine ethereal nature could out-drudge and out-slay the dullest : and show for once that Pegasus could be yoked and harnessed in wain or plough. Absorption in great principles, matched with interest in the minutest details ; exquisite sensibility, with leonine courage ; the sturdiest independence with a statesman-like adaptation to times and circumstances ; addiction almost inordinate to favourite ideas and modes of speech, with a candid and self-renouncing openness to the light of experience ; these all deepen the impression of originality as well as of greatness ; to which it is interesting to add, that while a Scotchman of the Scotch—Scotch in his physiognomy, dialect, humour, metaphysics, and glowing nationality of feeling, civil and religious, Chalmers rises more than almost any other, on the light wing of genius and Christian large-heartedness, into the open heaven of truth and charity, and acts as a recognized centre of catholicity, not only on English but on world-wide literature and religion.

In the total impression of Chalmers' life, grand and striking as is the spectacle, *goodness* outweighs greatness—goodness of the most pure and Christian type. I seriously question, so far as it is given to man to judge, whether a more eminent Christian has lived in the nineteenth century ;

and in the long and glorious roll of Christian excellence, the names are but few and far between to which one is tempted to assign the palm. I do not speak of accuracy of mere belief, though that was in its great substance eminently scriptural, happy in the equipoise of its doctrinal and practical parts, and rightly adjusted to the lessons of natural theology on the one side, and to the impulses of natural sentiment on the other. Nor do I speak of great public services rendered to the Christian cause; for the advocate, the preacher, and the administrator does not always shine in the blaze of his own victory. I speak of the essential and vital elements of Christian piety which make up the saint, as distinguished from the sage or scholar; and which, in the case of Chalmers, as in all the highest public men of the Christian commonwealth, have preceded and determined all the rest. His faith, assisted by his vivid imagination, was a constant realizing of that great world into which what he adored as a miracle of grace had led the way. He could truly cite this text as the record of his every-day experience: "My soul breaketh for the longing that it hath unto thy judgments at all times." And yet with the most profound humility—a humility which was too genuine to appear in protestations to man and not in confessions to God—he daily lamented his radical ungodliness; and his most frequent complaint is, that God is not in his thoughts. His diaries and journals, his letters to his most intimate friends, and the sudden gushes of devotion in his daily and Sabbath studies of the Bible, reveal a spirit instinct to the core with Christian influence; the all-pervading grace of humility being associated as always with the two other most distinctive graces of zeal and love—zeal for the glory of his Redeemer, for which everything human was counted loss, and love to the souls of men, especially the outcast and neglected, which glowed within him as the very incarnation of the



spirit of Christ. Amid every kind of test, flattery and obloquy, dazzling successes and crushing disappointments, the pure gold of Christian simplicity and godly sincerity shines untarnished; and we cannot but say that his own lofty strain, in bidding farewell to the pulpit, is maintained to his dying hour: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning!" What a Christian utterance amidst the eager prosecution of researches in pauperism: "I should count the salvation of a single soul of more value than the deliverance of a whole empire from pauperism!" What a singleness of eye to the highest ends, when, amidst the triumph of his own schemes, he exclaimed: "Who cares about the Free Church, compared with the Christian good of the people of Scotland? Who cares about any Church but as an instrument of Christian good?" What a pathetic burst of Christian patriotism and philanthropy, which could sing its *Nunc Dimittis* when the Communion table was for the first time set up with one hundred communicants around it, excavated from the heathenism of the West Port: "This is the most joyful event of my life. God has indeed heard my prayer, and I could now lay down my head in peace and die!" The pure Christian style of Chalmers' religion was enhanced by the absence of everything strained, ascetic, and artificial. The love of nature, of letters, of society, above all, the most tender and beautiful domestic life, ran parallel with his incessant work in his Master's vineyard, and with those unworldly aspirations which made him confess that he was "a stranger and a pilgrim on the earth." I will not canonize even one of the greatest of saints, but it is my deliberate conviction that a character with so little dross of imperfection and infirmity, in conjunction with so much transcendent genius and piety, has rarely arisen amidst the earlier or later developments of Christianity; and this production—this living epistle—to

my mind even more valuable than any works or monuments of another kind, will bear the longest and most effectual witness to the superhuman origin of the Gospel, and to the sovereignty of that grace of God which—in men like Paul, Baxter, Wesley, and Chalmers—utterly departs from the ordinary type of human character and makes all things new.

The conversion in which this Christian character originated—the great and decisive epoch in Chalmers' life—is one of the most interesting on record. It occurred about 1810, when he was in his thirtieth year, and had been already seven years a parish minister, and when his mind was in its full strength, and his earlier convictions and habits had reached their maturity. To many, to most in the Church of Scotland, in his day, he seemed to need no conversion. His strong sense of natural religion, which in his College career at St. Andrews had attracted the townspeople to hear his prayers, and which had wrapt him for months together in an admiring contemplation of the power and greatness of God, had not died out. His later doubts, infused by the pernicious "*Système de la Nature*,"—a work which would resolve the universe into material development and mechanical law,—had given place; and the external evidences of Christianity, gathered up in Butler's "*Analogy*," had, in his own words, "made a Christian of him." He preached a Christianity which is still from many pulpits, if not in Scotland, yet elsewhere, delivered as orthodox—that the work of Christ is in some unexplained way connected with the remission of sins; that it opens the path to a happy immortality; but that every man must work out his own title to the blessing by piety and charity, looking to Christ's mediation only to repair his own deficiencies. "Let us tremble," says he, in his earlier preaching, "to think that anything but virtue can recommend us to the

Almighty." "The real nature of the Christian service consists in gratefully adoring the Supreme Being, and in diffusing the blessed influences of charity, moderation, and peace." It was the ordinary Moderate theology, which had reigned in Scotland for more than half a century, but which in Chalmers clothed itself with a fervour and an eloquence alien to its nature, and made him long and labour among his parishioners, for that practical reformation on which alone it insisted. His very earnestness on his own side led him to denounce the Evangelical doctrines "as the unintelligible jargon of pretended knowledge," and even to pray in public for the deliverance of their adherents from "fanaticism." Nor did he preach a morality which he did not illustrate, for his personal character was frank, truthful, generous in a conspicuous degree; and his pastoral attentions to his flock, though limited, displayed a heartiness which secured not a little of their regard and affection. He had risen above the eccentricities of his earlier ministry, when he only saw Kilmany amidst the hurry of volunteer lectures in St. Andrews, on mathematics and chemistry. He was admired in the General Assembly; and had even received the important commission from Sir David Brewster, as editor of the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*, to write in it the article on "Christianity," the future leader of the Evangelical party, Dr. Andrew Thomson, giving way in his favour. Might not then such a man have said, "What lack I yet?" and is not the strong term "conversion," as applied to him, a party exaggeration? No one will say so, who understands the Christian religion; least of all would Dr. Chalmers himself have borne the suppression of this emphatic word. He speaks of himself as having experienced in this crisis "a very great transition of sentiment," "a great revolution in all his opinions about Christianity," and he also laments that his heart had not been right with



God; for reviewing his life, at the close of his thirtieth year, he uses words like these: "For the greater part of the last fifteen years there has been a total estrangement of my mind from religious principle; and my sole conduct has been dictated by the rambling impulse of the moment, without any direction from a sense of duty, or any reference to that eternity which should be the end and the motive of all our actions." His lectures on morality, which had made no impression on his parishioners, had made as little, in the deepest sense, on himself. He was living for time, and not for eternity; and his chief idol was still literary ambition, for whose glittering prizes he panted, labouring to show, by his elaborate work on "National Resources" (published just before this date), and by his continued mathematical studies, that the "malignant touch of ordination" had not exiled him from them for ever. God took His own way to recall this wandering spirit, whom we see hitherto, amid all the brilliancy of genius and the splendour of opening fame, out of harmony with all that is most vital in Christianity—out of harmony with all that was deepest in the religion of Scotland—out of harmony, too, with the simple-hearted piety of his father's house. That house was repeatedly and suddenly overshadowed with calamity. A brother and sister died of the same disease, but died in their parents' faith; and two sisters were equally threatened. An uncle, who had been as a second father to him, was suddenly caught away, in the attitude of prayer. Personal illness succeeded,—so severe, that it confined him for many months, and made him hang as on the brink of the grave. He awoke as from a dream to the nothingness of time and the magnitude of eternity; and the right book was at hand to confirm the impression. "I have been reading Pascal's 'Thoughts on Religion.' You know his history: a man of the richest endowments, and whose youth was signalized by his profound and original speculations in

mathematical science, but who could stop short in the brilliant career of discovery—who could resign all the splendours of literary reputation—who could renounce, without a sigh, all the distinctions which are conferred upon genius, and resolve to devote every talent and every hour to the defence and illustration of the Gospel. This, my dear sir, is superior to all Greek and to all Roman fame.” Like Pascal, he would now himself defend Christianity. But did he understand it? The preparations for his article on Christianity, carried on in the shaded sick-room, opened up startling gleams of light. Was it the Christianity which he had heard expounded from the lecture-rooms of St. Andrews, and seen exalted to the high places of Moderatism, that could inspire the primitive Christians to face death and smile on martyrdom? The article was a bridge over a deep river, landing in a region as yet unknown. There was treasure in the field, which he had undertaken to defend; but he had not found it; or if he had, he had not yet paid the price. He must become a Christian of that sublimer mould, and work out the problem, with God and His law and eternity stedfastly in view. Hence, a series of struggles and aspirations after holy obedience continued for months, which leave their deep mark on the whole man. His journals record the intensity of the effort, and show how he kept watch over his spirit, how he set his house in order, omitting family prayer now for no company; and how he strove to impress his new convictions upon others. When he returned to the Kilmany pulpit, in weakness and languor, there was the sense of a seriousness unfelt before; and the world to come cast an awful shadow over every sermon. His Bible was seen to be constantly in his hands; and a visitor having remarked the change, was met by the reply: “All too little, John—all too little.” These prolonged efforts to work out a righteousness by the law, as in

the great example of Luther, totally failed. They deepened the sense of sin, and gave a more commanding grandeur to the Saviour's atonement: but they all left the question of acceptance with God as perplexing and harassing as ever. "For," says Dr. Chalmers, many years afterwards, "during this course, I got little satisfaction, and felt no repose." At length the deliverance came from this spirit of bondage and of fear; and it came through that doctrine of justification by grace—the profoundest mystery of Christianity—which is so stumbling to the pride of human reason, that it needs to be discovered afresh in every age and in every instance. No part of Chalmers' history is so intensely interesting. "I remember," says he, "that somewhere about the year 1811, I had Wilberforce's 'Practical View of Christianity' put into my hands; and as I got on reading it, felt myself on the eve of a great revolution in all my opinions about Christianity. I am now most thoroughly of opinion—and it is an opinion founded on experience—that on the system of 'Do this and live,' no peace, and even no true and worthy obedience, can ever be attained: it is 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.'" "The deep views," he adds, "that Wilberforce gives of the depravity of our nature—of our need of an atonement—of the great doctrine of acceptance through that atonement—of the sanctifying influences of the Spirit: these all give a new aspect to a man's religion; and I am sure that, in as far as they are really and honestly proceeded upon, they will give a new direction to his habits and his history. . . . The doctrines of the Bible, I well remember, I then saw in an altogether new light; and could feel a power and preciousness in passages which I formerly read with heedlessness, and even with disgust." The work which the grace of God thus made decisive fell into his hands in the interval between a sister's death and funeral, as if death would complete what death



had begun ; and the scene was Anstruther, as if the same place would witness his natural and spiritual birth. The work of Wilberforce was one of a class which his father delighted in, but which the son had denounced from the pulpit : " When you are reading Newton's Sermons, and Baxter's ' Saint's Rest,' and Doddridge's ' Rise and Progress,' where do Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John go to ?" The first of these works comforted a dying brother—the earliest of the series linked with this conversion ; and the other two books, also, were connected with the hour of his soul's agony and deliverance ; for Baxter, more than any other man, inspired Doddridge ; and Doddridge, in turn, quickened Wilberforce. This is the true apostolical succession ; and who can tell where it will end ? It may be added, that in successive centuries, three great religious movements start from the same personal experience in regard to justification. The first is that of Martin Luther ; the second is that of John Wesley ; the third is that of Thomas Chalmers.

The conversion of Chalmers explains his whole life, which is but made up of streams and radiations from it. He lays aside his mathematics, forgetful no more, as he so nobly confessed he had been, of the true science of quantity, which teaches the littleness of time and the magnitude of eternity. Entries like this occur in his journal :—" Now that I have got well, let me devote a great part of my time to the business of my parish." The sick are now not only visited, but prayed with ; and the former ignorance which counted one day or even a fragment of a day sufficient for the pulpit, is renounced in the prayer,— " O God, let me give my whole life to Thy service and to the preparation of a people for eternity." As he becomes firmer in what he calls the " peculiar doctrines," he urges them in correspondence and in conversation.

Here is a sample: "Fell in with David Wilkie, the eminent painter, at Cupar. . . . I tried to impress my peculiar views on Mr. D. Wilkie." All his own relatives are thus talked with or written to out of the fulness of his heart; and so, also, his favourite tutor in mathematics, Dr. James Brown, concerning whom we thus read: "Let me write him a full and a firm testimony. I pray, O God, for his peculiar Christianity." We see the same overflowing earnestness in the most faithful letters on personal religion addressed, at a later day, to Sir Robert Peel and the Duc de Broglie.

But it was in his ministrations to his own people that the change was most manifest. He did not indeed, as rumour gave out, recant his errors from the pulpit, and publish his personal experience. But he returned to the texts which had been handled amiss to cast over them the broad light of an evangelical testimony, and with an earnestness, which could not be surpassed, to exalt the righteousness of Christ, received by simple faith, as the sole ground of pardon and fountain of holiness; and to urge home the acceptance of the universal and unconditional offer of that righteousness made in the Gospel as a duty preceding and including every other obligation. He spoke from a depth of inward peace thus mirrored in his journal,—“Had more intimate communion with God in solitary prayer than I had ever felt before; and my sentiment was a total, an unreserved, and a secure dependence on Christ the Saviour. Oh may I enjoy His cross, and may it be all my glory! May I view every spiritual blessing as the effect of union with Him by faith. He is laid before me as the one and the effectual Mediator. We are not only invited, but commanded to believe. Help our unbelief, O God; dissolve our hardness: enter into our hearts.” The Spirit of grace whom he thus invoked enabled him to speak with the power of a burning

eloquence, which caught and kindled in hearts that had been frozen under all the years of his legal ministrations. The flame spread to neighbouring parishes, and auditors were attracted from Dundee, from St. Andrews, and even from Edinburgh. Wonder, and in some cases offence, followed the crowds that streamed into the sequestered valley, and besieged the scanty church. But the crowds increased from month to month; and these Kilmany sermons, rich with the baptism of a recently found Gospel, continued, when used from time to time, to be the most effectual in his whole ministry.

A prodigious commotion ensued, which we need to go back to that dark age and dark region to understand. Moderatism, worldliness, ungodliness,—all rose up against the new evangelist. The old taunt was ready, “He hath a devil, and is mad; why hear ye him?” He had been mad on mathematics, botany, and chemistry; he was now in a new frenzy, and it would soon give place. But he boldly took up the Cross, supported by the sympathies of the remnant whom Moderatism had not deadened; supported by the Evangelical Dissent which had not been without influence on his own conversion; supported by the leaders of the revival in the Scottish Church, and by the returning energies of British Christianity. He threw himself into the ranks of the Bible Society, and his published sermon for it, preached in Dundee, was the first monument to the world of his great change. He brought himself into line with Sydney Smith’s “consecrated cobblers,” and received Andrew Fuller and a deputation from the Baptist Mission. This was then the *ne plus ultra* of sacrifice. No record of those times can so vividly recall the great and terrible wilderness, which needed a new Moses to smite the rock in it, as the confession even of Chalmers, “I am still ashamed of the testimony of



Christ, and would have felt this had I walked the streets of Cupar with the missionaries."

The translation of Chalmers to Glasgow, in 1815, and his seven years' ministry there, had results which were immense and incalculable. He was in the zenith of his powers; he had completed the cycle of his new discoveries; he was stirred by the advance of the rising Evangelism in one of its ancient seats, which but waited his mighty impulse to set in like a flood. He gave the movement commanding literary position, abounding hopefulness of tone, and the impetus of aggression which in every crisis is half the victory. His "Astronomical Discourses," prepared, some of them amidst the hurry of a tour in Fife, and written by fragments from morning to morning, shot through the educated mind not only of Glasgow, but of Scotland and of Britain, with the rapidity of lightning. His "Commercial Discourses" confirmed the impression; and his ordinary sermons, drawing not so much from science or political economy as from his vivid insight into Bible truth, his mastery of human nature, and the all-pervading glance and touch of genius, and delivered with a passion and a vehemence to exceed which would be frenzy, riveted every hearer, and swept along all ranks and classes in a tumult of agitation. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the preaching of Chalmers was declamatory or theatrical. It was, on the contrary, intellectual and abstract in its leading thoughts, and fitter for the educated than the uneducated, resembling in this the style of Robert Hall; while its popular elements were found in its affinity to universal Christian experience, its kindling strokes of imagination, and its tempest and whirlwind of passionate earnestness. The delivery of such discourses to such crowds, with such impressions, must have been one of the highest raptures of Christian oratory; and the whole soul of the preacher evidently lived along the line of its own

vibrations. But never did he stop with applause or mere excitement. He felt the danger, and constantly prayed against it. Here is a specimen. "Preached to the magistrates. Vanity—violent exertion prompted by vanity—a preaching of self—a want of singleness of aim after the glory of God. O my heavenly Father, sweep away these corruptions, and enable me to struggle with them." The love of souls was thus the bright unshaken centre of his stupendous popularity. The loftiest excursions of eloquence only gave momentum to the appeal which descended on the conscience, and shattered every plea and every argument against immediate return to God. Such preaching did for Glasgow what the parallel but different labours of Dr. Andrew Thomson did for Edinburgh. In the West the victory—to which, doubtless in both cases, others within and without the Establishment contributed—was perhaps more complete; and its great capital, one of the chief centres of Evangelism in the empire, bears to this day the indelible trace of the ministry of Chalmers.

Once only had I the distant chance of judging what this world-renowned eloquence must have been in its prime from a specimen of later years, when the pulpit had been long relinquished. It was at the opening of an extension church in the suburbs of Edinburgh, about the year 1839. The place was crowded, but the limited chapel seemed ill adapted to the vaster effects of eloquence. The text was his favourite one, "Fury is not in me," which happened also to be the last from which he ever preached. He had not proceeded far when the whole audience was quelled, and seemed to sway hither and thither in response to his words. Perhaps it was the result of my own impression, but, as he advanced, they appeared to cower and almost to divide, as if his hand were parting them asunder, till, amidst a tremendous description of the possible effects of the fury of God, I could have

thought that the judgment was set and the books opened, and every hearer, in obedience to a resistless impulse, about, by some visible movement, to rank himself among the sheep or the goats.

The other great and lasting effect of Dr. Chalmers' Glasgow ministry was the creative impulse given by it to Home Missions. With these no name in the roll of Christian philanthropy is so thoroughly identified as his. He acted indeed formally only as a parish minister. He mapped out no town or province for his labours, and founded no general society. But in dealing with the ignorance, profligacy, and religious destitution of two neglected and overgrown parishes, he virtually anticipated the whole developments of half a century, and planted the germ of city missions, territorial churches, ragged schools, theatre services, Bible women, and whatever else distinguishes our own times. The labours of these seven years, first in the Tron parish of 11,000 souls, and then in St. John's, almost as populous—the poorest in Glasgow, and selected as the theatre of the hardest experiment—read like romance. How he visited repeatedly in each parish every house, addressing the collected inmates, sometimes by hundreds, with extemporaneous fervour, in the evenings; how he multiplied Sabbath-schools on the local principle, and founded and superintended day-schools at the expense of thousands of pounds, persuading even the Romanist authorities to allow the teaching of the Bible in his mixed classes; how, above all, he gathered and held in hand the most multiform and miscellaneous agency, drawn in many cases from the fruits of his own ministry, and filling up every sphere of lay activity, to say nothing of the higher genius of Edward Irving,—all this can only be glanced at; but its impression is seen at this day over the whole world of Christian labour. Even the least permanently successful of his enterprises—his great St. John's experiment



in pauperism—though it has not influenced Scotland to abandon or even to keep stationary a compulsory poor-rate, has not been in vain ; and it contains many beautiful lessons on the spontaneity of Christian almsgiving, and the duty of the Christian Church to the poor, which are destined to be revived and remembered when the love of the Gospel has left the reign of law behind. The works of Chalmers in the home mission-field have not been more influential than his winged words. Who has not heard his pithy phrases to the effect that we must “excavate the Gallowgate and the Cowgate ;” that the Church of Christ is to be “not only a centre of attraction, but a centre of aggression ;” and that “a house-going minister makes a church-going people ?” It was his heart’s deepest wish to make Scotland, as he said, “an experimental garden,” with all its moral wastes reclaimed ; and whenever that day comes, the memory of his own labours, from the Tron parish to the West Port, will surround his name with a richer crown than all eloquence and all theological distinction.

It was to many, if not to most, an unwelcome change when Dr. Chalmers, in 1823, relinquished his Glasgow pulpit, and became Professor of Moral Philosophy in St. Andrews. To this day, there rise up features of contrast between the one sphere and the other which recall Elijah at the brook Cherith. Dr. Chalmers seems at times himself, during his five years’ solitude, to have been haunted by some such comparison. Still he was justified to himself, not only by the failure of his health, but by his high and constant idea of the pre-eminence of a University chair over a pulpit ; and we can see from the event how important a part this interval of comparative repose played in the development of his future history. He had so far worked out one seam, and needed to open another. His intellectual nature required some change of exercise, and some scene of

meditation for the working out and completion of all his deepest and most cherished views in mental and moral science, and in natural and Christian theology. He thus prepared himself for his more widely influential post as Professor of Divinity in the metropolis, which occupied the last twenty years of his life, and for the permanent contributions which he left to philosophical and Christian literature. Without going here into any of the special doctrines which he promulgated from his St. Andrews' chair, and which have some importance in the development of the Scottish philosophy of mind, it is enough to signalize the just relation in which he placed ethics to mental philosophy, as a separate and independent science, and the great service which he rendered in emphatically protesting against the common treatment of it as complete without borrowing from Christianity, and carrying up all its vital problems to a higher oracle. The enthusiasm which he kindled among his students was remarkable, and not less the missionary impulse which many of them received. In a career like that of Dr. Duff (to mention no others), the influence has gone to the farthest East, and through the world.

The Edinburgh labours of Dr. Chalmers, as a divinity professor, fifteen years in the Establishment and four in the Free Church, rank with the most fruitful and important of his whole life. In the one case, they completed the triumph of Evangelism in the Church of Scotland, by filling its pulpits with zealous adherents of that section ; in the other, they gave a tone to the theology of a new denomination, already composed to a large extent of his own pupils. Many students also of other denominations attended his prelections, and enjoyed alike the charm and the impulse of his personal intercourse. How many of his pupils received from him not only a mental but a spiritual awakening, will never be known. His place in the theology of Scotland was thus.

most influential ; and though a full examination of this, or of his strictly theological writings, is not suitable to this lecture, I cannot pass from the subject without some brief remarks, more especially as the theological standing and influence of Chalmers have been much less discussed than other aspects of his character and history. While it cannot be maintained that Dr. Chalmers reached the first rank of theologians in respect of his mastery of the sacred languages, or his familiarity with systems of divinity in their original sources, or as affected by the action and reaction of controversy, he undoubtedly did so in respect of his comprehension of the whole sum and substance of theological discussion, and of his independent and vigorous criticism of every separate issue. His profound Christian experience, his intimate knowledge of the pith and marrow of the Bible, his command of physical and ethical science, the very robustness of his sense and sagacity, and the largeness and expansion of his nature, made his one of the great minds that gather up the results of a past development, and reproduce it with a new stamp and impress. He did not alter Christianity (for he believed it to be unalterable), but he adjusted its relations to sciences like geology, and to forms of unbelief like Atheism and Deism, before the current Pantheism had arisen. He did not dilute Scottish Calvinism (for he found the substance of it in the Bible), but he exhibited it in its analogies to the mysteries of natural causation and moral government, and he loved to set it in harmony with those great truths of a sufficient salvation and a free Gospel offer, which are common to it with all theologies that deserve the name of Evangelical. Many fine examples of acuteness and strength of intellect occur in his handling of celebrated theses, as, for example, that of Hume on Miracles, and that of Clarke on the Being of God ; and his Notes on his text-books—Butler, Paley, and Hill—were models of brief and suggestive criticism. Here and there



his cautions were exceedingly valuable,—as, for example, against the exaggerated view of human depravity, which denies all natural virtue in man toward man, and does not as it ought, place the essence of the evil in aversion to God, and also against a too scholastic and materialized conception of the Trinity. With his great contemporary, Sir William Hamilton, as with Butler, he preferred a “learned ignorance” to the hasty solution of many problems left by Revelation unsettled; and he also coincided with Schleiermacher, apparently without knowing it and with much discordance in other points, in making Christian experience and the necessities of practice, rather than the high *priori* road of logical deduction, the starting point of Biblical theology. His acceptance of the infallible product of inspiration, while dismissing all theories as to its mode, was another proof of his sober-mindedness; and the same may be said of his ultimate justice to the internal evidence of Christianity against the undue depreciation of it in his earlier treatises and sermons. No competent judge will deny to Chalmers a high and permanent place among the theologians that are at once attractive and solid, liberal and orthodox; though possibly the style, with its occasional uncouthness and too frequent repetition, as well as the elevation of the thought above the popular mark, may somewhat limit his readers. These observations apply with nearly equal force to his writings on political economy. Their special doctrines are here beyond us; but no one can sufficiently admire the courage and unsparing earnestness with which, from every topic, he fetches a fresh illustration of their great truth, indeed the great truth of his life-long testimony, that morals are the soul of economics, and that the Gospel of Christ alone has healing for the nations.

The remaining passages of the public life of Dr. Chalmers all centre in two great and contemporaneous movements—the

Church Extension enterprise, and the Non-Intrusion Controversy in the Church of Scotland. As a leader of public opinion, his chief efforts till now had been made in the General Assembly in connection with the abolition of pluralities, and outside of it in the advocacy of Catholic emancipation. Now, the decease of Dr. Andrew Thomson brought him singly to the front; and the continued advance of the Evangelical party, with the outburst of the Voluntary controversy in Scotland, determined the character of the agitation in which he was destined to pass ten of the most laborious and anxious years of his life. On this period I must touch very lightly; for the nature of this platform, and the conflicting views among the supporters of this Association as to the right relation of Church and State, prescribe great caution and tenderness. But I cannot wholly omit such vital and integral parts of Chalmers' history.

Even when the Voluntary controversy had shaken Scotland for some years to its centre, Dr. Chalmers, with his characteristic courage and energy, did not despair of seeing his favourite parochial system extended by new churches and fresh endowments, to the neglected parts of the country. In the arguments of the controversy he took no part, till the delivery of his London lectures, in 1837; but three years before, his scheme of Church extension, embracing an appeal to the people for building funds and to the Government for endowments, was already in operation. How the Dissenters resisted—how a commission was appointed to ascertain the statistics of destitution, and how the Government ultimately did nothing,—all this, with the pleas and grievances on both sides, may be left here unrecorded at greater length. I follow Chalmers here with less sympathy than in other parts of his career, sharing, as is natural, even after the lapse of more than twenty years, something of the Dissenters' view of that movement. But it is impossible not to

admire the patriotic and Christian spirit with which, it may be, not without a certain impatience of contradiction, the long-cherished design was started and adhered to; the gigantic efforts of mind and body by which it was sustained; the unfaltering confidence with which, when State help failed, the resources of voluntary liberality were challenged into manifestation; and the striking result achieved of 200 Churches (one-fifth of the whole Establishment) added in ten years to the number, and at an expense of more than a quarter of a million sterling. These efforts have indeed been far surpassed in later fruits of Christian zeal with which the name of Chalmers is also associated; but they were till their own day unprecedented; and there can be no doubt that he was trained in the one school for the struggles and successes of the other. These Extension churches are now all in the hands of the Establishment, from which Dr. Chalmers broke away; having also been partially endowed by a repetition, in the hands of Dr. James Robertson, of the voluntary effort which called them forth. There cannot be a better wish for them, than that they may serve the great cause of home evangelization for which Dr. Chalmers laboured to create them; and perhaps it is not beyond the bounds of hope, that, in ways and under conditions which we cannot yet see, the sections of Presbyterianism, to which successively they have been monuments of strife and bitterness, may sooner or later offer in them an undivided worship, and recall with equal gratitude their founder's name.

The other great event—greater immeasurably—in the centre of which Dr. Chalmers also stands, is the movement which passed through the stages of Non-Intrusion and Spiritual Independence, and ended in the division of the Scottish Establishment and the creation of the Free Church. I wish here to guard against partisan writing, all the more that my sympathies—sympathies drawn from vivid personal



recollection of these agitations—are with Chalmers. I will seek to be just to him without being unjust to others. It has often seemed, especially to the English mind, an extreme procedure to rend a Church, not to say an Establishment, in twain, upon the matter of the election of ministers, and still more upon the right of objecting without reasons given to their election, which was the principle of that Veto Law which Dr. Chalmers stood by. Still, it is certain that, if anything was sacred to Chalmers, this was. He saw in the competency of a peasant to decide on the suitableness of a proposed minister a case of the great Protestant principle of private judgment, a flash of the internal evidence of Christianity on the soul; and he defended even the inarticulate utterance of that judgment by an appeal to the deepest principles of mental philosophy. We may agree or dissent; but we are bound to own that this was in harmony with his life-long mission of preaching the Gospel to the poor, and calling forth its response in their breast. The other principle into which, when the civil courts rejected this Veto Law and punished adherence to it, the struggle resolved itself, and even more decisively than before, was the right of separate administration and discipline claimed by Dr. Chalmers for the Church under the name of Spiritual Independence. In some form or other, and at some point or other, all Christian Churches acknowledge the right of self-regulation under its Divine Head, which belongs to the Church of Christ as a peculiar and spiritual society. In this sense even Arnold, who looked on the State as another face of the Church, would have regarded it as the bounden duty of the State to be regulated by Christ's laws, and no others. But Chalmers went farther, and held this to be a part of Christ's law, that the Church had a separate province, and that State functionaries should not interfere with the office-bearers of the Church in all such acts as the definition of

creeds, the control of worship, the admission and exclusion of members and ministers, and all similar questions of government and discipline. This he founded on the New Testament idea of a kingdom not of this world; and while he granted and contended for an alliance of the Church with the State, it was always on the understanding that this spiritual territory should be kept inviolate, as he believed to be ordained in Scripture, and legally provided for in the Scottish National Church by its constitution and history. I am not contending here that he was in the right either as to Scripture or fact; for this would be to turn an exposition into a vehicle of party. I am not judging between his convictions and those of other parties, who variously thought, either that this mutual independence of the two powers was not recognised in Scripture, or that something of its ideal purity might be sacrificed for the blessings of State connection, or that it could not be secured in State connection at all. I only wish to show, in justice to him, that the question was no narrow, sectional, or local one; and that while, with such convictions as his, it stirred up the depths of Scottish ecclesiastical patriotism, it touched the very essence of Christianity as a practical system, and appealed to the most intimate sentiment of Christian loyalty. For this principle, as he held it, of the separate action of the Christian Church, under Christ as its Head, when the denial of it came first from legal tribunals and then from the British Parliament,—more even than for the other, of the consent of congregations in the settlement of ministers, as equally denied,—he was willing to renounce the whole advantages, which none ever prized more highly, of State recognition and support, and to brave the imputation of inconsistency and surrender of the dearest interests of his country, urged with all sincerity, by many, especially among the aristocracy, like the Marquis of Dalhousie and Lord Aberdeen, who had been his warmest

admirers. The qualities of soul could not but be great that endured so prolonged and fierce a struggle. Impartial minds, while doing justice to others, and that on both sides, must ever be struck with the moral grandeur of Chalmers in this trying period. He sees from the first the gravity of the situation. He is resigned to the worst, and therefore he can do the best to avert the crisis. As the plot thickens, his courage rises ; "Be it known unto all men, that we shall not retract one single footstep ; we shall give place by subjection, no, not for an hour ; no, not by a hair-breadth." He steers right onward amid all the winds and currents of difficult, intricate, and stormy negotiation. "Nothing will serve," says he, "but an open, courageous, and rectilineal policy." His heart is fixed, trusting in God. "The prospects of the Church very dark. Bear me up, O God, under the weight of every visitation. Be Thyself my Portion." He makes common cause with his brethren. "Let me not, in this crisis of our Church's history, urge a sacrifice upon others which I would not share with them." "If there is a break-up, I mean to call my house 'The Refuge.'" He directs the perplexed to the highest Guide : "Unto the upright there ariseth light in the darkness." He is the first to abandon hope of a solution ; and his buoyant and active spirit taking wing into the future has planned and developed, under the name of a Sustentation Fund, to be equally divided among the resigning ministers, a large supply for the new body before it is ushered into the world. These great qualities recall the heroic age of Christian history. They are not the property of one section of the Church, but of all. The Free Church, indeed, has no reason to be ashamed of her founder. But virtues and graces like these shed their light far and wide on the common path of sacrifice and self-denial, that opens sooner or later on every Church and every individual, and that all must tread who would keep the faith.



The Church of God is not so rich in such examples that it can undervalue them when they arise ; and hence, when on the memorable day of the Scottish Disruption, the name of Chalmers was added to those of Luther, and Zuingli, and Howe, and Wesley, and others, who have paid the greatest earthly price for what in conscience they judged spiritual freedom, it was felt that religious conviction had received a universal impulse ; and the homage of applause and tears and awe-struck silence attested the great saying of Butler, that "Had conscience strength as it has right, it would absolutely govern the world."

The later years of Chalmers I will not follow. His labours in organizing a Sustentation Fund for the Free Church ministry evoked a liberality without parallel, yielding in the first year nearly £70,000, with a continual tendency to increase.\* He also gave development to the New College and other schemes of the denomination. He continued his experiments in territorial missions, till they were visibly successful. He rendered a service to Christian literature by assisting in the establishment and support of the *North British Review*. And he rendered a yet greater service to Christian union by taking part in originating the Evangelical Alliance, regarding as he did the differences among the majority of Christians, especially the Evangelical Dissenters in the country, as so many men of straw, and hoping (to use his own words) "to get the heads of the various denominations to meet together and consent to make a bonfire of them."


\* The Sustentation Fund in 1864 amounted to about £116,000, yielding to nearly 800 ministers a dividend of £138, and to about 100 more from £80 to 157, besides about £40,000 added in the form of supplement by individual congregations. The communion-roll of the Free Church is between 200,000 and 300,000, and the people adhering to it are variously estimated from a fourth to a third of the population of Scotland. In twenty-one years it has raised about seven millions sterling.

The Scottish disruption occurred almost in the year of his grand climacteric, and four years more of what he loved to call his Sabbath decade ran on with an ever softening and mellowing effect, amidst public work, study, and devotion. A parting visit was paid, in the spring of 1847, to the scenes of his youth, of singular tenderness, and another to England, where he was examined for the last time by the House of Commons on the Free Church movement in connection with the granting of sites, and preached his last sermon amidst the surviving friends of Hall and Foster in Bristol. By the time he returned to Edinburgh, in the end of the week, the Assembly proceedings had begun; and after the Sabbath rest, a report on some public matter was expected from him on the Monday, when the startling tidings burst upon the meeting that he was dead. On the Sabbath evening, after retiring to his chamber, he had rested from his labours, and next morning was found half erect in bed, in the attitude of majestic repose. A prayer, overheard some hours before in the garden,—“O Father, my heavenly Father,”—showed that, like Enoch, “he walked with God,” and in answer to it “he was not, for God took him.” A life of singularity and visible elevation above the common style of man, full of sudden shocks and critical periods, had reached a characteristic end.

I have striven not to exaggerate the place of Chalmers in Scottish religion. If I have said too much of his influence on its revival and development, it has been involuntary, and in obedience to that silent law whereby every great and good man diffuses the light in which his own features brighten as they shine. Little as my direct intercourse with him was, it has left an indelible impression; and this may have heightened my sense of the degree in which the whole Scottish atmosphere in which we live and work has been illuminated by his presence. Of the faces of the departed that rise out of

the past, there is none that I think of more tenderly, none on whose memory I feel it more sacred to dwell. Nor would I honour such men, grouped, as they now are, in lofty fellowship, only by remembrance, and, as Tacitus says, by imitation ; but also by the more Christian tribute of anticipation. They are the lights, not only of the past, but of the future. The heaven in which I believe is not the heaven of shadowy and secluded spirits, cut off from all sympathy with the earth which they have enlightened, and indifferent to the success or failure of the works on which their noble energies have been expended. In continuing their labours in anything of their spirit, we are fulfilling their joy and brightening their crown. In this sense of indestructible unity and predestined association, may we come daily to the sprits of the just ; and next to the hope of the highest welcome, may there breathe in our life-long struggle the humble but warm desire to gain also their sentence, at the end of the day, that we have not marred their work or dishonoured their memory, but, like them, have borne and had patience, and, for Christ's name's sake, have laboured and have not fainted !





The Influence of Knox and the Scottish  
Reformation on England.

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A LECTURE

BY THE

RIGHT HON. JAMES MONCRIEFF, M.P.

LORD ADVOCATE OF SCOTLAND.

DELIVERED BEFORE THE

YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION,

IN EXETER HALL,

ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8. 1859.





As I had not committed the following address to writing before it was delivered, it necessarily bears marks of careless and defective composition.

I have been chiefly indebted for the materials I have used to the prefatory notices contained in Mr. David Laing's edition of John Knox's Works, printed for the Bannatyne Club, and to notes furnished to me by the kindness of my friend, the Rev. Dr. Taylor, of Glasgow, whose labours have done so much to elucidate our early Scottish history.

EDINBURGH, *January*, 1860.



## THE INFLUENCE OF KNOX AND THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION ON ENGLAND.

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I VERY willingly complied with the request which was made to me by the Committee of this Association, that I should deliver the introductory lecture to the course about to begin this winter. I did so, not merely because I was deeply sensible of the honour conferred upon me in permitting me to follow so many predecessors, of eminence, distinction, and public usefulness, in this duty, but also because I felt I could not decline, if it was thought that my services could be of any benefit, to evince, in a manner however inefficient, the deep sympathy which I feel with the objects of this Association. If, indeed, it had been expected of me that in the discharge of this duty I should have been ready to lay before you to-day any elaborate disquisition, any polished composition, the result of any minute research, I should at once have declined that task, as altogether beyond either my ability or my opportunities of leisure. But I apprehend that the object of meetings of this kind, as well as the duty of those who address them, are very different. My province is not to instruct, but to suggest. I am to contribute, not knowledge, but trains of thought—topics of reflection which, superficial as they may be in themselves, may yet point to the rich ore which may lie beneath the surface. I therefore hope—I can attempt no more—and if in that I succeed, I shall be satisfied—to touch some chord of generous sympathy—to point out some useful



field of meditation—to hold up to the audience some examples which may animate and encourage the heart, either in the investigation after truth, or in the daily and ordinary struggles of life.

I propose to take you back to a scene of tumult now nearly three hundred years old—to a period when, in the meeting and crash of the contending billows of opinion, nations quivered to their centre, and old thrones and dynasties tottered, and individual life was held in jeopardy from day to day, as the victory inclined on either side. I propose to reproduce to you, in a hasty sketch, some of the characters which figured on that stage: and in the centre of them I propose to place the Scottish Reformer JOHN KNOX, not only as a great participant and actor in them, but as a characteristic type of those eventful times.

It may be thought that, in choosing such a subject for this introductory lecture, I have, perhaps, evinced a little of that over-nationality which we on the other side of the Tweed are sometimes accused of entertaining. If it be so, I am not very careful to rebut the charge, or to defend myself against it. I suppose that when the Committee of this Association came across the Tweed to look for a lecturer, they expected that the lecturer so found should at least speak about something with which he was reasonably conversant. And, at all events, I cannot think that in addressing an association of this kind, it can be out of place to trace the steps of a career chequered by almost every vicissitude of fortune; pursued, now in the obscurest shades of private life, now in the wildest and fiercest conflict; sometimes basking in the sunshine of the smiles of princes and of Courts, and again maintained in slavery, in exile, in solitude, in prison; to mark how the strong courageous heart held its constant sway amid the desolation around it, and made its clear voice heard above the roar and tumult of the

elements ; and to mark at last, how a career so maintained, and so continued, resulted, in the end, in a triumph more complete than even the most sanguine hopes had anticipated, and in handing down to a grateful posterity a name that remains, to this day, engraven on the institutions of the country which the hero of my lecture may be said to have regenerated.

A story of that kind, even of exertions in a more ignoble cause, and in a foreign land, could hardly be heard without reading some useful lesson, and lending some encouragement to the ingenuous mind. But I had a further object in view. It has occurred to me, in the course of inquiries to which I was at first accidentally directed, that there is one part of this subject which has not yet received from historians the amount of attention which it deserves. That great work of Dr. McCrie, the *Life of Knox*, admirable both in spirit and in execution, deals, as might naturally be expected, with the Scottish labours of John Knox, with the Scottish history of the Reformation, and with a vindication of the peculiar principles of that ecclesiastical establishment of which John Knox was the originator and founder. Other historians of that time, I am sorry to say, have rather been solicitous to disparage the great events of that period, or, at all events, to disparage the character and position of those who took the principal part in them : some, like David Hume, detesting alike the evangelical principles and the political opinions of the Reformers ; and others, naturally, I suppose—for it seems to be a common failing—so much dazzled with the beauty, so much touched with the misfortunes, so far carried away with the romance, of the unfortunate Queen of Scots, that they can only see in shadow the real principles which were the subject of controversy in those days, and the really great and momentous interests which were then held in suspense.

Indeed, I have often thought, looking back on the history of past times, how much there sometimes is of injustice and ingratitude in what is called history, and how easily a little fashion, or a little romance, in the hands of a skilful writer, will sometimes obscure and eclipse for a whole generation the memory of the greatest and most patriotic services. I need not recall examples; they will strike you at once. It has, however, too frequently happened in the great upheavings of opinion, in those great crises of the world's history, when men fit for the times rise to the surface, maintaining a conflict or a cause with unbroken constancy, at the peril of their fortunes, their fame, their liberty, their lives, and hand down the victory at last to their successors—if in the second generation their names are still had in reverence, that in the third—grown to greatness upon the results of forgotten strife—men turn round and decry the memory of those, under the shadow of whose great names they themselves live in peace and comfort, and are glad to dwell on the frailties, the imperfections, the peculiarities of the men who made their country what it is.

In the hands of such men, history shines by a light which only dazzles and misleads—dwelling on themes of no consequence and withdrawing attention from its real lessons. Whether Queen Mary were accessory to Darnley's murder—whether Cromwell were more hypocrite than fanatic, or either—whether King William directed the massacre of Glencoe—whether the Puritans were absurd in speech or dress,—are all matters of not the slightest moment. They were disputed centuries ago—they will be disputed centuries hereafter; it would make no one wiser or better if they were solved with certainty to-morrow. But to trace the results which established the Reformation in Scotland—to calculate the chances to the destinies of England if Charles I., and Laud, and Strafford had vanquished the



Parliament—to see how the spirit of English freedom was kept alive by the Puritans when threatened by popes and princes—to estimate the benefits of our great Revolution;—these are the sterner lessons which the philosophic inquirer reads in the events of those times, and it is treachery to the real cause of social improvement to disregard their magnitude or under-estimate their importance.

To the subject which I have proposed for to-night, the observations which I have made, I think, are peculiarly appropriate. Even in Scotland, although the memory of John Knox and of the Reformation is as green now as it was in the sixteenth century among the people, yet historians are very liable to this censure. In England I am afraid that, generally, the estimate of the great Scottish Reformer is one which falls very far short indeed of the mark at which he stands even in the eyes of Europe. The general impression in this country in regard to the Scottish Reformation—at least that general impression which one derives from ordinary social conversation—is, that it was a religious movement in a corner of the island, among a people, at that time at least, barbarous and fierce and warlike; a movement which did not concern the people of England, much superior as they then were, and still are, in numbers and in wealth, and superior, as they certainly then were, in the arts of civilised life. The ordinary estimate of the Scottish Reformers would rather seem to be, that although they might be men of ability and men of power, they were yet rude, ferocious, gloomy, and austere; and of John Knox that little was known, or needed to be known, excepting that he was rather unmannerly to a beautiful and youthful Queen, and that his followers, at his instigation, were the means of destroying the finest monuments of architecture in Scotland. That, I think I am not far wrong in saying, is hardly a caricature of the generally

received impression—I can hardly call it an opinion—of the Scottish Reformation and the Scottish Reformers. And then again, as regards the particular ecclesiastical system which was set up by them, it is always regarded askance, as something abhorrent and repugnant to the order of the Church of England; or at all events, as something for which those who profess to belong to the Church of England really need not have much concern, or much sympathy. It never seems to have occurred for the most part to the English mind, that England herself had any part in fashioning and framing the Scottish Reformation, or in forming the minds and opinions of the Scottish Reformers. Still less does it seem to be generally supposed that England herself, her institutions, her opinions, her destiny, had anything in common with the labours of John Knox and his co-adjutors. Now what I propose to myself to-night—and that is the view with which I chose the subject for this lecture—is to endeavour—I fear in a fragmentary and superficial manner—from the materials which have come to my hand, to show how far from accurate this opinion is; to point out what a deep and vital and continuing interest England had in the cause of Protestantism from its rise in Scotland until its triumph; to show the part which the Scottish Reformers, and Knox in particular, took, not in the Scottish Reformation only, but in that of England; and to show still further, if your time allow, how much this country, its free institutions, its freedom of religion, its Protestant faith, owe to the firm and steady hand with which the affairs of Scotland were conducted, during the few but eventful years in which John Knox was substantially its ruler.

There is no greater mistake than to suppose that John Knox was merely a Scottish Reformer. It is quite true that Scotland was the theatre of his stormy and exciting old age, as

it had been of his quiescent and unexciting youth. But Knox was the comrade in arms, he was the companion in misfortune, in labour, and to a great extent in opinion, of some of the best and noblest fathers of the Anglican church. Scotland had his youth and his old age ; but it was to England that he devoted the flower and the vigour of his manhood. That, I dare say, may be a new view to some of you who hear me ; but I shall now proceed to show how far it is correct, what these influences on England were, and to what end they tended.

At the time when my narrative commences, Henry VIII.—led at first, probably, to that view by his dispute with the Pope in regard to his marriage—had substantially effected the Reformation in England. In Scotland matters were in a very lamentable condition. That country for three or four successive reigns had been the theatre of constant warfare—warfare with England at one time, of intestine warfare at another. Nobles oppressed nobles, and all oppressed the middle class ; and the clergy—the Roman Catholic clergy—had grown to a state of demoralisation which called down even from James V. the strongest expressions of condemnation. It is not a history that it is pleasant to look back upon. The mind of Scotland—its public opinion—was still dormant ; it did not awake except at the voice of the Reformation. Its monarchs, one after another, had come by untimely ends. James III. had perished at the Battle of Stirling, against forces led by his own son. James IV. had fallen in the field of Flodden, in conflict with the English, with the flower of the Scottish nobility. James V. expired in 1542, immediately after the Battle of Solway, of mortification and despondency at the failure of his plans upon England. So stood the matter as regarded the reigning powers. As regarded religious opinion, Henry VIII. had long foreseen,

with the sagacity that characterised him, that if he hoped to maintain the reformed religion in England, it was absolutely necessary that it should also be maintained in Scotland; and he had done much with James V.—and but for the fear of the nobles that monarch would probably have complied with his wish—to induce him to follow his example. But, driven between the prelates on the one side and the nobles on the other, and finding that the power of the Church was the only lever that he had with which to curb the latter, James was obliged, notwithstanding his opinions, to maintain the Catholic faith. The state to which the manners of the clergy had degenerated at that time in Scotland is something almost incredible; and the quiet smouldering wrath of the commonalty, which had been growing from day to day and from year to year, was gradually approaching the point at which it could be trifled with no longer. Meanwhile the Catholic prelates hastened on the evil day by their own cruelties. The opinions of Luther began to find their way into Scotland. Patrick Hamilton, whose name, I presume, some of you, at all events, are familiar with—who is noted as the first martyr of distinction for the Protestant faith in Scotland,—a youth of noble family, of great erudition, of the highest promise, was in 1528 burnt at the stake in front of the Castle of St. Andrew's, on account of his having adopted Lutheran opinions. Time went on. Many more victims followed; and at last, in 1545, George Wishart, one of the most learned and accomplished, as he was one of the mildest and gentlest, men of his time,—coming, as he did, from the Continent full of knowledge and learning and zeal,—fell under Cardinal Beaton's displeasure, was himself tried and condemned to the same fate.

Here for the first time we obtain a glimpse of Knox. He was a friend and companion of Wishart's; and as



the latter departed for his trial, he said to Knox, "Go back to your bairns, go back to your boys"—Knox was at that time tutor in the family of Cockburn of Ormiston—"Go back to your boys; one is sufficient for a sacrifice." At this time, in 1545, Knox was a man of forty years old. He was born in 1505, and was an older man than Calvin. From 1505 to 1545 we scarcely find his name in the history of Scotland. He had been educated at Glasgow under a professor of the name of Major, a man of some reputation on the continent, of considerable learning, who had been educated at Paris, and who still has a certain name amongst the scholars of that time. He was famed for his skill in dialectics, in which Knox was supposed to have excelled him. Excepting that fact, and the fact that he at one time travelled on the continent during those forty years, and that he was tutor to Cockburn of Ormiston, we hardly have any details as to his previous history. Froude in his valuable book on Henry VIII. thus introduces his notice of John Knox: after describing some events which happened in 1505, he says,—“In the reign of the same king an event occurred of vaster importance. In the house of a retainer of the Earl of Bothwell, in the suburbs of Haddington, there was born into the world an infant who became, perhaps, in that extraordinary age, its most extraordinary man.” Such is the opinion of your most recent historian. But like that of other men who have in the end done great things on the theatre of the world's history, until he had reached forty his name was never heard of. He had remained mute and inglorious, in the capacity of a private tutor in the family of one of the lairds of East Lothian. But we can imagine how in the deep recesses of that man's heart, during those long years of quiet and silent meditation, the light of truth had gradually worked its way—how to conviction succeeded indignation, and to indignation the deep resolve

that when the time should come—be it early, or be it late—he at all events would lift his voice and hand to free his native country from her intolerable oppression. And we can afterwards trace how much of knowledge and of learning, not merely of the schools—for he threw his dialectics away when he came upon the arena in which he was destined to conquer—not learning merely of the schools, but learning of all kinds : knowledge of the human heart, knowledge of man, knowledge of affairs, as well as the better and higher knowledge, the result of deep religious impressions, he had stored up in those long, silent, years. One can see how all those great resources were gradually and silently accumulating within the man, and when the time did come, with what force and vigor, in defiance of fortune and of fate, he wielded them in the cause of his native land.

Cardinal Beaton was assassinated within a year from the time when Wishart was burned. His assassination of course produced a great sensation throughout Scotland. The Catholic party were indignant and furious, and Knox, with others of the Protestants, were shut up in the Castle of St. Andrew's. There he preached for the first time, and the effect of his opening his lips was so great, that, unknown as he seems to have been before, he was immediately called upon to take upon himself the office of the ministry. He declined ; he begged and entreated that this might not be thrust upon him ; but at last he was compelled to yield. In the Castle of St. Andrew's, until the siege was raised by capitulation, in 1547, to the French, he continued his ministrations. The castle capitulated ; Knox was taken prisoner ; he was taken on board a French galley, and for eighteen months—such was the inauspicious beginning of his public career—for eighteen months was he kept on board this French galley, in irons, a prisoner of France.

During that time he never seems to have lost heart or hope.

There is still extant a treatise on Justification by Faith, written by a man celebrated in those times, of the name of Balnaves,\* who was himself one of the prisoners, to which Knox added a summary and preface, written apparently during his captivity. He says in the preface that "This was sent me in Rouen lying in irons, and sore troubled by corporeal infirmity, in the galley named the *Notre Dame*." At the end of the preface he exclaims, "Abide, stand, call for His support, and so the enemies which now effraye you shortly shall be confounded, and never more shall appear to molest you."

In a year and a half the scene changes. Knox seems to have been liberated about 1549, and the next trace which we find of him—and this is the point at which my subject properly commences—is that he is engaged by the Privy Council of England under Edward VI. as a preacher in the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed. He was afterwards removed to Newcastle; and a year more, and Knox, the humble and obscure tutor in Haddington, is one of the chaplains of Edward VI. We know very little of the means or the gradual stages by which this was accomplished: I rather imagine the fact must be, that Knox's power and erudition and eloquence as a preacher were so remarkable, that it was at once seen of what advantage it would be to enlist such a man in the cause of the Reform of the Church of England. Be that as it may, such is the fact, that in December 1551 he was made one of the chaplains of Edward VI. The six chaplains of that time were of the names of Harley, Bill, Horn (who was afterwards Bishop of Winchester), Grindall (afterwards Archbishop of York), Lever (who also had preferment in the Church under Elizabeth), Perne, and Knox. It appears from a letter that has been preserved in the records, from the Duke of North-

\* He was afterwards a judge of the Court of Session.

Northumberland to Secretary Cecil, that he advised that Knox should be offered the bishopric of Rochester. I cannot say that the Duke's reasons are altogether those upon which such an appointment should be made. They are preserved in the letter, and I shall read them to you. He says—"I would to God it might please the King's Majesty to appoint Mr. Knox to the office of Rochester bishopric, which for three purposes would be very well. First, he would not only be a whetstone to quicken and sharpen the Bishop of Canterbury, whereof he hath need, but also he would be a great confounder of the Anabaptists, lately sprung up in Kent. Secondly, he should not continue his ministrations contrary to those set forth here." (It seems the Duke found him a rather troublesome neighbour in Newcastle.) "Thirdly, the family of the Scots now in Berwick and in Newcastle, chiefly for his fellowship, would not continue there (which the Duke of Northumberland apparently thought would be of signal advantage). Whether Knox was offered the bishopric or not, does not appear; it does, however, appear, that he neither desired nor would accept it. For the next letter from the Duke of Northumberland says that he "desired nothing more with Mr. Knox except to wish him well, because he seems to be a person that is neither pleasurable nor grateful." And accordingly that preferment did not take place. On the 2nd February, 1552, a letter appears in the council records, to the Archbishop of Canterbury, in favour of Mr. Knox, "to be presented to the vicarage or parsonage of Allhallows, in Bread-street (London), by the preferment of Thomas Sampson to the deanery of Chichester." But apparently Mr. Knox was no more inclined to take the parsonage of Allhallows than he had been inclined to take the bishopric of Rochester; and a proceeding took place which is rare in ecclesiastical patronage. He was summoned before the Privy Council to state his



reasons for refusing to accept the living of Allhallows; and, they are to be found in the Records. He said upon that occasion, that although he held that the duty of preaching the word was one which he could not decline, there were things in the existing order of the Church of England which disinclined him to take higher preferment in it. "With some gentle speeches" (says the Record) he was dismissed." Our next trace of him is a letter directed to the Lord Russell, and other gentlemen within the county of Buckingham, in favour of Mr. Knox, the preacher, dated the 2nd of June, 1553. He seems to have gone to Buckinghamshire in the middle of 1553, and there for half a year he preached up and down the county to immense congregations, and I have no doubt with considerable effect.

Now that is a period of four years from 1549 down to the end of 1553. During the whole of that time Knox was actively engaged—he could hardly fail to be actively engaged, from the temperament of the man—in preaching the gospel in England; in Berwick, in Newcastle, in London, before the King and Council, in Buckinghamshire—wherever he had the opportunity. Not only so: but although we have not materials for very accurately deciding what part Knox took, he did take some part, in the revision of the Liturgy at that time, and in the revision of what ultimately became the Thirty-nine Articles. We find from some of his own writings, and also from some records published by the Parker Society, that he effected some alterations upon the Communion service as it then stood in the service book of the Church of England. In a discussion with Latimer which took place at Oxford, in 1554, Dr. Weston, the Prolocutor, accused Latimer of being a party to the alteration. He said, "A renegade Scot"—as he calls him—"a renegade Scot did take away the adoration of Christ in the sacrament." "So much," he adds, "prevailed the authority of that one

man at that time." In regard to the Articles of the Church of England I dare say Knox's part was not very great. They were not adjusted at that time. But he was one of the King's chaplains, to whom the duty of revision was allocated.

Such is the first stage. What amount of effect Knox may personally have produced as a preacher it is impossible now for us to say; but I think it must be pretty plain that if his gifts and powers so recommended him to the government of Edward VI. when he was an unknown man, it is impossible that, with the earnestness and fervour and power which he possessed, he should not have been a very useful instrument in promoting the Reformation in the very heart of England itself.

We have some means of judging of it by what took place afterwards. Edward VI. died, and Queen Mary succeeded, in July, 1553. There was a tolerance of nearly half-a-year for the promulgation of the doctrines of the Reformation. And Knox remained at his post, preaching in Buckinghamshire down to the end of the year 1553; and, as I shall show you immediately, preaching with an amount of boldness characteristic of the man, but singularly dangerous for a person in his position; for it appears—and he afterwards published the passage—that he preached against the marriage of the King of Spain with Mary, and denounced against England all the woes that would come upon her if that unholy union were completed. At last the days of toleration ceased. The shadow of the approaching persecution was imminent, and Knox fled to Dieppe in the beginning of 1544; again an exile, and apparently without a companion. Friendless he was not, for he had friends in every Protestant congregation in that country. But to Dieppe he went, and from thence, poor and exiled as he was, he thundered forth the fulminations of an indignant heart

against the cruelties which Mary had begun to perpetrate. It is remarkable that he, a Scotchman by birth, with all his associations and all his early friends in that country, should have taken so deeply to heart the work on which he had been employed in England, that he rather looked upon it as the country to which his energies ought to be devoted. The position in which he was when he left London may be gathered from a letter which he writes to his future mother-in-law, in regard to pecuniary affairs, upon which it is not often that the Reformer makes any remarks. He says, in this letter from Dieppe,—“I will not make you privy to how rich I am, but from London I departed with less money than ten groats.” And then he adds, with the grim humour which pervades his writings,—“Either the Queen’s Majesty or some treasurer will be £40 richer by me, for so much lack I of the duty of my patent”—that was his year’s salary—“but that little troubles me. In an exposition of the sixth Psalm of David, which he seems to have composed for his mother-in-law in 1554, he says:—“Sometimes I have thought it impossible that it had been, so to have removed my affection from the realm of Scotland, that any realm or nation could have been equally dear to me. But God I take to record in my conscience that the troubles present and appearing in the realm of England are troubles more dolorous unto my heart than ever were the troubles of Scotland.” Then he seems to be afraid that he has not fought his battle with sufficient courage, and that he ought not to have turned his back upon the land in which his mission apparently was. He says:—“Albeit I have in the beginning of this battle appeared to play the faint-hearted and feeble soldier, yet I pray I may be restored to the battle, that England and Scotland may both know that I am ready to suffer more than adversity or exile in the profession of the truth. He adds:—“*For a few sermons to be made by me in*

*England I would be content to suffer more than nature were able to sustain."*

I have quoted these things, because, whatever opinions may be entertained in regard to Knox's character, or his theological and ecclesiastical views, it is surely refreshing to every generous mind to hear the sound of true words ring out so clearly amid the shadows of misfortune. He seems, indeed, at one time to have entertained a design of doing in England what he ultimately did in Scotland—of throwing himself into the country, and relying on the support and feeling of the people. He addresses in the same year (1554) from Dieppe a letter to the faithful in London. It is a long and earnest admonition to steadfastness, dated, "From Dieppe—whither, God knows. In the conclusion of this pamphlet, he says:—"My own state is this. Since the 28th of January, I have travelled through all the congregations in Helvetia, I have reasoned with all the pastors and many other excellently learned men on such matters as *I now cannot commit to writing*. Gladly would I by tongue and by pen utter the same. *If I thought I might have your presence, and the presence of some other assured men, I would jeopard my own life, and let men see what may be done with a safe conscience in these dolorous and dangerous days. But seeing that it cannot be done instantly without danger to others than me, I will abide the time which God shall appoint. But hereof be assured that all is not lawful nor just that is statute by civil law; neither yet is everything sin before God which ungodly persons allege to be treason.*"

These are very significant words. They imply that Knox at that time meditated nothing short of an armed resistance in England. His concluding remarks, as you will find, indicate principles which afterwards received very remarkable development.

Before he left Dieppe, which he did in 1554, he sent forth



from his retirement a far more important document. He entitles his work, "An Admonition to the Professors of God's Truth in England." It was written on hearing of the imprisonment of Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer, and is a very fervent, and at the same time a very vehement, exhortation to constancy. He denounces the return to Popery in a strain of unmeasured severity, sparing no amount of invective even against the Queen herself. One passage, which came to be of note, may give some idea of its general style.

"In writing hereof, it came to mind that after the death of that innocent and godly king, Edward VI., while that great tumult was in England for the establishment of that most unhappy and wicked woman's authority—I mean, of her who now reigneth in God's wrath—entreating the same argument in a town in Buckinghamshire named Hammersham, before a great congregation, with sorrowful heart and weeping eyes I fell into this exclamation:—

"O England, now is God's wrath kindled against thee! Now has he begun to punish, as he hath threatened a long while by his true prophets and messengers. He has taken from thee the crown of thy glory, and hath left thee without honor, as a body without a head. And this appeareth to be only the beginning of sorrow, which appeareth to increase. For I perceave that the herte, the tounge, and the hand of one Englyshe man is bente agaynst another, and devision to be in the whole realme, whiche is an assured signe of desolation to come.

"O Englande, Englande! doest thou not consider that thy common wealth is lyke a shippe sailyng on the sea; yf thy maryners and governours shall one consume another, shalte thou not suffer shipwracke in shorte processe of tyme?

"O Englande, Englande! Alasse! these plagues are

powred upon thee, for that thou woldest not knowe the moste happy tyme of thy gentle visitation. But wylte thou yet obey the voyce of thy Lord, and submitte thy selfe to his holy wordes? Truely, yf thou wilt, thou shalt fynde merce in his syght, and the estate of thy common wealth shall be preserved.

“ ‘ But, O Englande, Englande! yf thou obstinately wilt returne into Egypt; that is, yf thou contracte mariage, confederacy, or league, with such princes as do mayntayne and advaunce ydolatrie, (suche as the Empereure, which is no lesse enemy unto Christe then ever was Nero;) yf for the pleasure and frendshippe (I saye) of such princes, thou returne to thyne olde abominations, before used under the Papistrie, then assuredly, O Englande! thou shalte be plagued and brought to desolation, by the meanes of those whose favoures thou seekest, and by whome thou arte procured to fall from Christ, and to serve Antichrist.’ ”

This strong but stirring appeal found its way into England—how does not appear. That it did reach its destination, however, and produced alarm among those it denounced, is certain; for we find that it was afterwards alleged against the author that this work had greatly increased the severity of Mary against the Protestants, and not only directed the persecution of Government against those suspected of having the work in their possession, but actually led to the execution of Ridley and Latimer.

We have seen Knox now in private life for forty years; we have seen him in slavery for a year and a half; we have had him the companion of princes and nobles for four years; and we have him now cast adrift and in exile. And let me observe here, that those who imagine that Knox was an unpolished and uncourtly man must surely forget the training and experience which he had during those four years' residence in England—even if he had required that

training. The companion every day of the first nobility of England,—the private chaplain of Edward VI., frequently in contact with him,—a man that spent his life, so to speak, in courts,—could never have been that rude untutored savage that it has been the delight and pleasure of some historians to represent him. Strong he was of speech, no doubt, and strong of action. He was not given to express a thing in particularly mild language, if he felt it strongly; but that he had the manners as he had the education of a gentleman, no one who studies either his writings or his history can doubt. Accordingly, from the beginning to the end, whether in the Court of Edward or the Court of Mary of Scots, we find him with access to the inmost recesses of what in that time was the most refined and fashionable life in either country. Mary herself, we shall see immediately, if my time allows me ever to reach that point—sent for him over and over again; and although she did not much like what he told her, there is no ground whatever to imagine that he did not behave in the presence of majesty with courtesy and respect.

I now quit this period of his life. Probably those four eventful years may yet receive farther illustration from future history. But I proceed to the next. That next stage, however, is a more troubled and chequered one. It is curious as a matter of historical research, and it is also not without its bearing on the general topics that most interest an English audience; but it rather is conversant with matters, perhaps, not altogether fitted for so mixed an assembly as this is. I have come here not to express opinions. I have come here simply to speak historical facts. I am not here as the apologist or the advocate of Knox; I am here simply to lay before you what his life and career truly were, and you will not wonder that in a temperament so ardent, so intense a feeling of duty, so strong a scorn of what he

belived to be error—you will not wonder that in his case, as in the case of almost every man with a similar temperament, there are many things which critics may condemn, and some things which the most friendly may deplore. But I shall go on, and I shall describe to you what the next stages were in Knox's history. They were honourable to him; after having visited all the congregations of Helvetia, he was invited to be pastor of the English congregation at Frankfort—a congregation of refugees fleeing from the Marian persecution and having taken refuge in that city. Accordingly to Frankfort he went, and he remained there as the pastor of the English congregation for six months, when a discussion arose upon some matters which at first sight were not supposed to be important, but which in the end had a very material bearing upon his future career.

It seems that the authorities of Frankfort permitted the English congregation to assemble, provided they used the French or Geneva order of service, and a question was stirred among the English how far they could with propriety dispense with any part of the service book as it had been used in the time of Edward VI. That question was referred by Knox and his friends to Calvin, and Calvin gives his opinion; and an opinion which sounds full of good feeling and sense. "He says:—"This thing truly grieveth me very much, and it is a great shame that contention should arise among brethren banished and driven out from their country for one faith and for that cause which only ought to have holden you bound together as it were with a holy band in this your dispersion. For what might you do better in this dolorous and miserable plague, than, being pulled violently from your country, to procure yourselves a church which should receive you and nourish you, being joined together in mind and language, in her motherly lap; but now for some men to strive as touching the forms of prayer, and for ceremonies, as though



ye were at rest and prosperity, or to suffer that to be an impediment that ye cannot join unto one body of the Church, as I think, is too much out of season." He sends back a response, with a rebuke to them for troubling themselves with disputes of that kind, at that time, when they should all have been combined together. But his advice did not prevail; for some little time afterwards, Dr. Cox, who was afterwards Bishop of Rochester, and had been Preceptor to Edward VI., and who probably did not agree with Knox upon some of his known views as to the liturgy, and Grindall, who was afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, and I think Jewel and Lever, arrived at Frankfort from Strasburgh, and they insisted on carrying out the form of the English liturgy in its integrity. I shall not trouble you with the details of that dispute; but the result was this,—that some of these refuges, not greatly to their credit, represented to the magistrates of Frankfort that Knox was the man who had written that "Admonition to the Faithful in London," and made the observation upon Philip II. of Spain, which I quoted before, and the magistrates, fearing that some question might be made by the Emperor in regard to the harbouring of men of such sentiments, advised him to retire from Frankfort, and accordingly he went to Geneva. Unfortunately, his going did not heal the differences in the Frankfort congregation, and some months afterwards a considerable number of them followed him to Geneva, where he again began his pastoral ministrations.

I cannot avoid reading to you a sentence or two from a letter of Bishop Ridley at this time, written a very few days only before his martyrdom. He says, "Alas that our brother Knox could not bear with our Book of Common Prayer, matters against which although I grant a man, as he is, of wit and learning, may find many apparent reasons, I suppose he cannot be able soundly to disprove by God's Word!" And

then he ends by saying, "Surely Mr. Knox is to my mind a man of much good learning and of earnest zeal. The Lord grant him to use them only for his glory." That is a testimony not without its weight, written at such a time, from such a man. The last paragraph in the letter is significant:—"Where ye say ye were by the magistrates required gently to omit such things in your book as might offend their people; not as things unlawful, but to their people offensive; and so ye have done, as to the having of surplice and kneeling; *truly in that I cannot judge, but that both ye and the magistrates have done right well*; for I suppose in things indifferent, and not commanded or forbidden by God's Word, and wherein the customs of divers countries be diverse, the man of God that hath knowledge will (not) stick to forbear the custom of his own country, being those where the people therewith will be offended; and surely if I might have done so much with our magistrates I would have required Mr. Alasco to have done no less when he was with us." Knox accordingly went to Geneva; he became the pastor of that congregation for a few months.

I must now travel rapidly over the less important ground. The English congregation at Geneva were all composed at that time of the refugees from England. In Scotland, although the Catholic party was still dominant, the persecution was not proceeding as it did under Mary of England. After remaining at Geneva for five or six months, he went back to Scotland for the first time since he left St. Andrew's in 1549, and he was rejoiced at the change that he found. He found the preaching of the gospel allowed and tolerated; he found men's minds wonderfully stirred, enlarged, and advanced from the time he had left them. He remained there for six or eight months, and preached in Edinburgh to great congregations, and at last he was summoned before the Council by the bishops.

He had in the meantime received a call from Geneva to take up the permanent pastoral duty of that congregation, and seeing that the time was not ripe, he again left the country, and was condemned to death, and burned in effigy in his absence. From 1556 down to 1559 he remained the pastor of the Genevese congregation.

I have now laid before you the life of Knox for these ten years—they were, as I said before, the best ten years of his life. They were not the most illustrious, nor those for which he has been handed down to posterity. But I have, I think, so far fulfilled what I undertook to show you at the outset—I have shown you that he was not a mere Scottish Reformer—that you, too, had part of his labours—that in England as well as Scotland his power was felt; enough, at all events, to give Englishmen and Scotsmen a bond of sympathy, of fellow-feeling, in his reputation.

There is another incident in the Reformer's life which is, perhaps, not as generally known, but which excited at the time, and, perhaps, exerted in the end as much influence and as much feeling as any. It is one out of which the discretion of the Reformer does certainly not come as clear as it does out of most things which he attempted and undertook. Nor am I here, as I have said already, as the apologist of John Knox. I do not maintain that he was not a man capable of indiscretion, capable of vehemence of feeling, capable of being carried away by an excess of ardent impulses. We find running through all his career that intense and earnest love of the truth, that intense desire to be of service to his fellow men, that vehemence and ardour of feeling which in every fallible human breast will at one time or other hurry a man beyond the bounds of absolute prudence and moderation. But this proceeding of Knox that I am now going to speak of was a remarkable one. I read you an extract a little while ago from a letter which he wrote from Dieppe, in 1554, in

which he said, "All things are not lawful which are statute by the civil law, and all things are not treason that the ungodly call to be so." Knox seems at that time—and no wonder a man of his clear sight and firm spirit should have done so—to have been reflecting gravely on this question: "How far am I bound as a Christian man to obey these things that which are enjoined by those in authority in this land?" And in his difficulty he went to the celebrated Bullinger, and submitted to him a series of questions as to the obligation of the subject to obey where the ruler commanded that which was unlawful by God's Word. He at the same time put a question as to how far it was lawful for a woman to rule a kingdom. Bullinger's answers were prudent and judicious. He solves the last question in the affirmative: the first he considers a question of circumstances. These things had been festering in the mind of Knox. He went to Scotland in 1556, as I have said, and there he was summoned before the Council. He was tried and condemned in his absence—condemned to the flames and burnt in effigy. He had been driven from one country by the persecutions of one Queen; he had been driven from the other by the persecutions of another. His best and dearest friends had gone to the stake and had been committed to the flames by the ruling authority in England. He said to himself, "How long is this to last? How much am I to obey and how long to suffer?" And at last, pondering upon these things, he came out in his retreat at Geneva, in 1557, with that celebrated treatise, the object of which was to show that the Salique law was alone consonant to the Scriptures, and that it was unlawful for a woman to rule. He gave it the somewhat quaint title of "The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women." And he, doubtless, intended his work to subserve the purpose of a revolution in both ends of the island. It is needless to say that, as re-



garded the demonstration of the main proposition he desired to establish, this celebrated work, although written with a command of patristic learning which shows the great amount of his resources, and the ease with which he wielded them, was an entire failure. "My first blast," he said, "has blown all my friends in England from me." And, unluckily for Knox, the work was not only inconclusive in argument, but was also a great practical mistake. He had launched his thunders against Mary, and called down vengeance on her for the blood she had spilt, and prophesied in the end of the work her speedy death. His surmise came true. She died on the 17th of November, 1558, and Elizabeth ascended the throne, and never to the end of her life did she forgive the author of the work which questioned the title of her authority. And, indeed, it raised up enemies on all sides. Calvin complained, in language which does not testify any hostility to Knox—for he was Knox's fast friend both before and afterwards—that the arrogance of one man should have caused so much mischief. Beza was refused by Queen Elizabeth her patronage to his work because of his intimacy with Knox. Cecil shortly afterwards said, in a letter, that of all names at the Court of Elizabeth none was held in so much aversion as that of the Scottish Reformer. There can be no doubt that Queen Elizabeth's feelings in regard to this book and its author, although the work itself was inspired by the cruelties and persecutions of two female sovereigns, was in great measure the source in England of the kind of dislike with which the memory of Knox is regarded. Looking down as we do now from the eminence of a happier reign than that of Elizabeth herself, under which the throne stands firm on constitutional authority, and firmer still in the reverence and the affection of an united people, we can afford to look back with indulgence to the vehemence of the bold but unfriended exile of 1557.

He felt the effects of this mistake to the end of his career. But yet his blast has had its fruit in England, also; for, apart altogether from the main intent of the book, there was in it boldly mooted, for the first time, as far as I know, in English history, that doctrine of resistance which was destined in the next century to work such important results. The first effect no doubt was all the other way. It probably went very far in England to give force and fashion to the principle of passive obedience which found so much favour in the next reign. But when the leaders of the Commonwealth came to defend their proceedings in the face of the country, it was from the writings of Knox and his companions, Goodman and Gilley, that they did so. Milton, in writing of the tenure of kings and magistrates, quotes Knox expressly, calling him a most "famous divine, and the reformer of Scotland," and ends his summary of authority by the exclamation,—“These were the true Protestant divines of England, our fathers in the faith we hold; this was their sense who for so many years, labouring under prelacy, through all its storms and persecutions kept religion from extinguishing.”

Knox never blew his second blast, although he never admitted that his theory was wrong. His views of constitutional liberty were before his time, and even in his own mind dimly shadowed out: but whatever opinion may be held as to the views he adduced, there can be little doubt, in point of fact, that the barb of the javelin launched from his hand went deep into the troubles in England during the succeeding century.

There is a third phase of the story, a much larger one for Knox himself—a far more brilliant one for the exile of Dieppe. The refugee of Frankfort, the quiet parson of Geneva, in 1559 was called again to Scotland. To Scotland he came, and from the day he landed down to the day

of his death he was substantially Scotland's ruler. He landed in 1559, just ten years from that sad day when he was carried off a prisoner from St. Andrew's. He died in 1572, and during that time Scotland sprang from being the scene of contending factions, of petty wars waged by the petty nobility, to a nation with a mind, a vigour, and an opinion which from that time forward, I do not think I arrogate too much to my countrymen in saying, has not been without its due weight throughout the whole of this great island. From that time first arose the feeling of popular liberty in Scotland. From that time first arose the existence of what may be called a public opinion. From that time began learning to flourish in the middle and lower ranks. Then, whatever may be said of the church establishment which Knox formed, he laid the foundations of that great institution of our parochial schools which has made the name of Scotchmen respected and venerated throughout the world. I cannot trace—I cannot stop to trace—throughout the various phases of that troubled time, the way in which the Reformer, steadfast and true, maintained his course. It was not without difficulty; it was not without the desertion of friends, nor without the malice of foes, and even in his dying days he said, "Though this ungrateful generation will not acknowledge my merits, yet posterity will know what I have been." I cannot stop to speak of these things. There is only one view of my subject which remains, and that is a most important one. Whatever were the merits of Knox's ministrations in England, whatever he may have done to reform the mind of England, whatever part he took in that battle-field, is nothing compared to what he did for England during the period of his influence in Scotland. Those who have written of those times, and represent Knox and his band of reformers as a set of turbulent ecclesiastics, agreeing to

impose humiliation upon their youthful Queen, and caring for nothing but having their austere manners tied down upon the Court—know nothing of the real nature of the momentous interests which at that moment were at stake. Let anyone look over Europe at that time. The first Lutheran movement was beginning to flag; France and Spain were both adverse to the cause of the Reformation; Mary had just succeeded to the throne; she was married to the heir-apparent of France; the Pope and Philip of Spain, and the king of France, were all united, if they could, to put down the Protestant religion in England. It is now proved beyond a doubt, by documents which cannot be mistaken, that such was the intention with which Queen Mary set sail from France. Time will not allow me to demonstrate this at length. But in the collection of Prince Labanoff, a work compiled with infinite pains and labour, in order, as the author thinks, to raise the reputation of the unfortunate Queen, letters are found, from the day she landed in Scotland down to the day of her death, which prove the unbroken constancy with which her plans were pursued. To the Cardinal of Lorraine—the Ministers of France—to the Duke of Alva, and Philip II.—to the Pope, and, in short, to all the heads of the Catholic party in Europe, her correspondence was unremitting. It proves her to have been a woman of great ability, devoted to political intrigue, and an accomplished dissembler. No one knew better how to use her advantages, and if she did not succeed in enlisting Knox on her side, it was because his honesty and sagacity were proof against allurements which even strong and earnest men had been unable to resist.

When Mary first succeeded to the throne of Scotland, as soon at least as she was of age to act, the restoration of a Catholic dynasty in England was her object; and that she proposed to effect through her own influence in Scotland,



and by challenging the legitimacy of Elizabeth, and asserting her own right to the double crown. Such was her scheme when she first came to Scotland—a scheme concerted along with the French Court, and with the cognizance of the Pope. Of this Knox was perfectly aware, and he wrote to Secretary Cecil, to tell him,—You must not mind what offence I have given to Queen Elizabeth ; but unless you send us succour here, unless you maintain the cause of Protestantism in Scotland, your turn will come and your doom is sealed. Cecil was wise enough to take the hint, and Queen Elizabeth, albeit not without reluctance, yet still threw her influence into the scale of Knox and the Reformation, and the Reformation was completed in 1560. But the danger was not over. Francis II., the husband of Queen Mary, died ; there was the project of a new marriage, and you may all recollect to have read how Knox thundered from the pulpit against the proposal of a marriage with Don Carlos, the son of Philip II. of Spain, that he denounced it in the strongest and severest terms, and that Murray, the Regent, who had been his fast friend, blamed him for his vehemence and violence, and rather sided with the Queen and against Knox on that occasion. The Queen summoned him to her presence, and the story goes that he was so stern and severe that she burst into tears. It is a favourite scene with many romantic historians—the savage minister and the gentle Queen contrast with great effect. But Mary knew very well the use of her tears as well as of her smiles. We have now the whole history of that projected marriage, and can appreciate with accuracy the relative position of the parties to that conference.

It appears that in 1564 a project was set on foot by the Cardinal de Granville and the Duchesse D'Arschot, the aunt of Queen Mary, to carry out this marriage with Don Carlos. Mary's letters to both are still preserved. They were

written with the utmost secrecy, the negotiation being carried on by verbal messages, through a person of the name of Rouillet,\* who was then the Secretary of Queen Mary. In these letters she enjoins the strictest concealment of the project she had in view, but expresses her satisfaction at the prospect of triumphing over her enemies. Philip II.'s letters are also extant. They are referred to and partially quoted by M. Mignet. Philip says in one of them that he thought the marriage of his son with the Queen of Scots was "*the only means to remedy the state of religion in the KINGDOM OF ENGLAND;*" and in another, after the project had miscarried, he declares that he gave up the plan of the marriage because he saw that it would not produce the fruit he expected, "*that is to say, the reduction of the kingdom of Scotland, AND OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND, to the Catholic faith, FOR WHICH ALONE WOULD I HAVE EXPOSED MYSELF TO ALL WHICH MUST HAVE OCCURRED.*"†

Such was the plot on the religion and liberties of both countries, which the information of Knox enabled him to explode, and over which Mary shed those tears of disappointment. The trumpet-call of Knox spread the alarm; it was speedily caught up by England; and the design was happily averted. But, with this peril impending, was it a time to talk of courtly manners? Is it in that strain that Knox should be spoken of when, in the knowledge of the contemplated blow, and the secrecy with which it had been prepared, he spoke as a man might well speak who saw that the safety of the whole kingdom was at stake? Where, think you, would the Protestant religion and the liberty of England have been had that conspiracy succeeded? If you look into the letters that are preserved by Bishop Burnet and are printed at the end of the second volume of his

\* See Labanoff, vol. i. 200, *et seq.* † Mignet, i. 158.

history of the Reformation—I mean Jewel's letters to Bullinger, and one or two others—you will see the daily fear the English Protestants were in, not merely from the attempt of Spain, but from doubts of the feeling of some parts of the country. All the north was supposed to be disaffected, and it broke out every now and then in dangerous rebellion. Where then would England have been if the Catholic party had obtained predominance in Scotland, and the Spanish army had invaded or had been invited to those shores? Is it not perfectly plain that not Scottish interests only, but that English interests at that time, were suspended by a thread, and nothing but Knox's power over the people—which neither the frowns of the great, or even the desertion of friends, could change—kept Scotland steadfast to the Protestant faith and the English alliance, and enabled England to defy the united Catholic world.

The same struggle between the Queen, supported by the Catholic Powers on one hand, and Knox, maintained by the people of Scotland, on the other, continued during the remainder of the Reformer's life. It was incessant and critical during the whole period. There was not one year, from 1565 to 1572, in which England was not in danger of the assault which took effect at last in the Spanish Armada: and that danger sprang directly from the tenacity of purpose and perpetual machinations of the Court of Holyrood. As an instance of the duplicity by which these counsels were characterised, it may be mentioned that in 1566 the Queen put forth a proclamation from Glasgow, assuring the nation of her determination not to interfere with the established religion, and branding as false calumniators those who had spread reports to the contrary. At the very same time we find, from a letter preserved in Labanoff's collection, Mary wrote the most urgent letter to Philip II., assuring him that the time was now ripe, that all

things were ready, and urging him, without delay, to send over assistance to restore Scotland to the bosom of the Church.\* In 1567 she wrote both to Philip and to the Pope for pecuniary assistance, and received it from both; and Rizzio, who is generally regarded merely as a Court minion, there is now no doubt whatever was in the pay and confidence of the Vatican, and reported constantly how the hopes of the Catholic party prospered.

These perils were English perils; those who warded them off were the protectors of English religion and liberties. Probably there was vigour and spirit enough in Protestant England to have met and faced the danger single-handed. But all England was not hearty in the cause: the Catholic party were still strong, and if Scotland had joined the Catholic side the difficulties of England would have been greatly increased. To the vigilance, the extensive knowledge of Europe, and the unceasing energy, of one man, England owes it that she was not exposed, in those critical days, to a storm which might have submerged her liberties for ever.

My subject does not embrace, nor would my limits permit of my discussing, the progress of the Reformation in Scotland. That story is too well known, and has been too well told, to require enlargement on from me. Nor have I much to add on the personal character of the Reformer. His temperament, however, as well as his history, have been very imperfectly appreciated. He was as little of a bigot as a Churchman in

\* Labanoff, vol. i. 281. In this letter Mary says that she implored the favour and aid of Philip, "seeing what has happened in this realm, which tends to the entire ruin of the Catholics, and the establishment of those unfortunate errors, which wishing to resist, the king my husband and I will be in danger of losing our crown, and by the same means THE RIGHT WHICH WE PRETEND ELSEWHERE, *if we have not the aid of one of the great princes of Christendom.*"—September 10th, 1565.



those times could be, as his proceedings in regard to the use of the English Service-book sufficiently evince. He was, in fact, much more of a statesman than an ecclesiastic, and looked far more to practical results than to subtle analysis of means or of principles. Those who speak of his ferocity forget that, in an age in which life was little regarded, it is said in his praise by one of his great adversaries,—Lesley, Bishop of the Isles,—that no one suffered death for his opinions while Knox had sway in Scotland. He is supposed to have been an austere and gloomy ascetic: he was in reality a genial, humorous, and mirthful man. His history, written by himself, sparkles with passages of redundant humour, never very refined, but always strong, quaint and racy, thrown off, without effort, from the natural quality and colour of his thoughts. In his account of his dialogues with Queen Mary which he reports, he dwells with a grim complacency on the faint tinge of the ridiculous which even those eventful meetings did not escape. For instance, when Queen Mary gave a ball at Holyrood in honour of the Catholic League, then just formed, Knox preached on the text, “And now, kings, understand: be learned, ye judges of the earth.” Mary took great offence, and had a long interview with him, in which he recounts that, after suggesting, of the Court, that “they are more exercised in fiddling and flinging than in reading or hearing of God’s most blessed Word,” he delivered himself on dancing thus: “And of dancing, madam, I said that albeit in Scriptures I find no praise of it, and in profane writers that it is termed the gesture rather of those that are mad and in frenzy than of sober men, yet do I not utterly condemn it, providing that two vices be avoided; the former, that the principal vocation of those that use that exercise be not neglected for the pleasure of dancing; secondly, that they dance not as the Philistines their fathers, for the pleasure that they take in the displeasure of God’s people.”

As liberal a judgment, I think, as the least austere could desire. Even on the difficult subject of ladies' dress, his views were far from those of a precisian. Writing to a lady he says, that "Touching the apparel of women, it is very difficult and dangerous to appoint any certainty, lest in so doing we either restrain Christian liberty, or else loose the bridle too far to the foolish phantasy of facile flesh." In short, he was much less of a Puritan, and much more of a man of the world, in the best sense of that term, than is often supposed.

Much has been bitterly said, and it is one of the vulgar topics of reproach against his memory, about the destruction of the ecclesiastical houses at the Reformation. But the truth is that Knox is very little responsible for this offence if it be one. He did what he could to restrain the populace at the first outbreak. In fact, the Crown and the landed proprietors of Scotland, who swallowed up the revenues out of which alone these buildings could have been supported, are quite as chargeable with the loss of these architectural remains. There are not wanting other instances of a similar destruction, in edifices not ecclesiastical, and by hands not reforming. The royal palace of Dunfermline was entire, or nearly so, in 1690. Now, scarce a vestige of it remains. That of Linlithgow was in perfect preservation in 1745. It is now only a splendid ruin. More than one beautiful Abbey has been forced to part with every carved stone it possessed to build the fences in the adjoining fields. The result of the confiscation of the Church lands, and the payment of a stipend only to the parish minister, left no fund whatever to preserve these buildings from decay. But had it been otherwise, what then? In those "dolorous and dangerous days," as Knox termed them, it was no time to dispute on the carving of a doorway, or the beauty of a transept. We may lament, for the sake of art, that so much is lost; but if

we bought our liberties at no higher price, they were very cheaply purchased.

My task is now performed. My endeavour has been to exhibit the Scottish Reformer against a background of English history. I have produced but a hasty sketch: a more practised and powerful hand might greatly improve it. I have, however, accomplished my design if, by exhibiting what a bold and fearless spirit, sustained by earnest conviction, and maintaining a sound conscience, can effect in the most difficult circumstances and the darkest times—if by the example I have feebly delineated I have animated or inspired one generous breast in this large assembly—the proceedings of the evening have not been without result, nor has the labour I have cheerfully bestowed been entirely thrown away.





THE  
GOSPEL FOR THE DAY.

AN ADDRESS

DELIVERED AT THE ANNUAL SESSION OF  
THE BAPTIST UNION, ON MONDAY,  
APRIL 26TH, 1875.

BY  
ALEXANDER MACLAREN, B.A.

London:  
YATES & ALEXANDER, 21, CASTLE STREET, HOLBORN.

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1875.



## “THE GOSPEL FOR THE DAY.”

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My first words from this chair must be words of hearty thanks for the great honour which you have done me in appointing me to this office. Our simple congregational polity has few distinctions, no privileges, no prizes, as we are often reminded by critics who think they have hit a blot. But I for one know of no position, whatever be its adventitious accompaniments, which I should value so much, as to be chosen by “mine own people”—a free Christian democracy, among whom my work is done and my life lived, to the highest place they can give. Its very bareness of authority and emolument makes it the more grateful. A laurel crown is worth more than a gold coronal, when it means brotherly confidence and kindly judgment of one’s poor work. And I thank you that you have put me, though unworthy, here to-day. If I may allude to my venerated predecessor, I receive “the laurel, greener from the brow” of one whom, in early student days, I learned to admire; whose winged words, weighty with thought, not seldom radiant with the light of lofty contemplation, tremulous with emotion befitting a strong man, or glowing with fervours of generous indignation, were to many besides myself among our earliest lessons in the power of sacred oratory. We rejoice to have him with us still, though few of his coevals remain beside him, like some

closer-grained rock that stands unweathered in its compact strength, while time and storm have wasted away its brothers.

Nor can I, as the first of a younger generation whom your kindness has placed in this chair, assume it without thinking of one whom I had hoped to see precede me in this position, which he would have filled with that happy, natural grace, that sweetness and tenderness, that sympathetic eloquence, which we knew so well and remember so regretfully. We all loved him; we were all proud of him. We all miss and mourn him. We shall never forget him; and I am sure that I rightly interpret the feeling of the whole Baptist community when, as my first public act as your Chairman, I speak with brotherly affection and sorrow the familiar and well-loved name of Charles Vince.

And now, brethren, I turn to the task which you have laid upon me to-day. Selecting a topic on which one may, without presumption, address such an assembly as this, numbering those from whom I should more fittingly learn, is difficult. But from amongst the many which have suggested themselves to me, there is one to which I found my thoughts continually reverting, and crystallising themselves round it almost against my will, till I came to feel a kind of necessity laid upon me to choose it. For the sake of definiteness I may call it

#### “THE GOSPEL FOR THE DAY.”

My main purpose is to insist upon the strong and earnest affirmation of the positive truth concerning Christ and His death, as our chief work and best weapon in view of the existing state of feeling and opinion. In the prosecution of



that purpose I have two things chiefly to do—first, to ask what it is to preach Christ crucified ; second, to show that *so* we shall best meet the wants of the times in all their complexity and urgency.

In regard to the former question, it will conduce to clearness if I deal separately with these points—Our great theme, and our manner of presenting it ; What is the Christ crucified whom we preach ? and, What is it to preach Him ?

I start with the broad principle that *Christ is Christianity*. The specific differences which separate it from all other systems of religion, all flow from this one peculiarity. It is the history of a Person ; it is eminently the history of a death ; and therein it is the history of a redeeming act. Suppose a man, quite ignorant of Christianity, to have a New Testament put in his hands that he might learn what it was. We can imagine his surprise at what he found. Why, he might say, how is this ? I expected a theology, and I am met with a human life. I looked for thoughts, and I am set down before a historical fact. I wanted principles of conduct, and behold a man. I sought for light on dark mysteries of the grave and a future, and you tell me a story of resurrection and ascension. From beginning to end he is confronted with one great figure—a human personality, whose word is the basis of every doctrine ; whose life is treated, not as *a* revelation *from* God, but as *the* revelation *of* God ; whose death is set forth as the power that redeems ; from whose history is deduced all theology ; from whose character is drawn the highest conception of practical morality ; whose command is the ultimate and absolute law ; whose promises seal every hope that lights the darkness ; whose figure stands radiant at the end of every vista that pierces the dim land beyond ; whose

love is the inspiration of all goodness; whose approbation is the crown of all rewards.

“Nor know we any thing more fair  
Than is the smile upon Thy face.”

Whether these four Gospels be authentic or no, whether their authors record facts or no, at any rate they conceived themselves to be laying the basis of a religion, and the anomaly remains—more inexplicable if the books be not history than if they be—that they did it by a biography. The uniqueness of the character of Jesus is a commonplace of Christian apologists; but perhaps the most unprecedented and unique thing of all, is the place *that* character and personality hold in the whole mighty fabric. There is nothing like it anywhere else; and not the least remarkable feature is, that He Himself is represented as claiming this solitary place, and as being the first to insist upon His absolute right to unconditional obedience and trust. There have been religious enthusiasts—mad fanatics—who faintly approached the width and sweep of Christ's assertions about Himself; but outside of Bedlam there has been no second instance of such demands side by side with such lessons of wisdom and practical morality. This Man's whole message to the world has been *Himself*. His peculiarity is not so much His gracious gentleness, His pure and lofty teachings, as the inextricable way in which His personality is intertwined with them all, and the unconsciousness of audacity with which He fronts the whole race of men, and with open arms calls to generations that are separated from Him by misty millenniums, “Come unto *Me*, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give *you rest*.” Strange words to come side by side with “I am *meek and lowly in heart*”—strange exhibition of lowly meek-

ness to be vividly conscious of possessing it! Stranger that men should have listened to such a voice, and felt neither blasphemy nor absurdity in the words. Strangest of all that if He who spoke thus—the Christ of the Gospels, the only Christ whom the world can ever know—be but a dream, love and trust should for all these centuries have been clasping a cloud, and wrongly fancied warmth in the misty limbs, and the throb of a heart in the shadowy breast.

Still, further, our imaginary inquirer would meet this paradox, that *the central point of this life* which is Revelation, Philosophy, Ethics, Redemption, *is the Death*. Unique as is the claim, “I am the bread of life,” it is intensified in its peculiarity when He expands it into “The bread which I will “give is My flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.” Other deaths close men’s work. This man’s *is* His work. Others may be pathetic, heroic, stimulating, as examples of fortitude and patience, or forcible as the seal of a martyr’s witness to truth; but they add nothing to the life. This one has a substantive value. To it his own premonitions pointed. For this hour he came into the world. One man only, from all the generations, could look on his dependent followers, and tell them, “It is expedient for you that I go away.” All others, as they think of their unfinished tasks, and the period that death will put to their power to help, have to say, “To “abide in the flesh is more needful for you.”

And of this substantive value as the great centre of His work, the whole tone of Scripture gives ample evidence. Why do the four Gospels, which are silent about so much, and give such fragmentary records of what they do touch, change their scale when they come to tell of the crucifixion? They used to hurry over weeks and months. Why do they

here become diaries, and advance almost by minutes through these scenes? Is it at the impulse of a mere morbid love of lingering over ghastly details, or are we to measure the importance of the death by the space it fills in the narratives? To what part of His biography does the whole current of Apostolic thought turn? Take the four undisputed epistles of Paul, and remember that they afford incidental evidence that his idea of the life of Christ was, in its broad features, identical with that recorded in our Gospels, and then mark what he insists on. Not His mighty works, not His teaching, not His character, but His death. These lie in shadow, because all the light is focussed on the Cross. And so the anomaly becomes more anomalous. Our inquirer asks for religion, he gets *the Cross*; for morality, *the Cross*; for hope, *the Cross*. As if it were not sufficiently strange to give us a *Life* and bid us evolve all from *it*, we are bidden to take a *Death*, and draw all from *that*. It—this elsewhere impotent negation and close of all activity, this dark pall that swathes and smothers all other workers and their work—is calmly offered to us as having changed its nature and become the highest manifestation of God, the mightiest work of the worker, the beginning of all hope, the key to every mystery, the pivot of history, the centre of the world. Christ is Christianity, and the heart of Christ's work is His Death. Therefore, our theme is the Person, and the Act—for His Death is His act—in the full significance of their redeeming efficacy. Not the Christ alone—a Gospel even of incarnation is not enough for God or men; not the Cross alone; but Christ crucified is our message for this time and for every time.

I remark next that *this theme necessarily includes an element of doctrine*. We sometimes hear it said, Preach Christ and



not doctrines ; and with certain limitations and explanations the advice may be good ; but the antithesis is false and misleading. For what, in the name of common sense, is a Christ without “doctrines” about Him ? A sound, and nothing more ; the six letters of an unmeaning word, as empty as any name in the genealogies of the Books of Chronicles. What possible way is there of knowing a person whom one has never seen, but by teachings concerning his acts and character ? As soon as we begin to ask or to answer the question, “And who was Jesus Christ ?” the region of doctrine begins. The plain fact is that our opponents do not object to doctrine about Christ, which they too necessarily have, but to the kind of doctrine. The ascription to Him of a divine nature is neither more nor less “a doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ” than the denial of it is ; and every man who has any thought about Christ—who He is and what He has done—has a doctrine of Christ. It is impossible, I say, to preach Christ without preaching dogma, unless I confine myself to a bare recital of the mere externals of the history, and if I could do that, it were no Gospel. For what of good news is there in the dry chronicle that He lived and died, any more than in the same bald record about any other man ? Is the mere story of His death a Gospel ? Does it not need a commentary explanatory of the fact to make it that ? The history becomes a Gospel by the presence of the doctrine—as touching his Person that He is the Son of God, as touching his Death that it is the sacrifice for the sins of the world. Without so much of dogma, the facts are not seen ; without so much they are powerless to bless ; and our Gospel is of another sort, or rather is not one at all, unless we, too, can declare this as “the Gospel which we preached how that

“Christ”—the very name being the condensation of a whole system of doctrines—“died for our sins according to the “Scriptures.”

Nor need we pause there. For, believing as we do that Christ crucified is made unto us wisdom, and that in His unique personality and mighty work, all truths which we can know concerning God and man lie wrapped up, we fail in grasping the greatness of our theme unless we draw these forth. We have access to the mine of stored gold, the clefts of the rock where it lies in branching veins. We are slothful workmen, unless, digging in the deep places of thought, and labouring at the fires of fervid contemplation, we extract its hidden treasures, and fashion them into forms of beauty and use. That is no Gospel at all which falters in the proclamation of Christ as the Son of God; and His death as our peace, and that is a maimed and partial Gospel which does not make some attempt to evolve and arrange in systematic form, as propositions for the understanding and the reason, the light of God that shines in Jesus Christ. Surely a doctrinal Christianity, which is a necessity from the very make of our natures, is no less the necessary outcome of the belief that Christ and His Cross are the revelation of God. Therefore, let us not be afraid to preach doctrines, as if they were in opposition to preaching Christ, seeing that they are really integral parts of that preaching. Let no false idea of the simplicity that is in Christ prevent us from seeking to unfold and present the divine and deep thoughts that are in Him. Let no impatience of “dogma” on the part of “literature” or elsewhere, blind us to the fact that the cry for an undogmatic Christianity is really a cry for the return to barbarism, to a dim religion of instinct and sentiment, as fatal

to "culture" as to theology, and at bottom means the denial of all knowledge of God and the unseen. We preach Christ crucified, and therein and thereby, the whole body of truths on which the significance of the fact depends, and all that we can grasp of the endless fulness of the truths which lie wrapped in it as the beech leaves in their brown sheathes.

Only, we have to take heed of a possible danger on this side. There is a doctrinal preaching which richly deserves all the hard things that have been said against it, where Christianity is presented rather as a system of metaphysico-theological abstractions, than as the proclamation of a redeeming Person and a redeeming Fact. There is no danger in doctrine, but there is much danger in doctrines cut loose from Christ, or hiding Him in their misty folds. True, we have a theology to preach, but let us not forget that its form is a history, and its purpose redemption. To handle it so as to change its shape and to obscure its aim is a fatal error. It makes all the difference whether a man sets forth Christ as the Redeemer or a theory of redemption, whether he is mainly occupied with abstractions to the comparative neglect of the facts from which he deduced them, or with these facts in their solid concrete power, in a word, whether the uppermost thing in his preaching be the doctrines—though they be the true doctrines of Christ—or the Christ, the reality of which the doctrines are the explanation. It is possible to hide the Cross behind the cobwebs of doctrine, be it ever so orthodox. Let us take heed that we do not conceal Him by the interposition of what is meant to reveal Him, and that we set Him forth as what He is—the origin and the meaning, and the end of all our theology. Whatever pedestal of solid certainties for the understanding we rear to set His image upon, what-

ever background of gleaming truths starred with lights of imagination we inlay it against, let that one all-perfect Form stand clearly outlined and on high, that whosoever looks on our work may "see no man any more save Jesus only."

And precisely the same line of thought may be taken in reference to *the relation of the preaching of Christ to the preaching of practical duty*, which is sometimes put over against it both by friends and foes. There are two peculiarities of Christian morals, both inextricably interwoven with the person of Christ—its standard and its motive power. There were noble and lofty ideals of duty long before, as proved by the fact that the highest moral conceptions of the New Testament found a terminology waiting ready for them in the tongue of Aristotle. But the new thing is that the ideal is realized in Christ. Instead of the cold marble whiteness of an imaginary perfection, there is a flush of life on its limbs, and the statue breathes. And another new thing is the impulse to which all obedience is trusted—the cords of love by which our unruly wills are bowed to the easy-fitting yoke, and bound to the light burden. And yet another is the power which is breathed into us to make obedience possible—the spirit of life in Christ. The living Pattern stoops from His place to pour His own life into us, and stretches out His hand to hold and help. He our standard, His Spirit our power, His love our motive, these are the fundamentals of all Christian ethics. Therefore, we neither preach Christ if we leave out morals, nor do we to any purpose preach morals if we leave out Christ. To prate about isolated duties is utter waste of breath. Exhortations to goodness, even to goodness of a distinctively Christian type, are toothless commonplace, impotent to get themselves obeyed, as the noblest words of the noblest systems without



Him have ever been. Wrenched apart from Christ as ideal and as power, the precepts of Christian morals are like a piece of seaweed, which spread its filmy fronds, and swayed about all expanded and bright tinted in the great sea that gave it life, but, cast upon the shore, shrivels and hardens and loses its play of colour, and swells and rots.

“Talk we of morals, O thou bleeding Lamb,  
“The grand morality is love to Thee.”

We preach Christ crucified, and therein we proclaim the law of duty, the impulse to obedience, the power that fulfils.

Thus much must suffice, inadequate and fragmentary as it necessarily is, for the consideration of the substance of our message. And now a word or two as to its *Form*.

The one, to a large extent, settles the other. If we had to offer to the world a gospel of rites, the form of our ministry would be sacerdotal. If we had to offer a gospel of thoughts, it would be professorial and didactic. But we have a Gospel of fact and therefore we preach. Not we perform, not we argue—we preach. The metaphor in the words is full of instruction. We are heralds, criers, tellers of a message. We have not evolved it from our own brains, we have received it from the King. Of course I admit that that is not a complete description of the work either of the Christian ministry or of the Christian Church. Preaching in our modern sense of the word—*i.e.*, the public oral ministration of Christian truth—includes both preaching in the Scriptural use of the term, namely, evangelising, and the teaching which follows and completes it. But I confine myself to-day to the proper original meaning of the expression, and I venture, in passing, to express the conviction that all the Churches need to be roused anew to the prime importance of the first part of their

work—the preaching of the Gospel to those who are without. We have far too much allowed that to be swallowed up by the second, and no reform is more needed than the restoration to its true place, of the evangelistic character of the Christian ministry and the Christian Church. But that by the way.

Confining myself, then, to that side of our work, let me very briefly draw out one or two thoughts concerning its form and spirit, which the very word suggests.

There must be in it the *tone of one who is faithfully delivering a message*, rather than of one who is speaking his own thoughts. One secret of power lies here, that the whole manner, bearing, and utterance of a man, shall seem to say, “I received of the Lord that which I delivered unto you.” When listeners gain the impression that we are reporting realities which we have seen and handled, they will listen as men in the valley would to some comrade on the cliffs, who told what he saw on the far-off plains. And when a speaker has that vivid consciousness that his words are his Master’s message, he will be delivered from fear, from the intrusion of petty vanities, from anxieties as to his reception, from fastidious care as to trifles, his soul will be freed from bonds that confine its flight, and his powers braced and quickened into an energy beyond their own. In ourselves, we are but reeds; but if we be shaken with *the wind*, tones of heavenly music will come from us, weak as we are, and in His hands even that feeble pipe becomes a trumpet.

Such a tone in our utterances is not to be secured without much secret communion with God. If the light is to shine clear through the dim horn-lantern of our words, there must be much resolute paring of it thin, much suppression of self. There must be a great silence in our souls, if we will hear what

God the Lord will speak. If we are to have power with men, we must first prevail with God in many a solitary hour, when He tells us His secret and blesses us there. The words that bring Christ to men and men to Christ, must be heard in the ear, ere ever they ring out from the housetops.

There should be, also, a tone of *pleading urgency* of invitation. It is not enough that we deliver our message plainly and faithfully. One has heard preachers who seemed to think that they had done all when they had told it clearly, with a kind of "There it is, take it or leave it as you like" air. But, brethren, if we have any conception of our work, or any communion with our Master, we shall feel that we poorly represent *it*, and wholly fail in resemblance to *Him*, unless we plead with men. The voice tremulous with earnestness, persistent in entreaty, is, at its softest and most winning cadences, but a poor echo of His. But it will carry farther than the thunders of a whole park of logical artillery, and move hearts as nothing else will. Let us not be afraid of letting ourselves down. Let us not be ashamed of emotional preaching, "praying them with much entreaty that they would receive "the gift." We have much more need to dread and be ashamed of an unloving handling of the message of love, a transposition of it into another key, which mars its music. "As though God did beseech by us, we pray in Christ's stead." Who can say that the beseechings of God, the prayers of Christ, have sounded in all their wondrous power through His tones?

Our words should have the ring of *authoritative certainty*. I do not mean dogmatical hardihood, but I mean the confidence of a firm, unfaltering, personal faith. People should get the impression from us—that man believes with all his

heart every word he says. Nothing is more powerful in producing assent than that. There is a contagion in thorough belief, which may be very illogical, but it is none the less potent and real. And if ever there was a time when such certitude of conviction was needed, and longed for, it is amid the tossings and questionings of this distracted age. It does not become the bearers of God's message to speak with bated breath, as if they were ventilating a hypothesis, or setting forth some provisional and partial truth. It is not for us in preaching the Gospel of Salvation to be balancing yeas and nays, guarding every utterance with a limitation which reduces it to nothing, affecting the hesitations which are the paralysis of belief, though now-a-days they be called breadth of view. "Men and brethren, let me *freely* speak unto you." We have not to preach doubts, but certainties. Doubts are not meant to be proclaimed till they have ripened into convictions—be they positive or negative. They are opinion in the making. Keep your work under cover till it is made. Mr. Kingsley's "Yeast" bore a condemnation in its very title. Yeast should be put away in a cool, dark place, till the fermentation is over. Then it is fit to drink. If you want men to feel that you believe what you preach, preach what you believe, be it more or less, but not what you doubt and what you hesitate. I know how increasingly hard it is, especially for the younger men among us, to keep this tone of conviction in their utterances. Remembering one's own earlier days, one would fain speak words of sympathy and cheer to such, and while pleading for patience and tolerance for them, bid them keep close to their Lord, true to the light, preach their certitudes, not their perplexities, and trust to Him who guides into all truth. And to all I commend the



grand words: "That I may speak it boldly as I ought to speak."

Those to whom Christianity is mainly a theory of religion, and a set of more or less certain principles may discourse in elaborate essays; but that is not our work. Those to whom it is mainly a great sacramental system of material vehicles for the conveyance of spiritual grace, may do their rites, which to us seem like heathenism come again into the Church; but that is not our work. We have to preach. In our chapels, the prominent thing is not a professor's chair, nor a lecturer's rostrum, nor the altar (though a recent Bampton lecturer discovered that it was the Baptistry, and that we were Ritualists accordingly). It is a pulpit, because, in our estimate, our office is to declare a Divine Christ and a Redeeming Fact. We are neither philosophers nor priests, we are preachers; and in that character the charge is given to us each: "Lift up thy voice with strength, lift it up, be not afraid. Say, Behold your God!"

And now I must tax your patience for a little while longer, while I attempt, much more briefly, the second portion of my task, to try to show that this preaching of Christ crucified is the best method of meeting the characteristics of this strange distracted time.

I need not detain you with any lengthened attempt to estimate these. For my present purpose, I am concerned mainly with two patent groups of facts—the widespread intellectual antagonism to Christianity, and the far wider indifference and irreligion of the masses of the nation. I believe we shall best cope with both, by the message in its substance and in its form, as I have been trying to set it forth. As to the former, the fact of a widespread unsettlement of

belief, amounting in many influential teachers to a definite rejection of all supernatural religion, is only too familiar to us all. The idealism and spiritualism which ruled the cultivated classes of thirty years ago, have naturally swung over into materialism and positivism. Physical science—or, as its votaries prefer to call it, with a significant suppression of the adjective, science—has, by its brilliant successes dazzling the imagination, by its severe adherence to fact, its conscientious labour, the accuracy of its methods, and the certainty of its results, established an ever-growing influence over an ever-widening circle. And too many of its followers are ready to assert that its relation to religion is conflict from generation to generation, in which religion always has been, and always will be, wrong and worsted, while science is absolutely right and constantly victorious. And too many Christians are prone to take the same view. I need not speak of the attacks from the side of philosophy, of the exquisitely-polished shafts, dipped in gall, which are daintily discharged in the names of “literature” and “light,” of the poem and the novel, the newspaper and the review—the confederates in this new crusade. We all know them, and must be aware that we have to front this subtle spirit every time we stand up to speak for Christ. May I say, in passing, that we are, perhaps, too apt to lament over all this, and suggest a more hopeful aspect of the same facts? May we not see, in this intense eagerness of thought on religious questions, a great opportunity? What a testimony it is to the deep wants of human nature! How faint-hearted and mistrustful we should be if we could doubt the issue! How blind if we do not see that the “many adversaries” make the “open door,” and bind us to work *there*! A strange time, but a hopeful one,

when religious subjects crop up everywhere, reminding one of the old days in Constantinople, when washerwomen and boatmen took eager part for or against Athanasius ; or the more earnest interest that absorbed our own England, in the days when Milton's free spirit triumphed in the controversies of his time, as the sign that " a mighty and puissant nation was rousing herself like a strong man after sleep " ! A worthy ambition to set before ourselves, to bear some little part in lending this eager interest to Him who alone can answer its questionings and fill its desires !

The problem of how best, in these complicated circumstances, to serve our generation, must press heavily upon us all. And, of course, the answer must, in each case, largely depend on individual capacity, culture, and sphere of labour. I plead for no narrow construction of our message, either in its substance or in its form. " As every man hath received " the gift, even so minister the same. " Are all prophets ? " Are all teachers ? But while earnestly insisting on variety in method, and, within certain limits, variety in subject-matter, like the variety in the glancing dewdrops, many-coloured by reflecting different rays of the one pure, perfect beam, I believe that there is a broad principle which should guide us in this matter.

Now there are two methods of meeting the present tendencies of thought—the method of adaptation and controversy, and the method of presenting simply the positive truth. There is no reason why they should not be combined. There is no reason why one man should not adopt the one, and another the other, or why the same man should not mingle both in varying proportions. But while leaving a wide margin for individual discretion and circumstances, I venture

to express my strong conviction that our main reliance must be placed *on the strong uncontroversial proclamation of the Gospel of Christ and of His death.*

The grounds on which I would rest and enforce this conviction may perhaps be most conveniently set forth by an example. The Apostle Paul was a keen observer of "the spirit of the age." He did not "fight uncertainty, as one that beateth the air," but took careful stock of the forces with which he had to try conclusions. He recognised as predominant in the society around him, two leading tendencies. The one was the demand for a religion in the form of a philosophy. The other was the demand for a religion in the form of a visible power. "Give me clear accurate ideas, proved principles, something to know," cried the Greek. "Give me something to look at, a religion whose evidence is a sign, whose essence is a sacrament," answered the Jew. The one is the voice of the understanding, the other is the voice of sense. They are irreconcilably opposed, and therefore inseparably united, like double stars or polar opposites. Wherever you hear the shout of the one, you catch the antiphon of the other. They each express a real want exaggerated into a mistaken wish, and therefore they are perennial. They part the modern world between them, as they did Paul's. We know them as science and sacramentarianism. Fronting these twin tendencies, the rationalism and the ritualism of his days, Paul construed his duty as an evangelist to be—what? To try to shape his ministry so as to satisfy them? By no means. To try to shape it so as to confute them then? Not that either. But to speak out boldly his positive truth. He knew that his message would at first sight seem to fly wide of the mark, and that people would say, "This talk is far apart



“from the thoughts that interest men now. This preacher “signally fails in addressing himself to the age.” To the cry for wisdom he offered a Person and Death ; to the demand for power, a cross, and a weak man hanging on it. Could anything be more conspicuously wanting in adaptation ? Well, there is as true “adaptation” in rowing against or athwart the stream as in going with it ; and unless this age has got rid of the one-sidedness which has always hitherto affected the current beliefs of a period, perhaps the truest adaptation of a message to its wants, is to bring into prominence what it overlooks, and to emphasize the proclamation of what it does *not* believe.

And Paul was confident that his message really met, while it appeared utterly to ignore, or even to contradict, both the dominant tendencies, so far as they were legitimate. It went deeper down into men’s wants than they did, for it spoke first to the conscience and the heart. Therefore, in its wider sweep, it included these also, and just because it at first brushed them aside, it really responded to them. In this unspeculative, historical Gospel lie the germs of a nobler wisdom than that which blossomed and decayed amid the olive groves of Attica, and in this cross of weakness the energies of a mightier power than that which of old wrought signs and wonders amid the hills of Judæa. “The Jews “require a sign, the Greeks seek after wisdom ; we preach “Christ crucified unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto “the Greeks foolishness ; but to them which are called, both “Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom “of God.”

Such is the example which I venture to present as the model for our bearing in the face of existing opinions. We

must seek to *understand the times*, to bring ourselves so far into correspondence with them as to be keenly sensitive of their tone, and aware of their attitude. We shall never have power with men unless we can fling ourselves into their position, and show that, if we do not speak as they desire, it is not because we do not know what they want or what they are thinking about. There is no need to be perpetually talking about modern thought, but there is need to be fully conscious of "this great storm that is thundering over Christendom."

We must seek to *recognise what is true and legitimate in the demands and position* of our antagonists. Do not let us be forever speaking of the scientific spirit as if it were an evil demon. Do not let us play into the hands of any who would fain persuade the cultivated mind of England that it must make its choice between science and religion. In its most distinguished exponents, there is a reverence for facts, a patient labour in its pursuit, an unselfish devotion to its service, which we should all admire, and not a few of us would be improved by copying. And, however its demand for certitude may have been misinterpreted by some of its votaries, through a most unscientific limitation of the sources of knowledge and the bases of belief, that abuse should not hinder us from recognising the cry for light, as the cry that God Himself has taught.

Then we should take all these voices as *a call to the more earnest uncontroversial proclamation of our great message*. Perhaps I am speaking from personal temperament, and generalising merely from my own incapacity and disinclination, when I venture to express a grave doubt as to whether controversial preaching ever does much good. For one thing, a very large proportion of our hearers are very slightly affected by move-

ments of opinion interesting to more highly-cultivated minds. For another thing, the pulpit is not the place, nor—if I may venture to say it without offence, seeing that I include myself among the number—are many preachers the men to deal thoroughly with the problems of modern thought, and superficial treatment only aggravates the evil. “I have heard the Bampton Lectures for thirty years,” said a sagacious University official, “and thank God! I am a Christian still.” I am afraid a good deal of controversial preaching does more harm to the truth it tries to defend than to the errors it assails. For another thing, the constant reference to errors gives them importance, and imposes on the imaginations of the hearers, whilst also it creates sympathy with the subjects of these incessant attacks. Again, there is absolutely no connection between being forced by stress of argument to accept the true doctrine of the Cross of Christ, and being led as a sinful man to put my trust in Him as my Saviour. Rather, the whole point of view and attitude of mind must be altered before the eager disputant becomes the earnest evangelist, and the convinced listener passes into the penitent disciple. You may shiver to pieces all intellectual defences, but the garrison still gathers unsubdued into the central citadel of the heart. You cannot take it by batteries of argument. Another power alone will make the flag flutter down. Faith is an act of the will as well as of the understanding. Therefore, not logic, but the exhibition of Christ in His love and power evokes it. Ah! brethren, we are often so busy in proving the Gospel, that we forget to preach it; so anxious to get at men’s hearts through their understandings, that all our time and strength are spent in hewing the passage and none left to impel the Gospel through it. I think Christ’s Cross may

be trusted to stand firm without our stays, and I believe that, if we would seldomer try to prop it with argument, and oftener point to it with the herald's cry, "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," we should oftener see men drawn unto it.

We shall find that such broad uncontroversial *proclamation of Christ really meets the wants which it seems to ignore and contradict*. We need not to be so very solicitous about shaping our message so as to fit the needs of the times. Let us preach it plainly and fully, and be sure that it will shape itself according to men's needs. It fits each age, because it deals with no transient peculiarities of a period, but with the perennial realities of human nature. It fits each class of mind and every successive phase of opinion, because it addresses itself to that which is universal. It is a gospel for the cultivated doubter of the nineteenth century, as for all the ignorant, and the little children, because it speaks to that which is common to them all, and deepest in each—the fact of sin, and the need for a redemption. It brushes aside whatever belongs to the individual, the class, the age, and goes deep down first to what is central and common to the race. It will not speak to a man in his character of thinker and scholar, any more than it will to another as mighty or noble; but it appeals to the same consciousness in the man of science and in the rude savage, the consciousness of unrest and inner discord, and therein lies its adaptation to each. We have to beware that its grand breadth loses nothing in our hands, and that as it comes from our lips, it makes its appeal straight to the heart and the conscience. If men seek for wisdom, or ask for a sign, our task is to evoke a deeper cry than these—the cry of the heart that mourns over sin and longs for a deliverer. If I dig a well deeper than my



neighbour's, his will run dry. If we can only tap that profounder void in a man's soul which lies far below the cravings of the understanding and the sense, the surface-streams of interest that filled the upper will soon flow down to the deeper, and, instead of the demand, Give me knowledge, give me signs, we shall hear the welcome question, "Sirs, what must I do to be saved"?

Thank God, the surest way to evoke that sense of want, is by showing men Him in whom it has been met; and, once evoked, none but Himself can satisfy it. So, if we would awake men to a sense of their need of Christ, preach Him. If we would adapt our message to present opinions and desires, dig deeper than they, address the fundamental universal consciousness, and preach Him. If we would bring to our brethren what they most wish, begin by taking to them what they most want—and preach Him. And, depend upon it, that great Gospel will vindicate its own fitness to be the bread of the world, the food for all sorts of men, the food for all the hunger of each.

*It will become wisdom to the seeker after wisdom*—opening out into an ordered system of truth concerning God and man, a body of morality, certified by proofs, in their own sphere as valid as those of science, and verified by the experiment of a lifetime. Jesus Christ is the true "Master of those who know," and in Him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. The Gospel which is a record of a life and death, is already, in the mercy of God, cast thereby into a form which wondrously fits it for meeting the demands of a sceptical and scientific age. They reverence fact, they will have none of your speculations. Be it so. Meet them with that message which is a fact, not a speculation; with that Person whose endless significance the world, after eighteen centuries, seems

to find as singular and stimulating as ever; with that Death which really happened on this solid earth. A religion which is but the manufacture of our so-called religious instincts, pieced out with patches from the workshop of the understanding, will not stand the tests of to-day. But a religion whose roots are in history, whose Alpha and Omega are a person, whose claim is that it be reckoned with, and taken account of, like any other historical event, appeals to the very scientific spirit to which it is supposed to be antagonistic, and notably to that reverence for fact, and resolve to base all opinion on it. Brethren, we throw away our advantage and come down from the height to fight in a weaker position in the plain, when we try to change the form of our message, in deference to any supposed or real state of opinion, from a gospel of fact to a system of wisdom. God has already adapted it to all ages, and to this age. Let us preach it as we have received it.

*It will prove itself able to satisfy all that is natural and legitimate in the cravings of the seeker after signs.* Does he feel, and rightly feel, that religion cannot be a mere revelation of truth, but must be the exhibition of a Divine act? The Cross surely vindicates that conviction, and supplies what he wants, whilst it goes beyond his expectation, giving him power in weakness, and the Divine energy in its intensest operation in that redeeming act? Does he feel, and feel rightly, that there must be some objective fact of a sacrifice and a priesthood on which he may rest? Surely the Cross of Christ vindicates and satisfies that want, while it quenches all other altar fires by the blaze of this, and antiquates all priesthood but His, who continues for ever. Does he feel that he cannot live in the rarified atmosphere of a purely

spiritualistic Theism, and that his poor manhood needs something more substantial to lay hold of? Surely the Gospel meets and vindicates that when it gives him a brother man to love and follow, "sweet human hands, and lips and eyes," to look on and to clasp, while it delivers him from all other dependence on the material as the vehicle of the spiritual, because it presents the one "sacrament"—the human, corporeal personality of our Lord Jesus Christ.

And, in like manner, *every divergent tendency of human nature*, in all its phases, in all its varieties of culture, period, civilization, temperament, age, sex, circumstance, *finds its true satisfaction in that one great message*—its rest on the bosom of that loving Lord, its healing in the power of that Cross. The legend tells of a great king who owned a golden vase, the gift of some kindly deity, which gave forth whatsoever rich or refreshing draught its possessor willed, inexhaustible in amount. The dream is true. A loving God has given us a precious chalice, from which there pours, in unstinted measure and boundless variety, all that the longing lips of a world can crave—wine to gladden, milk to nourish, water to slake the thirst. From that one source, every appetite, every need, every taste, may receive what it will; for He said: "If any man thirst, let him come unto Me, and drink." With perfect knowledge of the endless varieties and tragic strength of men's cravings, He calmly plants Himself before the race, and proposes himself as the satisfier of each desire, of each unit of humanity. And the ages have verified His claim, and the river that flows forth from the foot of His Cross parts into four heads, and waters all the land, and whosoever drinks of it thirsts not, neither goes elsewhere to draw.

Brethren! preach *Him*—preach His Cross. It will find

an echo in men's hearts. It will appeal to a deeper stratum of their being than any arguments of ours can penetrate. It carries its own best evidence with it. It puts forth its own might when it is presented in its own simplicity. Let us preach it lovingly, pleadingly, authoritatively—as a fact, as a truth, as the power of God ; and be sure that whatever weakness there may be in us, however we may feel incompetent to deal with the difficulties of this generation, He will be with us, and will fulfil His own word : “ I, if I be lifted up on the Cross, will draw all men unto Me.” Yes, even though it be held but by our feeble hands, trembling, stained, unworthy. Yes. He, not we ; His power, not our genius, or eloquence, or argumentation ; His Gospel, not our preaching, will draw hearts to Himself, there to be at rest.

Think, I beseech you, brethren and fathers, more than ever we have done of the vast masses around us, like some shoreless sea, with the black waves tumbling out to the far horizon. They have no share in the sceptic's doubts, nor in our creeds. They never heard of the last brilliant assault on Christianity, and though they live within earshot of our hymn singing, they have barely heard of Christianity either. They outnumber the doubters by a thousand to one ; they have souls to be saved ; they know and care as little for our faith as if we lived on different planets ; and they are perishing in sheer animalism and indifference. Christ died for them. Let us leave off fighting unbelievers for a while, and put the evangelistic work of the Church to the masses in its rightful place. We shall find a great many questions as to the form in which we should preach the Gospel solve themselves when once we put our hands to this our proper task. The vital centre of it will be quickly found—the secret of its



power. Let us preach to the people, and we shall learn better than we knew it before *how* to preach the Gospel. Let us not hide the cross with the cobwebs of our own thoughts, nor the flowers of our own pretty fancies. Let us hide ourselves behind it, content if we can unseen hold it up. Preach that Divine fact, boldly, directly, lovingly, with the simplicity which does not empty it of its divine significance, with the profundity which does not rob it of its divine simplicity. Let us open our own hearts more to its power, and spread our spirits out before Him in many an hour of still communion and lofty aspiration, that they may receive the marks of the Lord Jesus, the print of the cross. Then shall we come forth from His presence with our voice attuned to harmony with the sweetness of our message, with our faith made strong by what we saw and tasted in the secret place; ready to proclaim on the housetops what He spoke to our listening ear, and "determined to know nothing "among men save Christ, and Him crucified."



THE  
SECRET OF POWER.

A Sermon

PREACHED IN SURREY CHAPEL, BEFORE THE DIRECTORS AND  
FRIENDS OF THE LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY,

MAY 11TH, 1870.

BY

ALEXANDER MACLAREN.

*SECOND EDITION.*

LONDON:  
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1870.





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## A Sermon

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“Then came the disciples to Jesus apart, and said, Why could not we cast him out? And Jesus said unto them, Because of your unbelief.”—MATT. xvii. 19, 20.

“AND when He had called unto them His twelve disciples, He gave them power against unclean spirits to cast them out.” That same power was bestowed, too, on the wider circle of the seventy who returned again with joy, saying, “Lord, even the devils are subject unto us through Thy name.” The ground of it was laid in the solemn words with which Christ met their wonder at their own strength, and told how He “beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.” Therefore had they triumphed, showing the fruits of their Master’s victory; and therefore had He a right to renew the gift, in the still more comprehensive

promise, "I give unto you power—over all the power of the enemy."

What a commentary on such words this story affords! What has become of their supernatural might? Has it ebbed away as suddenly as it flowed? Is their Lord's endowment a shadow—His assurances delusion? Has He taken back what He gave? Not so. And yet His servants are ignominiously beaten. One poor devil-ridden boy brings all their resources to nothing. He stands before them writhing in the gripe of his tormentor, but they cannot set him free. The importunity of the father's prayers is vain, and the tension of expectancy in his eager face relaxes into the old hopeless languor as he slowly droops to the conviction that they could not cast him out. The malicious scorn in the eyes of the Scribes, those hostile critics who "knew that it would be so," helps to produce the failure which they anticipated. The curious crowd buzz about them—and in the midst of it all the little knot of baffled disciples, possessors of power which seems to leave them when they need it most, with the unavailing spells dying half spoken on their lips, and their faint hearts longing that their Master would come down from the mount, and cover their weakness with His own great strength.

No wonder that, as soon as Christ and they are alone, they want to know how their mortifying defeat has come about. And they get an answer which they little expected, for the last place where

men look for the explanation of their failures is within; and they will ascend into the heavens, and descend into the deeps for remote and recondite reasons, before they listen to the voice which says, "The fault is nigh thee—in thy heart." Christ's reply distinctly implies that the cause of their impotence lay wholly in themselves, not in any defect or withdrawal of power, but solely in that in them which grasped the power. They little expected, too, to be told that they had failed because they had not been sure they would succeed. They had thought they believed in their ability to cast out the demon. They had tried with some kind of anticipation that they could. They had been surprised when they found they could not. They had wonderingly asked why. And now Christ tells them that all along they had had no real faith in Him and in the reality of His gift. So subtly may unbelief steal into the heart, even while we fancy that we are working in faith. And a further portion of our Lord's reply points them to the great means by which this conquering faith can be maintained—namely, prayer and fasting. If, then, we put all these things together, we get a series of considerations, very simple and commonplace indeed, but all the better and truer therefore, which I venture to submit to you, as having a very important bearing on all our Christian work, and especially on the missionary work of the Church.

The principles which the text suggests touch the perpetual possession of the power which conquers; the condition of its victorious exercise by us, as being our faith; the subtle danger of unsuspected unbelief to which we are exposed; and the great means of preserving our faith pure and strong. I ask your attention to a few considerations on these points in their order.

But first, let me say very briefly, that I would not be understood as, by the selection of such a text, desiring to suggest that we have failed in our work. Thank God! we can point to results far, far greater than we have deserved, far greater than we have expected, however they may be beneath our desires, and still further below what the gospel was meant to accomplish. It may suit observers who have never done anything themselves, and have not particularly clear eyes for appreciating spiritual work, to talk of Christian missions as failures; but it would ill become us, and especially you, brethren, in the full joy of the blessed tidings from Madagascar, which fill your hearts with praise to-day, to assent to the lie. Failures indeed! with half a million of converts, with new forms of Christian life budding in all the wilderness of the peoples, with the consciousness of coming doom creeping about the heart of every system of idolatry! Is the green life in the hedges and in the sweet pastures starred with rathe primroses, and in the hidden copses blue with hyacinths



a failure, because the east wind bites shrewdly, and "the tender ash delays to clothe herself with green"? No! no! we have *not* failed. Enough has been done to vindicate the enterprise, more than enough to fill our lips with thanksgiving, enough to entitle us to say to all would-be critics—Do you the same with your enchantments. But on the other hand, we have to confess that the success has been slow and small, chequered and interrupted, that often we have been foiled, that we have confronted many a demon whom we could not cast out, and that at home and abroad the masses of evil seem to close in around us, and we make but little impression on their serried ranks. We have had success enough to assure us that we possess the treasure, and failures enough to make us feel how weak are the earthen vessels which hold it.

And now let us turn to the principles which flow from this text.

I. *We have an unvarying power.*

No doubt the explanation of their defeat which most naturally suggested itself to these disciples would be that somehow or other—perhaps because of Christ's absence—they had lost the gift which they knew they once had. And the same way of accounting for later want of success lingers among Christian people still. You will sometimes hear it said:—"God sends forth His Spirit in special fulness at

special times, according to His own sovereign will; and till then we can only wait and pray." Or "The miraculous powers which dwelt in the early Church have been withdrawn, and therefore the progress is slow." The strong imaginative tendency to make an ideal perfect in the past leads us to think of the primitive age of the Church as golden, in opposition to the plain facts of the case. We fancy that because apostles were its teachers, and the Cross within its memory, the infant society was stronger, wiser, better than any age since, and had gifts which we have lost. What had it which we do not possess? The power of working miracles. What have we which it did not possess? A completed Bible, and the experience of eighteen centuries to teach us to understand it, and to confirm by facts our confidence that Christ's gospel is for all time and every land. What have we in common with it? The same mission to fulfil, the same wants in our brethren to meet, the same gospel, the same spirit, the same immortal Lord. All that any age has possessed to fit it for the task of witnessing for Christ we too possess. The Church has in it a power which is ever adequate to the conquest of the world; and that power is constant through all time, whether we consider it as recorded in an unvarying gospel, or as energized by an abiding spirit, or as flowing from and centred in an unchangeable Lord.

*We have a gospel which never can grow old. Its*

adaptation to the deepest needs of men's souls remains constant with these needs. These vary not from age to age. No matter what may be the superficial differences of dress, the same human heart beats beneath every robe. The great primal wants of men's spirits abide as the great primal wants of their bodily life abide. Food and shelter for the one,—a loving, pardoning God, to know and love, for the other—else they perish. Wherever men go they carry with them a conscience which needs cleansing, a sense of separation from God joined with a dim knowledge that union with Him is life, a will which is burdened with its own self-hood, an imagination which paints the misty walls of this earthly prison with awful shapes that terrify and faint hopes that mock, a heart that hungers for love, and a reason which pines in atrophy without light. And all these the gospel which is lodged in our hands meets. It addresses itself to nothing in men that is not in Man. Surface differences of position, culture, clime, age, and the like, it brushes aside as unimportant, and it goes straight to the universal wants. People tell us it has done its work, and much confident dogmatism proclaims that the world has outgrown it. We have a right to be confident also, with a confidence born of our knowledge, that it has met and satisfied for us the wants which are ours and every man's, and to believe that as long as men live by bread, so long will this word which proceedeth out of the

mouth of God be the food of their souls. Areopagus and Piccadilly, Benares and Oxford, need the same message and will find the same response to all their wants in the same word.

Much of the institutions in which Christendom has embodied its conceptions of God's truth will crumble away. Many of the conceptions will have to be modified, neglected truths will grow, to the dislocation of much systematic theology, and the Word better understood will clear away many a portentous error with which the Church has darkened the word. Be it so. Let us be glad when "the things which can be shaken are removed," like mean huts built against the wall of some cathedral, masking and marring the completeness of its beauty; "that the things which cannot be shaken may remain," and all the clustered shafts, and deep-arched recesses, and sweet tracery may stand forth freed from the excrescences which hid them. "The grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away. But the word of the Lord endureth for ever."

*We have an abiding Spirit*, the Giver to us of a power without variableness or the shadow of turning. "I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Paraklete, that He may abide with you for ever." The manner of His operations may vary, but the reality of His energy abides. The "works" of wonder which Jesus did on earth may no more be done, but the greater works than these



are still the sign of *His* presence, without whom no spiritual life is possible. Prophecies may fail, tongues may cease, but the more excellent gifts are poured out now as richly as ever. We are apt to look back to Pentecost and think that that marked a height to which the tide has never reached since, and therefore we are stranded amidst the ooze and mud. But the river which proceeds from the throne of God and of the Lamb is not like one of our streams on earth, that leaps to the light and dashes rejoicingly down the hill side, but creeps along sluggish in its level course, and dies away at last in the sands. It pours along the ages the same full volume with which it gushed forth at first. Rather, the source goes with the Church in all ages, and we drink not of water that came forth long ago in the history of the world, and has reached us through the centuries, but of that which wells out fresh every moment from the Rock that follows us. The Giver of all power is with us.

*We have a Lord, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.* “Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.” We have not merely to look back to the life and death of Christ in history, and recognise there the work, the efficacy of which shall endure for ever. But whilst we do this, we have also to think of the Christ “that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.” And the one thought,

as the other, should strengthen our confidence in our possession of all the might that we need for bringing the world back to our Lord.

A work in the past which can never be exhausted or lose its power is our message. The mists of gathering ages wrap in slowly thickening folds of forgetfulness all other men and events in history, and make them ghostlike and shadowy; but no distance has yet dimmed or will ever dim that human form divine. Other names are like those stars that blaze out for a while, and then smoulder down into almost complete invisibility; but He is the very light itself, that burns and is not consumed. Other landmarks sink below the horizon as the tribes of men pursue their solemn march through the centuries, but the Cross on Calvary "shall stand for an ensign of the people, and to it shall the Gentiles seek." To proclaim that accomplished salvation, once for all lodged in the heart of the worlds' history, and henceforth for ever valid, is our unalterable duty. The message carries in itself its own immortal strength.

A living Saviour in the present, who works with us, confirming the word with signs following, is the source of our power. Not till He is impotent shall we be weak. The unmeasurable measure of the gift of Christ defines the degree, and the unending duration of His life who continueth for ever sets the period, of our possession of the grace which is given

to every one of us. He is ever bestowing, He never withdraws what He once gives. The fountain sinks not a hair's breadth, though eighteen centuries have drawn from it. Modern astronomy begins to believe that the sun itself by long expense of light will be shorn of its beams and wander darkling in space, circled no more by its daughter planets. But this Sun of our souls rays out for ever the energies of life and light and love, and after all communication possesses the infinite fulness of them all. "His name shall be continued as long as the sun, all nations shall call Him blessed."

Here then, brethren, are the perpetual elements of our constant power, an eternal Word, an abiding Spirit, an unchanging Lord.

II. *The condition of exercising this power is Faith.*

With such a force at our command—a force that could shake the mountains and break the rocks—how come we ever to fail? So the disciples asked, and Christ's answer cuts to the very heart of the matter. Why could you not cast him out? For one reason only, because you had lost your hold of My strength, and therefore had lost your confidence in your own derived power, or had forgotten that it was derived, and essayed to wield it as if it were your own. You did not trust Me, so you did not believe that you could cast him out, or believed that you could by your own might; therefore you failed. He

throws them back decisively on themselves as solely responsible. Nowhere else, in heaven or in earth or hell, but only in us, does the reason lie for our breakdown, if we have broken down. Not in God, who is ever with us, ready to make all grace abound in us, whose will is that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth; not in the gospel which we preach, for "it is the power of God unto salvation"; not in the demon might which has overcome us, for "greater is He that is in us than he that is in the world." We are driven from all other explanations to the bitterest and yet the most hopeful of all, that we only are to blame.

And what in us is to blame? Some of us will answer—Our modes of working; they have not been free enough, or not orderly enough, or in some way or other not wisely adapted to our ends. Some will answer—Our forms of presenting the truth; they have not been flexible enough, or not fixed enough; they have been too much a reproduction of the old; they have been too licentious a departure from the old. Some will answer—Our ecclesiastical arrangements; they have been too democratic; they have been too priestly. Some will answer—Our intellectual culture; it has been too great, obscuring the simplicity that is in Christ; it has been too small, sending poorly furnished men into the field to fight with ordered systems of idolatry which rest upon a philosophical basis and can only be overturned by



undermining that. It is no part of my present duty to discuss these varying answers. No doubt there is room for improvement in all the fields which they indicate. But does not the spirit of our Lord's words here beckon us away from these purely secondary subjects to fix our self-examination on the depth and strength of our faith, as incomparably the most important element in the conditions which determine our success or our failure? I do not undervalue the worth of wise methods of action, but the history of the Church tells us that pretty nearly any methods of action are fruitful in the right hands, and that without living faith the best of them become like the heavy armour which half-smothered a feeble man. I do not pretend to that sublime indifference to dogma which is the modern form of supreme devotion to truth, but experience has taught us that wherever the name of Christ, as the Saviour of the world, has been lovingly proclaimed, there devils have been cast out, whatever private and sectional doctrines the exorciser has added to it. I do not disparage organization, but courage is more than drill; and there is such a thing as the very perfection of arrangement without life, like cabinets in a museum, where all the specimens are duly classified, and dead. I believe, with the old preacher, that if God can do without our learning, He needs our ignorance still less, but it is of comparatively little importance whether the draught of living water

be brought to thirsty lips in an earthen cup or a golden vase.

“The main thing is, does it hold good measure?  
Heaven soon sets right all other matters.”

And therefore, while leaving full scope for all improvements in these subordinate conditions, let me urge upon you that the main thing which makes us strong for our Christian work is the grasp of living faith, which holds fast the strength of God. There is no need to plunge into the jungle of metaphysical theology here. Is it not a fact that the might with which the power of God has wrought for men's salvation has corresponded with the strength of the Church's desire and the purity of its trust in His power? Is it not a truth plainly spoken in Scripture and confirmed by experience, that we have the awful prerogative of limiting the Holy One of Israel, and quenching the Spirit? Was there not a time in Christ's life on earth when He could do no mighty works because of their unbelief? We receive all spiritual gifts in proportion to our capacity, and the chief factor in settling the measure of our capacity is our faith. Here on the one hand is the boundless ocean of the divine strength, unfathomable in its depth, full after all draughts, tideless and calm, in all its movement never troubled, in all its repose never stagnating; and on the other side is the empty aridity of our poor weak natures. Faith opens these to the influx of that great sea, and “according to

our faith," in the exact measure of our receptivity, does it enter our hearts. In itself the gift is boundless. It has no limit except the infinite fulness of the power which worketh in us. But in reference to our possession it is bounded by our capacity, and though that capacity enlarges by the very fact of being filled, and so every moment becomes greater through fruition, yet at each moment it is the measure of our possession, and our faith is the measure of our capacity. Our power is God's power in us, and our faith is the power with which we grasp God's power and make it ours. So then, in regard to God, our faith is the condition of our being strengthened with might by His Spirit.

Consider, too, how the same faith has a *natural operation on ourselves* which tends to fit us for casting out the evil spirits. Given a man full of faith, you will have a man tenacious in purpose, absorbed in one grand object, simple in his motives, in whom selfishness has been driven out by the power of a mightier love, and indolence stirred into unwearied energy. Such a man will be made wise to devise, gentle to attract, bold to rebuke, fertile in expedients, and ready to be anything that may help the aim of his life. Fear will be dead in him, for faith is the true anæsthesia of the soul; and the knife may cut into the quivering flesh, and the spirit be scarce conscious of a pang. Love, ambition, and all the swarm of distracting desires will be driven from the soul in

which the lamp of faith burns bright. Ordinary human motives will appeal in vain to the ears which have heard the tones of the heavenly music, and all the pomps of life will show poor and tawdry to the sight that has gazed on the vision of the great white throne and the crystal sea. The most ignorant and erroneous "religious sentiment"—to use a modern phrase—is mightier than all other forces in the world's history. It is like some of those terrible compounds of modern chemistry, an inert, innocuous-looking drop of liquid. Shake it, and it flames heaven high, shattering the rocks and ploughing up the soil. Put even an adulterated and carnalised faith into the hearts of a mob of wild Arabs, and in a century they will stream from their deserts, and blaze from the mountains of Spain to the plains of Bengal. Put a living faith in Christ and a heroic confidence in the power of His gospel to reclaim the worst sinners into a man's heart, and he will out of weakness be made strong, and plough his way through obstacles with the compact force and crashing directness of lightning. There have been men of all sorts who have been honoured to do much in this world for Christ. Wise and foolish, learned and ignorant, differing in tone, temper, creed, forms of thought, and manner of working, in every conceivable degree;—but one thing, and perhaps one thing only, they have all had—a passion of enthusiastic personal devotion to their Lord, a profound and living faith in Him and in His



salvation. All in which they differed is but the gay gilding on the soldier's coat. That in which they were alike is as the strong arm which grasps the sword, and has its muscles braced by the very clutch. Faith is itself a source of strength, as well as the condition of drawing might from heaven.

Consider, too, how faith has power over *men who see it*. The exhibition of our own personal convictions has more to do in spreading them than all the arguments which we use. There is a magnetism and a contagious energy in the sight of a brother's faith which few men can wholly resist. If you wish me to weep, your own tears must flow; and if you would have me believe, let me see your soul heaving under the emotion which you desire me to feel. The arrow may be keen and true, the shaft rounded and straight, the bow strong, and the arm sinewy; but unless the steel be winged it will fall to the ground long before it strikes the butt. Your arrows must be winged with faith, else orthodoxy, and wise arrangements, and force and zeal, will avail nothing. No man will believe in, and no demon will obey, spells which the would-be exorcist only half believes himself. Even if he speak the name of Christ, unless he speak it with unfaltering confidence, all the answer he will get will only be the fierce and taunting question, "Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are ye?" Brethren, let us give heed to the solemn rebuke which our Master

lovingly reads to us in these words, and while we aim at the utmost possible perfection in all subordinate matters, let us remember that they all without faith are weak, as an empty suit of armour with no life beneath the corslet; and that faith without them all is strong, like the knight of old, who rode into the bloody field in simple silken vest, and conquered. That which determines our success or failure in the work of our Lord is our faith.

III. *Our faith is ever threatened by subtle unbelief.*

It would appear that the disciples were ignorant of the unbelief that had made them weak. They fancied that they had confidence in their Christ-given power, and they certainly had in some dull kind of fashion expected to succeed in their attempt. But He who sees the heart knew that there was no real living confidence in their souls; and His words are a solemn warning, dear brethren, to us all, of how possible it is for us to have our faith all honey-combed by gnawing doubt while we suspect it not, like some piece of wood apparently sound, the whole substance of which has been eaten away by hidden worms. We may be going on with Christian work, and may even be looking for spiritual results. We may fancy ourselves faithful stewards of the gospel, and all the while there may be an utter absence of the one thing which makes our words more than so much wind whistling through an archway. The

shorn Samson went out "to shake himself as at other times," and knew not that the Spirit of the Lord had departed from him. Who among us is not exposed to the assaults of that pestilence that walketh in darkness? and, alas! who among us can say that he has repelled the contagion? Subtly it creeps over us all, the stealthy intangible vapour, unfelt till it has quenched the lamp which alone lights the darkness of the mine, and clogged to suffocation the labouring lungs.

Our time, and the object in view, preclude my speaking of the general sources of danger to our faith, which are always in operation with a retarding force as constant as friction, as certain as the gravitation which pulls the pendulum to rest at its lowest point. But I may very briefly particularize two of the enemies of that faith, which have a special bearing on our missionary work, and may be illustrated from the narrative before us.

First, *all our activity* in spreading the gospel, whether by personal effort or by our gifts, like every form of outward action, *tends to become mechanical*, and to lose its connection with the motive which originated it. Of course it is also true, on the other side, that all outward action also tends to strengthen the motive from which it flows. But our Christian work will not do so, unless it be carefully watched, and pains be taken to keep it from slipping off its original foundation, and so altering its whole character. We

may very easily become so occupied with the mere external occupation as to be quite unconscious that it has ceased to be faithful work, and has become routine, dull mechanism, or the result of confidence, not in Christ, whose power once flowed through us, but in ourselves the doers. So these disciples may have thought, "*We* can cast out this devil, for we have done the like already," and have forgotten that it was not they, but Christ in them, who had done it.

How widely this foe to our faith operates amid the multiplied activities of this busy age one trembles to think. We see all around us a Church toiling with unexampled expenditure of wealth, and effort, and time. It is difficult to repress the suspicion that the work is out of proportion to the life. Ah, brethren, how much of all this energy of effort, so admirable in many respects, will He whose fan is in His hand accept as true service—how much of it will be wheat for the garner, how much chaff for the fire? It is not for us to divide between the two, but it is for us to remember that it is not impossible to make of our labours the most dangerous enemy to the depth of our still life hidden with Christ in God, and that every deed of apparent service which is not the real issue of living faith is powerless for good to others, and heavy with hurt to ourselves. Brethren and fathers in the ministry! how many of us know what it is to talk and toil away our early



devotion ; and all at once to discover that for years perhaps, we have been preaching and labouring from mere habit and routine, like corpses galvanised into some ghastly and transient caricature of life. Christian men and women, beware lest this great enterprise of missions which our fathers began from the holiest motives and in the simplest faith, should, in our hands, be wrenched away from its only true basis, and be done with languid expectation and more languid desires of success, from no higher motive than that we found it in existence, and have become accustomed to carry it on. If that be our reason, then we harm ourselves, and mask from our own sight our own unbelief. If that be the case the work may go on for a while, like a clock ticking with fainter and fainter beats for a moment after it has run down ; but it will soon cease, and neither heaven nor earth will be much the poorer for its ending.

Again, *the atmosphere of scornful disbelief which surrounded the disciples made their faith falter.* It was too weak to sustain itself in the face of the consciousness that not a man in all that crowd believed in their power ; and it melted away before the contempt of the scribes and the incredulous curiosity of the bystanders, without any reason except the subtle influence which the opinions and characters of those around us have on us all.

And, brethren, are not we in danger to-day of

losing the firmness of our grasp on Christ, as our Saviour and the world's, from a precisely similar cause? We live in an atmosphere of hesitancy and doubt, of scornful rejection of His claims, of contemptuous disbelief in anything which a scalpel cannot cut. We cannot but be conscious that to hold by Jesus Christ as the Incarnate God, the supernatural Beginning of a new life, the sole Hope of the world, is to expose ourselves to the contempt of so-called advanced and liberal thinkers, and to be out of harmony with the prevailing set of opinions. And though we have been told lately, on high authority, that being only Dissenters we must needs be out of the current of the national life, I suppose that every thoughtful man among us feels that the great danger to our faith to-day comes precisely from the force with which that current swings us round, and threatens to make some of us drag our anchors, and drift, and strike, and go to pieces on the sands. For one man who is led by the sheer force of reason to yield to the intellectual grounds on which modern unbelief reposes, there are twenty who simply catch the infection in the atmosphere, and who find that their early convictions have evaporated, they know not how; only that once the fleece was wet with dew and now it is dry. For unbelief has a contagious energy wholly independent of reason, no less than has faith, and affects multitudes who know nothing of its grounds, as the iceberg chills the sum-

mer air for leagues, and makes the sailors shiver long before they see its barren peaks.

Therefore, brethren, let us all take heed to ourselves, lest we suffer our grasp of our dear Lord's hand to relax, for no better reason than because so many have left His side. To us all His pleading love, which knows how much we are moulded by the example of others, is saying, in view of the fashion of unbelief, "Will ye also go away?" Let us answer, with a clasp that clings the tighter for our danger of being sucked in by the strong current, "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." We cannot help seeing that the creeping paralysis of hesitancy and doubt about even the power of Christ's name is stealing over portions of the Church, and stiffening the arm of its activity. Lips that once spoke with full confidence the words that cast out devils, mutter them now languidly with half belief. Hearts that were once full of sympathy with the great purpose for which Christ died are growing cold to the work of preaching the gospel to the heathen, because they are growing to doubt whether, after all, there is any gospel at all. This icy breath, dear brethren, is blowing over our churches and over our hearts. And wherever it reaches, there labour for Jesus and for men languishes, and we recoil baffled with unavailing exorcisms dying in our throats, and the rod of our power broken in our hands. "Why

could not we cast him out? Because of your unbelief."

IV. *Our faith can only be maintained by constant devotion and rigid self-denial.*

I have already detained you far too long, and can touch but very lightly on that solemn thought in which our Lord sets forth the condition of our faith, and therefore of our power. This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting. The discipline then which nurtures faith is mainly moral and spiritual—not as a substitute for, or to the exclusion of, the intellectual discipline, which is presupposed, not neglected, in these words.

The first condition of the freshness and energy of faith is constant devotion. The attrition of the world wears it thin, the distractions of life draw it from its clinging hold on Christ, the very toil for Him is apt to entice our thoughts from out of the secret place of the most High into the busy arena of our strife. Therefore we have ever need to refresh the drooping flowers of the chaplet by bathing them in the Fountain of Life, to rise above all the fevered toil of earth to the calm heights where God dwells, and in still communion with Him to replenish our emptied vessels and fill our dimly burning lamps with His golden oil. The sister of the cumbered Martha is the contemplative Mary, who sits in silence at the Master's feet and lets His words sink into her



soul; the closest friend of Peter the apostle of action is John the apostle of love. If our work is to be worthy, it must ever be freshened anew by our gaze into His face; if our communion with Him is to be deep, it must never be parted from outward service. Our Master has left us the example, in that, when the night fell and every man went to his own home, Jesus went to the Mount of Olives; and thence, after His night of prayer, came very early in the morning, to the temple, and taught. The stream that is to flow broad and life-giving through many lands must have its hidden source high among the pure snows that cap the mount of God. The man that would work for God must live with God. It was from the height of transfiguration that *He* came, before whom the demon that baffled the disciples quailed and slunk away like a whipped hound. This kind goeth not out but by prayer.

The second condition is, rigid self-denial. Fasting is the expression of the purpose to control the lower life and to abstain from its delights in order that the life of the spirit may be strengthened. As to the outward fact, it is nothing—it may be practised or not. If it be, it will be valuable only in so far as it flows from and strengthens that purpose. And such vigorous subordination of all the lower powers, and abstinence from many an inferior good, both material and immaterial, is absolutely necessary if we are to have any wholesome strength of faith in our souls.

In the recoil from the false asceticism of Roman Catholicism and Puritanism, has not this generation of the Church gone too far in the opposite direction? and in the true belief that Christianity can sanctify all joys, and ensure the harmonious development of all our powers, have we not been forgetting that hand and foot may cause us to stumble, and that we had better live maimed than die with all our limbs? There is a true asceticism, a discipline—a “gymnastic unto godliness,” as Paul calls it. And if our faith is to grow high and bear rich clusters on the topmost boughs that look up to the sky, we must keep the wild lower shoots close nipped. Without rigid self-control and self-limitation, no vigorous faith!

And without them no effectual work! It is no holiday task to cast out devils. Self-indulgent men will never do it. Loose-braced, easy souls, that lie open to all the pleasurable influences of ordinary life, are no more fit for God’s weapons than a reed for a lance, or a bit of flexible lead for a spear-point. The wood must be tough and compact, the metal hard and close-grained, out of which God makes His shafts. The brand that is to guide men through the darkness to their Father’s home must glow with a pallor of consuming flame that purges its whole substance into light. This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.

Dear brethren, what solemn rebuke these words have for us all to-day! How they winnow these

works of Christian activity which bring us here this morning! How they show us the hollowness of our services, the self-indulgence of our lives, the coldness of our devotion, the cowardice of our faith! How marvellous they make the fruits which God's great goodness has permitted us to see, even from our doubting service! Let us turn to Him with fresh thankfulness that unto us, who are "less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that we should preach among the nations the unsearchable riches of Christ." Let us not be driven from our confidence that we have a gospel for all the world to preach; but strong in the faith which rests on impregnable historical grounds, on our own experience of what Christ has done for us, and on eighteen centuries of growing power and unfolding wisdom, let us thankfully welcome all that modern thought may supply for the correction of errors in belief, in organization, and in life, that may have gathered round His perfect and eternal gospel—being assured, as we have a right to be, that all will but lift higher the name which is above every name, and set forth more plainly that Cross which is the true tree of life to all the families of men. Let us cast ourselves before Him with penitent confession, and say,—O Lord our strength! we have not wrought any deliverance on earth; we have been weak when all Thy power was at our command; we have spoken Thy word as if it were an experiment and a peradventure

whether it had might; we have let go Thy hand and lost Thy garment's hem from our slack grasp; we have been prayerless and self-indulgent. Therefore Thou hast put us to shame before our foes, and "our enemies laugh among themselves. Thou that dwellest between the cherubim shine forth; stir up Thy strength and come and save us!" Then will the last words that He spoke on earth ring out again from the throne: "All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."



BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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*David Hay*

# FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

AN INQUIRY INTO SCRIPTURE  
TEACHING.

IN THREE LETTERS PUBLISHED IN THE "CHRISTIAN WORLD,"  
WITH ADDITIONS.

BY JOSEPH ANGUS, D.D.

"I HAVE SET BEFORE THEE THIS DAY LIFE AND GOOD, AND DEATH AND EVIL."  
DEUT. XXX. 15.

"VERILY, VERILY, I SAY UNTO YOU, HE THAT HEARETH MY WORD, AND BELIEVETH  
HIM THAT SENT ME, HATH EVERLASTING LIFE, AND COMETH NOT INTO  
CONDEMNATION, BUT HATH PASSED OUT OF DEATH INTO LIFE."  
JOHN V. 24.

LONDON:

JAMES CLARKE AND CO., 13, FLEET STREET, E.C.  
1870.

*Price Sixpence.*

"All souls are immortal (*ἀθάνατοι*), even of the ungodly, to whom it would have been better not to be incorruptible (*ἀφθάρτους*)."—*Clement of Rome* (A.D. 30—100).

"I do not say that all souls die, for that were truly a piece of good fortune to the evil."—*Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho* (A.D. 103—167).

"If the day of a man's death annihilates him (*perimit et delet*), what can be more desirable than, in the midst of the ills of life, to lie down and shut his eyes in an everlasting sleep?"—*Cicero, Tusc. i. 49*.

"Punishments are often much greater than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions of which they are punishments, and many are final to him who incurs them. . . Nor must we forget that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and description as the Scripture does."—*Butler, Analogy, part i., chap. 2*.

"No one becomes blessed by being buried." The blessedness that is perfected then begins now.—*German Proverb*.

"To be far from God, who alone is the source of life, who alone can appease the hunger of the soul and allay the anxiety of the guilty conscience,—to be thus and thus eternally, this is perdition."—*Luthardt*.

"Two kinds of life has double-natured man,  
And two of death,—the last far more severe;—

And he that would be barr'd capacity  
Of pain courts incapacity of bliss.—

Heaven wills our happiness, allows our doom."

*Young, Night Thoughts, bk. vii.*

"This is death—

Darkness from light, from knowledge ignorance,

And lack of love from love made manifest;

The lamp's death when replete with oil it chokes."

*Robt. Browning.*

"Sin is a disturbing force of whose energy we have no sufficient measure, and to whose effects we can set no limit."—*Dr. G. Sidney Smith*.



TO  
JOHN YOUNG, LL.D.,  
REV. EDWARD WHITE,  
REV. SAMUEL MINTON, M.A.,  
REV. ANDREW JUKES, A.B.,  
AND  
HENRY DUNN, ESQ.

---

I venture to dedicate the following pages to you. In much that they contain you will agree.

It is one of the pleasures of my life that I have known and esteemed you all ; nor can I name works that display a stronger sense of the evil of sin or a profounder reverence for Scripture teaching than some which claim you respectively as their authors.

The more I esteem you, the more glad should I be to find you on my side. They are the good men whose mistakes do most mischief to truth.

I do not profess to have solved all difficulties connected with the question I discuss, and the treatment is of necessity brief and popular ; but I believe the solution is in the direction I indicate. And I am sure that our wisdom is to accept God's word as it is, neither creating difficulties it does not recognise, nor attempting solutions which may be at once unneeded and untrue.

With respect and affection,

I remain,

Yours very faithfully,

JOSEPH ANGUS.

“In these declarations of eternal punishment Christ never betrays one symptom of doubt or delicacy. . . It cannot be because He is less tender of man's lot or of God's honour than we are, or because He is not far enough on in the world's progress to have had our great theologic questions occur to Him. . . That the Gospel of speculative philanthropism is carrying just now the vote of the world, more and more largely, is quite probable. But I have thought much, in comparison, of the older, more rugged, rougher Gospel, and I feel obliged to say that it looks more real, and capable, and great. There is nerve in this, and there is none in the other.”—*Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice*, part iii., chap. 5.

“We are compelled again to say, ‘ex inferno nulla redemptio.’”—*Martensen, Christian Dogmatics*, p. 482.

“I do not accept the doctrine of future punishment because I delight in it. I would cast in doubts if I could; but that would do me no good. I could not destroy the thing itself. Nor does it help me to take the word ‘everlasting,’ and put it on a rack like an inquisitor until I make it shriek out some other meaning.”—*H. W. Beecher*.

# FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

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## LETTER I.

### THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE.

“The correct understanding of the New Testament is the sole essential problem of exegetical theology.”—*Schleiermacher*.

“There are two ways of teaching and learning theology.” . . . “The one best suited to the reflecting mind” is “to examine all the places that bear upon the same doctrine, and thence to deduce the information they contain.” “In these essays (of Stuart’s) the writer has completely made out his conclusions.” “He has arrived at them in the surest way, and we see not how they can be successfully gain-said.”—*Dr. S. Davidson’s Preface to Stuart’s Essays*.

“If the Scriptures have not asserted the endless punishment of the wicked, neither have they asserted the endless happiness of the righteous, nor the endless glory and existence of the Godhead.”—*Moses Stuart, Exegetical Essays*, p. 45.

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NOTHING NEW IN MODERN VIEWS.—SADNESS AND INSTRUCTIVENESS OF THIS FACT.—FUTURE PUNISHMENT REASONABLE AND SCRIPTURAL.—ITS NATURE.—FOR WHOM PREPARED.—DURATION.—SUMMARY.—IS THE ENDLESSNESS RESTRICTED?—IS THE PUNISHMENT ANNIHILATION.—IS IT CONDITIONAL?—“THE LARGER HOPE.”—THE QUESTION ONE OF INTERPRETATION SIMPLY.—LESSONS.

1. THERE is nothing new under the sun. With nearly twenty centuries looking down upon us, we are discussing the same questions as occupied the first Fathers of the Church. Trichotomy—the doctrine of man’s threefold nature—body, soul, and spirit, was taught by Justin Martyr, who held that common men are composed of only two parts, body and soul, while Christian men have a third—the spirit—just as now the doctrine is taught by some modern authors. Then,

as now, these views were rejected by the majority of thinkers, Tertullian taking the lead against them. The annihilation of the soul of the wicked was taught by Arnobius and Tatian, as also in more recent times by Hobbes and Whiston, by Dodwell and John Taylor, of Norwich. The doctrine was denounced, on the other hand, by Tertullian and Origen, as in later times it is denied by most theological writers. The Fathers generally regarded future punishment as eternal, while a few thought with Origen that all—devils and men—would be finally saved, though his statements are not always consistent, and the very truth he did not preach, thinking it mischievous to the unconverted. In the last century the same doctrine, under the name of Universalism, found defenders in Chauncy and Vidler, and opponents in Jonathan Edwards and Andrew Fuller. The thing that is is the thing also that has been. *There is nothing new under the sun!* \*

\* It is a misfortune when reasoners differ about their *facts*. It is said, for example, that the doctrine of non-eternal misery is “no novelty,” but “existed uncondemned during the first three centuries of Christianity.” And in support of this opinion we have quotations from Justin, Irenæus, and Arnobius. The last, however, is the only one who holds the doctrine. And the statement of Church historians is generally to the effect that it was not the common faith. Happily English readers can now examine the question for themselves.

Justin Martyr (103—167) is both misunderstood and misquoted. In reasoning against *Plato's* notion of the *essential* divineness and self-subsistent life of the human soul, he holds that it is created and that it lives only while God “wills it to live.”—(Trypho, chap. 6.) In the same context, however (chap. 5), he refuses to say that “the evil will have the good fortune to die;” while in his first Apology he teaches that the bodies of the wicked will be united again to their spirits, and they will undergo *everlasting punishment*, and not only as Plato says, “for a thousand years.”—(Chaps. 8 and 18.)

The testimony of Irenæus (130—200) is less clear, but it is on the whole to the same effect. In confuting Platonism (not Pharisaism, which is quite a different thing) he uses some expressions that are liable to mistake, and speaks of bad men as “deprived of *length of days* for ever.” Elsewhere he speaks again and again of men as sent *away* into everlasting punishment.—(Bk. iv., chaps. 28, 40, v. 27.) Both Massuet (the Benedictine editor) and Dr. Roberts (the translator) agree in saying that he teaches repeatedly that “the wicked will exist in misery for ever.”—*Ante Nic. Fathers, Iren. i. p. 253.*

“Eternal death with punishment,” “the soul destroyed by idolatry, hypocrisy, hatred of truth,” “suffering of eternal punishment”—are the expressions employed in other Apostolic Fathers.—The so-



2. The fact is at once sad and instructive. Sad, for nothing seems to get settled; men are everlastingly repeating themselves, and in their boasted progress they only pace round the same circle of folly or of truth. Yet instructive, for no new thing has happened to us. Ancient, Greek-speaking writers were evidently less clear about the "only possible meaning" of some Greek words than some modern Grecians are said to be. Nor must we complain if each generation has its own work, its own truths to defend, its own victories to win. Sad and instructive, too! Specially instructive will it be if it teach us to think less of great names on either side, and send us away to study God's Word with renewed humility and prayer.

called Barnabas (*Apost. Fathers*, p. 133, 4) and Ignatius (chap. 115) (*ib.* p. 162).

Tatian (fl. 170), who taught that the soul of the wicked dies with the body, holds that both will live again in immortality and will "die continually while they live on for ever."—(Address to the Greeks, chaps. 14, 15.) In the *Recognitions of Clement* (A.D. 200?), the wicked are said to deserve "the punishment of eternal fire in hell, and there their souls shall seek repentance, but not be able to find it."—(Bk. ix., chap. 13.) Cyprian (200—258) says that punishment will *always* afflict the condemned, nor will it ever know rest or end.—(Ad Demetr.) Minucius Felix (fl. 270) says that "their torments will have neither measure nor end."—(Chap. 35.) The language of Hippolytus (230) is equally strong and clear. "To the lovers of iniquity shall be given eternal punishment. No sleep will give them rest, no night will soothe them, no death will deliver them."—(*Discourse ag. the Greeks*, p. 50.) Augustine and Chrysostom, it is well known, affirm the common doctrine at length.

The exceptions to this teaching are rare. Arnobius (303), the rhetorician, taught that the wicked are annihilated and therein separated from the North African Church. Clement of Alexandria (220) and Origen (185—253), the founders of the Alexandrian philosophic school, held universal restoration—an opinion shared by some of their pupils. These views they held on philosophic grounds only, and on grounds which modern evangelical divines would certainly disown. With these exceptions the eternity of future punishment was the common doctrine of the early Church. Our appeal is, of course, to Scripture, but when it is said that the best extra Scripture proof is the opinion of old post-apostolic men, the answer is immediate—they do not teach the doctrine of annihilation, Clement of Rome, Irenæus, Ignatius, Justin, Hippolytus, to wit,—but the common faith.

The "Fathers" are at best 'a kind of Saul's armour, nor should they be used by any who has not first *proved* them. In fact, however, they support the view advocated in these Letters.

3. But while the doctrine of future punishment—its reality, its nature, its duration—is to be settled only by an appeal to Scripture it is worth noting that the doctrine itself is highly reasonable. The idea of the *existence* of the soul after death, which future punishment presupposes, is found among nearly all nations. Almost equally wide-spread is the belief in some retribution. There is probably no thinker who will assert that whatever a man may be whenever he leaves this world he will share at once the glory of the Blessed God. If such a belief were entertained, to die would be everywhere gain. Suicide would cease to be evidence of insanity, and murder would be the easiest way of fulfilling the great law of love.

Apart, therefore, from all revelation, men are generally ready to admit that punishment of some kind must be awarded at last to successful wrong-doers. The traditions of all civilised nations, the commonest argument on behalf of another life, the whispers of conscience which are ever suggesting that sin means punishment, first or last, the very principles that underlie all government—all teach that while “Abel’s blood cries out from the ground, and Cain goes off welcomed to the arms of the daughters of Nod,” the whole history of these two is not yet told us; and that, in short, the prosperity that often attends a bad man even to the grave is not all the portion of his cup. The wrongs of the world would become intolerable if the body had no soul, earth no hell, creation no Judge!

4. What all men feel to be reasonable, what good men trust to as just, the New Testament reveals as true. The doctrine of a future punishment is a clear and essential part of its teaching. By no conceivable perversion of our Lord’s words, by no toning down of their meaning as figurative or parabolical, can we get rid of the conviction that it was His intention to teach that there is a “wrath to come,” a state of being that is “accursed,” and that its penalties are in proportion to our wrong-doing. Yes; in God’s Word His wrath

is as certainly revealed—I will not say as fully—as His love. Generally both are set forth in the same books, often in the same chapter and verse. Nay, more, it is the wrath that gives scope for the love. ‘Deny that the world is perishing, and the love which dies for it becomes unmeaning.’ Men may not think of it, but the denial of our ruin and misery is the denial of the value of our salvation too. We have *destroyed* ourselves; therefore is it that we bless God, that in Him is our help found.

5. But we fairly ask, What does Scripture say further of the nature of this punishment and of the duration of it? Hear then as *to its nature*, how it is described and for whom it is prepared.

“All that are in their graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have *done evil*—their life summed up as the doing of what is profitless and vain—to the *resurrection of condemnation*” (John v. 29). “He that believeth shall be saved; he that *believeth not*”—or, as in John iii. 18, 36, he that disbelieveth—“shall be *damned*” (Mark xvi. 16). “All things that *offend*” (i.e., that *create sin*), “and all them that do iniquity”—words that describe a *lawless life*—“shall be *cast into the furnace of fire*. There shall there be Weeping and Gnashing of teeth” (Matt. xiii. 41). “These” (that *refused to feel for and to help* our Lord’s brethren) “shall go away into *everlasting punishment*” (or chastisement); “but the righteous unto everlasting life” (Matt. xxv. 46). “When the lord cometh the servant who *knew his lord’s will and prepared not himself*, neither did according to his will, shall be *beaten with many stripes*, but he that *knew not . . . with few*” (Luke xii. 47). “As many as have sinned without law shall perish without law, and as many as have *sinned under law* shall be judged by the law . . . in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my Gospel by Jesus Christ” (Rom. ii. 12—16). “The Lord Jesus Christ is to be revealed from heaven *inflicting just punishment* on them that *know not God* and on



them that *obey not the Gospel* of our Lord Jesus Christ,—*the which shall pay, as righteous punishment, everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of His might*” (2. Thess. i. 8, 9). “For those who *go on sinning wilfully*, after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth a *fearful awaiting* (or reception) of judgment, and a *fiery indignation*, soon to devour *those who oppose*” (Heb. x. 27). “Verily the Lord knoweth how to deliver the *godly* (the pious, the reverent), and to reserve under punishment (or chastisement) the unjust unto the day of judgment” (2 Peter ii. 9). “The heavens and the earth are treasured up for fire unto the day of *judgment and perdition* of *ungodly* (impious, irreverent) men” (2. Peter ii. 7). “The Lord cometh to *execute judgment*, and to *convict* all the *ungodly* of all the deeds of their ungodliness which they have in ungodliness committed, and of all the hard things that ungodly sinners have spoken against Him” (Jude 15). “And when at last the sea shall give up the dead which are in it, and death and Hades shall give up the dead that are in them, they will be judged every man according to his works, and whosoever *is not written in the Book of Life*,—has not his name on the roll of the living,—will be *cast into the lake of fire*” (Rev. xx. 13, 14, 15). “This is the second death;” “and there the *cowardly, and unbelieving, and abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and idolaters, and all liars* have *their part*.” (Rev. xxi. 8.)

These passages, so awful in themselves that to write them makes the hand shake, and to hear them makes the ears tingle, are rendered the more awful by the fact that they are taken from the teachings of our Lord and of four of His disciples who largely shared His spirit. *He* was incapable of exaggeration or of passion. They wept with Him over the sins of men, and devoted their lives to save them. In no case are their words the utterances of extravagance or of temper. The announcement they make of a future judgment is the language, as one of them tells us, “of soberness and truth;” and the wrath which men have to fear is “the wrath



of the Lamb"—the wrath of exhausted mercy, of rejected and unavailing love.

6. The *duration* of this punishment is set forth in terms equally explicit. "The blackness of darkness is reserved for them *for ever*" (*eis aiona*) (Jude 13). The same phrase is used to describe the happiness of the redeemed, "which abideth *for ever*" (Jno. vi. 51, 58; Jno. ii. 17); the glory of Christ, who as Son and priest "abideth *for ever*" (Jno. viii. 35; 2 Pet. iii. 18; Heb. vii. 17, 21, 24); the honour of God, who is "blessed *for ever*" (Rom. i. 25).

The smoke of the persecuting Babylon of the Revelation ascendeth up "*for ever and ever*" (*eis tous aionas tōn aionōn*) (Rev. xix. 3); and the worshippers of the beast and his image are "tormented *for ever and ever*" (Rev. xiv. 11). The same phrase is applied to the happiness of the righteous, who "reign *for ever and ever*" (Rev. xxii. 5); to the blessedness of Christ, who is worshipped "*for ever and ever*" (Rev. v. 11—15); and to God, to whom be glory "*for ever and ever*" (Gal. i. 5, Phil. iv. 20).

The wicked are said also to go away into *everlasting* (*aiōnios*) punishment (Matt. xviii. 8, xxv. 41—46, Mark iii. 29). "They suffer the penalty, the righteous penalty of *everlasting* destruction" (2 Thess. i. 9). The same phrase is used to describe the happiness of the righteous, who go away into "everlasting life" (Matt. xix. 29, xxv. 46, Mark x. 30, Jno. iii. 15, 16, Rom. ii. 7, 2 Cor. iv. 17), and to the glory of the everlasting God (Rom. xvi. 26, 1 <sup>1<sup>st</sup></sup> ~~Thess.~~ <sup>Thess.</sup> vi. 16).

These are the only phrases used in Scripture to set forth the duration of the future glory and happiness of the redeemed, the duration of the honour and blessedness of God Himself, and all are used to set forth the punishment with which those are visited who reject the Gospel. *Every form of words employed in Scripture to describe everlastingness our Lord and His Apostles employ to describe the state of those who die in sin and disbelief.*

7. Here, then, we have the *character* of the condemned and

their *destiny*. They are doers of what is evil, of what is lawless, of what is not loving and kind, of what is not according to God's will. They sin under law; they go on sinning wilfully; they obey not the Gospel; they oppose themselves; they obey unrighteousness. They are sensual, selfish (*εὐερίθειας*), impenitent, disbelieving. They know not God; they love not Christ; they resist the Spirit—terms that describe not *single acts* so much as states and habits; in short, a settled character. It is not that these men have stepped into the broad road; they walk in it and follow it. These trees fall as they have come to lean; and they lie, so far as we can judge, as they fall.

Their *destiny* is described as condemnation or judgment, as complete condemnation (damnation as it is now called), as receiving judgment and fiery indignation, as not seeing life for the wrath of God abideth on them, as being sent away into outer darkness, as being cast alive into hell, into everlasting fire, in which they are tormented day and night for ever, as being sent away into everlasting chastisement, into everlasting righteous punishment, into everlasting destruction; and—

The *duration* of this destiny is described by all the forms of expression that are used in Scripture to set forth the everlastingness of the blessedness of heaven itself.

Whatever alleviations there may be of these awful truths—and alleviations I believe there are—I can find none in questioning the truths themselves. The language—of which I have given only samples—is too clear, and frequent, and strong.

8. I know indeed that these terms descriptive of everlastingness are sometimes used in a narrower sense—"The *everlasting* hills;" "His children shall sit upon his throne for *ever*," fulfilled in the case of the descendants of David by their occupying the throne of Judah as long as it remained a kingdom. These are instances, just as in other languages "the true artist is said to paint *for eternity*," and "a thing

of beauty is a joy *for ever*." No one can question this restricted use of the terms. But two things have to be remembered. *First*, men speak of this restricted meaning as if it were quite common in Scripture, whereas it is comparatively rare even in the Old Testament, while in the New Testament it is questionable whether it be found at all. The only passage is in Jude where Sodom and Gomorrah are said "to suffer the righteous punishment of eternal fire," and this instance is by no means clear. There is certainly no case in the New Testament in which "everlasting," when used of the future, has the narrow meaning, unless it be in relation to future punishment itself. And, *besides*, the words occur in contexts where they are found already in their proper meaning ("everlasting life," "everlasting punishment"). To interpret them literally in one clause and restrictedly in the next, and to do this again and again a dozen times, is therefore a practice that no sound principles of interpretation can defend.

9. I know, also, that it is said that as the reward of the righteous is *life*, so the reward of the wicked and of the disbelieving is *death—destruction* from the presence of the Lord; and that, as life is existence, so death or destruction is annihilation. This is Mr. Minton's argument, as it was also Mr. White's before him. It is also the argument of the English writers of the last century, though it found little favour with the Greek-speaking Fathers of the early age. But the argument involves, as it seems to me, an entire misunderstanding of the meaning of terms. No doubt we who believe have eternal life *before us*, and are *waiting for it*, as the finally impenitent and disbelieving have death and perdition *before* them. But these are half-truths only. If we have believed our everlasting life is begun. It dates not from the morning of the resurrection, but from the day of our conversion. When we believed "we passed from death unto life;" and our everlasting life is only the perpetuation and completion of what we have already. So of the impenitent. They are already dead in law, as is the condemned malefactor; dead to



holy feeling, as the blind man is dead to the beauties of colour, the deaf man to the harmonies of music ; dead to practical holiness, as the man whose muscles are paralysed is dead to all activity ; dead to happiness, even though they be "living in pleasure." And so, as John tells us, "they abide in death." As their present state of death and destruction is not annihilation, neither is the perpetuation of that state. Eternal death, in short (if the phrase may be allowed), is the consummation of the sinner's present condition, just as eternal life, in its fullest sense, is the consummation of the present condition of all who believe.

10. There is yet another mode of setting aside this teaching. It is said that the passages quoted do not affirm that any will be punished eternally, but only that punishment will be awarded *if* there be continued unbelief. It will be seen, however, that the cases described are not suppositions, but facts of actual occurrence. It is not said that if men continue in sin or in unbelief for ever they will be punished for ever, though this is no doubt true ; but that the time is coming when those who are now sinners and unbelievers will be doomed to that punishment. There are some, indeed, whose doom is already certain. Their sin goes beforehand to judgment. For any who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost there is never forgiveness, as there is no true repentance. All who go on sinning wilfully after receiving a knowledge of the truth have before them only fiery indignation. And, moreover, the day of judgment is ever represented as a day of decision, a *crisis* in human destiny. After it, "the wicked go away ;" Christ Himself bids them go ; and the door is shut. When He comes to be glorified in His saints, when He judges the secrets of men, there rests upon the ungodly "indignation and wrath ;" "they are punished with everlasting destruction." (2 Thess. i. 8—10.) These are stated, not as *supposed* cases, but as actual facts.

11. And yet in spite of this clear and awful teaching I can



fancy that some humble inquirer pleads—"Is there nothing in Scripture to give hope? Did not Origen find comfort in the assurance that Christ must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet? It was but one piece of money that was lost out of ten, but one sheep out of a hundred, but one son out of two, and each *lost* one—not annihilated surely—was found." "May we not hope that every piece of money still bearing the king's image, though defaced, will be recovered from the dust and restored to the king's treasury, and that every prodigal, convinced, at last, through self-inflicted misery, of his folly, will return to the bosom of his Father?"

"The wish that of the living whole  
No life may fail beyond the grave,  
Oh, comes it not from what we have,  
The likest God within the soul?"

No man with a human heart can fail to feel the force of these pleas. Most men have been tempted to "trust this larger hope." But, alas! when all things are put under Christ's feet, the last enemy destroyed, and Death and Hades cast into the lake of fire, therein is also to be cast "whosoever is not found written in the Book of Life." The "hope" is suggested only by parables, and by parables that clearly touch not the question whether all are saved; while there are parables still more numerous that speak of virgins shut out from the marriage, of the man without the wedding garment (the symbol of sympathy with the purpose of the feast) who was sent away into outer darkness, where was weeping and gnashing of teeth, of servants who knew their lord's will, and did not according to his will, and who were therefore cut asunder, and after that had their portion with the unfaithful. The poet's "dream" is answered by the poet's fears:—

"For I, considering everywhere  
Her secret meaning in her deeds,  
And finding that of fifty seeds  
She often brings but one to bear;  
I falter where I firmly trod."

*Above all*, it is impossible to forget that Jesus Christ, Son of Man and Son of God, perfect love as well as perfect

purity, Saviour and Judge, has given no hope that men who die unwon by love will ever be won by punishment. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, but he that believeth not on the Son *shall not see life*, but the *wrath of God abideth on him.*" Can words be more clear or more awful!

12. In this summary of Scripture teaching I have taken no passages from the Old Testament. I have said nothing of the claims of God's justice, nothing of the infinite evil of sin; as, on the other hand, I have said nothing of the supposed inconsistency between this doctrine and the Divine goodness. I have purposely abstained from all such arguments on either side. I do not think the question can be settled in that way. The fact is that finite minds cannot tell what infinite justice will demand or what infinite goodness will allow. If I were reasoning from such principles the very first thing I should do would be to deny that there could be SIN; and as this reasoning is palpably absurd, I hold my peace. The existence of moral evil is to me a far profounder mystery than the punishment of it. In short, the whole question is one of interpretation simply, and our wisdom is to listen reverently to the New Testament.

13. With this explicit Scripture teaching before us, two lessons at least may be fairly noted and enforced.

It rebukes the style of talk in which many indulge. They scruple not to speak of this terrible ending of human life in any case as unjust or as revolting to charity. It is not that they use the argument of the incompatibility of the doctrine with God's benevolence to explain Scripture, or reverently to guide them to the selection of one of two interpretations both equally probable. They use it to set aside Scripture itself. In the extreme form of this talk it is the very existence of hell that is denied, and the plea urged is that God's benevolence will never doom men to such a destiny. Even when the argument is not carried thus far, men use it rhetorically to set aside the plain teaching of our Lord. They say, "It is torture to think of our friends as *there*, and how can God

allow it?" "Such harsh thoughts of His judgments belong to the dark ages, to priestism, or to 'sulphurous' preachers of our own time. With more charity, and a juster appreciation of God's benevolence, the doctrine would be sent back to the morbid fanaticism whence it sprang." 'Ought not such reasoners to ask whether Christ had not as much regard for God's honour as they, whether He felt not as tenderly for men? It is He and Paul who speak most of wrath to come, and warn men to flee from it, or tell them that they cannot escape it. These "harsh thoughts" of human destiny they entertained and published. Our modern benevolence is at best very cheap. What if it be also blasphemous and destructive; dishonouring by implication to God's "philanthropy," and precipitating the very ruin it professes to fear!

And as a second lesson; if the doctrine of a future punishment is Scriptural, ought it not to be preached as Scripture reveals it? To be silent in relation to it, to question it, to teach it as a mystery to be kept in reserve, to tone it down as unsuited for modern ears, is a practice unwarranted by anything in Scripture. Let men give it no larger place in their preaching than it occupies in the New Testament; let them keep if they will to Scripture language—as was Jay's practice; and leave it in all its simplicity and awfulness to produce its fair impression on the popular mind. But to deny or to dilute its affirmations may be to inflict serious mischief on practical godliness. Fear and love are the two motive forces by which men are won to God; and it is at our peril we weaken either. Scripture is clearly in favour of this view; and for myself I believe that the whole Gospel, with its provisions of terror and of grace, will find a readier response in man's complex nature—his conscience and his heart, than the substitutes which some are now seeking to put in its place.

In my next letter I intend to add notes and explanations on some of the statements here made; and in the third and last I purpose noting briefly some alleviations of the great mystery involved in the doctrine itself.

## LETTER II.

## NOTES.

"The doctrine of the Jewish people in the days of our Lord, as learned from Josephus, is beyond dispute. The language used is free from all ambiguity. 'Immortal,' 'unceasing,' 'endless,' 'everlasting,' can have but one meaning."—*Dr. G. Sidney Smith.*

"Every moral development attains its end whether above or beneath. These are the two goals—to be saved or to be lost. Eternity is a necessary element of the idea of perdition. Perdition for a time is perdition no more.—*Nicolas.*

"It cannot be Biblically maintained that through the Fall death is become natural to man as *deprived of spirit*, for the psychological man is, and remains by virtue of his original nature, a pneumatological one. . . . Death in sin is not negation of being. . . . and so the second death may exclude the capacity for spiritual animation, without annulling existence."—*Nitzsch.*

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METHODS, CANONS, SYSTEMS OF THEOLOGY. — DESTRUCTION. — PUNISHMENT AND CHASTISEMENT.—EVERLASTING.—ETERNAL LIFE, DEATH.—GHEHENNA.—THE WRATH OF GOD.—THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

1. METHODS, CANONS, and SYSTEMS OF THEOLOGY.—The sum of all that has been stated thus far is that men are represented in Scripture as living after death. Their souls survive, some in bliss, some under chastisement. They are to be summoned to judgment, and after the judgment they are sent away into punishment that is described by all the words used in the New Testament to set forth the everlastingness of the blessedness of the righteous. The words "death" and "destroyed" are applied to the condition of men in this world. They are, therefore, consistent with continued life in the next.

These expressions, which are all taken from Scripture, I understand in their usual Scripture sense. We need no theory on the natural immortality of the soul, no systematic theology on the nature of the Fall, or on Redemption, no special canons of interpretation, to explain them. The words



speak for themselves; and I believe that if it were not for theories on other subjects, or the difficulty we feel in admitting the doctrine they teach, the interpretation would stand without dispute.

At the same time, if the words thus used represent the truth, it must be defensible on sound canons of interpretation, and it must harmonise with sound, systematic views of the Gospel itself. I willingly accept these conditions.

The only canon of interpretation concerned in the case is that words must be understood in their common meaning—i.e., in the meaning common to the authors who use them, until some other meaning is shown to be required by the context or by other teachings of those authors.

The common meaning, I repeat, is the most probable one in each case: the common meaning, not necessarily the *literal* one, for reasons which Whately gives.\* What the rule

\* Whately's Logic, bk. iii. § 10. The reader will note the language here used. Other forms of the rule have been given, but less accurately.

It is said, for example, that words are to be taken in their *literal* sense rather than in their figurative, and "that the literal sense is *prima facie* the true sense." But that *depends*. In a treatise on mental philosophy "reflection" is never likely to have its literal meaning; in a treatise on optics the literal meaning is the most probable. In a medical treatise the Greek word for salvation has its literal meaning in healing, a deliverance; in the New Testament the figurative meaning prevails. In the Pentateuch "sacrifice" and "offering" are taken literally; in prophecies that speak of Gospel times they are generally figurative. In the New Testament they are both. Whately's hint, in short, is important. He reminds students of his Logic that sometimes words are used more extensively in their *secondary* sense than in their primary, and that sometimes words are employed always in their secondary sense, and with only a trace of their primary meaning beneath.

The bearing of these remarks on the present question is obvious. Critics who give the rule as above—the literal meaning is the probable one—say life is simply life, and death is destruction; therefore the righteous alone live, and the wicked perish—i.e., are annihilated. But, in fact, life (*zoe*) in the New Testament has generally its figurative or secondary meaning, and that meaning—not the *literal* one—is in each new instance the probable meaning; destruction or death is simply its opposite.

Nor is it accurate to say "that the literal sense of the main current of expressions employed in a document shall *always* be taken as the ruling sense, so that all seemingly exceptional phrases shall be explained in accordance with the ruling sense."

The literal sense does not overrule the figurative, nor does the

means is that, if in nine instances out of every ten a word has one meaning, and in the tenth instance another meaning, the probabilities are as nine to one that it has the common meaning in any new instance. Of course, the "burden of proof" rests with the man who takes it in the "odd" sense.

Now to apply this rule. Books have been written to prove that "life," the opposite of "death," is in Christ. What is the meaning of "life"? I turn to a Concordance under *Zoe*, the true Greek word for it, and I find that in five cases out of every six (or thereabouts) life is a special blessing, given to all who believe. They were *living men* before they received it; and bad men, who are living men, are without it. Therefore, the life is not existence, but something which, while implying existence, is much more. Occasionally, the word is used of the life we all live on earth, the "life which is as a vapour that passeth away;" but the deeper meaning is the common one. The "death," which is the opposite of this life, is the state of those who are without it, a state that is ascribed again and again to living men. This meaning of life may not be found in "Liddell and Scott," but it will be found many times in the Old Testament, more than fifty

common meaning overrule the unusual. Both may be maintained. The common meaning of "soul" in the Old Testament, *e.g.*, is the "spiritual reasoning part of our nature," the seat of thought, affection, and religious feeling. Occasionally it means "persons," and occasionally "life" itself. Any Hebrew or Greek Concordance will give the passages. If the principle stated be sound, and this ruling sense is to decide the meaning of the word everywhere else, it follows that brutes have souls as well as men, for the earth is said to bring forth living *souls* (Gen. i. 24, Heb.), and Jews under the Law were defiled by touching *souls* (Numb. ix. 6, Heb.). Nearly every word in every language has a ruling sense; but secondary senses remain unmodified by it.

The use made of this supposed rule is very delusive. In the *Bible as a whole* "life" is oftener literal life than anything else; therefore the ruling sense must be adopted, it is said, in every case!

The absurdity of the rule as thus stated is the more marked because it is the peculiarity and glory of the Gospel that all its spiritual realities are described in words taken from the lower use of daily life. Humility, the new birth, faith, justification, holiness, the kingdom of heaven—all express ideas that are new and unusual, and their very newness is among the evidences of their truth.

times in the New Testament, and is the *common meaning* of the word there. The common meaning is of course to rule.

"To save," "salvation," "Saviour," are words that occur 140 times in the New Testament. In 100 passages they have a spiritual meaning. In forty they refer to literal healing or physical deliverance. "Destruction" is the opposite term. Sometimes it is used literally, sometimes spiritually. Nearly all the literal meanings of "save" (37 of them) are in the Gospels, as are most of the literal meanings of "destroy." In the Epistles the spiritual meaning of each is the most common. In giving, therefore, to "salvation" and its opposite, "destruction," their spiritual meaning we are only acting upon the canon just named.

Once more. Nine times out of every ten the words "everlasting" and "for ever" are used in the New Testament of God and Christ and the blessedness of the redeemed, and mean properly, I suppose, "everlasting." In each tenth case it is used of the punishment of the wicked. Is not the first usage the usage "that ought to rule"?

If, therefore, we take the words—Life, Death, Salvation, Destruction, Everlasting,—in their common meaning—the "*ruling*" meaning, as it has been called, the discussion is at an end!

Attempts to get rid of the doctrine we are discussing by appealing to some comprehensive theory on the design of the Gospel take two forms. A theologian may say, man is naturally mortal, in every part, body and soul. Death was threatened as the penalty of sin. Death is simply the taking away of the life (the Psyche) of the sinner: for so our first parents must have understood the term. They saw brutes die, and could have no other conception than that they themselves were to die as the brutes. The teaching of the New Testament corresponds. Men die through Adam, as he was to die, and as brutes die.

"Dust thou art, to dust returnest,  
Was" first "spoken of the soul."

Eternal life, however—i.e., eternal existence—is the gift of



Christ for all who believe, but for none besides. Of course it follows that "destruction," annihilation, is the destiny of all whose original nature remains through unbelief unchanged.

Or, the theory takes another form. Whatever may have been the original nature of the man, the consequences of the first sin, and the meaning of the penalty denounced against it, the promise of the Gospel, it is said, is one of universal salvation. Christ is to reconcile *all things* unto Himself. God sent His Son that *the world* might be saved. The *free gift* is as wide as the condemnation. God being the Saviour of *all men*, and specially of those who believe, must be the Saviour of those who *do not believe*.\* And therefore punishment must end and end for ever in a blessed life.

There are specimens of theological systems held in support of the views we are now discussing. One or two remarks may be allowed in relation to them.

(1.) They are mutually destructive, and cannot both be true. Universalists, from the time of Origen downwards, deny annihilation; and Annihilationists, from Arnobius downwards, deny universalism. Systems, therefore, are no more helpful in settling this dispute than simple interpretations—rather less it seems.

(2.) The *first* system depends largely on what Adam understood by death. He may in his unfallen state have understood less than three-fourths of all nations have understood by it—for that death is to man more than to brutes is the common faith of the world. He had small knowledge of *ill*, we know, and perhaps he failed to grasp all the meaning of this summary of all ills. Yet why, even if it were so, should God mean no more, and we understand no more, than he? Is his understanding of the first promise to be our rule?—and if not, why is his supposed understanding of the first threat? The *second* system depends largely on wide and sweeping generalisations in the New Testament taken out of their contexts and without reference to far more numerous and more clear statements of an entirely different kind.

\* Dr. John Young—*The Creator and the Creation*.



(3.) The notion that the life (*Psyche*) of brutes is the same as the life (*Psyche*) in man is not so much humbling as degrading, is largely contradicted by nearly all nations, as it is by Scripture itself and by Jewish belief. If any reader will turn to "Soul" (the common rendering of *Psyche*) in Cruden, he will find that in by far the majority of passages the word means in both Testaments what is in man the seat of affection, thought, religious conviction, holiness, and sin, though sometimes it means the natural or *animal life* in man—the thing we give up when we die. The word, however, is very rarely used in the Old Testament of the life of brutes, and only twice (Rev. viii. 9, xvi. 3) in the New. Yet it is practically on this view of the soul that the annihilation argument rests.

(4.) The Universalist passages are nearly all restricted in meaning in the contexts where they are found. God sent His Son to *save* the world, not to judge it; and yet He will judge it, and in the issue those who *believe not* will perish. The "free gift," which is thought to be as wide as "the judgment," is restricted in Romans to those who "*accept it*" (Rom. v. 17); while the notion that God is the Saviour of all "who do not believe" is corrected by the teaching of the same Epistle that there are deceitful lusts which drown men "in destruction and perdition,"—not surely a "blessed life." But besides—

(5.) These arguments, based on the general design of the Gospel,—systems of theology such as they are,—prove nothing except the consistency of each system, not with Scripture teaching, but with itself. Men adopt a system which denies the plain teaching of Scripture and then boast that the new meaning they give that teaching matches their system, and therefore it is true. The common view of eternal punishment is equally consistent with the common systems of truth, and is so far as likely to be true as the other views, while it has the immense advantage of interpreting the teaching of Scripture on punishment according to the plain meaning of the words.

2. DESTRUCTION.—It is a favourite doctrine with some writers that when men are “destroyed” they cease to be, and that when God “destroys” them He annihilates them—systematic theologians notwithstanding.

The question is, of course, one for dictionaries in part to settle. Does “*apollumi*” always mean to annihilate? and are *apoleia* and *olethros* always annihilation? I turn to “Liddell and Scott,” and find that the Greek verb means to kill, to lay waste or ruin, to bore one to death, to perish or die, to be undone or ruined, to be lost; and examples of each meaning are given from classic authors. A house, it seems, may be “destroyed” by fire, a land by war, a man by his pride. Herodotus even tells us what the Getæ believed became of a man when he was “destroyed,” and how he was supposed to go afterwards into the presence of one of their gods. The noun (*olethros*) means ruin, destruction, death, and when applied to persons—one who is the ruin or the plague of another. I turn to “Wahl” and find that in the Greek Testament the word means to destroy—i.e. (1) to take away life, (2) to undo, to ruin without any idea of annihilation, (3) to make useless, and (4) to make utterly miserable, spoken of those who are excluded from eternal life. Then it means—to be lost, and is the word applied to the lost sheep of the House of Israel, and to the Prodigal Son. These are not opinions of theologians, but of lexicographers.

Of course, however, the lexicographers are only witnesses; the true authority is actual usage. Is, then, destruction used in Scripture for annihilation and nothing else? The prosperity of fools is said to “destroy” them. (Prov. i. 32.) Is that always annihilation? Must the sheep be annihilated before we can pronounce a curse upon those “that destroy them”? (Jer. xxiii. 1.) Did Christ come to seek and to save that which was annihilated? Was the Prodigal Son annihilated before he was found? Was it annihilation the evil spirit feared when he asked, “Art thou come to destroy us”? (Mark i. 24.) Was it not rather the “abyss,” the bottomless pit, the “torment before the time,” of which the

spirits speak elsewhere? \* When Christ *died* for the people was He annihilated? (Jno. xviii. 14.) Was it for the *annihilation* of the flesh that the incestuous member was excluded? (1 Cor. v. 5.) Did God annihilate the men who “perished in the flood”? (2 Pet. iii. 6.) Have the Israelites whom God “destroyed in the wilderness” been annihilated? (Jude 5, 11) and all the unbelievers of Rahab’s day? (Heb. xi. 31.) And is there for them no resurrection of the just and of the unjust? Will none of them appear in the judgment—“hear His voice and come forth”? In all these cases the “destruction” is said to be past; and yet those to whom it is applied are supposed to be still living—some to be saved and others still to suffer.

Even where the destruction is spoken of as future it cannot mean annihilation. For it is the thing threatened, and it is described in words that imply conscious suffering. Men are to be “punished” with it; they are to “suffer” it; they “go away” into it; they are “cast alive” into it; they “have no rest day nor night;” “their worm dieth not, their fire is not quenched.” It is after God has killed that He casts into hell. This is described as the everlasting perdition with which men are visited *when Christ comes*. Most who hold ultimate annihilation hold that it is preceded by years or ages of suffering. Either these ages of suffering are “the destruction” or they are not. If they are, then clearly destruction is consistent with continued life. If they are not the destruction, but only precede it, then the destruction is not inflicted when Christ comes, as it is said to be; and the

\* Surely this is the meaning of “destroying body and soul” in hell—a thing God *can* do. (Matt. x. 28.) In the parallel passage the phrase is simply “cast into hell.” (Luke xii. 5.) The demons express the thought in three forms—“destroy,” “send away into the bottomless pit,” and “torment before the time.” (Mark i. 24, Luke iv. 34, Matt. viii. 29, Luke viii. 31.) The evil spirits thought that “destruction” was “torment,” and though they might have got the notion—as I see it is said the Jews got their notions of a future life—from the heathen, they were right in their views (Matt. xxv. 41.) The destruction of a spirit is expounded by spirits themselves as meaning torment—not annihilation, and their interpretation is confirmed by the Judge Himself!



threatened destruction, which is always spoken of as punishment, is a blessing, not a curse. It is either suffering or a most welcome release! From one or other of these conclusions I see no escape.

If the English reader wish further to sift this question, let me remind him that "destruction" and "destroy" are very common words in our English version, and that they are often used to translate Greek words which have no connection with annihilation at all. There is nothing of annihilation in the following:—1 Cor. xv. 26 (the last enemy that shall be destroyed), 2 Thess. ii. 8 (whom He will destroy with the brightness of His coming), Heb. ii. 14, 1 Cor. vi. 13. In these passages the word means simply "take away the occupation of," render powerless. It is the word applied to the ground that was "cumbered" with the fruitless tree, and could therefore grow nothing besides. Nor is there anything of annihilation in the following:—Rom. iii. 16, 2 Cor. x. 8, xiii. 10, Acts ix. 21, Gal. i. 23, 1 John iii. 8, Matt. v. 17, xxvi. 61, xxvii. 40, Acts vi. 14, Gal. ii. 18, Acts xiii. 19. It is unfortunate that words so different in meaning as the words found in these passages should have been translated by the same English word. The fact has one advantage however. It shows that the translators of the English Bible, who were masters of their own tongue, never supposed that "destruction" implied of necessity annihilation.

In short, destruction or perdition is the opposite of salvation, as any one may see on comparing Scripture—e.g., James iv. 12, and 1 Cor. i. 18—just as life is the opposite of death; so that, as salvation is not merely continued life, neither is destruction the cessation of life. Each is both present and future, and the future of each is only the present in its blessed or in its awful completeness.

3. PUNISHMENT.—"The great end of all punishment," it is said, "is the improvement of the criminal. Hence one New Testament word for punishment (*kolasis*) should rather be rendered *correction*, and the design of future punishment



must be the recovery of the guilty themselves." This theory of the end of punishment is a favourite one, but it is not sound. Punishment is primarily intended to vindicate law, and to protect society against outrage. The recovery of the criminal may be important, but it is really secondary, and is often disregarded altogether.

As a piece of criticism on New Testament translation this theory is also a mistake. Twice only is a word used of sinners in the New Testament that is thought to imply corrective discipline. Once in Matt. (xxv. 46), "These shall go away into everlasting chastisement" (*kolasis*); and once in 2 Pet. (ii. 9), where the "unrighteous are said to be kept under chastisement till the day of judgment." Everywhere else (*twenty-four* places) the words for punishment imply the infliction of penalty for the vindication of outraged justice (*ekdikesis*), and once of outraged honour (*timoria*) (Heb. x. 29). A common rendering of these last words is "avenge," "revenge," "vengeance"—a word that means in old English what *vindicates* law or right. In eleven of these passages the words apply to the avenging by God of all disobedience. The *modern* notion suggested by "vengeance" is wrong and mischievous. There is no passionateness implied in the Greek nor in the *old* English meaning.

But besides this fact the word supposed to mean chastisement (*kolasis*) has not that meaning. It really describes punishment in relation to the *feeling* of the criminal, not (as the other words describe it) in relation to law. The two other passages in the New Testament where the word is found (though not applied to Divine punishment) sustain this view. (In Acts iv. 21, the priests wanted to make the apostles *smart* for it; and in 1 John iv. 18, "fear hath *torment*.") The New Testament word for loving discipline or fatherly chastisement is entirely different (Heb. xii. 6, Rev. iii. 19), and is never used of the final punishment of the wicked.

There is a curious amount of prejudice against future punishment from the use of the word "torment" in relation

to it. It occurs nine times in Revelation, in the parable of the rich man (Luke xvi. 23, 28), in the petition of the evil spirit (Mark v. 7), and in the case of the debtor who was given over to the "tormentors." Punishment, it is said, is possible; but "torment" never.

The Greek word means to try sorely.\* Of old jailers were often empowered by law to whip or otherwise punish criminals; hence they were called "tormentors;" and hence "tormentor" is defined as "one who inflicts *penal* torture" (Ogilvie).

A form of the same word is used in the Septuagint for a prison-house (compare 1 Pet. iii. 19); another form for grief or heavy calamity, and for trespass offering or punishment (see 1 Sam. vi. 3, 4, Septuagint).

If, therefore, punishment be used everywhere, we shall do more justice to the true meaning. The modern idea of gratuitous, cruel suffering is not in the word at all.

4. "EVERLASTING," "FOR EVER AND EVER."—I have heard men say, "Everlasting,—oh, it may mean anything. It is used in Scripture of the hills and of covenants that have long since ended. Some hold that it means 'age-lasting,' and translate it 'time-state.' Others think that it means 'spiritual.' We cannot put dependence upon that word." But the word has a definite meaning notwithstanding. Happily its meaning is in old Greek clear enough. Aristotle, the tutor of Alexander the Great, has explained it at length. In describing the highest heaven as the residence of the gods he says that as to the things there time never makes them grow old; neither is there any change of any of them. They are unchangeable and passionless, and having the best, even the self-sufficient life, they continue through all (*aiona*) *eternity*. For the word itself, according to the ancients, divinely expressed this. For the period which comprehends

\* A glimpse of the old meaning may be seen in Robert of Gloucester's statement that "Peter *tormented* our Lord that they might not perish."

the time of every one's life, beyond which, according to nature, nothing exists, is called his *aion* (eternity). And for the same reason also the period of the whole heaven, even the infinite time of all things, and the period comprehending that infinity, is *aion* (eternity), deriving its name from (*aei einai*) *always being*, immortal and Divine. Whence also it is applied to other things, to some indeed *accurately*, but to others in the *lax signification* of *being* and of *living*. (De Cælo. Lib. i. c. 9.)

And this word is the one which is used by the Alexandrian translators of the Septuagint to render *leolam*, an expression to which Gesenius assigns as its proper and primary meaning the sense of (*ewigkeit*) *eternity*. Indeed, he gives no other meaning, only remarking that with the Hebrews, as with us, it was used somewhat loosely. It is, in short, our English word "*for aye*," and is used in the same way.

Such is the common meaning of the word. As to Bible usage, it is seldom found in the Old Testament, except in the proper sense; and in the New, when applied to future time, it is found in that sense alone, unless we regard its application to the wicked as an exception. We never find the word used figuratively of the hills or of the sea. It occurs in the New Testament in one of its forms, and as applied to future time, about 130 times; of these in 118 passages it is applied to God or Christ, their honours and blessedness, or to Christians and the everlasting life they gain; 12 times it is applied to the punishment of the wicked. Restricted usage of the phrase itself there is none. Everlastingness of blessedness and of misery is described in the New Testament only by this word, and *the word is never used there in a future sense of anything besides*. There is in it none of the uncertainty for which some men plead.\*

\* There ought to be no difficulty in verifying this statement; and yet since these letters were published a journal has affirmed that *Gnolam* is translated "desolation and waste!" in twelve instances, and that both it and *aion* and *aionios* are most frequently used in "a limited sense."

The facts are in brief that in the Old Testament two words are used for "for ever" (*ad* and *olam*). *Ad* occurs forty-eight times,



If any wish to ascertain whether it mean "spiritual" they will find ample negative evidence in a little treatise of Moses Stuart's, published in 1829.

5. ETERNAL LIFE—DEATH.—The meaning of these words is given in the first Letter. Each begins on earth, and is perfected after the judgment. But as these words enter largely into the controversy, it may be worth while to examine them at more length. Is "eternal life" mere existence, so that he who is without it is not? And is death the opposite state—non-existence? That is practically the point in dispute.

and *olam* 420 times, or (as both occur in seventeen passages), in 451 passages in all.

They may be classified as follows:—

	Passages.	Ad.	Olam.	
1.	Describing God's existence, attributes, worship, praise . . . . .	13	126	
2.	His law or truth . . . . .	3	10	
3.	The salvation, trust, and blessedness of His servants, including two in which it is said, "May the King live for ever!" . . . . .	13	43	
4.	"Never," "No more," including questions, as "Will He be angry for ever?" . . . . .	—	2	
5.	Passages that refer to types (David, Abraham, &c., with a fulfilment in Christ. (See, for example, Luke i. 55; Gen. vii. 7; Gal. iii. 16.) . . . . .	3	70	
	Total, referring to an unlimited future . . . . .	35	286	= 321
6.	Describing the punishment of the wicked . . . . .	7	22	= 29
7.	Passages referring to a future shown to be temporary by the nature of the case. Of these about fifty are in the Pentateuch, and refer to purely Jewish statutes, many having the modifying clause, "For ever throughout your generations" . . . . .	5	69	= 74
8.	The same words are used with different prepositions for <i>past</i> time . . . . .	1	41	
9.	And for "the world," as in New Test. . . . .	—	2	= 44

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Deduct seventeen passages in which both *Ad* and *olam* are found .

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17

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451

In the New Testament *aion* and *aionios* are the words that answer



The idea of *life* pervades the New Testament. It is found again and again in our Lord's teaching and in the epistles. In the Gospel of John *life*, *real* life, eternal life, is represented as beginning in a new birth, wherein by believing in the name of Christ men become sons of God (Jno. i. 12). Prior to this change men are in death (Jno. v. 24); after it their everlasting life is begun. The same truth appears and reappears. Till we eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man—*i.e.*, as our Lord Himself explains these words, till we believe, till by His word and Spirit we have union with Him, we have no life in us (Jno. vi. 53, 47, 63). Till then we are dead; after we believe we live. John himself repeats the truth by telling us in his gospel that if we believe not the wrath of God abideth on us; or, as he explains it in his epistle, "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren, while if a man love not his brother he abideth *in death*" (1 Jno. iii. 14).

The truth comes out in the writings of Paul with additional clearness. Sinners are there represented as by nature dead unto God, as dead unto righteousness, as dead through sins. Christians, on the other hand, are said to be alive unto God,

to those Old Testament terms. *Aion* occurs 103 times in 101 passages, and *aionios* seventy one times in seventy passages. As applied to *future* time they have the following applications:—

	Aion. Aionios.			
1. Describing existence, perfections, worship of God, of Christ, and of the Spirit . . . . .	40	2	=	42
2. God's salvation, redemption, judgment	1	5	=	6
3. Salvation and happiness of the redeemed . . . . .	5	56	=	61
4. Never, "not ever," including two that speak of the punishment of the wicked . . . . .	11	—	=	11
				<hr/>
				120
5. Punishment of the wicked . . . . .	5	5	=	10
6. Past time, with a different preposition, "A past eternity," or from the "beginning of the world" . . . . .	9	3		
7. Passages with a sense shown to be temporary from the nature of the case	—	—		
8. For the "world" "the age" (a peculiar Jewish usage) . . . . .	—	32		

as alive unto righteousness, as no longer dead through sins, though they are dead to the claims of the law, but as made alive in Christ, and as risen from the dead with Christ. They are, therefore, exhorted to be holy as being alive from the dead, and to make dead their members that are upon the earth. This teaching pervades the epistles (Rom. vii. 11, 2, 4, viii. 10, Eph. ii. 4—6, Col. ii. 13, iii. 1—4, 10, Gal. ii. 19—21, vi. 15, 2 Cor. v. 17, 1 Pet. ii. 5), and is set forth in various imagery.

Side by side with these statements are others in which death is spoken of in its literal sense. Our Lord spoke of the *death* He was to accomplish at Jerusalem; and Paul was ever being given up to death for Jesus's sake (2 Cor. iv. 11). The question may arise, Is the death of the wicked literal? Do they cease to be? and the answer is plain. The literal sense cannot be the true one, for Christians are said to have passed out of death, and yet they die; while sinners are said to be dead and to abide in death, and yet they are living; to say nothing of the fact that descriptions of that death when completed in the other world all speak of suffering and anguish that forbid the idea of annihilation. We conclude, therefore, that the life and death of which our Lord and His apostles so constantly speak are not literal, but "spiritual." The life belongs to men who were living before they received it, and who are still to die. And the death describes the *present state* of men who are now alive. Men may object to the term "spiritual" as applied to death, but it is as intelligible as the Apostle's phrase, "Ye as living stones are built up a *spiritual* house." And the *thing* itself is clearly Scriptural.

How life and death came to be thus used it is not difficult to ascertain. Whenever men go beyond the objects of their senses and of their consciousness or reflection, they are obliged to employ words which have originated in one or other of these sources, and to use them in a qualified sense. Everything we say of God, of Heaven, and of Hell is described in such words. Life, moreover, is of all things most dear; and death is, as Aristotle describes it, "of all

fearful things the most fearful." Both words, moreover, naturally describe states in relation to acquittal or condemnation, to feeling, consciousness, activity, enjoyment. This figurative usage is quite common in the Old Testament,\* and was familiar to the Jews in the days of our Lord.

But still further light may be thrown on these terms. All words are best known through their opposites, and it may help the student to understand the doctrine of Scripture if I give a list of the Scripture opposites of *eternal life*, the antithetic phrases as they are called:—

Shame and everlasting contempt. Dan. xii. 2.

Eternal punishment (or chastisement). Matt. xxv. 46.

Perishing. John iii. 15, 16, x. 28.

Abiding under God's wrath. Jon. iii. 36.

Coming into condemnation (*krisis*). John v. 24.

Indignation (*thumos*) and wrath (*orge*), tribulation and anguish. Rom. ii. 7, 8, 9.

Death. Rom. vi. 21—23.

Destruction or corruption (*phthora*). Gal. vi. 8.

*Life*, in the sense of eternal life, has the following opposites:—

Perdition or destruction. Matt. vii. 13, 14.

Being cast into hell (Ghehenna) fire. Matt. xviii. 9,  
Mark ix. 43—45.

Condemnation (*krisis*). John v. 29.

Death, in the comprehensive sense in which it is applied to men while alive on earth. Rom. vii. 10, viii. 6,  
1 John iii. 14.

"Eternal death," it will be noted, is a phrase not found in

\* "Keep My commandments and *live*" (Prov. iv. 4—see also Lev. xviii. 5, Neh. ix. 29, Ezek. xx. 11, 13, 21, Isa. liii. 3, Ezek. iii. 21, xviii. 9, 17, xxxiii. 13, 15, 16, 19, Amos iv. 56), "It is your *life*" (Deut. xxx. 19, Jer. xxi. 8, Prov. iii. 18, Mal. ii. 5, &c.), "In his trespass he shall *die*" (Ezek. xviii., Prov. xix. 16, &c.), "The way of *death*" (Jer. xxi. 8, Deut. xxx. 15, Ezek. xxxiii. 11), are specimens of scores of passages in which life and death cannot mean life and death *in this world*, nor mere life and literal death in the next. If the reader will substitute continued existence and annihilation for life and death in the passages where these words are found he will be startled at the result.



Scripture. The common opposite of "eternal life" is simply "condemnation and wrath."

Though "eternal death" is not a Scriptural phrase, "the second death" is. And "this awful second death" is what men have to fear. It is in fact the punishment that awaits the ungodly. What is this, it is said, but annihilation?

The phrase is found only in Revelation. The opposite is either the *first* death, or the death in sin in which bad men are found. "Be thou faithful unto death, and the second death shall do thee no injury" (Rev. ii. 11). "Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection, over such the second death hath no power" [or claim] (Rev. xx. 6).

"The dead shall stand before God"—*body and soul*—"and shall be judged according to their works." . . . "The cowardly and unbelieving, &c., have their part in the lake of fire. This is the second death" (Rev. xx. 14, xxi. 8). These are all the passages.

The argument is that, as in the first death the body dies and ceases to exist, so in the second death the soul dies and ceases to exist. The first destroyed man physically, and the second will destroy him in his spiritual essence. There will be as complete an end of the *whole* man in the second death as there was of *part* of him in the first.

But the answer to this reasoning is plain.

(1.) The first death annihilated nothing. It only severed for a time the union of body and soul. The souls of dead men still live. The dead themselves are to be raised; and "body and soul" they are to be judged according to their works; or, if we take the other view, that the *first* death is the present state of bad men, that death clearly is no annihilation—nor is the second.

(2.) If the second death is cessation of all life, and that is the punishment that awaits the ungodly, then are there no degrees of punishment; and if the punishment precedes the death, the death is no "awful thing," but a blessed relief.\*

\* I see it said "that there cannot be a second of anything unless it be at least of the same kind or genus as the first." Hence it is con-



(3.) Scripture itself moreover has defined the second death and has excluded the meaning for which this reasoning pleads. "It is the second death" to be cast into "the lake of fire," and *there* it is expressly said are those "who worship the beast and his image, and who receive the mark of his name." "And they have no rest day nor night, and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever" (Rev. xiv. 11).

It may be said that this is a figurative description, and is taken from a book of symbols. Part of it therefore must be regarded as figurative. Be it so. How can the figures mean cessation of life or of consciousness? And is it forgotten that it is only in this symbolical book that the phrase "the second death" is found?

6. GHEHENNA.—There are two words in our English Testament which are translated hell. One (*Hades*) means properly the unseen state, and is once translated the *grave*. (1 Cor. xv. 55), as it generally is in the Old Testament. It is the word used in Matt. xi. 23, xvi. 18, Luke x. 15, xvi. 23, Acts ii. 27, 31, Rev. i. 18, vi. 8, xx. 13, 14. It will be noted that "the death and *hell*" cast into the lake of fire are simply Death and Hades. The passage gives no reason to believe, as some have taught, that there is an end of hell itself.

cluded "new life is simply existence, and the *second* death is, of course, annihilation."

The conclusion is refuted above. But the premise is equally unsound. Is the *second* birth physical, as the first is? Is the *second* Adam, only "a living soul," and not "a life-giving spirit," "the Lord from heaven"? Must the New Jerusalem be made of stone and mortar? Must a man's "Alma Mater," his second mother, be a *woman* in honour of the first? The fact is that things the most unlike may be classed under one quality—life, blessings, mercies; so that nothing can be proved by such classification except the one quality in common. All figurative or analogical language, moreover, presupposes that the things to which the common name is given are different, though with one or more points of resemblance. To reason from Jordan, or Canaan, or streams, or trees, or sapphire, on the nature of death or of heaven is as if they were all of one genus, is to sanction all kinds of absurdity. Indeed, it may be safely said that the things differ in at least as many points as those in which they agree.

The other word (*Ghehenna*) occurs eleven times in the Gospels, and once in James (iii. 6). It means as a word [the fire of] the Valley of Hinnom, or, more fully, "of the Valley of the son of Hinnom." The name belonged originally and literally to a valley that lay outside of Jerusalem to the south, and was infamous for the human sacrifices there offered to Moloch. Josiah defiled the place, and, according to a common view, it became a receptacle for all the filth of the city. There the worms revelled, and there a fire was kept constantly burning. Hence it came to be an emblem of hell. Whether this view is quite accurate may be questioned. Vitringa holds that "Tophet" was known to the Jews long before; and that it was not the Valley of Hinnom that gave rise to the use of the name for hell, but the notion of hell that suggested Tophet as a fitting name for *Ghehenna*. And certainly Isa. xxx. 33 is in favour of this view. However this be, the Jewish commentators nearly all regard the language of Isaiah (lxvi. 24) as a description of the place of future punishment. It is not, in their judgment, a description of the visit of literal worshippers (see verse 23) who come up to Jerusalem and look upon literal "carcasses of men who have transgressed," but a description of their punishment in the next life. The worm and the fire being symbols exist together, not as instruments of annihilation, but of pain. Such were the common notions of the Jews when our Lord appeared. They held also, most of them, the immortality of the soul, both of the good and of the bad; and it was among a people holding these notions that He used their familiar phrase—the fire of hell, and spoke of the wicked as cast into it—not once in His teaching, but several times.

I have laid no stress on Jewish opinions, nor have I quoted from the Old Testament; but when it is said that modern notions of punishment were unknown when our Lord appeared, and that we must interpret His words as those interpreted them who had no knowledge of a future life, and thought only of a local *Ghehenna*, I say simply that the reasoning is not true either in its principle or in its facts.

Even if the Jews did attach an earthly local meaning to our Lord's words, as they did, for example, to all He told them of His "kingdom," it does not follow that there is no deeper, truer meaning than theirs. Tophet may "still be ordained of old," though they thought only of the place that Josiah polluted. But, in fact, they understood His words as well, and in senses as profound and awful, as ourselves.\*

7. THE WRATH OF GOD.—Men find it hard to understand what is meant by the Divine anger. "We are forbidden to let the sun go down on our wrath," it is said; "how can we conceive of the fierce and settled anger of the blessed God?" The difficulty is partly verbal and partly moral.

There are three words in the New Testament translated "anger, wrath." Two of them describe emotional states that are nearly always wrong, and the third an emotional state that is right.

One (*thumos*) means "strong, passionate feeling," and is translated "wrath," "anger," "fierceness." In the plural (2 Cor. xii. 20), it means "bursts of anger." The word occurs nineteen times. Passionateness is the idea it represents, and it is nearly always condemned.

Another word (some form of *parorgismos*) occurs but thrice (Eph. iv. 26, Rom. x. 19, Eph. vi. 4), and is wrath *in excess*, or wrath *directed to wrong objects*. The Jews were angered in this sense against the Gentiles, and it is on this excessive or misdirected wrath that the sun is not to go down. The wrongness of this feeling is expressed in the word itself.

The common word for wrath is *orge*. It implies more of a settled disposition than of a passing feeling, and shows itself in punishment. Above all it is not passionateness but a *moral sentiment*. It is the feeling of the magistrate when the law is broken (Rom. xiv.), and it is the moral disapprobation or "wrath" which Scripture ascribes to God. It occurs in the New Testament five-and-forty times.

\* Any who wish to see the passages from Josephus and from Jewish writers on these subjects may find them in a convenient form in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," vol. xv. p. 636.



This last explanation meets the moral difficulty which some feel when they are told of the "wrath of God." A God who loves righteousness must hate iniquity. If He feel complacency in the good He cannot but be displeased with the evil; and wrath is only displeasure felt and expressed, nothing more.

I have said that the first of these words describes a state which is nearly always wrong—*nearly* always. In Revelation, however, the term is applied nine times to God (Rev. xiv. 10, xv. 1, xvi. 1, &c.), and is translated fierceness (of His anger), or wrath simply. This usage is peculiar in the New Testament to that Book and to one passage in the Romans (ii. 8). In the Old Testament, where anthropopathic forms are more common, the *fierceness* of the wrath of God is a frequent thought. In such cases, it must be regarded not as teaching passionateness, however, but as describing the intensity of the moral disapprobation with which God regards sin. "Moral disapprobation" is our cool modern phrase, doing most justice, no doubt, to our logical conception of the mental state; the "fierceness of His anger" is the Eastern phrase, doing most justice to the greatness of the evil rebuked. "*Intense* moral disapprobation" is the expression that does most justice perhaps to both. Such disapprobation, let it never be forgotten, is inseparable from the Divine glory. It is only the other side of God's delight in holiness.

8. IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.—The natural immortality of the soul is a wide-spread belief, and, in the right meaning of the words, it is sustained by all the arguments which a subject so difficult admits. Immateriality and immortality have the same evidence, and immortality has besides many presumptions of its own. The words do not mean, however, as some suppose, that the soul cannot be destroyed, but simply that, so far as we know, there is nothing in the make of the soul that tends naturally to death. The body is naturally mortal, for it dies unless preternaturally preserved. Its parts are ever decaying; they need nutriment, and in



time the vital force which sustains their functions ceases to work in the body itself. The soul has no material parts, needs no material sustenance, nor is there anything, so far as we see or know, in the soul itself to destroy it. Even reasoners on ultimate annihilation admit that the soul does live on for ages after the body has perished. They hold therefore that death, in its commonest sense, is simply the separation of body and soul, but not properly the annihilation of either. God, we have no reason to doubt, *can* destroy the soul; but to destroy it needs, so far as reason and analogy teach, some external interposition. This is all that is meant by natural immortality.

The whole subject of life is a profound mystery. As yet our biologists cannot tell us what it is. The analogy of the seed which lives in death—an analogy used by our Lord and by Paul—suggests that death only dissolves our bodies into their elements, leaving untouched the living germ. That germ in the corn gathers to itself new elements, which it converts into a new plant, another and still the same. In the man it can live apart, and yet is destined to reappear in a new body. If this analogy is to hold, death destroys nothing. The *material* elements of the body, it is notorious, all remain. The living germ, separated from the body, lives still.

I lay stress upon these explanations, however, only for two reasons. They answer the statement that death is of necessity *destruction*. They make it clear, moreover, that those who hold that “everlasting” means “lasting for a time only, because the soul is naturally mortal,” have to prove from natural laws, or from actual observation, that the soul must die as the body dies. From *natural laws*, I repeat. Scripture says, it is punished *for ever*; and though the punishment is called “death” and “destruction,” I now know that both terms are applied to those who still live. The literal death of the soul—the annihilation of the thing made in God’s image—cannot therefore be proved from the Word of God. Who is prepared to prove it, either from the nature

of death, or from the nature of the soul itself? Yet this is the one proof on which the annihilation argument rests!\*

These notes are of necessity dry and technical. Some readers may not need them. They feel no difficulty, and take Scripture just as it stands. If any who have studied the question and felt its difficulties will now turn to the first Letter, they will, I trust, find the notes to the purpose. They show, as it seems to me, that the natural meaning of Scripture is amply confirmed in every part by further research.

\* I have not made man's natural immortality an important part of my argument, not because I question the truth, but because it is not to my mind the strongest nor is it the Scriptural method of proof. Inspired writers affirm strongly that men enter another life, and then use expressions that describe continued existence both of the evil and of the good. Our Lord appeared among a people who believed in immortality and in future punishment, professing to take their ideas from their own Scriptures, and He confirmed their impressions concerning both.

The general arguments in support of this doctrine I cannot here expand. Analogy (showing the thrift of nature and the changes man and other creatures have undergone), the probable immateriality and simplicity of the thinking substance (largely independent as it is of the body, and naturally incapable of dissolution), the powers and growth of the human spirit, its natural desire for immortality, the continuance of social and sympathetic affections after the objects of them have been removed, the moral constitution of man, and the necessities of the Divine government, and the general consent of nearly all nations

“Point out a hereafter,  
And intimate eternity to man.”

The arguments are not of equal strength, and they need careful handling, but they furnish as a whole weighty evidence. One fallacy that seeks to refute them deserves notice.

Elaborate calculations are made to prove that “the immortal soul” and “the immortal spirit” are phrases never found in Scripture. “Sixteen hundred times the words soul and spirit occur in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures,” the immortal soul or immortal spirit never once. Here are the facts, and the conclusion, it is said, is plain—the spirit is not immortal.

This is an old and futile argument. “Trinity” never once occurs in Scripture, nor “Providence.” Are both therefore to be denied? “Mortality” or “Immortality” never once occur in the Old Testament. Was there no death under the old economy, or no everlasting life for the holy, for angels, for the blessed God? The complete fact is all in favour of the common view: *Men* are said in Scripture to be mortal, bodies and flesh are said to be mortal; but mortal or mortality is never applied in either Testament to soul or spirit.

## LETTER III.

### ALLEVIATIONS.

“Considering the moral necessity of punishment, we cannot but regard it as one of the most prominent symptoms of a fatal disease, which is eating into the very heart of our national life; that our people, so far at least as they are represented by the prevailing views of our educated classes, no longer believe in punishment as properly the desert of sin. . . No one is surer of applause than the man who discovers some new method of evading justice under the pretext of humanity.”—*Müller on Sin*, i. 250.

“How can we ourselves hate sin without being certain that God hates it, and believing that He will punish it? In giving up sin to sorrow God does nothing but yield an object to its own nature, mark it with its true stamp, and declare that evil is evil.”—*Vinet*.

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THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN ONLY PART OF THE TRUTH.—DIVINE LOVE AS CLEARLY REVEALED.—GOD’S PUNISHMENTS ALWAYS QUESTIONED.—WHAT SIN IS, AND HOW GOD REGARDS IT.—ARE POPULAR VIEWS OF HELL ACCURATE?—MORE SAVED THAN ANY OF US KNOW.—WHAT OF OTHER ALLEVIATIONS.—UNIVERSALISM.—“ANOTHER CHANCE.”—ANNIHILATION OF ALL SIN?—DIFFICULTIES IN SUCH ALLEVIATIONS WHEN COMPARED WITH SCRIPTURE.

1. It is a saying of Dr. Arnold’s that the three chapters in Romans on election (ix.—xi.) should never be read apart. The ninth read by itself is a partial truth, and gives a very erroneous impression of God’s plans. The three read together justify the outburst with which the last closes, “Of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things; and to Him be glory for ever.”

A discussion on future punishment, apart from other truths, labours under the same disadvantage. It describes God’s “strange work.” It forms the dark shadow of the picture of His dealings—a picture that is rich in light and in colour, only when this question is discussed apart they are concealed.

It is some alleviation of the mystery of future punishment then that it is a *partial* truth. It covers only a portion of the canvas. There are others that cover and brighten the rest. It is a revelation of the Divine holiness, and illustrates the



evil of sin. There are also revelations of the Divine love that illustrate the freeness and superabounding of grace. The *whole* truth honours the Divine philanthropy, as well as the Divine wrath. Both are set forth by our Lord, and both are held by most Christians. The Gospel is supremely a message of mercy ; and it becomes a message of wrath only if men *will not* obey it and believe.

It may be true that when we take in the whole world, and remember the state of nations that have never heard of Christ, the revelation of love is dim and mixed. Yet even in their case God has not left Himself without witness ; nor need we scruple to say that if men are finally punished it will not be because they have sinned, but because they have *persisted* in sin against such light as they have ; not because they have failed in goodness, but because they have failed even to *desire* it.

If any are unable to accept this last statement, it is still true that punishment is only part of God's ways, and that underlying it all there is a heart of infinite tenderness and pity which would have all to be saved. We may fail to reconcile the existence of sin with this fact to our own satisfaction, but the fact itself we must strenuously maintain ; and herein is some relief.

2. This mystery of future punishment is aggravated by the doubts of those whom it is to influence. Men seem to think it intrinsically improbable. And how can we believe what has been questioned in every age ? But these doubts are rather confirmations of the truth—alleviations of the mystery. There have always been men who questioned or denied the threatenings of God's Word, ever thinking that *they* should escape, or abusing the riches of His forbearance to strengthen the hope that He would not punish. The first lie told on earth came in the form of a suggested doubt of

God's goodness : "Hath God said, Ye shall not eat of any of the trees of the garden ?" and the second in the form of a denial of His *threatening* : "Ye shall not surely die." For a



hundred and twenty years, Noah, "the preacher of righteousness," warned the antediluvians of the coming flood. They watched the building of the Ark; they probably helped to build it. Yet they were moved by no fear; they deemed it a very needless precaution; and they perished. Lot had to be "hastened" out of Sodom. His message to his sons-in-law seemed as the "words of one who was joking"—and through unbelief they perished. The captivity and the final overthrow of Jerusalem, though both foretold again and again, came upon men "unawares." They were "eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage," till God swept them all away. The Apostle Peter confirms these conclusions, and tells us that the infidelity of the last days will show itself chiefly on this very question. Men will deny the reality of the Judgment, among other reasons, because in the constancy of the great laws of Nature they think they see a proof that it will never come. "All things continue as they were," say they, "since the beginning of the Creation." The Bible is largely a history of God's judgments on men and nations, and yet men still say—"dreams," "fanatic fears"—"God is too good to inflict them." No new thing, at all events, has happened to us. The mystery of wide-spread unbelief in relation to this solemn theme is only what prophets and righteous men have had to struggle against in every age!

These past judgments alleviate other difficulties besides those created by the unbelief of men. How shocking it must have seemed to our first parents had they foreseen all the consequences of their sin—that one sin—what misery, what sins it was to entail. To have been told of them would have excited the profoundest wonder. To have believed in what was told them would have made Paradise itself intolerable.

How little is it men know, how easily they sin, how fearful and mysterious under a government of Almighty power and love their transgressions and the penalties that follow! The prophet's scroll, written within and without, "with mourning and lamentation and woe"—sin tingeing and staining all—is the history of our race; and when we attempt to recon-

cile it with Divine love and holiness we can only bow before the mystery, and, through our faith, *believe* it right. The miseries and sins of men which have lasted for ages, and will last on any supposition for ages to come, are as little realisable by the imagination, would be as oppressive, all things considered, if they were realised, and are well-nigh as hard to reconcile by mere reason with the Divine goodness, as eternal punishment itself! And yet, alas! they are none the less true.

In short, neither general disbelief nor profound mystery in the facts is any proof against the reality of the facts themselves. Here is some relief!

3. It would be a further alleviation if we were to ascertain what the sin is against which everlasting punishment is denounced, and with what feeling God regards it.

I cannot say that it is only the rejection of the Gospel, though in most of the passages which describe everlasting punishment that is the sin condemned. There are expressions no less strong against the ungodliness of different ages, and against the fearful immorality in which ungodliness ends. I can say, however, that in most passages it is not a single sin that ends in ruin, but a *settled habit*. Every precept of the law and every principle of the Gospel has been violated by men who are now safe with God. The tenses and the words of Scripture all imply, when fairly interpreted, that it is not the single act that destroys men, but the character; not the evil-doing of a day, but the drift of a life. Sometimes this truth is concealed by our version, as when it is said, "If we sin wilfully," when the meaning is "If we go on in sin;" sometimes by a misunderstanding of the meaning, as when men conclude that a *word* against the Holy Ghost will ruin them. I cannot now discuss the question; I only repeat the conviction that everlasting punishment is the result only of habits of sin, of ungodliness, or of disbelief. Men may be saved by *acts*—true penitence and faith, for example, in a dying hour. Men are destroyed only by character, by the sin or the impenitence that is habitual.

Not that single sins are other than fearful evils. Under law, and in the case of a holy being, a single sin is a fall—a fall that may bring death, and in its issues endless woe. Even under a dispensation of grace a single sin is ruin if the sinner appeal to *law*. They are single sins, moreover, that *form* character, and that *reveal* it. Nor can any finite mind tell the fearful consequences a single sin may produce. All this, however, leaves untouched my previous statement.

And how does God regard these sins and the sinful nature from which they spring? The strongest language of Scripture is reserved to describe His feeling in relation to them, His desire that men would avoid them, His purpose to punish them. It was to deliver men from sin that our Lord became man and was obedient unto death. We may safely measure the evil from which He came to deliver us by the love which prompted Him to redeem, and by the agony of the Cross. Is it not significant that as men grow in holiness they grow in their appreciation of the evil of them, while their sense of personal sinfulness deepens with their growth? “I cannot think that God will punish my fellows eternally,” said one of the most intelligent and holy defenders of annihilation, “though I feel that eternal punishment is what *my sins* have deserved.” The case is that the best amongst us fails to feel what sin is. Everything in us and everything around us lessens our sense of its evil. We frame excuses for men, and often speak of sin in slighting terms—acts and states alike. It seems so natural. But this tendency of ours Scripture never sanctions. It shows indeed the utmost tenderness to the errors of the man who is on the whole struggling after holiness; but men who sin “with a will,” who “take pleasure in iniquity,” who yield to coward fears, to disbelief and gross sin, are spoken of by our Lord and by His apostles in language that ought to ring in the ears of us all. Here is some relief.

How amazing the following seems: “Evil that is conquered, suffering that is probationary, . . . are exemplified throughout the whole system of nature. . . . It is when



probation ends the difficulty begins. It is when the agony leads to no amendment, when suffering plunges the soul deeper to all eternity, that the difficulty becomes terrible. . . . Beyond question no analogy tending to remove the difficulty of believing this can be discovered within the whole universe as known to man. . . . An eternity of pause—of aimless, endless pain; . . . to this the realm of nature has absolutely no analogue.”

What has no analogue—“the *eternity* of” pain? Nobody ever said it had, or can have, *in time*. Or is it the “*aimless* pain”? Who said pain was aimless? The very case supposed is that endless pain has the same aim as all *penal* suffering now—the maintenance of holiness, and the general interest of the universe; or is it “the agony that leads to no amendment—*i.e.*, in the sufferer”? Alas! analogues are innumerable. Has the writer forgotten his *In Memoriam*, or his Butler, or the history of thousands and millions who have *only* suffered without any known good to themselves, even when their example has suggested lessons to the race? or does he suppose that the devil and evil spirits are “progressing” in penitence?

It is, in fact, as easy to conceive of circumstances that make eternal punishment subservient to the interests of the universe as to conceive of circumstances that justify the existence of sin, or the misery of brutes. “Overruled for good,” “unavoidable,” “conducive, on the whole, to the holiness and happiness of the vast universe of God,” and other phrases, are conceivably applicable to them all.

4. Perhaps there would be alleviation of the mystery if we had juster conceptions of what hell is, and of what the state of the lost involves. Popular conceptions are taken largely from the imagery of Scripture, and from lurid sketches drawn by Dante and the poets. Hence men have come to speak of the lost as in flames, as desiring to reform, but kept in torment by a dread necessity against their better purposes, and for the sins of a life long since ended—as writhing under pains which it is supposed must have worked repentance ages ago.



What if much of this teaching is a mistake! What if the case be that our life is a probation, that if our nature is to be healed at all it must be healed on this side of the judgment, and that if not healed we take it with us—its passions and habits strengthened—into our future life, and our last state becomes worse—not only more miserable but *morally worse*—than the first?

What if the sin which makes hell hereafter is still loved, even as the sin which makes hell now; passion and rebelliousness being preferred in the other life, with all their consequences, even as they are preferred in this? What if the sinner suffer there only what he *chooses* to suffer? What if men live for ever, smitten with the leprosy of hatred to a God of blended holiness and love, and with intensest selfishness—their condition at once their choice and their penalty? The worm that never dies may be the self-accusation of their own hearts, and the fire that is never quenched may be the burning eagerness with which they cherish perverse desires, an eagerness that blights and blasts everything generous, as it has long since blasted everything holy. There are no doubt positive punishments as there are positive rewards, but the descriptions of each are largely figurative—"pearly gates," "golden streets," "flaming fire," "ascending smoke." Hell and heaven, however, are characters as well as places. Nor must we confound the imagery with the truths it represents. Continued punishment means continued sin; continued sin implies volition, and excludes penitence. Here again there is some relief.

5. It is some alleviation that many more may be saved through God's grace than the most large-hearted among us have supposed.

Within the last two hundred and fifty years there have been creeds, or interpretations of creeds, that doomed even infants dying in infancy to eternal conscious punishment. There are creeds now that consign all the heathen and all Christendom with few exceptions to the same destiny. There are also reasoners who press these views, that men may be

driven to seek relief, such as it is, in the belief of annihilation or of universal restoration.

But it becomes us to beware of such language. All that live and die rejecting the Gospel, perish—that we know. All that live and die loving and practising sin, knowing the right and having their hearts set in them to do the wrong, perish—that we know. Scripture is no respecter of persons. If our literary men, our statesmen—the men whom we all delight to honour—live and die loving sin and rejecting Christ, we can have no hope for them, as neither can we hope, under like circumstances, for ourselves. All this we know. But how many there are in these classes we do not know, while there are many intimations in Scripture which lead us to believe that many more are saved than any of us have hoped. Elijah thought himself alone among his countrymen—the solitary servant of the true God; while yet Jehovah had reserved 7,000 men who had never bowed the knee to Baal; nor are we to conclude that none who had bowed the knee ever repented. In the Gospels we read of twelve disciples and of seventy, and are told that at the great gathering of Pentecost the number of the names was but a hundred and twenty. Many years later we read quite incidentally of five hundred brethren in Galilee at once, while intimations in different Gospels lead us to believe that there were many more true disciples scattered throughout Samaria and Judæa.

In our own age there may be many more Christians than are connected with all our sects. Some men deem it part of their religion to keep it to themselves—a sacred question, as they say, between God and their conscience. Some are drawn to Christ, but kept out of the Church by inconsistencies they witness; or by their own mistakes. Some, like Nicodemus, find it hard to *profess* their discipleship, though, like him, they may be ready to defend His cause when His professed disciples desert Him. Some are real Christians, though they stand in doubt of themselves; nor will they know that they have been doing things for Christ till the Lord Himself honours and rewards their service (Matt. xxv. 37). Many are better than their creed, make fearful mistakes on lesser

questions, and are yet “looking for the mercy of God unto eternal life.” Many are better than their acts ; they are of necessity excluded from our churches or are refused admission, and yet they may have the root of the matter in them. How many may there be who, with little knowledge and few advantages, just reach the haven, guided and sustained by a single text or the single verse of some hymn. I am not defending the imperfections these facts imply : I even believe that every imperfection brings with it loss and mischief. I am only gathering comfort from the larger views they give of the number of the saved. Facts of this kind are within the knowledge of us all. How many more of them may there be known to God !

Nor am I forgetting other facts of a different kind. “Eight souls” only were saved at the flood. “*Ten* righteous” would have delivered Sodom from its doom. Even in favoured Judæa there was a season when only a “tenth” had life in it. And in the days of our Lord they were “the few” who found the narrow way and walked therein. All these cases, however, are cases of nations ripening for judgment ; and it would be unjust to regard the state of religion at such a time as a sample of its state at all times. There were days in the history of the antediluvians when men called on the name of the Lord. There were judges and kings in whose reigns the people were faithful and prosperous. The “few” of our Lord’s day became in three hundred years the majority throughout the Empire. These facts are some alleviation.

So of the heathen. Peter had no hope of the salvation of the Gentiles—even after he had studied under Christ for nearly three years and had received the anointing of Pentecost. He could touch “nothing common or unclean.” Not he ! Yet he learnt from the case of Cornelius—a man whose alms and prayers had come up with acceptance before God before ever he was a believer in Jesus Christ,—that in every nation he that fears God and works righteousness is accepted of Him. In the Epistle to the Romans the Apostle Paul affirms that when “Gentiles who have not a law do by nature the things of the law, they are a law unto themselves, since they show



the work of the law written on their hearts." And he boldly asserts that "to those who in the way of patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honour, and incorruption, God will give eternal life," whether they be Jews or Greeks. The family of the redeemed, we rejoice to be told, was even in the first ages, and *before* the marvellous victories which are spoken of in the later chapters of Revelation, a "multitude redeemed out of every kindred and tongue" (Rev. v. 9).

These are hints only. All may not feel that they justify the belief that many of the heathen are saved, or even that any are saved. But they give ground of hope, and they rebuke the assertion which aggravates the mystery of future punishment by affirming that *all the heathen* are doomed to it.

Of course this presupposes that there may be efficacy in Christ's work, even for those who have never heard His name; and that the Good Spirit has access to the souls of men in ways of which we know little. And both suppositions are rendered probable by the case of children, by facts in many countries and in both Testaments. My argument does not require, however, that I affirm these things as certain. But when men say that the heathen all perish, and that the members of the visible Church are all that are saved, I deny their right to make such assertions. There is nothing in Scripture to justify them; while there is much that gives hope that we shall ourselves be surprised at the many crowns (each crown the symbol of a saved nation) which shall encircle the head of our Redeemer, and that when He who has a heart of infinite love sees of the travail of His soul, even He who knew best what His travail was shall be satisfied. Not *all* nations, as if there were no ruin; but *many* nations at the least He is to claim. And here there is some relief.\*

\* Some Christian people may feel a difficulty in accepting the above alleviation. I respect the difficulty they feel. I believe it arises, not necessarily from narrowness, but often from a deep sense of the evil of sin, and from an unwillingness to say anything where they think Scripture is silent. Nor does my argument require more than that—there *may* be heathen who are saved, and that men have no right to say *all* are lost. Yet I should be glad to carry such Christians a stage farther. May we not all agree that whenever men



If these facts are connected with another—viz., that half of the human family die before personal responsibility begins they justify the conclusion that already Christ has the pre-eminence. More have been saved in *every age* by grace than have been lost through sin!

6. Are there, then, no alleviations besides? Is there not a purgatory for the Church, or, better still, for the *whole world*? May not this consuming fire purify all? and may not this “second death” introduce all into a sinless and blessed life?\* Nay, more, may not the love of Christ and the zeal of redeemed men find fresh scope in this purifying work?

are penitent, trusting in mercy for pardon, striving on the whole to be good, *these* God will, for Christ's sake, forgive; that He will honour and accept the penitence and holiness which He Himself has produced, even though men have never heard of Christ? Admitting this principle, it follows that, if the heathen are condemned, it is not because they have never known the Gospel, but only because they have sinned and persisted in sin. Whether there are many or few who are thus penitent and holy is a question we cannot settle; we can only deny the right of any man to say there are none,—*and hope*.

That these are no new sentiments is well known. Cowper has expressed them with inimitable clearness and feeling:

“Is virtue, then, unless of Christian growth,  
Mere fallacy, or foolishness, or both?  
Ten thousand sages lost in endless woe,  
For ignorance of what they could not know?  
That speech betrays at once a bigot's tongue;  
Charge not a God with such outrageous wrong.  
Truly, not I! The partial light men have,  
My creed persuades me, well employed may save;  
While he that scorns the noonday beam, perverse,  
Shall find the blessing unimproved a curse.  
Let heathen worthies whose exalted mind  
Left sensuality and dross behind  
Possess for me their undisputed lot,  
And take unenvied the reward they sought.  
But still, by virtue of a Saviour's plea,  
Not blind by choice, but destined not to see.  
Their fortitude and wisdom were a flame  
Celestial, though they knew not whence it came,  
Derived from the same source of light and grace  
That guides the Christian in his swifter race;  
Their judge their conscience, and her rule their law—  
That rule pursued with reverence and with awe,  
Led them, however faltering, faint and slow,  
From what they knew to what they wish'd to know.”

COWPER'S *Truth*.

\* Dr. Young, Mr. Jukes.

Or if this may not be, may we not restrict the final doom to those who, with light and knowledge, reject Christ and live and die loving sin? Is there not another chance—say between death and judgment—for those who never heard the Gospel, who sinned without law, who knew not their Lord's will, in whom the "tares" had not ripened for burning, who died young, and who, in their lifetime, had excited the love of the Master and of His servants, though they stood not the test of the Gospel—almost Christians, "not far from the kingdom"? When God gives an absolute threat (Jon. iii. 4) is there not always implied a promise and hope of pardon, as Jonah in his anger complained (Jon. iv. 2)? Is there not a "harrowing of Hades" that may yield some harvest? Does not Peter speak of Christ "preaching to spirits in prison"? Does not Jude tell of men reserved under *chastisement* till the judgment? Does not the very announcement that there is a sinful state that will never be forgiven in that future world—"a sin unto death"—suggest that there are sinful states and sins that may be forgiven? Surely this would be a blessed alleviation, especially in relation to those whose case creates most sympathy.

And may we not even go farther? Admitting that for some there is no forgiveness and no fresh offer of mercy; that even in Hades men to whom forgiveness is offered will still prefer the sin that has brought them there to deliverance on the condition of holiness and submission,—may not "everlasting destruction" mean sin and misery lasting as long as the soul lasts? And may not the time come when it will be announced that all sinners and all sin have ceased out of God's universe,—not through penitence, but through the annihilation of all who would not repent? Admitting that "*everlasting*" punishment is against this view, may not everlasting *destruction* support it? And would not this be some alleviation?

They are Christian men who suggest these alleviations. They do not mean to deny inspired teaching. They profess to interpret it. They desire to vindicate the Divine benevolence, to lessen the mystery that is involved in the continued

existence of sin, to get rid, as they think, of a grievous scandal.

Nevertheless I can accept none of the suggestions they offer. The first suggestion—of universal salvation—is contradicted by the explicit teaching and general tenor of the Gospel. The second—of a further chance for some—is not revealed. And the third—of annihilation—seems contradicted by the meaning of “destruction” and by the terms that define it. I cannot believe the first; I have no sufficient reason to believe the second; and the third is opposed to the natural and plain meaning of Scripture. All the suggestions aim to vindicate the Divine benevolence. But it may really need no vindication, or there may be other methods. When we have waited “the Great Teacher, Death,” have learnt what sin is, who are saved, and what “few stripes” mean, I believe that either our present conceptions will justify the Divine dealings, or God will give us such further light consistent with the teaching of His Word as will justify them. And with this belief I am content.

Let me briefly explain:—

(1.) Of *universal* restoration Scripture gives me no hope. The mystic and fanciful interpretations by which in all ages the doctrine has been sustained, the *real* meaning of plain passages quoted in support of it when these passages are examined in their context, the silence of Scripture where explicit teaching would seem so essential, if this “truth” is “our safeguard against infidelity,” its clear and strong language on the punishment of sin, the solemn assurance that there is a sin—itself the expression of a sinful state—that is never forgiven, and that there are men who “shall not see life” and others who “cannot be renewed to repentance”—all forbid.

(2.) Of conversions between death and judgment Scripture says nothing. Jude’s “chastisement under which men are kept,” is punishment, as we have seen. Peter’s words on “preaching to spirits” now “in prison” may have the meaning given to them; but that meaning neither suits the context nor is in itself probable. In any case the passage



stands alone, and tells nothing of any agency for saving the dead. That one sin is never forgiven either in this world or in the world to come does not teach that other sins are to be forgiven there,\* nor does it justify men in announcing

\* The passage in Matt. xii. 32, Mark iii. 29, is one of some difficulty. The sin, the penalty, the peculiar terms "neither in this world nor," in which the penalty is described in Matthew, all require notice.

Our Lord, it will be seen, speaks of an *act*, and even of a word, as exposing men to the punishment He denounces. The case is, however (as in the instance of Raca and Moreh), that the sin is not a merely outward act or a mere word. It is the expression of an internal state—an expression which brings up the state itself for judgment. For that state, thus revealed, our Lord says there is no forgiveness.

The state is, in brief, the antitype of blasphemy against God under the law. It is anti-Christianity in spite of spiritual light and conviction. Other passages still further explain its meaning. Heb. vi. 4—6, x. 26, 27.

"Shall not be forgiven," i.e., says Chrysostom, Grotius, Bengel, and others, he shall be punished—in both worlds.

"Neither in this world, nor in the world to come." This phrase is not found in Mark or in Luke (xii. 10), who wrote for Gentiles. They say simply *never* and *not*; and hence many regard the words in Matthew as merely an emphatic denial of all forgiveness—a meaning supported by similarly strong phrases in *Jewish* writings; the meaning actually given in Mark and Luke. There are four shades of opinion among those who agree in this interpretation. (a.) "This world," and "the world to come," are common Jewish terms for the old era and the new, the first dispensation and the second, as in Heb. ii. 5; the dividing point between the two being the resurrection and ascension of our Lord, when He was declared "Son of God in power." In this view Lightfoot, Wetstein, Müller, and Fritzsche agree. (b.) Under the law sins of *ignorance* admitted expiation, Num. xv. 28; sins of *presumption* did not, Num. xv. 30. Among the Jews, however, there was a fond belief of the final happiness of *all the seed of Abraham*, and of the expiation even of presumptuous sins by death or after it. This imagination in relation to sins against the Holy Ghost our Lord rebukes, and in words specially suited to destroy all hope. (c.) Scripture speaks of two remissions of sin as it speaks of two adoptions (Rom. viii. 15, 23), and two salvations (Rom. xiii. 11), and two *Life-s* and two deaths—the second in each case the completion of the first. The first forgiveness is bestowed on all penitent sinners on earth (Matt. ix. 5, 6; Acts xiii. 39), the second will publicly absolve all faithful servants of Christ at the judgment (2 Tim. i. 18). Neither, our Lord tells us, shall be shared by those who sin against the Holy Ghost. (d.) Chrysostom suggests another explanation. The words mean, he says, "Both in this world and in the next, those of you who commit this sin shall be punished. Some are punished only in the next world, as the rich man in the Parable. Some only in this, as the adulterer (or incestuous man) in the Corinthian Church. Some in neither, as when the sins of good men are followed by immediate repentance. Those who wilfully rejected Christ suffered in both; they and their city were destroyed, and themselves became subject to final condemnation."

On any of these expositions, the expression means substantially



that they *will* be forgiven. And this is all. While on the other hand the Parable of the Rich Man tells us plainly that even in Hades there is a great gulf fixed which none can pass. Again and again, moreover, "doors are shut," and slothful servants are sent away, and men who had what seem natural excuses for neglecting a Divine call are excluded from the feast in tones and amid silence which themselves forbid hope. No doubt there are many over whose ruin we should tenderly yearn. If they perish, it is "without law," it is "with few stripes." "Another chance" might relieve that perplexity.

But there may be other facts that give relief or show that none is needed. What if the young man whom our Lord loved grew strong in the thing he lacked! What if his sorrow when he went away were the turning-point of his life, and he grew hopelessly selfish! What if no single transgression of law has ever ruined any man eternally, but is always followed by penitence or by aggravated guilt! What if God reads character in its germs as easily as in its development, and sees unfaithfulness in what is least as clearly as in much! What if "few stripes" be the explanation of some mysteries, and not "another chance"! In short, Scripture does not authorise us to believe it, still less to announce it *in any case*; and our duty is to trust and hold our peace!

(3.) But may we not say, or hope, that, after all, "everlasting" is restricted, and that "destruction" is literal? Under the law, the death and kingdom of Christ, the conversion and worship of the Gentiles, are described in terms which our Lord's own disciples did not rightly understand,

"never," and they each suggest a reason why the peculiar form—neither, nor—is employed; employed, it will be marked, in Matthew only.

Another interpretation of these words is given by Augustine, and adopted by Stier. They think that the denial of the forgiveness of this sin in the next world implies the possibility of the forgiveness of other sins, especially of sins of ignorance and thoughtlessness—and this after-grace they suppose may last to the time of the judgment. If this is the meaning, it is strange that the words are wanting in those Gospels (Mark and Luke) that were specially designed for the Gentiles, who needed them most; and even if this meaning be admitted, the passage only *suggests* that there may be forgiveness between death and judgment; it does *not tell us there is*, still less does it authorise any one to announce it.

and on which even we, with the experience of centuries and the teaching of a completed Bible, divide. So may it be under the Gospel. Is there not in revelations of hell, as of heaven, an intentional mystery, an obscurity designed to inspire awe and hope? The very death at first denounced against sin needed subsequent comment to explain how much was literal and how much figurative. As did also the first promise. Surely we are living under the same rule. May we not *say* it, or, at least, may we not *hope*?

I look again at the passages given in my first letter and at the statements in the second, and I cannot but answer, We may not *say* it, if we are to speak in God's name; nor can we *hope* it, if hope is to rest on a Divine announcement. Every form of expression used in Scripture to describe the *everlastingness* of the blessedness of the righteous is applied to the condition of the lost; and the "destruction" to which men are doomed is set forth in terms that describe moral disorder and misery, not annihilation. Fair *interpretation*, apart from general notions of God's benevolence, can get no hope from these descriptions. Scripture gives us no warrant for believing in annihilation, still less for proclaiming it. In our present mood of feeling, such a consummation may seem a relief, just as it might have seemed a relief had there been no sin. But I distrust these moods. Men at least as tender and as holy as we have distrusted them. And above all I distrust their competency to decide this question. If further relief is given us in this form we shall be thankful. If it is given in some other form, still illustrating the awful evil of sin, and the overruling grace of God, we shall then be thankful; *as we shall be, if with a juster appreciation of things already revealed, we find that we need no further relief at all.* In any case our exclamation will be, in the language of the Book that contains the most vivid descriptions of the coming wrath and of the coming glory, "Thou hast done all things well!" "Just and true are Thy ways, Thou King of Saints!" What alleviation need we more?

JOSEPH ANGUS.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE  
OF  
PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER  
AND  
THE REIGN OF LAW.

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THREE LECTURES,

BY THE  
REV. WILLIAM SALMOND,

UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,  
NORTH SHIELDS.

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“Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is  
“from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variable-  
“ness, neither shadow of turning.” James i., 16, 17.

NORTH SHIELDS: JOHN HALL, 4, CAMDEN STREET.

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1875.

These Lectures were not written with a view to publication, but in the ordinary course of the writer's ministrations to his own Congregation. They are printed at the urgent request of those who heard them, and with the hope that they may be useful to some who have not the opportunity of studying the subject in any more elaborate form.



## ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS.

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- I.—The paralyzing effect of a religious doubt or difficulty—statement of the difficulty with which we purpose to deal. The Bible doctrine of Providence stated. The Bible doctrine of Prayer stated—the influence of prayer not wholly subjective—prayer not to be limited to spiritual things. The doctrine of the Government of the World by general laws stated—its truth conceded—the impossibility of life and action in a world otherwise constituted—the impossibility of supposing the Creator otherwise governing the world.
- II.—The question re-opened—how modern science has magnified its proportions. The difficulty reduced to the point ‘believing of prayer necessitates the supposition of miracles.’ The kind of answer which is required. Our ignorance of the nature of matter—of force—of cause—and the proper inference from our ignorance. The sense in which the laws of nature are not unbending but pliable—nature not inexorable but most variable—and the proper inference. A miracle does not carry with it the idea of disturbance or violation of the order of nature. The point of resemblance and distinction between a miracle and an answer to prayer. Illustration from one of Christ’s miracles.
- III.—Nothing more required than to show a possible way in which God may hear prayer. Other theories—that of a force breathed forth from the spirit of the suppliant—that of pre-established harmony. Preference for that of a force entering at a point to us invisible—analogy from Bible doctrine of illumination—of regeneration—and from general mode of expressing the Divine interpositions. This theory explains why we may not pray for things unnatural—why we may not expect any results without using means—why all providences and answers to prayer wear a common aspect. The difficulties of the sceptical position. Summary. The momentousness of the issue involved in this controversy.





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#### ERRATUM.

Page 47, 9th line from bottom, instead of "pray. It was all only the course of things " read "say, 'It was all only the course of things.'"

air and food, and even, converts into poison what in itself and for a sound body is nourishment. This is indeed the reason why so many are ever learning, and never able, to come to the knowledge of the truth. But attention has not been so frequently directed to the kindred fact that an idea or opinion may in such a manner haunt the mind that the Truth can obtain no proper access to it, and the Gospel in no effectual manner leaven the heart. A sceptical or semi-sceptical thought may act as viciously as a secret sin: aye, even an invincible doubt or an unresolved difficulty may be—for many a mind actually is—like an impenetrable cloud between its gaze and the face of Christ. It is found, to take an example, that the thought of the vastness of the physical universe and of this earth as being only like a vanishing







## I.

YOUR attention has often been turned to the fact that the Gospel can obtain no proper hold of us so long as any sinful passion is nourished in the heart or life. A secret sin acts upon the wholesome word of God like some vicious disease which neutralizes all the effects of air and food, and even, converts into poison what in itself and for a sound body is nourishment. This is indeed the reason why so many are ever learning, and never able, to come to the knowledge of the truth. But attention has not been so frequently directed to the kindred fact that an idea or opinion may in such a manner haunt the mind that the Truth can obtain no proper access to it, and the Gospel in no effectual manner leaven the heart. A sceptical or semi-sceptical thought may act as viciously as a secret sin: aye, even an invincible doubt or an unresolved difficulty may be—for many a mind actually is—like an impenetrable cloud between its gaze and the face of Christ. It is found, to take an example, that the thought of the vastness of the physical universe and of this earth as being only like a vanishing

point in space—the thought that the world, with all that it contains, might be annihilated and no more missed out of the universe than a speck of dust floating in the sunbeam—can in such a manner haunt the mind and bewilder the imagination, as to make it impossible to believe in the Incarnation of God, or in the earth's having been the scene of a stupendous, divine, redemptive interposition. I am fully persuaded that this difficulty is only a hallucination of the imagination. It disappears like morning mist when we realize that Mind is greater than Matter: that Spirit is everything and physical bulk nothing: that Spirit is substance and Matter but shadow. Yet it is a striking example of the way in which a thought can bar the way of access, and hinder the Gospel becoming ruler of the heart. Now, perhaps there never was a time when a larger number of minds were conscious of the burden and nightmare of such thoughts, which somehow will not amalgamate with the Gospel, which torment them with a misgiving, which hinder all solid rest in belief, and all really saving influence of divine truth on the soul. With one of these it is my purpose to deal—with one which has been very much before the mind of the public, and very much discussed—with one which is hindering very many from entertaining any practical belief in God as a Heavenly Father, and causing them to feel like liars when they bow their knees to pray—with one which, when once in full possession of the mind, will as effectually prevent any man from ever being a Christian as the cup of the drunkard would—I refer to the supposed irreconcilable antagonism between the fact

of the Government of the Universe by Fixed Laws and the Christian Doctrine of Providence and Prayer. I am well persuaded that no real difficulty exists. I accept the Christian doctrine with perfect rest and conviction of mind, and shall be only too happy to bring cure to any mind which may be growing sick with the poison of a horrid doubt, and to build you up in your most holy faith in the living God, the Father of our spirits, who worketh all things after the counsel of His will, and heareth prayer.

It will be necessary to commence by stating the Doctrine of Scripture on the subject of Providence and Prayer. I must refer to both. The ideas of Providence and Prayer cannot be separated: they are only different sides of the great Christian idea of an immediate, personal, universal interference of God in the life-experience of men.

It will not be denied by any man that the Scriptures teach the doctrine of Providence. He may count it a delusion or superstition, but he will not deny that Christ taught it. There are few ideas more thoroughly pervading and impregnating the whole body of Scripture. We are taught that God rules in the world as a father in his family, with at once a general care and a particular interest in each. 'In the application of law in Nature, the terms great and small are unknown;' so also in Divine Providence: God attends equally to what we call great and to what we call small—to the great king whose volition vibrates through our empire, and to a little child—the flight of a comet and the falling of a sparrow—the

countless hosts of heaven and the hairs of our heads. The immediate will of God extends to everything. He appointed the day of my birth, and He has appointed the day of my death. He has appointed and arranged all the circumstances of my life. Not a blessing has ever descended on my head but He sent it, not a sorrow ever befallen me but He commissioned it. Not a friend was ever raised up to help me but God sent him : not a foe ever cursed me but God had bidden him : not a dark and cloudy day has ever dawned upon me but 'twas His holy will. The sword, the famine, and the pestilence have never awaked to smite a nation but God summoned them ; nor did they ever stay their ravages till His voice said, ' Hitherto!—but no further ! ' The stormy wind fulfils God's word, and goes forth, as if it were an intelligent angel, to execute God's message to the very letter. God keeps in His hands the treasures of the light and heat, the rain and dew, the snow and ice, and distributes them as He will ; so that we rejoice in His sunshine or hide ourselves before His might when He sendeth forth His ice like morsels : we reap God's bounty or pine under His withholding. God's hand is so actively present that it is He alone who gives a man power to get wealth, He who blows upon accumulated treasure, and it vanisheth like a vapour. He is so near, so vitally present, that any hour He can make a straight path for a man's feet through all entanglements, or scatter blindness upon a man's eyes, and be staggers to ruin like a drunken man. But enough ! The Scriptures never teach that our lives and destinies are the sport of laws once, it may be, launched by



the Creator, but now beyond His control. We are taught that a most wise, righteous, strong, merciful Will rules all things great and small, determines whatsoever comes to pass, and that every single effect may be regarded as a separate volition of God. Be the doctrine true or false, who will question that Christ so thought and so taught? If Science will permit us no longer to believe this, what orphans Science will make us!

And what, now, is the Scripture teaching in regard to Prayer? We are taught that our Prayer becomes an actual power that brings results to pass, which shapes and determines what transpires otherwise than it would have been without it. You have seen a lecturer on chemistry pour water into a vessel, then add to it some ingredient which instantly coloured it, then another which changed the colour, then another which resolved the elements into isolation, then another which produced a new composition and a new colour. For every element introduced there was a new effect; withdraw any one element, and there is a different result. Now, we are taught that prayer introduced into a man's life is an element producing an effect and a change in it—that the element of prayer withdrawn, all that transpires in his inward and outward life would be different. We are taught that if we bow down before the face of Him who seeth in secret, and telling Him all about ourselves, pouring out before Him the story of our sins, miseries, perplexities, and temptations, implore Him to help and bless us, He will hear, and so act within us by His Holy Spirit, and so interfere in the world of men and

things around us, as to send us the wisdom, strength, guidance, and comfort which we require: and that He will thus do because of our asking what He would not have done without our asking.

It can scarcely be questioned that this is what the Scriptures teach: but attempts are frequently made to explain away great part of the fulness and the fearless sweep of the Christian doctrine. For example, it has sometimes been said that the effect of prayer is wholly subjective, that the exercise of prayer reacts upon the mind of the suppliant with an elevating, soothing, bracing influence, that herein alone lies all its use and virtue, and that this is the answer to prayer that it answers itself. Undoubtedly the very act of prayer has in it a blessing, and it has, of all things, the most salutary reactionary influence upon our moral nature; at the same time it is manifest that it does so only so long as we earnestly believe in its prevailing power with God—that its subjective virtue is nourished by a persuasion of its objective validity. The moment a man entertains the idea that prayer is only self-discipline, his heart becomes the grave of prayer, his lips will refuse to frame one true petition. The doctrine that prayer has only subjective force is suicidal, and strikes a death-blow at the very roots of prayer. Again, it has sometimes been said that the power of prayer must be limited to spiritual things, but wholly kept out of things physical—that it is right to pray for pardon, peace, wisdom, and purity, and we may cherish the persuasion that in answer to our prayers, God will interfere in the world of our

minds to create these things, but that it is absurd to pray for health, or fair weather or rain, and superstitious to imagine that, in answer to our prayer, God will interfere in the physical world to do or create what we supplicate. It would be premature to show at this stage that such a distinction cannot be maintained, and that every argument which is supposed to banish the power of prayer from physical things is equally powerful to banish it from the realm of mind: it is enough now to affirm that the Scriptures know of no such distinction, and teach us to regard prayer as a power with God equally in the world of mind and matter. There is only one distinction to be drawn. When we pray that God would pour out upon us His Holy Spirit, we know that we are praying for what He has unreservedly promised, and for what is at all times good, and never can be ill: whereas, when we pray that God would send us health or rain at a specified time, our prayer does not rest upon any such absolute promise, and we do not know whether the bestowal of what we ask would really be a blessing, —we have no certainty that we are not entreating what would be a curse; and therefore prayer in regard to physical things must always be qualified. But, with this solitary distinction arising from the very nature of the case, Scripture teaches us to believe that the worlds of mind and matter lie equally open to God, and are equally under His immediate control, and to expect results alike in each in answer to prayer. Prayer may heal the sick body as well as the sick soul—will bring rain to the parched ground and quickening grace to

dead souls—will cause the locusts to depart and the moral wilderness to blossom—will overthrow the chariots of Pharaoh and speed the message of mercy to men's hearts.

Having now stated the doctrine of Scripture concerning Providence and Prayer, we must now proceed to state, with equal prominence and emphasis, the doctrine of Science concerning the Government of the Creation by General Laws—the doctrine which, to so many minds, stands in irreconcilable antagonism to Scripture teaching, and is felt to make it an intellectual impossibility any longer to accept Christ's voice.

Let me here say, before proceeding, that while with full assent I believe Christ's teaching concerning Providence and Prayer, I do none the less fully accept the fact that the world is governed by General Laws, and acknowledge that the doctrine of Science is established beyond all doubt. I should despair if I had in any way to throw doubt or discredit on the doctrine of General Laws in order to defend my Christian belief. I believe that what Christ says is true. I believe that what Science has established is true. My task will be to show that there is no necessary contradiction between the two beliefs.

Let me now proceed to state the fact or doctrine which modern Science has lifted up into such clear light and huge proportions: and this we shall do in a popular way, without aiming at scientific precision of statement. Experience teaches even a child that nature is uniform and regular, that the properties of matter are



not one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but so fixed and invariable that we can infallibly calculate upon their action. Fire always burns. Cork always swims. Heavy bodies always fall to the ground. Water always rises to the level of its source. A man need not put his hand in the fire and expect Providence to prevent his being hurt: he will be burnt although a thousand saints were praying that he might not be. Submerge a man under water for a couple of minutes and he will be drowned; no prayer will prevent it any more than shouting at the moon will stop an eclipse. This is unquestionably true. Nature acts uniformly, not capriciously and at haphazard. Not only are the properties of matter invariable, but the more carefully we look, the further we penetrate, the more clearly we perceive that nature acts according to definite laws, that there is an invariable order of sequences in nature, that certain things always happen together or in immediate succession, that one thing given, something else is at hand, or will follow, and cannot be prevented. Given a certain intensity of cold, water always becomes ice: given a certain amount of heat, water becomes vapour. Given a certain mineral, say a poison like arsenic, in the human body, and life is destroyed—no power can prevent it. Given a certain state of the atmosphere, and fever or cholera appears immediately: restore the atmosphere, the pestilence disappears as darkness flies when the sun rises. Given certain conditions of air and light, and dew falls—otherwise, never, although hecatombs were offered. All this is unquestionably true. Thus men begin to

learn that the kingdom of nature is surrendered to them, and that they can predict. So steady, so uniform, so invariable is nature, that we can predict—in certain departments, with infallible accuracy—what will come to pass. To untutored minds and more ignorant ages, nothing seemed so arbitrary and so manifest an interference of the Deity as a comet or eclipse; but now we can calculate on the very hour when a comet will return, when an eclipse will commence and depart. An astronomer will tell you to a second when such events will occur next century, with as much certainty as if he were inspired by God. But law reigns just as triumphantly in all other departments, although we cannot predict in departments where the results of so many laws are all inextricably interwoven, where so many subtle forces are all linked together. Yet no one doubts that law is everywhere. The gyrations of a feather tossed about in the air are ruled by laws as surely as the movement of a planet. The uncertainty of human life has almost become a proverb. Our breath is in our nostrils. No man knoweth the day of his death. Yet observation and experience show that there is no caprice ruling the length of our days. Take any thousand men of a given age, and you can tell to within a fraction of certainty just how many will be alive, say 25 years hence. Nothing seems so arbitrary as the blowing of the wind; yet no one doubts that there is a law of storms, that laws as fixed govern the wild career of the wind as govern the nutrition of the human body. Let this be enough. We

live in an ordered world, in a world governed by invariable laws, which sweep on in their path, and for no entreaty will turn to the right hand or to the left. It is this remorseless sweep of law which frightens us—the cruel, inexorable way in which Nature rushes on, making no account of moral distinctions, crushing alike the good and the bad, and seeming to make a plaything of man's well-being and destiny.

That we are now confronted with a formidable difficulty must be apparent to every one. It lies upon the very surface—happily just upon the surface. The difficulty has existed ever since the uniformity of Nature was observed: Science has only made it more prominent. It is very long since men asked, where is there room for an immediate Providence in this iron-bound world? And what can prayer do? Only now men are saying so more loudly as Science has found law a little further back. Reserving the task of explanation and reconciliation to the next lecture, let me add some not unnecessary remarks on the fact of the Government of the World by Law.

It might seem to you that it would have been a great advantage to religion if things had been otherwise arranged—that if Nature had been less uniform and invariable it would have made belief in Providence and Prayer much easier to us—that if we had been left in habitual uncertainties we should have been taught to trust and pray—but that this world seems just so arranged as to make religion difficult, to hide God, and shut him out of our hearts and lives. But such reflections are not well founded,

It is manifest that if the laws of nature were not uniform, if the course of nature were not fixed and invariable, life and action would be impossible. If fire burned to-day and cooled to-morrow: if to-day it fused iron and to-morrow hardened it: if to-day wood floated in water and to-morrow sank, and all the laws of specific gravity were for ever shifting: if to-day a substance were nutritious and to-morrow poisonous: we should be like men paralyzed. We live with energy, we plan with deliberation, we put down our foot with firmness, because we walk among certainties, in an ordered world, where all things are uniform. Who would build a house if to-day stones flew upwards and to-morrow fell downwards? Who would sink a well if to-day water rose to its level and to-morrow became inert as sand? Who would plough or sow if the rotation of the seasons were not fixed? Surely, a world so arranged that we could not live and could not act, would scarcely reveal God or help us to be devout.

But further: we cannot even imagine an intelligent Creator governing the world in any other way than by a system of fixed and invariable laws—laws so perfect that they need no make-shift expedients to supplement them. It is the mark of a child to be wayward and capricious. The undeveloped reason has no principles, no calculation, and no foresight. Can you imagine the Creator acting like a capricious child in the government of the world? You regard method, uniformity of regulated action, as the characteristic of rational manhood. If a man live waywardly, not uniformly subjecting his



conduct to a law; if he adopt one maxim or principle as guide of his way to-day, forget it to-morrow, and take a quite different one the third day, you regard him as so far an irrational person—he has on him the mark of folly. Shall we expect the Creator so to govern the world? Were the world not governed by laws, we might almost be excused for being atheists. It is because the Creation is so orderly, so symmetrical, so full of law, that we feel it to be full of Mind: that, looking into the realm of nature with the eye of reason, we feel ourselves met by the gaze of a Spirit. The perception of order is the perception of Mind. The perception of law is the perception of a deliberating Intelligence. The world reflects the face of the Creator-Father, with whom is no variable-ness, neither shadow of turning.





## II.

THAT the properties of matter are invariable, that the course of nature is uniform, that a system of fixed laws girds the whole creation, and that they will yield to no entreaty of ours, but sweep on with deaf ears,—must be conceded by us, not only as to a proved theory, but as simple matter of fact and every day experience. The question then immediately forces itself upon us, How can every effect be regarded as expression of an immediate volition of the Creator? How can there be a universal personal interference of God at every point and in every occurrence? What possible use can there be in Prayer? In ages past, when the universal reign of law was unknown, as we now know it, the difficulty was lightly felt—it was easier to believe in Divine interpositions. But now when one and another and another supposed interference of God has been resolved into the natural, God seems to be receding further and further from our grasp. The Greek believed that the Sun was a god who drove his chariot across the sky:

the suggestion, that it was a luminous body, was denounced as savouring of impiety: it seemed to banish God out of the heavens and substitute a lump of dead matter. Was it not a much more religious theory to believe that the Sun was a god driving a fiery chariot? Our forefathers saw an immediate interference of God in an eclipse: but astronomy explained how it happened, predicted it, and the prediction came true, and seemed in doing so to destroy a prop and stay of religion, and to remove God a stage further off. When a pestilence scourged the land, its awful mysterious power was readily understood as marking God's displeasure: but when Science began to show that it was connected with certain circumstances over which man himself has control, and that it was the punishment of dirt rather than of sin, it seemed as if the mind was now emancipated from all religious interpretation of it, any more than of the most common occurrence. Thus, seeing how the light of knowledge has been making God flee before it, and retire deeper and deeper into the unknown, the heart of man has begun to tremble lest it should lose God and religion altogether, lest all religion should come to be regarded as a kind of superstition, lest it should no longer be able to believe in any providence of a Heavenly Father, or in having any profit in praying to him. In what sense was it the will of God that a ship should founder, when it would not have foundered if we had built it properly? What use is there in praying to God to remove the cholera, when we can remove it ourselves by flushing the drains? Has not the time come for



dispensing with God, Providence, and Prayer? Is it not time to build temples to Science instead of to an invisible Power who hides himself more and ever more? Surely the hour has struck to be done with an idle superstition: to put self-help for trust, and skill and science for prayer! The issue raised is a very serious one. Certainly it is time for every man, who has a conviction left, to utter it, and give a reason for the hope which is in him with meekness and fear.

That there is a difficulty is apparent, but it is necessary to discern precisely where the difficulty lies and what it is. If a workman proceed to rectify any piece of machinery, having only a vague idea that there is something wrong, but he knows not what or where, he is not likely speedily or efficiently to execute his task. He must first be able to put his finger on the exact spot where the defect lies. So we must not proceed to work, groping in a region which seems all darkened and perplexed: we must trace back the difficulty to its central point, and so also reduce it to its narrowest dimensions. It is then supposed that the Christian Doctrine of Providence and Prayer, and the fact of the Government of the world by Law, are antagonistic and contradictory—that both cannot be true, and that if you will maintain the one you must surrender the other. *A world governed by law is supposed to leave no room for the immediate interpositions of a living will.* It is supposed that God does not hear prayer, does not *will* to hear prayer, or that God *cannot* hear prayer, having put an obstacle in His own way: but these two ways of putting it really

come to the same thing. We may state the matter thus: 'Seeing it is the manifest will of God to govern the world by fixed laws, it is therefore His manifest will not to hear prayer. The world is an intricate, clever machine, like a watch. God winds it up and sets it a-going. He never interferes, but lets it run its mechanical course.' On this statement I shall meanwhile offer only one remark: Seeing a man can construct a machine, say a steam engine, and set it in motion, and yet is never as it were quite outside of it, but with his brain and hand guides it, regulates it, and interferes in it, in perfect harmony with its laws and by means of them making it execute his behests at every moment—seeing that this is true of a man and his work, it seems a strange thing that the Infinite Mind should not guide and regulate the machine of creation, causing it to do His will, all in sweetest harmony with its laws and by means of them. Do God's works fetter God more than man's works fetter man? Shall we invert Christ's word and read—'The things which are possible with man are impossible to God.' But this just by the way.—We may state the difficulty thus: 'God cannot hear prayer, The mechanism of fixed law is such that God who made it finds it an insuperable obstruction in the way of answering prayer. The hearing of prayer necessitates the supposition of a ceaseless working of miracles—ceaseless interruptions, suspensions, violations, and contradictions of the order of nature: but we know that no such thing does occur. If God heard prayer, He would ever and anon throw nature off its balance: therefore God does

not—cannot hear prayer.’ Thus Tyndall says:—‘We have ceased to propitiate the powers of nature—ceased even to pray for things in *manifest contradiction* to natural laws.’ And again: ‘We sometimes pray *for a miracle* when we do not intend it.’ This, then, is perhaps the most precise way in which the difficulty can be stated—the *hearing of prayer supposes a miracle—countless miracles*, whereas we know that they are not wrought, and nature’s course never violated. *If then we could show that the hearing of prayer does not require the supposition of a miracle, or that prayer may be heard and nature’s course suffer no violation and no suspension, we should sufficiently answer the difficulty which surrounds the doctrine of Providence and Prayer arising from the government of the world by Law.* I believe that this can be done. But we must proceed leisurely, and shall start at a point further back. A leisurely course will be the most satisfactory in the end.

1. It will be admitted that our assertions ought always to be cautious just in proportion to the density of our ignorance in the departments in which they are made: we call by no polite name the man who affirms dogmatically where his ignorance is so great that an important element which might qualify or change his assertion may be unknown to him. What then is the measure of the rashness of the assertions made by the opponents of the doctrine of Providence and Prayer? It may be that God has purposed not to hear prayer, or finds His own arrangements such that to hear prayer were to act in contradiction to Himself: but to affirm

that it is so, must be so, and cannot be otherwise, is surely reckless in the highest degree: it is to affirm in a region of deepest darkness where a veil of impenetrable obscurity hangs around us at every step. It may ultimately aid us to ponder this fact.

You would imagine, to hear some men speaking about what God does do, does not do, and cannot do, that they had climbed up into a region where there is a light shining like the sun at noon. Would you credit it that they are walking among inscrutable mysteries, themselves being witness? They speak much about matter, properties of matter, and laws of matter, and have got into a way of speaking as if matter were the grand essence and substance which confronted God like some granite wall. Not one of them knows what matter is—a profound mystery meets them at the very threshold. You take a stone in your hand. What is it? It is something hard, cold, coloured, and so on. But what is hardness? To a hand a thousand times stronger it would be soft. What is coldness? It is all relative to your own senses. What is colour? It is a perception of your own eye—in it, not in the object. And what is that *something* which is hard, cold, coloured? Who can tell? Matter seems to melt away before the gaze of the mind. It melts away, too, in the laboratory of science. “Under the analysis of the Physiologist, the Chemist, and the Electrician, matter dissolves and disappears, surviving only as the phenomena of Force.” (Argyle’s *Reign of Law*, p. 116.) “Heat and Light are only modes of motion,” says Tyndall. It seems to be one of the



admitted conclusions of science that Matter is resolvable into Force—that we are confronted, not by a material universe; but a magazine of wondrous Forces. But what have we learned? We are only plunging deeper into the inscrutable. We speak of the force of gravitation, the force of electricity, the force of magnetism. But what is Force? Who can answer? Not one. ‘Hast thou entered into the treasures of the snow?’ Who has been behind nature? What if all matter be only force? What if all the forces be but modes of one Force? What if that one Force be only the living Will of Him whose name is I AM, streaming its energy through the universe? Who dares deny that that is possible? Who, then, dares pronounce dogmatically on the relation in which God stands to things which come to pass? Again: Science is never weary speaking about the causes of things, is ever assigning the causes of phenomena, and is supposed to explain things when it assigns causes for them. Are you aware that men of science admit that they do not know the real and true cause of anything? We know only a certain invariable order of sequences. We know the fact that Hydrogen and Oxygen in certain quantities of each produce or become Water: but why or how no man knows. We know the fact that seeds sown in the ground germinate: but why or how no man knows. The true productive and efficient causes always elude our grasp. And if we know not the real cause of anything, shall we make bold to affirm that the immediate volition of God causes nothing? never operates? It remains at least possible that the volition

of the Creator is immediate cause of everything? I affirm, then, that seeing we know not what matter is, know not what force is, know not what the true cause of anything is, and seeing that the relation in which the Infinite Mind stands to the Creation must needs be above our comprehension, it must be pronounced rash and reckless to affirm that God does not or cannot hear prayer. In this boundless region of the Unknown there seems to be room enough left for everything which religion asserts—space enough for every truth which Christ has taught. If even Science allows that it is everywhere brought face to face with a Mystery—may not that veiled mystery *be* God? What if the veil which shrouds matter, force, and cause be the veil which He wears upon His face, of whom it is written—“Thou art a God who hidest thyself,”—“who coverest thyself with light as with a garment?”

2. There is now a second point to which we shall do well to direct our attention. The doctrine of the government of the world by General Laws is admitted to be true: at the same time that doctrine is often misapprehended, misstated, and exaggerated, and just in these misapprehensions, misstatements, and exaggerations is found to lie no small part of our whole difficulty. It is amazing how the atmosphere clears when they are removed. We speak of the order of nature as fixed, rigid, inexorable, invariable; and in a certain sense it is undoubtedly so. But in what sense? There is also a sense in which the order of nature is *not* fixed, *not* rigid, *not* inexorable, and *not* invariable.

Nature is full of Law: but at the same time the word 'Law' carries with it a misleading association, for the laws of nature are not hard and unbending, but of all things the most yielding and pliable. Nature is not built of blocks of granite and not forged of adamant: nature were just as fitly compared to softened wax or to the yielding waves of the sea.

Let us look into the kingdom of nature. Nature is just a great storehouse of materials with definite properties, or a great magazine of forces and powers of definite quality—materials and forces which are being constantly arranged in ceaseless varieties, which are capable of being assorted, adjusted, and manipulated in ever-varying manner to produce new results. When you go into a great manufactory you find large stores of materials with definite properties, wood, coal, iron, lead, and so on: and when anything has to be done, any effect produced, they are brought out, adjusted, fitted into each other, combined and arranged by a presiding mind, and made all co-operant to an end: and the materials are thus pliable just because their properties are so fixed—the more pliable, the more definite, and the better known their properties are. What else do we see in nature? The Creation lies waiting for the Mind and Hand of God and Man to move it and mould it. Our homes, our temples and palaces, our railways, our bridges, our ships,—all show to what an amazing extent nature is soft and plastic—to what an incredible extent a few primitive properties and forces are capable of adjustment and combination to produce new results. It has been shown

how nature constructs the little barnacles which crust the rocks at low tide, which are at once so fragile and so strong, which a blow can destroy, and which can yet resist the momentum of hugest billows, on the same principle which Stephenson employed in constructing the Menai bridge, so as to combine the maximum of strength and the minimum of weight.\* Might not ten thousand similar examples be produced? When Professor Tyndall creates a bit of blue sky in a lecture-room, he does it just as nature does. When Armstrong makes his huge gun and thunders forth its volley, he has gone to work in the laboratory and workshop of nature, much as when Nature herself prepares and launches forth a thunder-bolt. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," said the Son of Man. Is not nature alike plastic under the hand of the Creator, and of Man whom the Creator made in His own image? There is manifestly a sense in which nature is not hard, but malleable—not rigid, but most pliable—not invariable, but ever new and ever changing—not inexorable, but most yielding, most willing, most serviceable, responding to every touch as the waters of the sea to the blowing of the wind: and yet nothing has been so much overlooked, no fact more obscured by many of the prevalent modes of speech. Is it, after all, so very hard to believe or understand that the world may be full of Law and yet full of Mind and Will?—all established and fixed, and yet all responding, like a living thing, to the voice of the Eternal Spirit, who so knows it in its innermost essence?

\*Argyll's *Reign of Law*, p. 99.



The fact to which I am now calling your attention may be brought out again from yet another point of view. Looking again into the kingdom of nature, we see an almost boundless variety in the effects produced: no two things, however similar, are absolutely alike: and there is thus made upon us the impression of the working of a hand which moves with consummate ease and skill among most subtle and obedient elements. When we look more narrowly, it almost seems to us as if nothing were ever done twice, or ever done twice the same way, as if there were a ceaseless separation and new arrangements of properties and forces, and as if every effect was the result of an endless number of antecedents, the result of ten thousand concurrent causes inextricably inter-linked. Let us take a very familiar example of the way in which a result is brought to pass. A man goes out on a cold, raw, winter's night: he catches cold: the cold becomes pleurisy or fever, and he dies. We familiarly say, His going out that given night was the cause of his death. But how many links lie between the cause and the effect! The temperature of the atmosphere from which he went out—the state of body he was in—the food of which he partook—the medicine which he took or wanted—and innumerable other points, all lie between: and each one is as well entitled to be called cause as the actual going out or the actual disease, for probably had some one little link been a-wanting, he would not then have died. But speaking as we commonly do, that is, fixing our attention on the more prominent links in the chain, we have here an effect,—a man's death, caused by the concurrence

of three things, a certain temperature of the atmosphere, a certain state of his body, and his going out. But if we ask, How came the atmosphere to be in that state? we are led on, and on, and on from link to link till we discover that it was the result of ten thousand causes acting through all past time and through the whole physical universe. Or, if we ask, How came he to be in that state of body? we are led in search of an answer, through all his past life and habits, through all the life and habits of his father and mother before him, on and on through all the circumstances and positions in which he has been placed—once again we are led through all past time and the whole physical universe for an explanation. Or, if we ask, How came he to go out that night? you will find on enquiry that that action was linked with all his past life and actions, with all the ramifications of his connections with other people, so that the likelihood is that had some utterly trivial thing been different some previous day, he would not have gone out, and—would not have died. Thus, the effect, the man's death, is organically connected with a myriad antecedent things, is the result, not of one cause, but of a myriad antecedents, each one of which is equally cause, for if any one thing had been different in the whole chain, ten thousand years back or ten thousand miles away, the result would have been different. Now, when we permit our minds to rest upon such an example of the way in which results are really brought to pass, a very different impression is produced upon the imagination than by ringing the changes upon expressions like 'The immutability of nature' and 'the

inexorable course of law:’ for we see at once that the system of nature is most wondrously plastic. Such an example not only shows how extremely limited must ever be man’s control over what we call the events of Providence, and how helpless we are: not only enables us vividly to realize what possible room there is for an interference, which would elude our vision, in a chain of cause and effect reaching through all space and time: but it most vividly shows us that nature is tender, subtle, yielding, variable to an incredible extent—that a touch or whisper or breath will produce differences of results sometimes of the greatest magnitude and importance. Nature hard and unbending as if built of blocks of granite! No! No comparison could convey an impression more at variance with facts. The volition of a child may influence the destiny of empires. Every time you plant your foot upon the ground it sends an echo through the universe. The falling of a leaf may exert an influence which propagates itself for ever in widening circles, as when a pebble is dropt into a lake. Nature is hard, rigid, and invariable only so far as the properties of things are fixed and the action of force uniform: but in all other respects elastic, as if it were a living spirit obedient to a living spirit. How pliable must all nature be in the hands of the great creative spirit! We shall wonder no more when we read in our Bibles how God produces results in nature and providence by His word, by His breath, by His look, by His touch. The *voice* of the Lord breaketh the cedars. By the *breathing* of the Lord frost is given. He *looketh* on

the earth and it trembleth. He *toucheth* the hills and they smoke. Ye looked for much, and lo! it came to little: and when ye brought it home, I did *blow* upon it. He shall *blow* upon them, and they shall wither.

3. I have now spoken concerning the density of human ignorance, showing how we do not know what matter is, or what force is, or what the true cause of anything is, how we live and move and have our being is an inscrutable mystery: and I have shown how misleading many of our current expressions are in regard to nature, diverting our attention from the fact that nature is most yielding and plastic, and the laws of nature most pliable and serviceable to mind and will. Admitting that we have not yet fully resolved the difficulty with which we are confronted, yet we feel as if it were already less formidable, and were indeed slowly dissolving. We do not feel that Christ's voice makes so very extravagant a demand upon our reason after all, and are less afraid to advance to closer quarters.

We have already said that the difficulty about Providence and Prayer when reduced to a precise statement is just this—that if God hears prayer He must be perpetually working miracles; but inasmuch as God does not work miracles, we may rest certain that He does not hear prayer. If we ask, How do you know for certain that there is no other way of hearing prayer but by working miracles? we commonly get no answer but one which seems to beg the question. If we ask, How do you know that God never works miracles still? we are probably met by a stare of bewilderment which



means, How can any man imagine such a thing? If we press home our assurance that even if obliged to suppose that God still works miracles we should in no way be appalled, we shall probably be told that the working of miracles supposes violations, disturbances, and contradictions of the order of nature, and that as none such occur, no miracles are ever wrought. Into such confusion has the idea of a miracle fallen!

Certainly a miracle has frequently been defined as an inversion or suspension of the laws of nature, and such a definition has naturally enough suggested the idea that if miracles are wrought there must be upheavings in nature and commotions in human affairs. It is hard to understand how such ideas can ever have existed alongside of the Scripture narratives of Christ's miracles. Christ's action in working miracles was soft and gentle as nature's action in her sweetest course. When Christ healed the leper, was the leper conscious of any unnatural convulsion in his frame? Probably never less. When Christ stilled the storm did nature quake as if her balance were overthrown? When Christ raised Lazarus from the grave, did the sun stagger on its course? Christ so linked on his supernatural power to nature's course, that even in his most stupendous acts, his power was soft and noiseless like the falling of the dew. Supposing then that God still wrought miracles when he heard our prayer, what disturbance would follow? He might work ten thousand miracles and you would not know it: He might introduce a force

direct from His will into the course of nature, and not a leaf quiver.

We have no wish, however, absolutely to identify a miracle and an answer to prayer, and we assent, although not without qualification, to the statement sometimes made that God hears our prayer but does not work miracles. We call an event miraculous when we see and note the point at which the supernatural force enters. Thus the stilling of the storm was not in itself miraculous, for storms frequently abate suddenly: but we call it a miracle because we here see a common event linked with a supernatural cause—a spiritual force emanating from a will. Conversely, we call an event miraculous which simply transcends all known phenomena: for example, the darkening of the sun at noon, without an eclipse, although we do not see the point at which the supernatural force entered. Or again—we have the highest class of miracles when we see a supernatural event immediately linked with a supernatural power: as when Christ cried, ‘Lazarus, come forth!’ and he that was dead came forth. Popular attention is too exclusively fixed on the idea of a miracle as a wonderful event, whereas the essence of the miracle lies in the cause,—and a quite common event may be as truly miraculous as the most tremendous prodigy. A miracle is an effect, whether common or uncommon, whether sometimes happening in ordinary course or never so happening, wrought by a force, beyond all known forces which are under man’s control, and entering nature from above and from without—a force issuing from Mind and

Will. We do not, therefore, hesitate to say that answers to prayers may be classed among miracles: for we suppose that, when God hears prayer, He sends a force straight from His living will which enters the realm of nature to produce a new result, exactly as Christ did when he raised up Peter's wife's mother, or stilled the storm: and we know, not only that this can be done without violations of the order of nature, but also in such a way that we shall never know it.

It will make our meaning clearer to take an example or suppose a case. Let us take the case of the son of the nobleman of Capernaum. He is lying ill of fever: life is ebbing away: his pulse beats slowly and fitfully. The physician is standing over him. He fears the patient is dying. He may recover—he may die. An hour or two will decide. Meanwhile, at a distant place, the word was gone from the lips of Christ, 'Thy son liveth!' He has launched a force from His will which rushes straight to the seat of life in the young man's body. The physician knows nothing of all that: it is as much unknown to him as what God is doing in heaven is unknown to us. He is standing watching as life trembles in the balance. He perceives some more hopeful symptoms. There is a quickening of the pulse. He opens his eyes. The fever abates. The crisis is past. It is striking, but he has seen such a thing happen before in a young healthful frame; and he takes his leave, uttering some words of congratulation to the family. To the physician, it has all happened in the course of nature—he had a similar case last week in the

adjoining street: but to the father it is a miracle. The father had seen the point at which the Divine will launched a force into the course of nature: the physician had not seen it. *We are now, relating to what transpires in Providence, exactly in the position of that physician.* How do we know how much that transpires may have a miraculous background, that is, be a result of the immediate will of God veiled by the very way in which it links itself to nature's course? Is that impossible? Is it hard of belief? I find it, of all things, the easiest to believe it.





### III.

In the previous lecture we have shown that there is a *possible* way in which God may interpose in the course of nature in order to produce results corresponding to our petitions, or may move the forces of nature to definite foreseen issues, all without violations or disturbances ; and so have shown that the doctrine of Providence and Prayer is not incredible, and have taken the edge from the argument against it from the invariability of nature. Nothing more can reasonably be demanded from us than just to indicate a possible and conceivable mode of answering prayer. It is not required to show how God actually answers prayer, but only how He may answer it : and probably the actual mode can never be known by us, but only surmised. If one were to assert that a certain action must have been done by a certain man called A, it would not be necessary, in order to neutralize the assertion, that I should declare who did it : it would

be enough to show that it might equally well have been done by B, or C, or D. Or, if one were to assert that a certain thing could only happen under one set of circumstances, it would not be necessary to show it happening under other conditions, it would be enough to show that it might equally well happen under a different set of circumstances. So, I am not required to do—what never can be done—to show the actual mode in which God interposes in providence and hears prayer: enough to show a possible way in which He may do so, without infringement of the fixed order of Creation. I have shown you one such way, but there are other possible ways to which we may refer.

It is possible that in the act of fervent prayer a veritable force, as real as the force of magnetism, goes forth from the spirit of the suppliant, which links itself to the course of nature, and enters as a factor in among the forces which bring results to pass. We do not know what fiery energy may pass from God into the soul when it touches Him in true prayer. We do not know what wondrous forces are hidden in the spirit of man—energies which prayer may unlock. We do not know by what wondrous links the world of spirits may be interlocked: nor do we know to what extent mind may be connected with matter and nature, and exercise power over it. Some branches of Science seem to be feeling their way to some great facts and truths in this direction. Why did Christ demand Faith in the soul before ever He could send His healing virtue through the body? Had the divine power to stream through the soul and pass from

it to the material frame? It cannot be deemed absurd or incredible that communion with God may unlock a hidden power, or that in fervent prayer a real energy passes out from the suppliant's spirit. This is at least a possible explanation. Real prayer *does* go out of a man like a subtle fire.

Or again: it is a possible supposition that the course of nature has been pre-arranged so as to run parallel with the moral and spiritual world: that what transpires in nature has been fore-ordained, so as to dovetail into what transpires in the world of mind: that the providences which meet a man from without have been arranged from the beginning so as to run parallel with his behaviour and his moral history: and that the events which are answers to prayer have been hidden in the womb of eternity, to reveal themselves in time, when behold! we are praying for them! We are taught that the physical creation is moving on to a grand crisis, which will culminate at the same time with a grand crisis in the moral world and the history of the kingdom of God. (Matthew, xxiv. 29-30. 2 Peter, iii. 7-14. Book of Revelation—*passim*.) May it not be so through all the previous stages and events, both great and small? It is possible that the flood happened in nature's course, pre-arranged to transpire at a certain moral condition of the world. It is possible that the pestilential wind which slew the army of Sennacherib happened in nature's course, pre-arranged to transpire when Hezekiah prayed. It is possible that the storm which shattered the Spanish Armada happened in nature's course, fore-ordained to

issue forth as a providential rescue of the world from the moral and intellectual thralldom of the Papacy. The wonderful parallel between the course of nature and the moral history of the world has often forced itself upon the observation of historians: and if so, it is no superstition at once to recognize the divine and the natural in what transpires,—no superstition at once to view a pestilence as a divine judgment, and as caused by certain physical antecedents. We have here, then, another theory: one, certainly, which cannot be proved, but which cannot be disproved, and must be allowed to be at once possible and conceivable.

To such suppositions, however, or to any others which I have seen, I prefer the one which I have previously indicated—namely, that the Creator sends out, from His living Will, a force which enters, at a point invisible to us, the chain of cause and effect, so as to produce results which are at once providential and natural, which are answers to prayer and yet meet us as only the outcome of the order of nature. We have seen how vividly the recorded miracles of Christ enable us to represent such a mode of action on the part of the Creator, for we see a force issuing from Christ's living Will and entering into nature to produce new effects, but without violations or disturbances. But this supposition finds points of support and analogy in the whole Scriptural representation of the mode of God's interference in the life-experience of the individual and the moral history of the race.

We are taught to believe in a divine Inspiration and



supernatural enlightenment of the human mind, reaching its ideal point in the Light kindled in the minds of Prophets and Apostles. Yet inspired men thought, reasoned, felt, and spake after the manner of man, and each one after his own way : it was as if their intuitions of moral and religious truth sprang up from within rather than came down from above. They could never draw any sharp line of demarcation between what their own labouring minds produced and what the Holy Ghost conveyed, any more than one of the five thousand fed by Christ in the wilderness could separate between the original bread and the supernatural addition in the portion which he ate. We believe that there is still a direct immediate teaching of the Holy Ghost, an illumination from above, a suggestion of thought and purifying of the vision by God ; but certainly no one can ever with mathematical precision separate what is God's from what he owes to his own reading and thinking, or the teaching of man. In the work of illumination God seems to enter the mind at a point which is to us invisible, and in the sweetest manner to link on His activity to the laws and faculties of reason, to produce a new result, without violation or disturbance.

We are taught to believe in a supernatural moral renewal of the human soul : that the Holy Ghost breathes out a moral force, which, entering into our minds, thrills them with a new consciousness, becomes wisdom, peace, love, health, purity, which makes us love what we despised, and makes easy what was difficult. But we know that the action of the Holy Ghost links itself so

sweetly with all our actions—so coalesces with our own thinking, reading, praying, and striving—that no one can ever with certainty indicate the point or the moment at which the divine beam mingled its rays with the light of reason, or the divine force united itself to our moral powers. Certainly, the laws of our minds are never violated by the Spirit of God, but, on the contrary, confirmed. He works a miracle in us, and yet in most noiseless manner, and entering us we know not how.

We find, further, that the Scripture language, in representing the divine action and interference, is so framed as ever to convey the idea of an interposition, in a way unknown and at a point invisible, in the course of nature, in the world of human volition, and in the heart and life of man. Thus: "Evil shall come upon thee and thou shalt not know whence it riseth,"—it shall enter at a point beyond your vision. "I destroyed his fruit from above and his roots from beneath." "His roots shall be dried up beneath." Above and beneath: at a point higher than you can see, at a point deeper than you can reach to, my curse shall enter: and ye shall see its effect. "I will be unto Ephraim as a moth,"—the divine action wondrously hidden in the very folds of a nation's life, eating away its own glory and giving no sign. "I will be as the dew unto Israel,"—silently dropping blessing, distilling it, as out of the atmosphere, in a way no man can trace. "I will come on thee as a thief, and thou shalt not know what hour I will come,"—with silent step, as in the dead of night, entering into our life experience, at a point unknown and unsuspected. Do

not such words indicate that the mode of the providential action of God is to send out a force from His will, which enters the order of nature and the world, at a point invisible, so as to produce foreseen results? I feel as if this thought enabled me to thread my way through all the perplexities of our subject.

We can now better understand why we do not, and may not, pray to God for things unnatural and preternatural. I am not anxious to affirm that we may not pray to God to work miracles on our behalf: for indeed we do pray for miracles, if we mean thereby results to be effected by an immediate interposition of the divine power; we pray for a miracle, more stupendous than any physical miracle, when we pray for the renewal of a human soul, we pray for a grander putting forth of the arm of God when we pray for the Holy Spirit than when we pray for rain and dew. At the same time we do not pray for the unnatural or preternatural—for visible and tangible divine interpositions—for the production of any effects which are out of harmony with nature's course, or would startle by their very aspect. We pray that a sick man may be cured, but we do not pray that God would raise a man from the dead; we pray for a bountiful harvest, but not that God would convert stones into bread; we pray for the former and latter rain, but not that God would roll back the current of a river. Why not? Partly, because we know that such wonderful signs are reserved for special times and uses, for great turning-points in the history of the kingdom of God and to accredit special messages, and that if they were common

they would not only lose all special use, but be in all respects hurtful to the world. Partly, because the express promises given us in the Scriptures must be the standard of all our petitions: every prayer must resolve itself into this—‘let it be unto me according to the word on which Thou has caused me to hope’: and we have nowhere a promise that anything preternatural will ever be wrought for us. But further, because it is not necessary that God should at any moment either violate or transcend the order of nature in order to answer any legitimate prayer or send any providential mercy: for God honours His own laws, and links His action with nature’s onward course.

We can now better understand why we do not expect God providentially to interfere for our help, and answer our petitions, without the use of means on our part. It is written, We are fellow workers with God. And again: We are made partakers of the divine nature. And again: God made man in His own image. Man is appointed to become Lord and King of the realm of nature (Psalm viii.). He is to grasp and master it by knowledge, by penetrating to its secrets to yoke it to his will, by comprehending its properties to mould it by his hand, by bowing under its laws to command it to perform his behests. His rational will is to make him King of Nature: the reflection of the divine sovereignty. God himself will not violate nature: He treats his own arrangements with awe and reverence. Are not the laws of nature as much the expression of the Divine Will as the Decalogue? What shall we then think of ourselves



if we expect results without using the means, or count on results while treating God's manifest will with scorn? Shall we not work *with* God and *as* God works? When a man wantonly ignores the constitution of nature, and trusts that God will interfere to avert the consequences of his misconduct, he becomes presumptuous: God may interfere, doubtless does interfere, many times, wholly or partially to avert the consequences of our folly, sending from some quarter a current of influence which neutralizes them: but the probability is always that we shall be left to reap the fruit of our ways. If a man wantonly casts himself down from the pinnacle of the temple and trusts that God will give His angels charge over him to prevent his receiving serious injury, he is guilty of tempting the Lord,—he puts a severe and unnatural strain upon God's power, kindness, and wisdom: God may thus interpose, and doubtless has saved us all from the bitter consequences of many a suicidal action, saved the whole race from many a self-destruction: but we are not to tempt the Lord our God, but solemnly reverence His appointed laws in all things as He Himself does. We cannot rob ourselves of the belief that there is One ever near us who can supplement our weakness, pity our ignorance, rectify our errors, guide our perplexities, succour us in our extremities, extricate our feet from all the meshes in which they may be caught, who can never want means to effect any result, "whose arm is never shortened that it cannot save," and who is very gentle and pitiful, suffering incredible drains upon His resources from our ceaseless perversities. But the thought that even He

will effect no result excepting in sweetest harmony with law and order, and will never violate the course of nature, and has appointed rational man to be a fellow-worker with Him, leaves no room for presumption and superstition, and points to us to expect results only in a legitimate way.

Again: We can now understand why it is that providential interpositions and answers to prayer always meet us wearing a quite natural aspect: how nothing ever transpires in providence or as answer to prayer which might not have happened in the course of nature, and which will not look as if it had so happened. Some men seem to be hindered believing in a Divine Providence, and the hearing of prayer, by a secret demand of their minds, that they should be able to see the point at which the divine will enters the chain of cause and effect, or should hear the Divine command given, or should be confronted by some event conspicuously transcending nature. They would believe in Providence if—at least occasionally—an angel were sent to a widow's home carrying food and raiment for her children: but they cannot believe in it, when the only angel who ever appears is in the shape of a sister of mercy, a Bible woman, or a kind neighbour: they find it very hard to credit it that God touched the springs of the human heart and will, and sent the timely help along the channel of the world's common life. They would believe that God hears prayer if—at least occasionally—an angel appeared and said, 'Thy prayer is heard!' But when the answer comes in the pages of a book, or in

the voice of a man, or in the salutation of a stranger, or in an accidental meeting on the street, or in a thought or emotion welling up within us of itself, they find it hard to credit it that God had anything to do with it—or interfered at some point beyond our range of vision. We shall have no difficulty here henceforth. If God's method in answering prayer is as we have indicated, there may be ten thousand providential interpositions and answers to prayer which we shall have no means of distinguishing from the course of nature. In this very arrangement lies no insignificant part of our moral discipline. God is never far from every one of us, but never obtrudes Himself forcibly upon our observations: we may ignore Him, if our hearts incline. God gives us all things richly to enjoy, but gives with a veiled hand: if we will, we are permitted to deny that ever He gives us anything. His active will is ceaselessly interposing and arranging for our good, but in such a manner that he does not permit us to see Him working: it is left us to shut Him from our hearts, if they have no room for Him. He is ever hearing prayer, but so that we are left at liberty always to <sup>say</sup> ~~pray~~. It was all only the course of things." It was left free to the Pharisees to say, 'He casteth out devils—by Beelzebub.' It was left possible to Judas Iscariot to say in his heart, that night Christ stilled the storm,—'It was about to abate of itself. The wind would have lulled anyway, as we have seen it do before,' In our interpretation of the Creation, and Providence, and Grace, there is of set purpose, space left to show what manner of men we are, to declare the contents

of our hearts. There is always room for a double interpretation, that the heart may throw its weight into the scale: for we are under discipline that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.

We have been endeavouring to grapple with a formidable difficulty—for a difficulty we have owned it to be. Need it astonish us to have met with one here? Supposing some elements of difficulty to remain yet unresolved, shall we be astonished? We have only found obscurity where we might beforehand have expected it: for how should we be able to see through the relationship in which the Infinite Mind stands to His creation and the free volitions of His creatures? Supposing we were to admit some outstanding obscurities, shall we therefore turn for mental relief to the affirmation that Prayer is futile and trust in a Providence a superstition? Are there no difficulties there? I find many. It is very hard to believe that the Creator has put His own works out of His universal control, has left man as a helpless orphan to be the sport of blind remorseless laws,—that there is a Creator at all, and that Creator not as a Father in His house. It is very hard to understand how there is a deeply-implanted instinct of prayer in the human soul—how, whenever the human soul is powerfully thrilled by any emotion, it almost irresistibly breathes out prayer—and yet there is no response to it in Him who made us. It is very hard to understand how the holiest, sublimest action of the human mind, and that which more than all others has blessed, elevated, purified, and comforted tens of thousands of the best of the race,



should be the wildest of superstitions and most delirious extravagance. It is very hard to understand how the innumerable multitudes of the race who can testify that the Lord has heard the voice of their supplication, and set their feet in a large place when they cried to Him, have all been the victims of an insane folly. You have no refuge from difficulties in unbelief: and that possibly all things are not yet quite clear, is no reason why you should cease to pray, or to acknowledge God in all your ways.

To sum up the matter. We believe that the whole physical creation, and the whole hidden world of mind, are in such a manner filled with the Eternal Spirit that His hand can at any moment touch their most hidden springs, and sweep all their chords as the hand of a musician sweeps the chords of a harp. We believe that it has pleased Him so to condescend to us, that our humble fervent prayer prevails with Him to accomplish both in nature and in the soul what else had not transpired, and that when the hidden secrets of the world's tragic course are revealed, it will be found that prayer has accomplished ten thousand wonders, and been the mightiest factor in determining what has transpired. We are not alarmed nor caused to stagger by the vastness and sublimity of the belief: and are sure that it is capable of progressive verification in the life experience of every man who will put it to the test, and not weary in supplication. We are not daunted by anything which Science advances: but feel that many of its discoveries seem rather to help us to a sublimer grasp of our old faith, and

we anticipate the hour in which Science, by slow and painful labour, will arise to confess that the intuitions of Hebrew seers have anticipated its conclusions.

I have now said the best which it lies in my power to say in vindication of the Christian Doctrine of Providence and Prayer. I sincerely hope I may have said what may help to clear up some difficulties or chase away the murky night of gathering doubt, or confirm your belief and make it strong against assaults. The subject is most vital, central, and crucial. There are many doctrinal subjects on which a man may long suspend his judgment and yet lead a pious life, many on which we can well afford to tolerate different conclusions and yet feel ourselves brethren of a common Faith. But nothing is more certain than that the question whether God hears prayer does not belong to this category. It is manifest that piety cannot tolerate disbelief in a Heavenly Father and the power of Prayer, cannot even exist alongside of doubt and misgiving: and that if what certain men of Science are saying be true, religion has received a death-blow, Christ's name must now begin to pale, and his fame be lost among the ever deepening shadows of the past, and Christianity begin to succumb to doom, and slowly rot away as a time-worn superstition. Piety demands a most firm and profound affirmation to the sentence, 'God is the hearer of prayer.' The entrance of a doubt will strangle it and poison it in its very roots. The disbeliever will find himself, before many days have come and gone, not many steps removed from sheer blank Atheism. There are those who plainly enough

see the momentousness of the issue involved in this controversy, whose souls shiver with terror as they feel their souls drifting away from the very centre, with no prospect but that of henceforth wandering over an abyss of doubts into an ever denser darkness. To have cried in the hearing of such, "We believe still with all our heart and mind, and find the old truth no way incredible," may not be without its reward.

FINIS.





*David Hay*

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“It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea—a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below,—but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and windings, and mists and tempests in the vale below, so always that the prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.”—BACON.

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# MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY :

ITS CHARACTERISTICS, TENDENCIES, AND RESULTS.

BY J. D. MORELL, M.A.

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## VII.

BEFORE we proceed to the Hegelian system, let us make a brief pause, and look back upon the course we have already traversed. Kant, we have seen, shewed by a very acute process of criticism, that the human reason, in attempting to arrive by a speculative process at the knowledge of supersensual realities, such as the essence of the soul, or of the universe, or of God, becomes involved in hopeless contradictions, from which it can never free itself by any scientific procedure. Fichte accepted these contradictions, and made the solution of them the very principle of his scientific system. We never can arrive at these realities, he affirmed, and that for the obvious reason that they are, in fact, *no realities at all*, apart from the percipient and thinking subject, "the *me*." In this way he based the whole system of human knowledge upon one simple foundation ; shewed the perfect unity of thought and being ; made substance but a form of the infinite personality ; and raised human

nature, morally speaking, to what he regarded as its true position of absolute freedom. Schelling, taking up the thread of speculation, and accepting the idealistic basis of the universe, on the one hand, while he avoided the one-sided subjective principles of Fichte on the other, evolved in this way a theory which maintained the *fundamental identity* of mind and nature, and then sought to make good his ground by translating all the natural phenomena of the universe into the new-found language of idealism. The attempts of both these remarkable minds to reach the truths after which they were aspiring, were, however, fragmentary and imperfect; they failed in laying hold of any great central principle or method by which the *logical*, the *physical*, and the *moral* order of the world could be reduced to one connected system; and the perfect harmony of thought, nature, and human history be made clearly apparent. This final step was left for the philosophic genius of Hegel.

The extension of the Hegelian philosophy, its wide acceptance, and its influence upon German society at large, are phenomena which appear almost unprecedented in modern times, and have commonly been, to English spectators at least, perfectly unaccountable. We shall endeavour to clear up the mystery a little, by pointing out on the one side the real elements of common sense which this system contains, and on the other side, the peculiar circumstances in the political



and religious position of Germany, which have greatly contributed to its extension.

Hegel's aim in his first great philosophical work (*Phænomenologie des Geistes*), which he usually termed his "voyage of discovery," was very simple, as well as very necessary. He did not plunge at once into any one-sided idealistic principle, like that either of Fichte or Schelling; but taking for granted, according to the spirit of the whole modern science from Kant downwards, that truth really exists, and that it is possible to rise to a clear and adequate perception of it by some medium or other, he set about a sober and critical examination of all the facts of the case.

If human knowledge, he thought, really tends to a truly complete and philosophic form, then it will be well to watch *the process* by which this end is obtained—to watch it, on the one side, as it appears on the sphere of the individual consciousness, and on the other side, as it appears upon the sphere of man's historic development in the world. Starting with this idea, he takes an inventory of all the phenomena of mind, viewed as the great organ of truth;—he explains the relation of the subject to the object, as seen in the common unreflective process by which the ordinary human consciousness grasps and appropriates the realities of the external world;—he shews how the light of self-consciousness breaks in—that

light in which the mind views everything in relation to itself, and asserts its own supremacy over nature and human life; finally, he follows up the process until he arrives, through the different stages of man's moral and religious development, at *philosophic knowledge*, properly so called—knowledge in which individual phenomena are seen only as the results and applications of the universal laws of existence.

To illustrate the nature of philosophic knowledge in this sense, let us take an illustration suggested by one of Professor Oersted's beautiful dialogues, in his work entitled "The Soul in Nature." Suppose you are revisiting a charming waterfall which you had seen and admired the previous summer. The scene that your senses actually gaze upon is precisely the same as it was before; there is the stream rolling over its ridge of rock; there are the hues of the sunshine playing upon it; the spray throwing its almost invisible mist over the surface; the green leaves, the flowers, the shadows of the trees, and the roar of the cataract. And yet, when you *interpret* the scene which the senses reveal, by your inward *reason*, you know that not one particle of what we term the actual, material reality that before met your eye, is now left. The water has flowed to the ocean; the sunshine renews itself every instant; verdant nature has died away and reproduced itself;

may, if we could only understand the secret physiology at work through every atom of its organic structure, you would see that its very existence is a constant process of life and death, and never for one instant a fixed existence. Well, then, what do you *really* see when you stand and contemplate the scene? You simply see the *complex result of a number of natural laws*—laws which form the interior essence of nature herself, and are but the outward expressions of the infinite *thought* from which it came. *Which then shall we say is the reality?*—the mere phenomenon which the senses reveal, or the laws which produce that phenomenon, and which are accessible only to the grasp of reason? Clearly the latter; for that alone is the abiding truth, while the other is a mere outward appearance that passes away, and anon renews itself.

If our readers have followed the spirit of this illustration, they will probably find but little difficulty in understanding Hegel's fundamental point of view, which regards all *existence* as consisting in a *process*, eternally going forward; a perpetual position and negation; a constant coming into being, and passing *out of* being; an unceasing struggle between life and death. But then, how must we *systematize* this conception of the universe; how must we reduce it to one intelligible principle, that can explain, by its direct application, all the phenomena of mind, of

nature, and of human life? This is the task which Hegel set himself to accomplish in his logic and its subsequent applications.

If all existence be a process, then we must admit, as a necessary consequence, that the *law of this process* is the abiding reality, a reality which merely *reveals itself* in phenomena. But what is a law but a thought or purpose actualized, and sent upon its mission in the world? Thought and existence, accordingly, are *essentially* the same,—and the laws of thought, if rightly understood, must be identical with the laws of being. Hence, to investigate the laws of thought is the same thing as to investigate the laws of existence;—logic and metaphysics fall together as one and the same science; and, combined, give us a fundamental department of philosophy, in which we can study, at one and the same time, the forms of all thinking and of all being in the universe around us.

From the study of thought in itself, *i.e.*, in its fundamental forms and processes (to which correspond the fundamental forms of existence), we can then ascend to thought in its manifestation—thought embodying itself in the laws and the products of nature; and finally, we can see thought returning to itself, and coming to self-consciousness in humanity. In this way we shall have all the regions of philosophic investigation bound together in a grand unity, and reduced to perfect order and harmony by the regular process of one vast logical development.



It only remains for us, then, to see what is this logical, or as it is more commonly termed, this *dialectical* method, the knowledge of which is to reveal the great pulsations by which the life of the universe is carried forward. The science of logic, from the time of Aristotle downwards, has expounded more or less clearly the real abstract processes of thought ; and to this science, therefore, we must look now to reveal its more universal laws. Logic, in the scholastic sense, falls into three parts, the doctrine of simple apprehension, or Ideas ; of judgment, or the Proposition ; of reasoning, or the Syllogism. In an *idea* we have simply an *undivided* thought ; in the *proposition* we see this thought separating itself into two portions, the subject and the predicate ; in the *syllogism* we see the parts which had been divided, combining together again into a new conclusion, or a higher unity. This process Hegel accepts as being virtually the law of all thought ; which, he shews, must consist uniformly of a separation into two opposites, and a reconstruction of them into a higher and more advanced conclusion. Thus we can form no definite conception of the infinite, without putting it in contrast with the finite ; no idea of cause without effect ; or of the living body without the soul. Or take again the idea of Being, *per se*, and consider what it involves. The moment you begin to apply the power of thought to its analysis, you find that the whole conception

you can form of it is *the negation of all determining attributes*. This idea, accordingly, like all others, divides itself into two opposites—Being on the one side, and Negation on the other ; and it is only when you take these two parts into account, and put them side by side, that you can listen, as it were, with the ear of reason, to the process by which thought passes over from nothing into the first and barest conception of *existence*. Beginning then with bare existence, Hegel has shewn in his logic how thought rolls onwards in its course by this triple dialectic process, gaining one category after another, until it has deduced the forms of all existence, of all the phenomena in nature, and finally, of all life and intelligence itself.

Having once got, therefore, the great law of Thought, which, as we have before seen, is identical with the law of Being, we have but to apply it to the various departments of psychology, morals, jurisprudence, æsthetics, religion, philosophy of history, &c. to solve all the great questions of human interest, and build up our knowledge into one vast scientific system.

What Hegel has really done in taking the syllogistic logic as revealing the absolute laws of thought, is, in fact, a virtual falling back upon scholastic authority. He has begun by viewing, as Kant did, the proposition as the absolute form of all truth, and then perceiving that the subject and predicate vary indefinitely,

while the copula remains the same, he has elevated the copula itself (*i.e.*, the relation between objects) to the highest principle of philosophy, and made all truth and all reality to consist in the laws of that relationship instead of the objects to which they apply. This part of his philosophic system, to say the least, comes very near to a play upon *words*.

The ingenuity and deep insight with which Hegel applied his logic to the various questions of human interest; the profound glimpses he gave into the nature of psychology, the theory of morals, the principles of jurisprudence, the philosophy of art, and more than all, the development of human history, tended, however, greatly to maintain the credit of his system among his first disciples. Still, if we would comprehend the real causes of its rapid extension, we must take a variety of collateral circumstances into account, some of which it may be desirable for us to glance at as we pass.

First, then, we must remember that from the time of Kant downwards, it has become almost a necessity of the German mind to have scientific knowledge presented in a systematic form. The struggle of the German people for national independence had indeed broken in for a time upon the steady progress of speculation, but now, just as that struggle was over, here was a philosophic structure ready at hand, perfectly symmetrical in form, and which exactly an-

swered to the requirements of the age. Calm, logical, unexciting, wholly architectonic in its form, it seemed to afford that repose to the mind which was absolutely needed after the mighty storm through which it had passed. As Fichte's was the philosophy suitable for a period of *struggle*, so Hegel's, in its original form, was equally the philosophy suited for a period of *rest*, and owed, undoubtedly, a considerable portion of its early celebrity to this fact.

Again, there were more *direct* political causes, which favoured its expansion. The Prussian King, Frederick William III. had formed, and was anxious to carry out, a state plan for uniting the whole protestant church within his dominions under one banner; and he looked with very decided complacency upon the Hegelian doctrines, as tending to allay the petty differences which existed between communities, and to unite them upon one broad philosophic basis. His prime-minister, Altenstein, was himself a zealous disciple of Fichte, and as such, conceived that a philosophical interpretation of church-life, christian dogma, and state-policy, was decidedly advantageous in itself, and highly conducive to the political and religious interests of the community. Hegelism, accordingly, basked at Berlin, as well as at the other Prussian universities, in the sunshine of court favour, and ascended the chairs of public instruction with a kind of royal authority enstamped upon it.



This golden age, however, soon passed away, the royal patron paid the debt of nature, and the present Sovereign ascended the throne. Almost simultaneously with this event the stifled murmurs of political discontent began to make themselves heard ; and the demand for a popular constitution, which had been faithfully promised during the national struggle, but unfaithfully deferred, now gradually gained a stronger and more decided voice among the people. The philosophic spirit which had *speculated* at its leisure, and pictured the most enchanting visions of freedom *upon paper*, began gradually to sink into the minds of the people at large, and to embody itself in a more practical form. Speculatively speaking, freedom had been asserted and recognised by every philosopher, from Kant downwards. The Reason was proved to be free ; the Will was declared equally so ; society was shewn to be a combination of free agents, united for the fuller development of their own nature, while government was but the actualized expression of the national will. These kinds of theories had a hundred times been expounded with infinite care, and illustrated with all the apparatus of logical diagrams. So long as they were confined to the lecture-room, they naturally occasioned no uneasiness, but as soon as they descended amongst the people, and threatened to become really *practical*, it was seen that they stood in very obvious antagonism to the policy of

every absolute or even semi-absolute government. Hegelism, being the most recent, and at the same time the most perfect expression of the speculative spirit of the age, thus began to be identified with the cause of popular political liberty; while the opponents of this philosophy, both in church and state, were looked upon more or less as the allies of absolutism, and the foes of German freedom.

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#### VIII.

To understand the progress of events more accurately, we must refer briefly to the *splitting up* of the Hegelian school into several almost antagonistic parties, which now took place. Soon after Hegel's death, a contest arose among his followers as to how they should interpret his views respecting the Divine Personality, the immortality of the soul, and the fundamental ideas of Christianity—a contest which soon separated the entire school into *three* distinct sections. The watch-word of these parties, speculatively speaking, was taken from the theory they severally maintained on the question of *Immanence* and *Transcendence*. The term Immanence, we must explain, implies the unity of the intelligent principle in creation, with the creation itself, and of course includes in it every

genuine form of pantheism. The term Transcendence implies the existence of a separate divine intelligence, and of another and spiritual state of being, intended to perfectionate our own. There were many earnest thinkers in Germany, who while they admired the Hegelian method as a wonderful development of the logical forms of thought, yet deplored the twilight in which Hegel had left all the great questions relating to religion, to God, and to immortality. These, accordingly, formed a school at the extreme *right*, as it was termed, which, while it availed itself freely of the Hegelian logic, uttered its voice strongly in favour of the divine personality, the existence of a spiritual world, and the necessity of a positive Christian faith for the peace and progress of the human mind. This tendency, represented by the younger Fichte, by Weisse of Leipsic, by Ulrici of Halle, and others, uttered itself in the pages of Fichte's *Zeitschrift*. Here it has from time to time combatted the levelling dialectic spirit of the age, and pleaded earnestly for moral and christian truth, while it has discussed freely all the deepest metaphysical problems of the day. It is a somewhat significant fact, that this has been the *only purely philosophical journal* which could weather the storms of the last revolution ; and the only one which has retained to the present day enough of public interest to enable it to flourish over the grave of its former cotemporaries.

The party which stands next on the Hegelian scale, was composed chiefly of the personal friends and pupils of Hegel himself; and who therefore regarded themselves as forming the centre or middle point between all the other divergences. The struggle of this party has been to hold exactly that indefinite position which the master himself always maintained in reference to the question of Immanence and Transcendence. That the divine essence is immanent in the world they appear pretty plainly to maintain; but only in the entire consciousness of humanity, in which and through which the whole intelligence of the universe attains its free and reflective form. Thus, *quoad the individual*, there still exists a *transcendence*—i.e. an infinite reason beyond our own, and a possible futurity; although, *quoad the universe*, the *immanence* of the divine life and reason they consider must be firmly maintained. The most prominent representatives of this phase of the question have been Marheineke, Michelet, and Rosenkranz. Of these the first is now dead; the second has continually verged more and more towards the *extreme left*; so that Rosenkranz now stands almost *alone*, the one living type of the pure Hegelian School.

Of the three parties to which we are now referring, the last, or young Hegelian, is undoubtedly the most energetic, as well as daring, nay the only one which has formed a distinct school of thought that exerts a



popular influence upon the German people at large. Amongst them the doctrine of transcendence is finally abandoned, God and the world become identical terms, and pantheism draws itself nearer and nearer to the atheistic side of the question. The contest which arose among the followers of Hegel, turned, as already noticed, upon the *theological* bearings of his philosophy. While various of his disciples were developing the master's views on the side of Law, Morals, Æsthetics, History, Nature, and Psychology, according to their respective leanings to one or other of these branches of enquiry; the theological question gathered around it an amount of popular and practical interest which made it the great battle-field for the entire speculative spirit of the age.

Strauss was the first who stepped clearly out of the cloud in which the Hegelian philosophy had enveloped religious questions, and pronounced clearly his dissent from the historical truth of the Evangelical narratives. That there is *some basis* of historical truth at the bottom, he admits; but then he endeavours to shew that just as in all other great developments of thought, so in the rise of Christianity, the enthusiasm of the early converts erected spontaneously upon a small ground-work of fact a large superstructure of religious mythology, by translating their wishes, hopes, aspirations, and ideas, into the language of historical reality.

This view of the Gospel narratives, it is evident, draws the whole contest between Christianity and unbelief into a new point of view, and brings fresh weapons to bear on each side of the question. The old English deists, unskilled in historical criticism, and living, as they did, before any researches into the genesis of historical ideas had been instituted, admitted as wholly beyond question, the historical authenticity of the whole of the sacred books ; but as on rational grounds they rejected their contents, they were constrained by the very logical position they occupied, to place the sacred writers themselves in the light of hypocrites and deceivers. Over this, polemic Christianity gained an easy victory. The transparent honesty, the intense earnestness, the high moral grandeur, of the first Christian teachers, crushed under its subduing power every attempt to aim a blow either at their moral principles or motives.

The German Rationalistic School which followed (*rationalismus vulgaris*), planted itself on quite another basis. It began by admitting the historical authenticity of most of the sacred books, and also the *purity and integrity of the writers* ; but endeavoured to shew that what was written in an age of wonder, and under circumstances of intense enthusiasm, must be *accommodated* to our more cool and rational method of judgment. Under this notion, they gave us a new version of the Scripture miracles,

stripped by the hand of criticism of all their supernatural dress. Thus the moral idea and the religious elevation remained; while the miracle and the wonder softened down into events perfectly explicable, *in the present day*, by the ordinary laws of nature. This system of what is commonly called anti-supernaturalism, had also its little day; the further it proceeded, however, the more it became entangled amongst those obstinate assertions of miracle which proved to be so interwoven with the sacred narratives as only to be drawn out by plucking every thread of the entire texture to pieces.

It was just at this time that the researches of Otfried Müller and others, began to throw new light upon the philosophy of history, and more especially upon the *early mythology* of nations, and the rise of great national ideas. Müller's great principle was that those myths which always penetrate a nation's early life, are never the production of an individual mind, but rest upon the higher and more general foundation of the entire spirit of the people; that they are, in fact, allegorical expressions which have grown up in the life of the nation, of their inward sentiments, aspirations, or beliefs. Several writers previous to Strauss (Bauer, De Wette, and others), had shewn the applicability of this principle to some of the early records preserved in the Old Testament; but it was left for him to found upon it an entire

theory respecting the basis of early Christianity. Taking into account the old Hebrew Messianic belief; the wants and aspirations of the age; the restlessness with which men looked from the political troubles and popular vice of that period, for a purer and diviner life; the power with which they were driven back, by the breaking up both of the Jewish and the heathen traditions, upon the primary elements of our moral nature and our fundamental human hopes:—all this, he affirmed, borne upon the tide of an intense enthusiasm, was *sure* to express itself in some concrete and apparently historical form. The real life and character of Christ, accordingly, gave the historical basis for the structure; the hopes of the Eastern world then gathered gradually around it; the facts and traditions in which the Christian churches commenced were the centre around which the thought of the times crystallized; and thus the whole edifice of the Christian faith grew up as the natural production of an age unexampled for the intensity with which man was thrown back upon the great problem of his nature and destiny. According to Strauss, therefore, the historical Christ became gradually a kind of type of humanity; and his final apotheosis expressed the longed-for apotheosis of man himself; the union of the divine with the human in the life and consciousness of humanity at large. Few, perhaps, would now contend that this mythical theory of Strauss can



stand its ground *entire*, against all the force of that new historical criticism, which it has aroused to so large an extent that we begin already to speak of the *Leben Jesu literature* as one of the great phenomena of the times. None, however, who are well read in that literature, can now accept as secure, the old defences which were thrown up against the former Deistic controversialists. The entire polemic between christianity and unbelief is carried up into a higher arena, where a keen historical research into the rise and growth of ideas and dogmas bears down from time to time, with destructive energy, upon both hosts of combatants. If, on the one side, it cuts the ground from under the feet of the Straussian school, it only does so by *vastly enlarging the basis* upon which the pillars of Christianity rest. In this way the Straussian controversy has really marked an era in European thought. It laid the basis for that vast secession from the catholic church in Germany, which the fable of the holy-coat put into operation. It has shaken the old system of verbal literalism even in countries where that system maintained its stronghold for ages before; it has rendered a more free and spiritual interpretation of Christian ideas a necessity of the age, which only the blindest of the blind refuse to admit; it has made most of the old doctrinal disputes which rent the church and the world, seem like so much solemn trifling; and has thrown us all alike

back upon the essential elements of the Christian life, as the only thing for which it is worth our while to labour and contend.

Strauss, then, we may term the negative and critical spirit of the school; in him the Hegelian philosophy came first to an open rupture with orthodox Christianity. Feuerbach, the next in the order of development, leaving the path of negative criticism, has taken up the question of the essence and genesis of *religion*, as a universal fact of human nature. Religion, according to him, is a man's relation to his own essential humanity. The consciousness of God is really the self-consciousness of man. The divine nature is no other than human nature idealised and personified. The conception we form of humanity, with all its powers and faculties, its aspirations and its destiny, is projected as it were, upon the spread-out cloud of our phantasy, and regarded apart as a supreme and infinite personality. Worship, accordingly, is *love*,—love to humanity: to love God is to love the nature of man; to serve God is to serve the true interests of man, by bringing him ever nearer and nearer to his true ideal. Feuerbach has thus exactly *inverted* the original process of speculation. The German idealism began by affirming *the absolute*; and then strove to deduce from it all the phenomena of existence in regular logical order. Feuerbach accepts the individual man, with his senses and in-

instincts, his faculties and emotions, as *the real* and *the true, par excellence*; and from this as his *absolute*, he deduces the nature of religion, and the God of religious worship.

It can hardly fail to strike the philosophic reader, that the system of Feuerbach well nigh completes the cycle of speculation, and lands us again *very near* the point of view from which it started as a popular system during the French Revolution;—I mean the system of pure sensualism in which man and his personal enjoyments become the Alpha and the Omega of all human interest. Although Feuerbach himself still remains standing on the loftier platform of humanity, in its ideal, yet it needs but one step (a step which has been already taken by some of his disciples) to bring this ideal down again to the real, and to make *sense* once more the sole God of man's worship and admiration.

As logical combatants, these daring spirits have certainly shewn themselves formidable to those who enter with them into the arena of abstract disputation; still it cannot but strike a calm looker-on with something like wonder, how the most obvious and startling objections are lost sight of in the heat of metaphysical disquisition. Starting from the subjective side, and analysing simply the processes of human thought, it may be easy for them to construe the great idea of God in many different forms.

From a divine personality they may shew, that it is a very easy transition to make the Absolute coincident with *the soul of nature*, which having passed through the various stages of unconsciousness, comes at length in man to a self-conscious existence. It may then be easy enough to shew, with another stroke of the logical wand, that the divine consciousness is nothing else than the ideal of humanity; that the reason of man, therefore, is the highest reason in the universe, and the will of man the supreme *power*.

But now let us wake the logician out of his dream of ideas, and place his Divinity face to face with the standing wonder of creation. Surely creation must be the work of the *highest* reason, and the effort of the *supreme* will. If this reason and this will,—supreme knowledge and supreme productivity,—be really concentrated in the human consciousness, then we say to this divine humanity, *carry on the work of creation*, or at least explain to us its inmost secrets. Shew us the point in the history of man's reason and will, where human power can create one little flower of the field. If the consciousness of man can neither *create*, nor comprehend the wonders of what *is created*, then let it bow in submission before the infinite power and productivity which holds all things within its grasp, and by transcending our highest thoughts, shows that we are creatures and not creators, and that our reason is but a spark from the infinite reason



above us. Such a solution of the great world-problem as this philosophy affords may satisfy a mere dialectician, but it will never satisfy the wants of the human *soul* in the midst of its hopes and fears, nor of the human *reason* either, when it once breaks through the circle of a logical system, and roams at large over the standing wonders of the universe.

In *Arnold Ruge* the spirit of German speculation has come out of its abstract and dialectical form, and addressed itself, at length, to the attainment of practical ends. Religion, according to Ruge, is the natural impulse of the human soul after the ideal; it is man's effort to realise the highest perfection and the highest freedom, under all the different forms in which they can be attained. The three great fields of human effort are knowledge, art, and practice; and the true function of the religion of humanity is to give the utmost *freedom* to man, in the prosecution of all that is comprehended in these great ends.

It will easily be seen how direct the bearing of this philosophy must be upon the political agitations of the age. Man is bound by all that is sacred in his religion, not to lie down patiently under oppression, and look for his bliss in a future state *only*. The world is the real sphere of humanity; and everything which conduces to the perfection of man's nature in society, must be pursued in spite of all the opposition we may encounter in the path. *Humanism*, then, is at

once the religion and the philosophy of the age ; for all the aspirations of the one, and all the conclusions of the other, centre in humanity as their great end, and proclaim the highest culture and freedom of humanity to be the *purpose* for which we have unceasingly to strive.

Here then we have the final conclusion at which the Hegelian philosophy, in its latest form, has arrived. The Revolution of 1848 marks the termination of its efforts. Strauss and Feuerbach remain in Germany, shielded by the abstract form of their philosophy from the hand of political persecution ; Ruge pays the penalty of his *practical* tendencies in confiscation and exile.

We mentioned that this last phase of speculation came round once more to the stand-point of the old French materialism. In saying this, we are far from intimating that the men who represent it, bear any likeness whatever to the scoffers of that period. So far from that, justice obliges us to bear witness that they are men of a noble bearing,—men too, whose minds have been trained to habits of deep thought, who have lived lives of purity and virtue, and who have a sincere reverence for everything great in moral purpose, and everything conducive to the highest welfare of humanity at large. Breathing, as they do, the air of freedom, there is no wonder that they should become more or less the idols of a people who feel the

chains of political oppression hang heavily upon them, and are panting for national liberty and national life. Whenever the fires of a European Revolution may next break out, the men of this school will assuredly not be the least prominent in the ranks of the new republic. Would that they could ensure to their followers a moderation as great as their own ; and guard against the abuses to which (in the opinion of most impartial observers) their principles but too surely and naturally lead.

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## IX.

HAVING thus gone through the principal phases of German speculation, we can afford to put aside for a little its partial aberrations and extravagances, and look at the general relation which this *whole phenomenon* of modern thought, as developed in Germany, bears to the present elements of social life in that country, and their probable developments in the future.

It is pretty evident to any attentive observer, that there are two antagonistic modes of viewing and interpreting human truth, now prevailing throughout the whole mass of German society ; first that of the middle-age, or romantic school ; and secondly,

that of the modern or philosophic systems. Our present European civilization has come down in a direct traditional line from the middle ages; and Germany, as well as every other country, bears the obvious marks of this fact in all her civil and ecclesiastical institutions. On the other hand, Germany, of all the spots on the face of the earth, has been most influenced *in thought* by the steady advancement of modern scientific ideas. These scientific ideas form a natural antagonism to the middle-age principles of authority; for however numerous may be the different schools of philosophy that have sprung up, or however widely they may diverge from each other, they coincide in fixing their starting point within the natural range of the human faculties, instead of basing any of their conclusions upon historical tradition, or authoritative sanctions.

This antagonism began to shew itself most obviously—not at the Reformation, which merely strove to substitute one principle of authority for another—but in connexion with the advance of physical science. The establishment of the Copernican theory of astronomy: the perception of the fact that this world, in place of being the centre and the main substance of the universe, is but a minute speck in its vast extent; the clearer development of the idea that there are fixed and immovable *laws of nature*, which can not be interrupted without ruin and disorder; the



consequent weakening of the notion that this world is governed in all its detail by a special providence, and the substitution for that idea a steady confidence in natural law and moral order :—all tended to modify the entire hue and character of the philosophy by which human truth had been interpreted. In proportion as the conceptions of *positive science* became predominant in the mind, the more concrete and imaginative ideas of the middle ages imperceptibly passed away; until the difference thus engendered in the whole attitude of the mind towards truth, spread itself over the whole circumference of human existence.

The antagonism which has thus organised itself in modern times between *romantic* and *philosophic* ideas, may be traced more or less throughout the whole of the present German social life. In RELIGION, it is obvious enough. On the one side, we have the Catholic element, still struggling, though very hopelessly, to keep alive some faith in an altar and a daily sacrifice, in a human priestly intercessor, and in a divine authority on earth. Added to this, we have the more dogmatic protestanism of the country, trying to stand firmly on the old pedestal of Luther, uninfluenced by the storm of criticism which has for ever swept so much of the first dogmatic faith of the Reformation into virtual oblivion. And sometimes, too, in their zeal for the picturesque and the sensuous

in worship, we find the unreasoning protestant passing over the boundary line into the pleasing religious delirium of the middle-age system. On the other side, we see historical criticism reducing many of what used to be "unchallenged facts," to a very attenuated form; and philosophic analysis, with its spiritual chemistry, applying a solvent to ideas and dogmas which had long played a vastly important part in human society.

Again, in *morals* we have, on the romantic side, the *ascetic* principle placed at the head of the whole ethical scale; the *flesh* put in antagonism to the *spirit*; time to eternity: on the philosophic side, we have justice and charity inculcated in place of self-abnegation; the cultivation of the flesh reconciled in theory with that of the spirit; and the present world regarded as a sphere of action which, so far from being despised as a valley of desolation, should rather be rejoiced in as inciting to a career of unwearied progress.

In like manner, once more, in *politics*, we have on the romantic side the doctrine of divine right, the principle of willing submission in the subject, and the high privileges both of royalty and nobility, proclaimed to us with all the unction of the very best days of chivalry. No doubt the present monarch on the Prussian throne (the Romanticist on the throne of the Cæsars), well meaning as he really is, and kind of heart beyond most of his own fraternity, would

rejoice above all things in feeling himself the loved father of his people ; would exult to see himself surrounded with a romantic middle-age splendour, and dispensing from his throne beneficence as well as law to all his subjects. But this said Prussian people are by no means so romantic in their notions as their sovereign. They do not ask for *beneficence*, they ask for *human freedom* ; they do not feel bound to obey their sovereign just *because he is a king*, but accounting the divine right a pretty bauble, with which crowned heads are fain to play, they substitute for it *the rights of man*, the wants of society, and the laws of historic development.

That the antagonism we thus trace is likely to die away, except by the final victory of one side of the question over the other, no one who has any insight into the history of opinions, can possibly imagine. The struggle is, in fact, the gradual and slowly matured fruit of ages ; it springs out of the whole modern scientific development of humanity ; it is the contest of two worlds of thought with each other ; it shews us the life of the old world panting for existence against the upheaving of a new and fast advancing era of opposing ideas and principles. Many men in this country, ill-acquainted with the real bearings of the question, are fain to set down the modern German speculations as consisting of extravagant fancies which will only run their little

round, and then pass away into oblivion. They little know *what a world of futurity* lies hidden in these germs of philosophic thought. Admit, as we do, that many of the doctrines propounded *are* mischievous and extravagant; admit that many are also recondite, and hard to be understood; yet it were well to remember that the world-problem they attempt to solve is one which recurs ever and anon to the human spirit in new forms and phases; that it is one which, despite all the failures of past times, leaves an ever-renewed necessity in the human soul; and that those who scoff at all earnest attempts towards a more satisfying solution, are generally men who have, in plain fact, nothing but half-exploded traditions to put in their place.

Let us not be too hasty either, in this country, to draw a *too* flattering contrast between the practical common sense of which we sometimes boast, and the over-wrought speculative tendencies of our German brethren. For it is now evident to any one who has ears to hear, and eyes to discern the signs of the times, that we ourselves are not destined to escape the very same struggle, in an English form, which they have passed through in their own particular manner. The very constitution of our modern European civilization, we believe, proves it to be a mental necessity; and we cannot perhaps terminate this disquisition better than by shewing on what



grounds such a conclusion, so important in reference to our future progress, really rests.

To make these grounds apparent, we would first point to the fact that some such contrast as that which I have pointed out in Germany, lies essentially, more or less, in the very nature and constitution of humanity in all stages of its progress. There have always been two great types of mind standing in antagonism to each other; those which ground their convictions most readily upon Authority, and those which ground them upon Reason, or Insight. To go back to the old world, we may regard the Greek mind as being a fair example of the latter, while the Roman mind presents a similar example of the former. The Greek was replete with native genius; his perceptions were vivid, his mind creative, his whole intellectual nature speculative and self-reliant. The Roman was of a wholly opposite type; deficient in original genius, incapable of original thought, and taking all his grounds of action from recognised authority rather than from personal convictions. The Roman people received their laws with the most passive obedience, upon the basis of prescriptive, or divine authority; and these laws, when once expressed or propounded, they held sacred as maxims of human conduct, fixed and promulgated once and for ever. What had come down to them from antiquity was looked upon as something

that had originated in a source far above the limits of their own reason, and the formula "*Quod a majoribus acceptum*," gave a title which no possible amount of insight or criticism could ever call in question. In Greece, on the contrary, law was the direct creation of the people; and they little thought of attributing to any transcendent source what they felt themselves quite able to construct out of their own minds. While the Roman looked at his verbal formulas as containing one unalterable sense; the Greek cared little for the mere words in which the code of his country was expressed; he looked at the *spirit* more than the *letter* of the law; and followed a *polity* rather than an *edict*.

This contrast is perhaps most strikingly seen if we consider the importance, in a juristic point of view, which these two nationalities attached to the *human individual*. In the Roman law the state was the primary idea, by which the position and value of everything else was determined. The individual was not regarded as a living man, who can act, think, and claim for himself; he was simply a "*persona*," a creation of law, whose rights do not spring at all from his original nature, but from the civil code of his country. "*Persona*," in fact, is but the abstraction of a man, a man to whom the main thing, namely, moral life and personal will, are wanting; precisely, in fact, what the Romans themselves were in the later

period of the Empire. In Greece the case stood far otherwise. There, it was not the state which defined the citizen, but the citizens who *constituted* the state. Those citizens too were far from being mere "personæ," they were men possessing minds, wills, rights, feelings, impulses; men whose nature and duties were prior to human law and government, and could never be subverted or even modified by it.

An equal contrast shews itself on the *moral* side of the Greek and Roman character. The Greeks only recognised moral obligation in so far as it manifested itself as an inward sentiment of their nature, or as a rational idea developed out of it; their moral feelings grew up in connexion with the sense of *fitness* and *beauty*, so that the same words in the Greek language which designate the one, almost invariably include some element of the other. If we come down to the time of Plato, we cannot but see how deep a philosophic insight the Greek mind had gained into the foundations of moral truth, viewed both as a discipline and a science, and how thoroughly independent of all authority was its pursuit into the nature of such truth, even to its ultimate seat in the very Archetypes of the divine mind. On the other hand, in the stern Roman character we see the notion of *right* taking early possession of the mind, and propounded under the form of strict obedience to the demands of *law* and *order*. With the Romans this was no sentiment

of the heart ; nor did it include any notion of virtue as grounded in the nature of things. Right came before them universally under the type of a proclamation sanctioned by some power beyond their own, and imposed upon them by high authority. The primary quality of the virtuous man, accordingly, was *steadfastness*, a quality closely allied to courage, (*virtus*), and one which sprang out of strength of purpose in obeying a law rather than tenderness of heart, purity of life, or the fitness of things. Accordingly, as this original strength of the Roman character declined, duty became more and more synonymous with *formal obedience to a written code*, and every question of right was determined by an appeal to the verbal authority which that code was supposed to possess. Hence arose that miserable habit of casuistry which characterised the Roman Jurists of the later period (*Rabulistik*) ; and which from their example, as the highest legal authorities, infected the whole mind of Western Europe. Through their influence the word of the lawyer became substituted for the grave decisions of the moralist ; and the slavery of verbal authority triumphed, as it always will do when predominant, in the moral annihilation of the individual.

To describe the contrast between the Greek and Roman mind in the power of philosophical thinking is unnecessary ; for every one well knows that the



Latin school is but a reflection, and that a very poor one, of Greek ideas.

The *religious* characteristics, however, of the two nationalities are too important, and have had too vast an influence upon our modern civilization, to be passed by unnoticed. The religion of the Romans was promulgated by the civil rulers, on the *authority* of supposed divine communications. Wherever there was a sign, an augury, or any other indication of authority, which rested upon some basis lying behind their own powers of analysis or speculation, there the Roman mind yielded its homage as to a legitimate source of reverence and submission. Not so the Greek. From the earliest times the thought lay almost unconsciously in their inmost nature, that their gods, their oracles, their rites,—in a word, their whole religious belief was but the creation of their own thoughts and aspirations. Xenophanes affirmed that the gods were but the projection of man's own interior nature; and that if lions, oxen, and horses had fingers and could paint, they would each represent them in a body fashioned like their own. All the highest speculations of the Greek philosophy respecting the origin of the world, and the great first cause of all things, shew how utterly they repudiated the value of mere verbal authority on these questions; how they stripped words themselves of their pretensions, and drove them back to their original meanings;

and with what scorn they exploded every dogma which could not assert by its intrinsic power, some hold upon the speculative reason, or inward self-consciousness.

But what, it may be asked, have the old Greek and Roman ideas to do with our struggles in the 19th century? They have more to do with it than is generally known or acknowledged; more to do with *the form* in which Christian truths, and the Christian civilization propagated themselves throughout Europe, than we are apt to admit. It is not in the power of any new system of faith, not even of Christianity itself, to alter the natural constitution and intellectual tendencies of a people. The Greek and the Roman, in embracing Christianity, naturally viewed it under the peculiar hue of their respective intellectual developments. The Greeks wanted to penetrate into the *fundamental ideas* which it propounded; to probe them to their centre; to test them all by the light of their own self-consciousness. This was the origin and nature of the early *Gnosticism*—that desire to know, to comprehend, and to analyse every thing held up for human belief, which, we have seen, was inseparable from the whole nature of the Greek intellect. Hence it was that Theology as a science penetrated into Europe under the direct influence of Greek philosophic ideas. Most of the theological terms we even now employ, and not a few of the

current theological ideas, are clearly traceable to the Greek speculations of the third and fourth centuries ; and we may often witness, even in the present day, theological contests, which spring not in any way out of the spirit or even the letter of Christianity, but which are simply relics of Greek speculation, that have propagated themselves in the tradition of the churches down to the present moment. The all-pervading Mind of that extraordinary people has thus lived on in its propagated effects,—and that throughout every country where the Christian faith is dogmatically professed and expounded.

With regard to the Roman intellect, there are also too few who have a clear idea what kind of a legacy *it* bequeathed to our modern civilization, when its political power crumbled away into annihilation. Here was a vast empire which had grown up under the stern respect of a people for law and order ; in which no independent apprehension of philosophic truth had ever developed itself ; but where the trust to *authority* had ever been the great predominating feature of the national mind. It was just at the time when that mind had become *most* enervated, *most* stripped of its pristine energy, *most* given up to a slavish appeal to words, instead of a manly self-reliance in the search for truth—that Christianity as a state-polity became patronised by the princes, and established by law. Was it possible, we ask, that a

people thus constituted, their whole character moulded in this definite stamp, could at once strip off their nationality, and at the approach of Christianity (brought before them too, be it observed, not so much as a new and purer life, as a portion of the state-machinery) reverse all their intellectual habits and tendencies? It is morally certain that they could not, and equally clear that they would inevitably view the new theistic ideas just as they had been accustomed to view all other religious edicts and dogmas, namely, as something to be received on verbal authority, and to be revered as a kind of legal compact between the superior powers and themselves. As Christianity became more and more incorporated with the laws of the empire, the jurists learned, in fact, to treat its proclamations in the same spirit as they treated all other laws; they represented the obligations of Christianity as resting upon certain forms of doctrine, discipline, and precept; and they inculcated or exculpated a man, not according to his religious *spirit*, but according to his practical acquiescence in certain verbal conditions. Thus all those great human truths, those great spiritual conceptions which were embodied in the early Christianity, came out, in passing through the alembic of the Roman mind, in the form of a *rigid and organic church discipline*, demanding unconditional submission to certain verbal formulas, and set forth as containing an authori-



tative standard of truth, such as no human insight dare ever either criticise or resist. In proportion as the political power of the Western Empire gradually diminished, the spiritual power steadily increased, until Rome aimed a second time at swaying a universal sceptre, based upon the idea of religious instead of political authority. The papal dreams of universal government were but the ghost of the old Roman empire, still haunting the spot where its mighty corpse had been buried.

Thus the entire view of the nature of truth, and the attitude of the human mind in relation to it, which Western Europe entertained for so many centuries, was, in fact, the stamp which the Roman intellect placed upon the new civilization; for it was to that intellect that Europe, historically, owed all its modern culture. On the other hand, at the revival of learning,—a revival which was brought about greatly by the re-introduction of the Greek language and literature,—the philosophic or rational element began to re-appear, and to organise an antagonism against the principle of church authority. This element laid hold chiefly upon the *Teutonic* mind, (which is fundamentally far more closely allied to the Greek than to the Roman stamp), while the romanesque nations continued to remain more under the influence of the Latin type of thought and action. The reformation was in fact not merely a reaction against *Roman*

*Catholic* authority, it was at heart a reaction against *the principle of authority itself*,—it was the first concentrated struggle of the Teutonic intellect demanding personal conviction and rational insight, against the Roman idea of law, right, and duty, as based solely upon words and propositions.

The Church of Rome assumed the aspect of a *compact* between God and man, founded on articulately expressed documents, and a living exegetical authority: it was the very idea of the Roman Empire resuscitated in a spiritual form. The Protestant Church denied the compact, cancelled the documents, disputed the divine mission of the officials, and affirmed that every man must stand *alone*, accepted by heaven not on the virtue of church compacts, but of his own personal faith in Truth and God. The Church of Rome was founded on a fixed unalterable *law*, one which was never to be questioned, much less modified, by the human reason. The Protestant Church, on the contrary, was never based on a verbal formula, which was to be the ultimate form of truth, but upon a *symbol*, which was the natural expression of the *convictions* of the living individuals who composed it. The protestant confessions were never regarded as divinely authoritative; they were rather the testimony of a number of minds to the truth which they had inwardly realised; a testimony, accordingly, which might be modified or developed, according as the Christian

experience of every age should dictate. The delusion of there being an absolute meaning in words and propositions, was thus tacitly exploded, and the experience of the individual was taken as a necessary element into the terms of fellowship and the forms of Christian profession.

There was, in fact, the same difference between the two churches as we have shewn to have existed between the Greek and Roman idea of *the state*. In ancient Rome the state created the citizen ; while in Greece the citizens created the state. Just so was it with the two rival churches at the Reformation ; in Catholicism the church created the saint, while in Protestantism the saints created and constituted the church. The one was based fundamentally on a legal covenant ; the other was based on the convictions of living individuals. Putting together the conclusions which historical criticism leads us to draw respecting the elements of our modern civilization, and comparing them with the phenomena which present themselves in this country at the present day, we can hardly suppose that the controversy which has descended to us from the old-world-civilization has much more than *begun* to find its solution in the new. In France, Spain, and Italy, the countries where the *romanesque* type of nationality has ever maintained a preponderance, the middle-age church has always held its ground in the imagination and feelings of the people.

Where philosophic ideas have come in, they have led rather to religious scepticism than to any new development of religious life, independent of the Romanesque Traditions. In Germany, on the contrary, where the Teutonic type of nationality is the purest, the progress of rational investigation has antagonised and well nigh extinguished all faith in the religious tradition of the middle ages. In England, just as we have the most complete blending of the Romanesque and Teutonic elements in our blood, our language, our institutions, and our intellectual culture, so we have had the most complete interpenetration of the two in our *religious* life and development.

In every era of our national development, we have had a large infusion of the romanesque element going side by side with the steady march of philosophic ideas; but instead of either of them running into marked extremes, both elements have usually modified, softened, and thus partially neutralised each other. The Church of England is itself a standing monument of the close combination into which romanticism has entered in this country with progressive philosophic ideas. On the one hand we gaze upon its ancient creeds and formularies, its semi-retained altar, its half-expressed doctrines of priestly intercession and sacramental efficacy; on the other hand, we note its homiletic protests, its partial yielding to a Calvinistic philosophy, and the broad tolerance, within



its precincts, of every species of interpretation which the progress of modern science and philosophy may suggest.

Amongst the other evangelical bodies which form so large a portion of the religious life of the country, we see the same ingredients, only entering in different proportions into different combinations of idea. Here the church-life of the middle ages, its picturesqueness, its appeals to the imagination, its christian adaptation of the old heathen notions of an altar and priesthood, have disappeared under the demand for a rational, in place of a symbolical worship. On the other hand, the old Roman literalism; the repose upon law, statute, verbal authority; the demand for fixed dogma in the form of distinct propositions, the claims of which lie above the power of human criticism;—all this comes amongst these bodies into marked ascendancy. Both elements, the ecclesiastical and the dogmatic, start professedly from the scriptures as the great appeal; but the one loses the letter in the interpretation—the other forgets the interpretation in the worship of the letter.

While these two modified elements of romanticism have been going forwards in the history of our church life, sometimes separated, sometimes blending closely with each other, both of them have been subject to the constant outcropping of extreme views, as well on the romantic as the philosophic side of the question.

Thus on the romantic side we see occasional struggles of *high church principles* to gain ascendancy amongst the people. What the efforts of Laud were in his time, the modern Puseyistic movement is in our own. This, in fact, is *our romantic school*. Just as on the continent we have seen a middle age reaction setting in against the threatening aspect of philosophical theories; so in England we see the very men whose philosophic culture was leading them *irresistibly* away from their traditionary state of compromise, sinking back into the arms of church authority as the only defence against the march of modern criticism.

On the philosophic or critical side we have also had a series of phenomena making their appearance, since the age of Locke and Milton down to the present day. In the English Presbyterian church the critical spirit attacked the dogmatic positions of orthodoxy, with more or less success, during the whole of the last century, and ended in the rise and development of modern Unitarianism. In more recent times, the spirit of German criticism has taken deep hold of the English mind, which, conscious of the many internal contradictions in the struggles it has had to undergo, has applied here almost *spontaneously* for assistance and direction.

The inevitable result of these varied discussions within the pale of the christian communities, has been insensibly to weaken their faith in their own professed

principles and convictions. The whole tone of religious literature at the present time, in this country, is *apologetic*. Books, sermons, magazines, reviews, all the various channels through which the mind of the age expresses itself on theological topics, shew this unmistakable symptom of uneasiness. Instead of that mental repose, which arises from perfect faith; that calm expression of truth, which distinguishes periods of undoubting trust; that spirit of moral edification, which aims at building up the superstructure of religious life, rather than guarding the foundations;—we have now a well nigh universal tone of apology on the one hand, and of defiance on the other. Where strength of argument fails, the place is occupied by sarcasm and irony; and where the least bearing of philosophic analysis, or historical research, seems to add a stone to the buttresses of the current systems of popular faith, be it the last dying confession of some notorious unbeliever, or the fancied remains of the deluge in the crust of the earth, or the winged bulls from the soil of Nineveh with pictures of the captive Israelites,—all are triumphantly pressed into the army of witnesses, as though God's truth, when it really speaks to the heart of the age, does not carry with it its own testimony and indicate its own power.

The fact is, we are not yet out of the conflict which modern ideas (as they grew up at the time of the Reformation), have perpetually waged against

the romanesque world and the middle-age civilization. Neither the philosophic basis of truth on the one hand, nor the traditionary on the other, has yet made itself good, in the moral consciousness of the people at large. And many are the battles that will yet have to be fought before the struggle will be ended, and a new Christian life can prevail, the foundations of which are not shaken by the storms and billows of controversy. In this struggle how many idols will be thrown down! how many institutions will crumble in the dust! how many theories for which men are now fighting with desperate energy will turn out to be clouds and shadows! how many will make shipwreck of their faith altogether! how many will be saved yet so as by fire. These are the natural and necessary concomitants to a subversive and critical era, like our own. But the storm will *one day* pass away; the battle that has been so long raging will one day be over. And does any one think that *his* belief will rise triumphant in that day over the ruins of hostile creeds? Poor dreamer! He knows not yet that the oppositions which mark the intellectual life of the present day are but low and partial views which will vanish in that hour when the new heavens and the new earth shall be revealed, and *faith* and *reason* unite once more into a harmony long forgotten, but eternally pre-ordained.



# VEILS AND FACES.

BY PYNGLE LAYNE.

It may be advisable at the outset of this paper to caution our readers—ladies and gentlemen alike—the former more especially, against too hasty conclusions respecting the drift of our title. An enquiring mind (and the minds of the ladies are always enquiring), looking at our index, might answer itself swiftly with the impression that we were about to launch into a Lavaterish discourse, and that the veil was thrown lightly over the vestibule for the promotion of a good substantial mystery; or a more masculine enquirer, possessed with the popular notion which no disappointing experience can ever destroy, that wherever you have a veil and a face there is beauty in the midst of them, might assume that, amidst festoons of Brussels and Honiton, we were about to show up a perfect vineyard of feminine charms. Now to such witnesses, from the midst of our judicial horse-hair, we say “be careful, and mind what you’re about.” This paper is not to treat of physiognomical science, or the prognostics of noses; nor is it to be a leaf from “The Book of Beauty, or Sketches of our Female Aristocracy.” Upon special veils and special faces it will

offer no word of comment, but try to work out its moral from a broader and far different tale.

Pretences and shams are said to be proper to a high state of civilization. Indeed, according to some writers and speakers, it would be difficult to say what nuisances are not proper to that state; for they have already written us into the cheerful acceptance of plaster of Paris instead of wheaten bread, as a marked indication of our progress towards the millennium; whilst the congregation of men in large cities, aforetime so conducive to the welfare of States, and the blessings of which are even yet plentifully paraded as the great antidote to tyranny, is nevertheless made in deference to a high state of civilization, the fruitful source of social evils unexampled in the records of the world. These glossing excusers have thrown a cowl over that kind and gentle word "civilized," until despite its good professions, and even good works, we suspect the devil's horrid leer beneath. It may be taken as an axiom, that the more ambitious our ascent, the deeper and ghastlier will seem the chasm we have left behind. But the question is, *have we left it behind?* Are we not, as one body politic, partakers both of the height and the depth? Does not one refer to the other,—reproach or despise the other? If we are told that the warm clear sunshine must of necessity produce pestilent mine-damps, must we not suspect the warmth and doubt the

clearness? So when men talk of a high degree of civilization, precipitating notorious social evils, it behoves us to look this "high degree" steadily in the face, to watch its eyes that they do not blink, and to mark its tones that they have a truthful ring. It is not, however, our purpose at present to put this extraordinary theory on its trial; but assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is false, we may be quite sure that an imposture so huge will be the parent of others less ponderous, and floating therefore with less suspected freedom in the imaginations of men. If rapid social progress mean dreadful poverty, dreadful ignorance, pig-stye houses, and *barytes* bread, it will mean many other bad things, more mildly spreading through the branches and towards the summit of the social tree. Now some of these lighter civilizing tendencies we purpose cursorily to notice; and to endeavour to point out that wherever you have anything very heavily denounced, there you will also have close at hand a veil, that shall either entirely screen the evil, or so alter its appearance that, it should be unrecognizable by its most intimate acquaintance.

Let us take for instance the influence of monied wealth in this country; we do not mean precisely in a politico-economical point of view, but as it affects public opinion, and as public opinion estimates *it*. You will have two leading notions regarding this wealth—the one as of something wonderfully active

for good ; the other as of something unceasingly corrupting. Our own position in these northern industrial districts of England, is an apt illustration of this two-sided estimate. Regarded from the one side, our thrift and our money are blessings ; viewed from the other side, they are blackest curses. Now which is the more correct view ? Of course we shall be told that this depends upon the way in which the wealth is used. Scarcely so ; for if a man hoard his money, he is called a miser ; if he employ it for the multiplying of its kind, he is said to be scripturally condemned ; and if he use it to obtain political or social influence, he is said to be buying his fellow creatures, and setting up a false standard of excellence. What then is the real truth of all this ? To us it seems to be that in our investigations of this matter we start with a veil over our faces. It is our custom, from a supposed deference to morality, to start with the leading notion that large masses of wealth indicate a sordid love of gain, a Dives luxuriousness and insolence. The aristocrat sneers at the scheming goldsmith ; the man of letters at the golden, brainless calf. But the aristocrat screws his tenant for the delights of *rouge et noir*, and the men of letters make their bargains with all the keenness of a worshipful company of skinners. In like manner, the men whose principles are supposed to flow from the high fountain of the Christian code, whilst they talk of the mammon of unrighteousness,



of the riches of this world which too fleetly fade away before the solemn hereafter, are themselves not infrequently the most retentive holders of money, and the keenest aspirants after secular gain. Walker, the millionaire, who is a worldly man and a covetous, becomes Walker the beneficent, if not the beatified, when he has endowed a church, and emblazoned his recent escutcheon upon the stained glass of the great eastern window.

Now the love of money may be the root of all evil, but the prominent preference of this maxim, concurrently with its abeyance in general practice, appears to us almost as great an evil; and it is probably from this cause that whenever any one is found declaiming against the pursuit of gain, no person believes in his sincerity, even though a long-faced acquiescence be accorded to his discourse. It is conceding too much to assert that in thus expressing themselves men are guilty of self-deception. There is no deception, and there cannot be any. When a man says he does not care about money except as a means of doing good, he knows the precise value of that declaration. When a poor man says that he envies not his richer brother, the very words confute him, and return to the place from whence they came. In like manner, when a fluent dignitary of any church makes a set at "filthy lucre," we may guess that there will be a collection after the service.

It pleases the high moralists of these days to keep up delusions of this nature, and to expect from their prevalence a regeneration of society. We confess that a community of Daniel Dancers would seem to us preferable to such deluders; for it is incontestable that the energy, and perseverance, and skill, by which alone can wealth be permanently amassed, even when provoked by gold-love solely, are in every respect more serviceable to states than a shammy sneering at that gold, and an envious idleness which renders necessary the declamation against gain.

When, therefore, we are told that a rabid mania for wealth is one of the worst features of our times, we retort that there is a feature worse than this in the pretence which denounces money in the market-place and loves it in the closet; which howls and whines on account of a sordid generation, whilst in its heart there is a secret hoard, a golden altar burning for ever. There seems to us no more palpable windmill-tilting in existence than that which is incessantly crashing against the pursuit of money power. Against specific evils, notorious, outcrying sins, the bugle notes of indignant virtue are not half so loud; perhaps for this very reason, that men would in those cases be able to measure the result of the defiance, and the prowess of the attacking knights:—they would be able to test exactly how much good all the warring had effected, and to discover whether the challenge

were sincere and meant fighting, or whether it were wind, the coming and the going of which could not be defined. Possibly this modulated denunciation of definite evils may arise from the fact, that in the position of the perjurer and the thief there is nothing to envy, whilst the march of ambition and the splendour of wealth, tempt but too easily our frail humanity. Granted that there is a natural justice in all this baying the silver moons, 'the question arises, when does the baying begin to be just? Take the ambitious man. We speak of "laudable ambition," and "inordinate ambition," and imagine that the terms carry their own meaning. But generally does not the former mean the ambition which is successful, and the latter the ambition which is not so? The compact Corsican who did not wish to remain an artillery officer all his life, might be described as having a laudable ambition to raise his family and his name in the world, and might be plentifully eulogised up to the reasonable limit of a general of division, working his agile battalions within a given territorial radius. So far his career might honorably illustrate a Sunday school catechism, and his achievements be worked in ingenuous worsteds over a cottage wall, because they were crowned with success. But beyond that, when the hitherto laudable ambition expands into the sphere of military dictatorship, first consulship, imperatorship, and then declines, sub-

merged in the distant seas; beyond that, in the Hades of non-success, this ambition stands out to tell us with sullen warning, that it was by it the angels fell. But what if that inordinate grasper should rise, as he has done, from his grave, and in the person of his "laudable" kinsman, disperse our thousand morals, catch up the fallen fortune which made us judge him harshly, and pursue his race of glory to a goal the splendour of which all Europe attests;—how about the character of his ambition then? After the experience of the last year or two, the feasting of Windsor, and the pageant of St. Cloud, it would be risky to call the ambition of the Emperor Napoleon I. a vaulting ambition which overleapt itself. And as the history of the third Napoleon comes quite naturally out of that of the first, it would seem after all that what was thought inordinate ambition at the beginning of the 19th century, becomes quite laudable within sixty years after. And if this lucky Bonaparte be all to us that we make him out to be, it is clear that at Elba and St. Helena we began to moralize too soon, and that therefore when we warn men against ambition, tell them what it is, and what it is not, where it should begin, and where end, at what it should aim, and with what be content, we but indulge in vague generalities, and have no firm doctrine for our discourse.

Very much in the same fashion is our crusade



against the men of money. Up to a certain point we require them to go, in order that they may prove their industry; but where the coining should stop we cannot tell, unless failure step in to decide for us, and in that case our acuteness rapidly develops itself. It is no futile question to ask, at what point accumulation is fairly open to the sneers of professional, and the jibes of literary men,—where does the laudable desire for independence cease, and the savage yearning for gain commence? With so much general invective we ought to have some code of laws by which to try our peccant traders,—some rules for their guidance, so that when they had secured certain monies sufficient to pay heavy fees, and buy dear books, they might purchase annuities and become christians. Our own firm impression, received from no partial or limited experience, is, that the thirst for mere money, accumulation for its own sake, obtains to a very slight extent indeed amongst the mercantile community. We go further, and say that the purely commercial classes think less of money than any other classes in the kingdom. Of course where the realization of wealth is so marked and general; where you have the aggregate occupations of large districts, most of them turning over remunerative capital, and where an overwhelming majority is buying and selling commodities,—not subsisting on rents, or the refined product of intellectual labour,—attention will more

frequently be directed to the golden results; and it may easily be supposed that men so working, and so gaining, must in the main be mere money-grubbers. But such a view is, in truth, eminently unfair, and is unsustainable on any sensible grounds. We admit that the great portion of men in trade are mere traders; but that fact in itself does not make them mere misers. As traders, their general information may not be of a high encyclopædic character; their imagination may not be keen enough for a grasp at the "Chancellor's medal," or a tight-rope poem on the basis of "Maud;" but as traders, badly-spelling, ungrammatical citizens, they may still have souls above their wealth, and may do their duty in the state of life which they occupy, just as well as highly-cultivated Templars, learned physicians in Saville Row, or succeeding apostles in the hallowed stalls of a cathedral.

Bear in mind we are arguing now the unreasonableness of general attacks upon the supposed narrowness and sordidness of our great commercial and monied interests. The intellectual engines of the metropolis especially, are fond of playing upon what they call the "low blaze of money-getting" in the northern provinces of the kingdom; they want to cool us down here from the high-pressure mains of London genius and pure London life. And as a proof of their disinterestedness, they turn the hose sharply round

upon that portion of their own great "nation" which is devoted to trading industry, and conceive that in putting out "city" pretensions they are displaying unwonted loftiness. Not content with watering the aldermanic or turtle phase of "city" life, they attack men to whom aldermen and turtle are alike distasteful; they take commercial London in the gross, and make it a dark back-ground for setting off to greater advantage their own effulgence.

The reasons are so many and so obvious, why the middle classes in England should desire monied influence, apart from mere miserly considerations, that there is scarcely an excuse for the charge of sordidness so frequently hurled at their heads. The smallest and thinnest honour legally recognised, usually waits upon a monied qualification; and when you approach the better fed and robuster dignities, there is always something stronger than a begging-box at the door. And yet it was not by a party of commercial usurers that the property qualification of members of parliament was fixed. But the golden chain which bars the House of Commons is light, compared with that which guards the integrity of the Peers. And if to be a Peer be an honourable thing; if to be elevated to aristocratic position, the position of the best men, be desirable; and if this can be done by money principally; who can consistently declaim against the pursuit of money for that purpose? It may be said

peers are not often created on account of their wealth, but they are never created unless they are wealthy, and of late years we have the cases of Lords Overstone and Londesborough to prove that sometimes even wealth alone can drift men into coronets; whilst only recently a great lawyer has been snubbed by their lordships because his comparative poverty made him look apprehensively upon hereditary honours, and desire their exceptional disuse.

But although we signalize the desire for nobility as a first-rate excuse for the accumulation of wealth, we are very far from allowing that it is an excuse either generally entertained, or openly professed, by those traders who might reasonably hope to reach the goal. Indeed, we need only refer to the cases of the Peels and the Strutts, two families whose useful course has been based on commercially acquired wealth, in order to show that enormous gains may be grasped for useful purposes without any regard to merely nominal honours. Nevertheless we have still a right to say to the men who elevate their noses at successful commerce, retail or wholesale, and who at the same time make the peerage a mighty prize, that they are inconsistent in their attacks upon gold getting, when a golden hand alone can clutch that prize.

In our opinion, people make a grievous mistake when they try to draw distinctions between the motives which actuate different men in following



perseveringly and heartily different pursuits. We believe that every avocation, professional, mercantile, or otherwise, when worked with good will, is worked in the main from the same motives ; and that the difference lies not in the motives, but in the results. In other words, that a hard-working lawyer, *litterateur*, and merchant, are blown along by the same gale of intent, incited by the same wish to excel, to do what they have to do as well as it can be done, and that although their gains may differ in amount, the incentive will in every case prove identical.

The keen desire of winning for its own sake seems altogether to escape the attention of men who attribute ardour in money-getting to avaricious and low desires. They cannot conceive of generous emulation, except on a battle-field or a race-course, in a law-court or a senate. The swift run of a brace of frigates to catch a dodging enemy, inspires them with delight, and they would blush to accuse the captain of a greed for prize-money ; but a merchant, so manœuvring his clipper tea-ship as to beat a rival in a novel market, can only have one sentiment, and for this *vide* Miss Kielmansegge, and her precious leg.

Yet if spirited, go-a-head men, men who like to be first, who love the spur of competition,—exist only beyond the commercial circle, and not at all within it, to what small dimensions must our national energies have shrunk !

Suppose that out of regard to the bread and cheese exigencies of the human system, a misfortune, not a fault, we stoop to a certain amount of low trading, until "the union" is kept safely behind, and then desist; what must we do afterwards? Must we leave the counter and the mart, and sue people, or bleed people, promiscuously? Must we write for magazines, or report for newspapers, or break out into a favourable rash of lawn sleeves? These questions should be answered before we can pretend to deal with general declamation against the hurtful tendencies of commerce.

It is often said of a monied magnate, "Oh, he is a skilful man of business, and has lots of money,—but a man, sir, of no general information, and can scarcely write his own name;" just as if he had been made ignorant by his trade pursuits. Is it not likely that we have many artists whose general knowledge is not specially profound,—many lawyers whose company one would scarcely court for the purpose of general information? The greatest lawyer of modern times, the late Sir William Follett, as keen a money-getter as ever lived, is said to have been wofully deficient in that general mental culture which we should look for in a man of his station; but no one would be justified in calling Follett narrow-minded, because exclusive attention to his duties had restricted the play of his intellect.

A young gentleman on the London press, highly gifted, and wearing spectacles, bountifully endowed by nature with intelligent features, and having the useful faculty of familiarly conversing with a Roman; comes down to look at the manufacturing districts. Should he turn up at Oldham,—which is not improbable,—he beams with his features upon the black expanse before him, and has an exceedingly pleasant manner. He writes a dashing account of his visit, and does it really well. He narrates how he dined with some of the leading merchants;—but the old tale turns up,—they were persons of no mental culture, and some of them grossly ignorant, with scarcely a thought beyond their business and their money. This sounds very distressing, very humiliating. But this gross ignorance may not be so very dreadful after all, and judged from its working, may present none of the results which make ignorance so evil an agent in the world. In fact, the gross ignorance described by the press man was just this. The spinner out of his mill was comparatively a dunce; in the mill he was learned far beyond the writer, whose ignorance there was lamentable beyond measure; but as such no-knowledge, though gross, was not in itself pernicious, so that of the trader in like manner loses all the sting which is generally attributed to such terms. Is this an unfair way of putting it?

We roll about our pitying eyes when we hear that

Jones, the eminent shipowner, can scarcely write his own name, as if this indicated a very imperfect state of being. Unquestionably it would be better for Jones if he had a more fluent pen, and could, in case of need, fling himself lightly into poesy; but it would not of necessity follow that after the fluency and the sonnet he would be a better shipowner, a more loving husband, or a more sincere Christian. We want to educate people in order that they may better their condition, and have purer enjoyments than they have at present; but if Jones, shipowner, has managed to get on without grammar, and without H's, we need not burden our spirit with his misfortune, however we may desire its remedy. Still less need we run away with the notion that because his syntax is nowhere, and his appreciation of literature and the fine arts scant, therefore money has eaten like rust into his soul, and commerce dragged down his mind into the mire. Had he carried his normal ignorance to any other duty, and followed that as closely as he has done ship-building, the result would have been very much the same.

We want to know why deficiency of education should be considered more despicable in a trade than in a profession, and why the deficiency should generally be attributed to the trade, especially if the man be wealthy. Our recent experience of professional men would lead us to believe that if gross ignorance



consist in bad spelling and horrid grammar, the army and navy must be lamentably tutored, nor can the church be said to put forth her finest educational plumage when we have bishops getting their charges written for them, and a reverend gentleman making such a zebra of himself as to advertise a sermon machine which would turn out a well-expressed, properly-punctuated, and powerful discourse, for a merely nominal sum.

There are numbers of men whose mercantile pursuits have left them little leisure for etymological recreation, but the Civil Service examinations just instituted, show us that the ignorance of trade circles is mild, when compared with the almost imbecile culture of men to whom trade would be loathsome. Men are, therefore, no more made ignorant and kept ignorant by money getting, than they are by fighting, or by preaching, or by place-seeking.

If we were to adopt in its integrity, the theory of much money making rendering men low and groveling, and placing on their minds and hearts a very heavy weight, in what a predicament would be the banking business! A camel preparing to force itself through the eye of a needle would be perpetually present before the eyes of Threadneedle-street; whilst the position of Smith, Payne & Smith, would be painful beyond measure. And as to the Gurneys and the Rothschilds, they ought to sue *in forma pauperis* to be converted into terminable annuities.

And yet, though the amount of information and wit necessary to make a skilful banker, is much smaller than that required for extensive mercantile operations throughout both continents, we do not find that bankers get trampled upon by high-minded writers, as men whose souls require cleansing ; on the contrary, they are esteemed as men of liberal education, and worthy of a place among the upper ten thousand. When we are told that the rule of Britannia over the waves is relaxing, and that England's sun is setting, because the greed of money has crushed every generous sentiment, no one ever thinks of a banker, the dealer in money, but rather of men licensed to sell tea, coffee, tobacco, and snuff, as the arch traitors to their country. We do not stop to enquire whether this is just, because we find it perfectly natural. Our modern poets have, by dint of much singing, so identified this injury to Britannia with mean trading, coke, steam-boiler, and fenced-off occupations, that amidst all the rhymy lightning and thunder, the respectable white-handed banker is never thought of. Even the Poet Laureate would have hesitated to string up Samuel Rogers on a scaffold.

This indulgence to the money-dealers indicates more plainly than aught else, how very loosely people talk when they expatiate upon the corruption of the times. It shews that if they know what they are asserting, they do not believe it. They put up their veil of

ingenuousness, advocate a large liberality, collect rapidly a herd of vapid sentiments; and preach until they are weary with exertion; but behind the curtain, the grasping, selfish human face is serenely bent upon the universal game. And this game of money getting, all the world over, is after all only another name for exertion, emulation, ambition, adventure, independence, success, power. We can see no reason to expect its disuse—none even to wish for it. It is so general, so universal; its good is so practically acknowledged, that a thousand platitudes from pretended sceptics do not damage it in the least. The scepticism and the platitudes only prove its utility; the taunts of laziness only demonstrate its worth. The world *will* have it, the world *must* have it. It is always wanted; sometimes for good, oftentimes for evil, but the good and the evil weigh in this instance only on the same scale as in all other human arrangements. It may be called for to ravage a continent; it may be required to civilise one; it may be wanted to hollow out a mountain-range that too long has made enemies of nations; its potent forces may be asked to build hostile barriers on a peaceful plain;—but in all these cases it only stands up to represent human hate or human passion, human enterprise or human love, husbanded for the inevitable strife alike against physical foes or social evils.

The taunt of avarice against England will appear of

all taunts the most hollow, when it is remembered that we groan under the heaviest of debts, and that our squandering propensities seem well nigh exhaustless, and when every great national effort, however chimerical or visionary, is sustained with the grandest force and the most enduring prodigality. It is said that we carry out our plans in this country by length of purse; but length of purse only means length of arm and brain, of muscle and will. The money is voted because, though the gap will be felt, the energy can be counted upon for its speedy filling up. And the strength required to fill up that chasm is not that of the sordid man; it is no base metal, it is faith, mountain-moving faith, — faith in skill, industry, intelligence, vigilance, and the grand endeavour which conquers all things. Of these the poet is never tired of singing, but their gathered palpable results in the wealth of nations he scourges, as often as the flagellating fit is upon him.

We are, however, always disposed to look with indulgence upon the freaks of our poets in this regard. A poet is allowed to say anything that comes into his head, so that he say it with grace and spirit, and with fulness of assurance. An ethereal "*stand-punkt*" is permitted him from which he may batter the pomps and vanities of this wicked world, and approve himself a warrior fighting the good fight for some truth of which he has no very distinct conception. One of



his first claims to bardic precedence is, that he should be earnest against those ordinary pursuits by which men are clothed, and fed, and sustained upon the face of the earth. His horror of these things implies, at all events negatively, that he subsists on the early snow-drop, browses upon the eglantine wild, and quenches what little thirst he has by the nectarous distilment of the damask rose.

In the nature of things, therefore, he must be thrown very early in his career upon the glittering gold-heaps of his unfortunate fellows, and begin to scratch them about like a celestial bird who would fain get at the priceless grain which the dirty lucre obscures. We believe that poets of all men are in a position to do this with the best grace ; for generally, as a class, there is nothing in their lives to give the lie to their professions. That they are usually consistently careless of money, will, we think, be admitted by all but their publishers. We, therefore, are of opinion that it was mere waste of time on the part of the controversialists who took so mean a side against the Poet Laureate, in his recent attack upon the English traders,—for if they knew anything at all of the poetic temperament, they could not pretend that the attack was unexpected, although possibly it might be undeserved. The fervent declamation of Tennyson against money getting is quite sincere, though burdened with an excess of exaggeration. But this is

more than can be said of the general run of prose denunciators, who have all the exaggeration, with not one particle of the sincerity. The feeling of Tennyson was shown years ago in his famous verses called "Locksley Hall," amongst the finest he ever penned, when he broke out with the startling query—

"What is that which I should turn to, lighting upon days like these ?

"Every door is barr'd with gold, and opens but to golden keys."

We are, consequently, prepared to accord to men like Tennyson and Gerald Massey,—the latter a much wilder though feebler crusader than the laureate,—ample room and verge enough for their natural dislikes. But we must protest with all possible force against those artificial hatreds of wealth-seeking which teem from the mouths and pens of modern social reformers, for their life-experiences confront and expose the simulation. We say that at the very outset of the matter, so much scolding of money-power is exceedingly suspicious, and as our researches progress, the dubious symptoms receive too ample confirmation. It has become the fashion with certain public teachers to have a spare bugaboo at hand to scare their pupils withal, and which they call "the signs of the times." Amongst these signs, always understood to be evil ones, we believe that of shamming impecuniosity should hold a regal position ; it is such a transparent, such an unnecessary sham.

Transparent, because the merest infant can see through it; unnecessary, because the thing denounced, if accepted in its pure significance, would be a far stronger agent than at present in pushing on the lagging age. The veiled deception has now been prevalent so long that we begin to find men serenely adopting it who should be the first to rip it up. The trading and monied classes themselves are beginning to own the soft impeachment, and to yield to the apprehension that they are arch corrupters of the land. We hope, however, that the delusion is but partial, and that it will only be temporary; that manly independence and practical sense will re-assert their supremacy, and save us from a notion that would be the grave of our national energy.

We know too well how hopelessly inefficient in the main, are the advices and monitions of laymen, when placed in the balance against the teachings of those who are the expositors of the weightier matters of the law. But we appeal to the arbitration of deeds, not of words; and when without denying the presence of the mammon of unrighteousness amongst us, we say that an honest amassment of wealth is as virtuous as the garnering of military fame, or the fame of letters, or of titles ecclesiastical or civil—we believe that we speak a truth which might be urged occasionally from our pulpits, with much advantage to our temporal, and certainly with no detriment to our more lasting interests.

## NATIONAL AND RATIONAL RECREATIONS.

BY REV. W. G. BARRETT.

IF a jury composed of all young England were assembled to decide upon the most popular and useful proverb in the English language, we should have no hesitation in anticipating what would be their verdict. With a shout of indignation that there should be any doubt upon the matter, they would unanimously pronounce that the "wisdom of the many and the wit of one" had never got beyond the old story,

"All work and no play,  
Makes Jack a dull boy."

If, however, "*dulness*" were the only result of "*all work*," we might console ourselves under the loss of national vivacity, by remembering that it might be imported to any extent from our continental neighbours and allies. But something more than diminished intellectual power is the result of over toil and ceaseless occupation, either manual or mental. Man does not live by work alone. There is that in man which ought to be developed, and which must be developed, if a nation is to reach its true greatness, which neither sweat of brow, nor sweat of brain, by themselves, can educe. Not only is Jack made a *dull* boy, but he is



made a useless boy, a wicked boy, and in all probability will become a dissolute and drunken man, if he have not time and means for manly, life-invigorating sports. Such being our firm conviction, this paper, opening the subject of national and rational recreations, may be deemed, we trust, an appropriate continuation of the article on "*Destitute and Criminal Juveniles*," contained in our last number.

We have great faith in fun,—real, riotous, exhaustive fun,—at proper times and seasons, and under certain statutes of limitation. We are made to devise and enjoy it to our heart's content, just as a kitten is made to pursue her tail in an imaginary and ever unsuccessful circle, or a herd of goats to have a sham fight for the possession of a towering rock or the stump of an old tree. Not for this alone, of course; boys, men, kittens and goats have other functions to fulfil; all that we say is that these functions will be better fulfilled if they have full allowance of genuine sport. A dull boy is a sad anomaly amongst his fellows; if instead of joining in the games of the school, he seek the shade of a tree to read a book, or mope about musing on quadratic equations, his fate is sealed;—he may become "the pride of prim nursery maids, the joy of aged unmarried aunts, and the favorite of self-indulgent bachelors, with a precocious perception of the proprieties, and a tendency towards the sublime of mediocrity;"\* but he will never be a

\* Alexander's Life of Dr. Wardlaw, p. 8.

great *man*: in after life he may decide the destiny of a Greek article, or succeed in squaring the circle, but he will die out of society's deepest recollections, and only leave such footprints on the sands of time as the next passenger will efface.

For as Milton finely says in his account of his own studies: "because the spirit of man cannot demean itself lively in this body, without some recreating intermission of labour and serious things, it were happy for the commonwealth, if our magistrates, as in those famous governments of old, would take into their care, not only the deciding of our contentious law cases and brawls, but the managing of our public sports and festival pastimes; that they might be not such as are the provocations of lust and drunkenness, but such as may inure our bodies by martial exercises to all warlike skill and performance. Whether this may not be, not only in pulpits, but after *another persuasive method*, at set and solemn pageantries, in theatres, porches, or what other place or way, may win most upon the people to receive at once both recreation and instruction; let them in authority consult."

We shall return to Milton presently; meantime let us make a note of this one word of his, "whatever may win most upon *the people*!" Because we feel for *ourselves* and for *our children* the necessity of recreation;—entire and perfect relaxation from the

ordinary cares and engagements of daily life,—we have put the case thus hypothetically in reference to the average order of school-boys, that we might claim for the people at large, more numerous national holidays, and a better supply of the means of healthful recreation on such occasions. We shall probably be thought Utopian, if not worse, but meantime to what we have to say we invite our readers' attention, and ask them at the close, "a true verdict to give according to the evidence."

It is true we have a sad amount of drunkenness and crime in our large cities and smaller provincial towns, and the associations connected with these words are so frightful that few have the patience, fewer still the courage, to go honestly into the details of evidence, in order to form correct conclusions either as to their proportion to the population, or their relation to other times. And because men will not take the trouble to investigate, there are hasty and unreasonable lamentations over what is called the increase of crime, and passionate appeals to legislation to put down this evil, and uproot the other, and a thousand absurd schemes of suppression and asceticism which strike only at the externalisms of vice, without going down to the root and ground of our existing evils. We confess to an entire want of belief in, or sympathy with, any negative methods of exterminating evil. When we have succeeded in making

a man refuse to taste, or touch, or handle a particular form of evil, there are a hundred others within his reach, to which his depraved and uneradicated tendencies will instantly reach forth, and with intenser determination, because you have in another quarter thwarted his inclinations. John Smith goes into the Red Lion to have his pipe and his pint of beer : bright gas-lights depend from the ceiling ; cheerful, perhaps not over modest pictures hang upon the walls ; a glorious fire burns in the grate, and on the table is " Bell's Life in London," or the last number of " Reynolds' Miscellanies." In the parlour of the Red Lion, John Smith, who hasn't " bothered " himself by any ablutions or change of dress before his evening visit, meets with a number of hail fellows, all well met, who like himself have just " dropped in : " conversation ensues and waxes warm and loud ; the last murder ; the last desperate affray with poachers ; the last strike ; the high price of provisions ; the war with the " Rooshans ; " the steeple-chase at A, and the rabbit run at B ; Charley Nobb's fancy pigeons that won the last prize ; and such like themes as

" Who danced with whom, and who are like to wed,  
And who is hanged, and who is brought to bed,"

fill up the evening's *sederunt*. During the conversation another pint or two has been imbibed, and John Smith goes home " quite learned, and quite drunk," and wakes in the morning inert and melan-



choly. However, he goes to his work, but as he cannot do a fair day's labour, his master pays for the evening's debauch. Well, what shall we do with John Smith? for he not only went there last night, but ten to one will go there every night he has a little spare "brass;" and in the end will die a drunken sot, or add another to the already sufficient list of criminals who began their career in the public-house.

Now the negative system will not meet the typical case of John Smith. We have no right to ask that man to take the pledge, until we have investigated the circumstances that have driven him to the public-house; until we have ascertained whether it is not quite as much *our* fault as *his*, that he has become one amongst the heathen tribes of England in the nineteenth century.

When the Roman Catholic young lady of Madrid had the misfortune to witness the burning of a few heretics, she involuntarily sighed "What a very uncomfortable religion Protestantism must be." She did not know these heretics could not help being burned. Such is the unthinking pity we too often bestow on John Smith and his class. Let us visit his home, and see what is to be seen there. We will not describe at random, we will sketch a place we visited this very week, a large block of houses in the midst of one of our fashionable suburban retreats, not six miles from Manchester. Little do they who fly to

these retreats for purer air and bluer sky imagine that in many cases they jump out of the frying-pan into the fire: far better the smoke of ten thousand chimnies, with its disinfecting properties, than undiluted typhus and ripe malaria. In a street that promised decently, we turned up a little opening, just wide enough to admit a wheelbarrow, and came at once on a festering mass of filth, stench and other abominations, in the midst of which whole families, (no not families, herds of human beings,) were doomed to drag out a miserable life, which but for the enjoyments of the alehouse for the men, and the night's scandal for the women, would be a perfectly joyless desolation. Below is a cellar, and for 1s. 6d. a week, a family have permission to poison themselves slowly in two rooms, which have never felt the sighing of a breeze, or seen the bright shining of the sun. Above, in a similar pair of rooms, is another family, breathing the poisoned air that all night long comes up the chinks of the floor; and above is another story again, in which dwells another household, a little nearer an apocryphal sky, and perhaps a little nearer the traditional air. Here those diseases which future generations will read of with astonishment, and wonder that we permitted them to exist, when their utter extirpation was within our immediate reach, find their fruitful origin: typhus, cholera, and a host of scorbutic diseases are gene-

rated in these horrible pest-places until they become indigenious, while the gay occupiers of the neighbouring villas little dream that when the wind sets in the right direction, the charged atmosphere is breathed by the susceptible lungs of delicate wives and daughters. When the jury sits in obedience to "crown's quest law" to enquire into the death of John Smith's boy, found dead in his bed some foggy morning for want of oxygen, instead of "Died by the visitation of God," we think there should be substituted, as far more reverent and true, "Died by visitation of the Landlord." We talk of the harm done by public-houses and beerhouses, but scarcely any one has the courage to speak of the owners of lanes and alleys, getting rents out of the grave, making themselves rich by disseminating poison, and doing infinitely more injury to the life of a community than all the public-houses in the district. Let us hear a well known witness, and an honoured name on this vital subject : in the Blue Book, headed "Public Houses," No. 367, printed in 1854, the following questions and answers occur between Mr. Sotheron, one of the Committee of the House of Commons, and Mr. T. Wright, the Prison Philanthropist. "Does it enter into your contemplation with the view of obtaining a considerable improvement in the habits of the people, that there shall be some attention paid to the improvement of their dwellings?" "If it could be done, it would be a

most excellent thing." "Does it enter into your plan?" "Yes." "You would think that your scheme for *moral improvement could not be carried on without some such provision?*" "No."

This, then, is our first step to the social elevation of the masses: give them, in the name of justice, decent homes to live in, before you condemn John Smith and his class for disinfecting themselves of foul air in the well-smoked room of the Red Lion or Crooked Billet. Give him a better home, and the public house will be deserted to a great extent, and ultimately the true joys of domesticity will supplant the false ones of evenings spent in the bar-room.

But in addition to better *homes*, we seek for more and better *amusements* for the people in their hours of recreation. It is the want of occupation in the times of relaxation from active life that drives men frequently to the excitement of strong drink, or the equal stimulus of bad places of public entertainment. Every man, peasant or philosopher, priest or layman, must have his periods,—and they ought to be frequently recurring periods,—of entire rest from the ordinary toil of life. "The work," says Dr. Arnold in one of his letters, "I am not afraid of, if I can get my proper exercise; it is this *entire relaxation* at intervals, such as my foreign tours have afforded, that gives me so keen an appetite for my work at other times, and has enabled me to go through it, not only with no fatigue, but with a sense of absolute pleasure."



Into the spirit of these words every one must enter. Neither the mill, nor the counting-house, nor the study, will hurt any hard toiler therein, if "at intervals he can get entire relaxation and proper exercise." How to get this, seeing that the great majority of men are debarred from "foreign tours," is not only another question, but the most difficult we have ever felt constrained to study. How thoroughly can we understand the misplaced gaiety, the riotous abandonment, the approximations to licentiousness, the determination to be "jolly under any circumstances," so painfully and revoltingly forced on our attention during several solitary rambles through that Easter fair which is the darkest blot upon, and foulest pest in, the social life of this great city of Manchester; when we remember that Christian people do almost entirely ignore the necessity of amusement, and have serious doubts as to the tendencies of fun. Like the mystics of the fourteenth century, who *made piety an occupation*, and thus committed the greatest blunder men could possibly make, religious people in modern times have been too prone to consider themselves as necessarily standing disconnected from the employments and sports of the people. In the subjective satisfaction they have felt in the truths they believed, or the emotions they experienced, they have passed by with indifference, sometimes with scorn and reproach, everything unconnected with such pure sub-

jectivity. Living in a state of contemplative seclusion from mankind, they have branded as "carnal," things that were healthful and manly; have condemned themselves to the resultless tribulation of writing enormous autobiographical sketches of their barometrical changes of feeling; have forbidden their children to read works of fiction, and to believe in Shakespere; and have thus unwittingly become, under the guidance of a morbid conscientiousness, the chief sources of that unhappy revulsion from religion, which characterises so much of the thought and speech of the present day. Who does not sympathize with Emile Souvestre,\* when he says: "As we are obliged all the year to be decent, orderly, and reasonable, we make up for such a long restraint during the carnival. It is a door open to the incongruous fancies and wishes which have hitherto been crowded back into a corner of our brain. For a moment the slaves become the masters, as in the days of the Saturnalia, and everything is given up to the 'fools of the family.' Alas, our whole life is often but an unsightly carnival! And yet man has need of holidays, to *relax his mind, rest his body, and open his heart*. Can he not have them, then, without these coarse pleasures? Economists have been long enquiring what is the best method of disposal of the industry of the human race. Ah! if I could

\* In the *Attic Philosopher* in Paris.

discover the best disposal of its leisure ! It is easy enough to find it work, but who will find it relaxation ? Work supplies the daily bread ; but it is cheerfulness which gives it a relish. O philosophers ! go in quest of pleasure ! *find us amusements without brutality, enjoyments without selfishness ; in a word, invent a carnival which will please everybody, and bring shame to no one.*”

We pretend to no solution of this difficulty. What amusements are lawful but not expedient, and what are absolutely unlawful, we shall not now presume to discuss. Whether a game of quoits or bowls be allowable or not ; whether billiards or bagatelle should be placed in the “index expurgatorius,” or otherwise ; whether an “even Christian” may play cricket, or perchance use his double-barreled Manton ; whether the idea of a pure drama be purely ideal or not ; and whether pyrotechnics and polytechnics contribute to the elevation of the masses, are questions we leave to be discussed after the first *decennial*,—we are not so presumptuous as to ask for a *millennium*, of common sense. At present this commodity is sadly at a discount. We have anti-this and anti-that. The winds blow antagonistically from all points of the compass against the genus “homo” placed in the centre. Anti-snuff, anti-tobacco, anti-beer, anti-beef, anti-Germanism, anti-living-together-comfortably, have got so much the fashion, that a man is

afraid to speak or move in a company where he may be a comparative stranger, lest he should send some weak-minded person of one "anti"-idea, into a paroxysm of antics.

Meantime in London we have the "Bower Saloon, Lambeth,"\* a theatre with charges varying from sixpence to twopence, where "Rob Roy is very well represented," (evidence, Balfour) where "the audience conduct themselves with the strictest propriety," but where, when "*all is over*" (that is about twelve o'clock), in one night this witness counted 400 persons rushing to the public-house connected with the theatre, where three fights took place, where an infant was "fast asleep on a butt," the "father and mother drunk by the side," and "a little child four years old fast asleep against the counter;" where it would require "thirty times as many policemen as there now are to take up disorderly persons;" and around which theatre "all the public houses were full of people drinking." In London, again, we have the *Cremorne Gardens*, about which the least said is soonest mended; and the *Eagle Tavern*, in the City Road, where "debasement songs are given with no double meaning, but plain out, and which, as far as young females are concerned, is one of the most demoralizing places in London;" where lads and young

\* In the mention of this and other places, we are quoting from the afore-mentioned Blue-Book, No. 367.



persons are taken into dark alcoves and plied with drink, and where on a Sunday, the scene was such that the witness "could not describe it" to the Committee of the House. Till very recently existed also the "*Shades in the Adelphi*," where the Eagle Tavern was out-eagled, but which was so horribly bad that "it has gone completely out." In its vicinity still flourishes the "*Coal-Hole*," a "house of the same description," to which "people in high life" resort, and "many gentlemen who come out in a state of intoxication are picked up by females." Then there are the "Penny Gaffs" in various parts, in which is proved every day the fallacy of Pope's rhyme,

Vice is a monster of such hateful mien,

That to be hated, needs but to be seen ;—

where it is seen and is not hated, though it comes out in its most undiluted form of "unrestrained debauchery," and concerning which, whosoever wishes to be enlightened, can go and investigate for themselves, or doing the work by an excellent proxy, may read Mayhew's "*London Labour and the Poor*."

In Manchester we have some equally bad places of much resort. Public houses, with a "free and easy" every night, and a performance of sacred music on Sundays, advertised to the public in staring letters on an attractive sign-board in one of our principal streets ; with other places about which we have

most reliable private evidence, and concerning which it were well worth the while of those in authority to make a few enquiries. What connection a *quasi*-zoological garden has with assassinations: or a show of fireworks with riotous abandonment, it is hard to say. But in addition to our own private sources of information, we may again quote from the same Blue Book. "On the Sunday," says Mr. Wright, "I have heard in public houses in Manchester, young people singing the 'Doxology,' 'Praise God from whom all blessings flow,' 'Before Jehovah's awful throne,' and so on. I have seen them sitting with beer before them on a Sunday, a boy and a girl together, the boy with a pipe in his mouth, and with his arm round the girl's waist, or round her neck. There is one large room called 'Carpenters' Hall.' I went up there one Saturday night: I thought I would go and see the ages of these poor creatures. I think there were about 200 on the floor dancing: they ranged from fourteen to twenty, and they were allowed to be in that place till eleven o'clock at night."

Sad as this picture is, let us relieve it, first, by adding what Mr. Wright says farther on—"None of these people were drunk; nothing is sold there but ginger beer:" and secondly, by the painful confirmation of our own previous remarks. "I venture to say not two out of twenty of those present *had comfortable homes*." In short, the people wanted comfort and amusement, which they could not get at home; not

strong drink ; and they got the two first in their own way, because we had nothing more excellent to offer.

Another witness, Mr. Reginald John Richardson, of Manchester, has also his tale of wretchedness to unfold. It will help us to a better investigation of this subject, and to safer conclusions, to allow these testimonies to stand in their own words, without note or comment. "There used," he says, "to be singing psalms and hymns carried on in the public houses on Sunday. It was very horrifying, to the religious people particularly ; they complained, and the police put a stop to it. They considered they were making an apology for not keeping the Sabbath, by singing psalms : they thought it would be better if they were to sing psalms, not songs." And with regard to the theatres, this witness adds, that although the performances are subject to the restrictions of the Lord Chamberlain, "there are certain things, which in technical phraseology are called "gags," in which there are often vulgarisms and lewd expressions."

We quote once more on the dark side, (we are presently going to relieve it), from the evidence of Mr. W. Howarth, Manchester : "My inference is that *two persons out of three !*\* in Manchester go to

\* We quote this verbatim : it is perfectly incredible : the population is upwards of 300,000 ; certainly two-thirds of this mass are not in the public house on Sundays. It may perhaps refer to a certain class of the population who may enter a public house half a dozen *times* in the same evening, but we think it must not be taken as representing so many *persons*.

public houses on the Sunday. When I visited the public houses I found that sixty policemen on duty entered those houses; some of them stayed five minutes, and some half an hour. The first house that was taken was a singing saloon: the man keeps a noted beerhouse, and we found that it was attended by 549 men, 151 women, and 420 mostly youths and young women; this was in a period of six weeks; singing goes on upon the Sunday, but of course they profess to play sacred music. Some of these public houses are thronged three and four together, especially in low neighbourhoods like Deansgate."

So far then as evidence can guide us in reaching a conclusion, it would seem that from some necessity of his nature, man universally seeks relief from care and toil by recreations of one kind or another; that little yet has been done wisely and generously to meet this necessity, and hence the existence of Bower Saloons, Casinos, music and dancing halls, low theatres and all this large class of influences, that are evil and only evil, and that continually, for the uprooting of which we look not so much to the action of law, as to the substitution of other and better methods for the employment of leisure.

Something, however, has been attempted in the way of providing rational recreations for the people; and considering the very short time the experiment has been made, and the necessarily imperfect data



gathered as yet from its results, we are surprised at the largely beneficial influences already exerted upon "the people," and the hopeful promise that lies before us of a "good time coming," never yet seen in this great and happy England. And these attempts have been made with much wisdom. Those who have initiated the movements we are about to refer to, believe what the well-known Rev. Sidney Godolphin Osborn states in one of the "Meliora" essays: "To war against these ill-regulated resorts, you must be prepared, in some degree, to yield to the tastes which make them popular. You must not forbid the taste for beer," (we thoroughly concur in this, and say so at the risk of shocking the feelings of those who believe only in antagonism), "bar the meal of bread and cheese, or even exclude the poor man's pipe. But is there no way left open to us by which we can provide the men of a village with a place of resort, where they can have refreshment such as they like, *in moderation*; where the glass or two of beer may be consumed, and the pipe smoked, the fire enjoyed—and this with a so far selected company, that these comforts shall be obtained exempt from the evil of the presence of the blasphemers, the drunkards, and the dishonest of the locality?"\*

But in addition to these mere "creature comforts," we would say, "is there no way left open to us" by

\* Meliora, first series.

which we can approach such a glorious state of things as Milton so grandly sketches in his "Tractate on Education," in which, speaking of such "exercises and recreations as may best agree with study," he says in his own grand English:—"This institution of breeding which I here delineate, shall be equally good both for peace and war. The exercise which I commend first, is the exact use of their weapon, to guard and to strike safely with edge or point; this will keep them healthy, nimble, strong, and well in breath; it is also the likeliest means to make them grow large and tall, and to inspire them with a gallant and fearless courage, which being tempered with seasonable lectures, and precepts of true fortitude and patience, will turn into a native and heroic valour, and make them hate *the cowardice of doing wrong*. They must also be practised in all the locks and gripes of wrestling, wherein Englishmen were wont to excel, as need may often be in fight, to tug, to grapple, and to close. And this perhaps will be enough, wherein to prove and test their single strength.

"The interim of unsweating themselves regularly, and convenient rest before meat, may both with profit and delight, be taken up in recreating and composing their travailed spirits with the solemn and divine harmonies of music, *heard or learned*; either whilst the skilful organist plies his grave and fancied descant in lofty fugues, or the whole symphony, with artful

and unimaginable touches, adorn and grace the well-studied chords of some choice composer ; sometimes the lute or soft organ-stop waiting on elegant voices, either to religious, martial, or civil ditties, which, if wise men be not extremely out, have a great power over dispositions and manners, to smoothen and make them gentle from rustic harshness and distempered passions. And in those vernal seasons of the year when the air is calm and pleasant, it were an injury and sullenness against nature not to go out and see her riches, and partake in her rejoicing with heaven and earth. These ways would try all their peculiar gifts of nature ; and if there were any secret excellence among them would fetch it out, and give it fair opportunities to advance itself, which could not but mightily redound to the good of this nation, and bring into fashion again those old admired virtues and excellencies, with far more advantage now in this purity of Christian knowledge. Nor shall we then need the *Monsieurs* of Paris to take our hopeful youth into their slight and prodigal custodies, and send them back transformed into mimics, apes, and kick-shaws."

Now although we have not come up to "the height of this great argument," we have firm confidence in those ameliorative movements already set on foot, and which, having their origin in this city, are not only our reasonable boast, but as forming the initiative to

similar movements in other places, are, as practical endeavours after a solution of a social problem, most worthy of a "local habitation and a name" in these *Manchester Papers*.

In Manchester we have three public parks within easy reachable distance; Peel Park being one mile from the Exchange, Queen's Park about two, Philips' Park also two. In addition to this, there is the "*Manchester Free Library*," one of the noblest institutions in the kingdom, and which of itself would reflect the highest honour upon the municipal institutions of any city. Neither London nor Edinburgh can point to such rare provision for public want as the Free Library of this metropolis of manufactures, "established by public subscription, in the third year of the mayoralty of John Potter, Esq., 1851." The first subscription list amounted to £10,125 9s. 10d., of which £800 was raised by small contributions from "20,000 persons employed in various industrial establishments, and residing in all parts of the town."

We shall, however, select Peel Park, because from its museum and library it is more attractive than any of the other parks, and after glancing at its growing influence, shall conclude this paper with a word or two about the Free Library, and its successful operation.

As these papers will be read farther south than Lancashire, it may be as well to condense the history



&c. of Peel Park, gathered from the "Blue Book" already so often referred to, in the hope of placing such testimony upon a more permanent basis than it can have in a book consigned so often to the trunk-maker and pastry cook.

"About ten years\* ago, there was a considerable movement made in Manchester for the purpose of purchasing land to construct public parks and public walks. It was thought at the time, by almost every class of the population, that it would be a very desirable thing for the purpose of elevating the condition of the working classes. The rich came forward very munificently with their gifts; the working classes subscribed in their workshops, and among their social circles, for the purpose of promoting the object, and a large sum of money was raised, sufficient to purchase land for three parks. \* \* \* \*

The third park was established in Salford, upon the estate of Larkhill, formerly in the possession of Wm. Garnett, Esq.; it was purchased, and a large portion of land was added to it for playgrounds. This park is considered the most useful, as being the most populously situated. Sir Robert Peel subscribed £1000 to it, the Earl of Ellesmere £1000, and others in similar proportion: many Manchester gentlemen also subscribed their £500 and £100 to it; and since that

\* Evidence of Mr. Reginald John Richardson: page 196 of Blue Book 367: questions 3512 et seq.

time there has been a museum and public library established there."

Such, in brief terms, is the history of this Manchester institution, honorable alike to its founders and to the people who have so abundantly availed themselves of its manifold purposes. Let us take the following extracts from the last year's report, presented by the Executive Committee, the 18th Sept., 1855. "It is most gratifying to find that the demand for useful knowledge by the artizans, mechanics, and other operatives who have so largely availed themselves of the benefits of the library and museum, has during the six years of its existence, continued steadily to increase:—it is the pleasing duty of the committee to refer to the *orderly demeanour* of the *many thousands* who have visited the institution, and the care which is taken by them of the books, especially those in the *lending department*, which *are almost invariably returned without damage or injury*;" —so that the people can be *trusted*. Again, "the number of volumes issued in the reference library in the past year is 73,780, and in the lending library 34,822, making an aggregate of 108,602 volumes delivered to readers, thus showing that nearly one-third part of the books are taken to the dwellings of the applicants for careful reading and study." No wonder the committee conclude by an "appeal to the friends of education and social improvement, for a

continuance of their liberality towards this free institution, which they believe is calculated to effect much permanent good to those who have not the means of purchasing instruction, such as may be had gratuitously in the Peel Park library." To this we heartily append Amen ; and "let all the people say, Amen."

Now let us return to our Blue Book, and to Mr. Richardson's evidence. "The influence of Peel Park has been very great in drawing the working classes from public houses and beerhouses, and also out of the streets. It used to be a custom when I was a boy, for the young men to stand at the corners of the streets, sometimes for mischievous purposes, sometimes for insulting people passing along, sometimes for the purpose of hatching crime. \* \* \* These scenes are seldom now. \* \* \* I do not think the parks do much good to the public houses. The publicans themselves are my authority ; they say, 'we wish the parks closed.' When the parks were originated, they condemned everything and everybody connected with them. If you asked them for a subscription, they said, 'Of course not: we wish they were shut up !' And indeed the public houses and beerhouses along the line of road do not sell so much as they did. I have occasionally to value them ; speaking from my experience as a surveyor, the public houses on the roads to these parks

do not sell for as much as before the parks were opened. The consumption of beer and spirits is not so great as it used to be. The people stay in the park as long as they can ; when they have done in the park they go home. In the summer time they stay in till half-past nine. The time of closing is regulated according to the season. They stay, at all events, till dusk, and then go home. It is a positive fact that in Manchester you cannot, in the theatres and public places, get people to stop very late. Most of them have to be up by half-past five in the morning very promptly, which makes them very particular as to the time at night."

To this, as expository of the general question, let us add the testimony of Sir Elkanah Armitage, as found in Blue Book 853 : "The population of Manchester is 303,000 ; in 1843 we had 502 public houses ; in 1844, 490 ; in 1845, 482 ; in 1846, 487 ; in 1847, 482 ; in 1848, 475 ; in 1849, 480 ; while in 1850, 1851, and 1852, there were exactly the same number, namely, 481." So that while there has been a great increase of population, there has been an actual diminution in the number of public houses, and also a diminution of the offences for which publicans are informed against."

Such testimony is very valuable. Would that we could command attention to these facts and their legitimate inferences. Very seldom in this impatient



world do we find those who respond to the old prophet's words, "He that believeth shall not *make haste*." On all sides are those who ignore such facts as these ; who reiterate ten thousand absurd clamours against the people of the day ; who don't believe in man's goodness unless they can bind him down by the manifold chain of a pledge and a law ; an abstinence pledge that is enforced on the moderate, and is looked upon as a burlesque by ninety-nine out of every hundred we have ever met with ; and a Maine Liquor law, about which all we can say is, that having carefully examined the evidence of its working, we come to two conclusions, first, that while at present, drinking is made public and expensive, this law would make it private and cheap ; and secondly, that it adds iniquity to iniquity by making concealment a part of the grand virtue of getting drunk. We do humbly implore the negatives to study positives ; and to tell us which is best, voluntary sobriety, or enforced abstinence ; the one enforced by stern maxims of law, or the other the natural out-growth of a progressive religious life.

Our limits compel us to conclude. We will just refer to the "Report of the Free Library," for the purpose we have kept in view throughout this paper. Assured as we are ourselves of the beneficial results of co-operation *with* the people ; of the utility of meeting their necessities in a rational manner, believ-

ing that they are just as capable as we are of all the elevating tendencies of our age ; knowing also how slow John Smith and his class are to believe in solemn preachments, and in elaborate arguments antagonistically arrayed before his slumberous propensities ; we do solemnly implore those who have never tried by aid of any kind to bless existing influences, to study their extent and character, before they throw away their all that they have of time, means, and money, upon chimerical schemes that must and will die out and

“ Leave not a wrack behind.”

“ The issues of books from the Free Library during the year were as follows :—

	VOLS.
1. From the reference department. .	64,578
2. From the lending department . .	77,767

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Total issue . . . . . 142,345.”

Here we must close. In the heart of this city are two institutions that are comparatively unknown, which are nevertheless exerting a prodigious influence on its population. Let those who have gone, as we frequently do for these purposes, into the museum of the Peel Park, or the reference room of the Free Library, carefully watch the people that are there, the velveteen jackets and corduroys telling plainly of the mill ; let him mark, as we have done, the books

being read, and the notes in writing that are being taken; let him ask the librarian, always attentive, or the able secretary, to whose laborious diligence the Free Library is so much indebted, a few questions touching the ordinary uses of the noble hall in which the reference library is kept, and we think he will come to one conclusion,—that which is ours and has been ours for many a long year: that *before we presume to take away bad things from the people, we must be prepared to give them better.*

Would you stop the flowing river,  
 Dreaming it will cease to flow?  
 Onward it will flow for ever,  
 Better teach it where to go.

## ON CIRCUIT.

BY ALBANY FONBLANQUE.

THERE are many old customs that have been handed down to us from bygone generations, upon which time has acted like a filter, sweetening and purifying them as they have passed upon their downward course. Some there are, also, which appear to have been influenced in a totally different manner, for instead of leaving their impurities behind them, clinging to the medium through which they have been flowing, they seem to have attracted every foul atom within their reach, and to have left the little good which was once to be discovered in their composition in exchange.

In this country we have a wonderful affection for this latter class. Only let a custom or a formality be sufficiently old, and we cling to it with a tenacity perfectly irresistible. No matter how unsuited it may be to the times in which we live, no matter how much changed, clipped, and distorted it may have been from its original form and purpose; let it but bear the name it was known by a hundred years ago, and that is quite enough; we take all the rest for granted. It is but a relic of the past, a musty, stupid relic perhaps, but still such a relic as must be enshrined and sacrificed to.



We have some ancient offices to which many of these old customs and formalities attach; some of them harmless enough in their way, so much so as to disharm opposition by their very inanity; some of them passively mischievous only; some actively so; some a mixture of all these qualities, but retaining, notwithstanding, some wreck, great or small, of their pristine use and import. If this could be rescued from out the inert mass of rubbish in which it is involved; stripped of the fantastic and threadbare trappings of the past, and invested with externals more suited to the temper and requirements of the present, it would be all the better. Of such offices, that of "HIGH SHERIFF" is not the least worthy of consideration.

It would be an endless task to trace the decline and fall of the dignity and power of the High Sheriff, from the potent man-at-arms whom we find in the *Percy Reliques*, the terror of "the bolde outlawe," down to the hospitable gentleman who held the wand of office at the last Assize, and who never was a terror to anybody.

As attendance upon the Judges of Assize is the only duty of his office which exhibits any degree of vitality in our own time, we will take our readers to an Assize and show them the forms and ceremonies thereof—no matter where it is, or when it was; we will call it the Assize in and for the County of *Green-shire*, held at *Steepleton*.

The county papers have already given notice that "Saturday next is the commission day, when Mr. Baron Bigwig is expected to enter the town, and open the Assize with the usual formalities."

Greenshire, as everybody knows, has a circuit named after itself, of which Steepleton is one of the principal Assize towns. Upon reference to a geographical treatise identified with our earliest scholastic recollections, and blistered with our bitterest tears, we find upon turning to the letter S—"Steepleton, the County town of Greenshire, famous for its castle, cattle-market, and periwinkles; has a population of 7,000 souls, and returns two members to parliament."

We can answer for its castle being one of the finest old ruins in England; and for its market being certainly the dirtiest hole we ever entered. Of the merits of the Steepleton periwinkles we are not qualified to speak, as we entertain a rooted antipathy to that article of refreshment. Steepleton is not a very flourishing town; it had its 7,000 souls, and its brace of representatives long before the first publication of the learned authority we have quoted, but has not materially improved its position since. The population has decreased rather than otherwise, and there is some talk about taking away one of its members, and giving him over bodily to Forgeham, the great manufacturing town, which within the last thirty years has risen from a country village into the

commercial capital, not only of Greenshire, but of its five neighbouring counties.

It is needless to say that Steepleton was once an important coaching station, upon the great North road : all old towns which have fallen into decay have once upon a time been great coaching stations. The main road through the town forms the High-street, a long straight thoroughfare, full of red brick houses and shops to match, cut and shuffled, and apparently upon indifferent terms with one another. It has a railway station at the beginning, a musty and dear hotel in the middle, and a workhouse at the end. The every-day appearance of the town is, of being hopelessly scared by the first, and of going through the second into the third. The market-place is in the middle of a sort of square, in which some of the best shops are to be found. On market-days the sheep and pigs are penned with hurdles upon the pavement, and take the place of the foot passengers, who are consequently driven into the street, which is generally ankle-deep in slush, upon these occasions of a most malodorous nature.

There is a "Theatre Royal" somewhere in Steepleton, but no one seems to know precisely where ; it is very seldom taken, and when it is, nobody goes, it is therefore not very much in favour with country managers. There is a chronic rumour that a London company is coming down in a week or two, to restore

the fallen fortunes of the establishment—but it never comes. Taking it altogether, Steepleton is not a very lively town; it has a dreamy, dozy air. We have thought that if half the houses were to tumble down into the street, and half the people were to be buried in the ruins, the other half would go on about their business as if nothing unnatural had happened. There is no such thing as a cab, and the chemist sells cigars—an unmistakeable sign, if one were wanted,—of the feeble state in which we find the old town.

Nevertheless, the law, which has no respect for persons, or towns either, holds to Steepleton, and ignores the very existence of its great rival Forgeham, with its tens of thousands of inhabitants; its wealth, its enterprise, its trade. The Steepleton folks have to go to Forgeham for all the necessaries of life, but if the Forgeham people choose to indulge in the luxury of law, they have to return the visit. And not only Forgeham, but all Greenshire has to come to Steepleton, to be plaintiffs and defendants, and witnesses; to be tried themselves, or become that eminent conservator of liberty—the British jurymen—upon the trials of their neighbours.

There was a time when the high sheriff of Greenshire was pride, pomp, and circumstance personified. He was to the county, in reality, what our lively friends and allies imagine the lord mayor to be to the city of London. There were only two or three people in



those days who *could* be high sheriff of Greenshire, for bitter beer had not then been invented, and the Burton brewers had yet to buy up all the best estates in the county. Cotton spinning was then in its infancy, and the furnaces of the iron masters, like the fire of Tubal Cain in his sorrow, "smouldered low." There were no railroads to bring people poking and peering and measuring into country gentlemen's estates. There was no Mr. Mechi to put new-fangled ideas into the farmers' heads. The gaols and the workhouses were full, and the labourers' cottages were empty. It was a good old-fashioned time, and a good old-fashioned county. The half dozen nobility and gentry who possessed the landed qualification necessary for becoming high sheriff of Greenshire, were all wealthy, or appeared to be so. They originated and planned all the county festivities; they presided at the county agricultural meetings; they gave away the county prizes of blue coats with brass buttons, to county labourers who had brought up their families upon seven shillings a week without "coming upon the County." They kept open house during the assizes, and entertained all comers. They maintained a regiment of retainers in gorgeous array, to accompany them and their guests, the judges, to the confines of their territory, and to protect them against the sympathising friends and admirers of convicted highwaymen; they were accompanied by their tenantry upon

horseback, and their peasantry upon foot. For the assize week was the time chosen for transacting all the business of the half-year at the county town. Purchases were made, orders were taken, bills were paid, meetings for business or pleasure were held, the tradesmen kept open house for their customers, the gentry filled their houses with guests for the balls and concerts, and from the highest to the lowest, it was a busy, bustling period; during which everything was done, from matching muslins to hanging murderers. But to return to the sheriffs, whose reign at these times was at its highest point of grandeur. They drove in coaches with eight horses and outriders; they held levees, and their ladies had drawing rooms in high pomp and state; they gave grand balls, and invited everybody; they kept bands of music, and paid the piper generally to the tune of from two to four thousand pounds for the expenses of their office alone, during the year of their shrievalty. Every succeeding functionary strove his utmost to outshine his predecessor, till affairs arrived at such a pitch of ostentation and extravagance that they began at last, as was natural, to take a turn in the contrary direction. Instead of puzzling their brains to invent new occasions for display, the sheriffs began to enquire how little was expected from them, until at last we find the high sheriff of Glamorganshire sending a cab to meet the judge, and an association formed in

Essex for the abolition of our old friends the javelin men, and the pomp and circumstance of the office altogether. Railways began to cut up old roads and old prejudices, and carried the judges and the bar from place to place. People did not wait for the assizes to go to the towns to give their orders and pay their bills as heretofore, but ran backwards and forwards at all times as they pleased; highwaymen gradually became extinct; farmers found something better to do than riding after the high sheriff's coach. The high sheriffs removed to London for three parts of the year, and spent their superfluous cash there. They dabbled in shares, and their estates began to melt; Greenshire began to receive new Paladins who did not choose to spend their money in tomfoolery, much less to get into debt for it; county elections began to be contested; wives of ruined farmers began to drive their carriages; millowners sent their sons to Oxford and Cambridge; the workhouses and the prisons began to empty, and business began to look dull upon the Greenshire circuit.

Everything was improved. Old systems, old implements, old habits, were flung aside once and for ever. Even the law, from its stronghold in Westminster Hall, came down in new forms; men were neither hung for sheep-stealing, nor transported for poaching; and yet Greenshire, contrary to prophecy, prospered. Amidst so much change, however, two or three of

the old customs we have alluded to, are still retained, and maintain a sort of second-hand vitality. They have ceased to answer the purpose for which they were intended; they are worn seedy and thread-bare; they are out of place, and out of character; they are mere rags and tatters of their originals. We are going to examine one of them now, for Mr. Baron Bigwig is going to open the commission "with the usual formalities."

The sheriff's carriage stands in the High-street, opposite the hotel; the London coachman is on the box, and the London footmen in their elegant livery of green plush unmentionables, scarlet waistcoats, and white coats with yellow shoulder knots, in the pinkiest of all possible pink stockings,—blossom like variegated passion-flowers against the pillars of the portico. They have been brought down from town specially for this occasion, and give themselves airs accordingly. Upon the pavement, and around the carriage, stand a score of yokels in green livery coats with red collars. They seem as if they had got up in a hurry, and every man had put on somebody else's coat. These are the sheriff's javelin men, so called because they all carry a long blue pole with an iron spike on the top, and a piece of worsted fringe nailed round to hide the consequent crack. They are not clever in the manipulation of their javelins; the butt-end appears to have a strong affinity for the inside of their legs at all



times; and when they are marching, and have shouldered their troublesome charge, the sharp point gyrates playfully under the nose of the man in the rear, who, starting back to avoid it, pokes his javelin through the hat of the man behind him, and the weapon of that worthy, you may be sure, is not idle as he stoops to regain his mutilated covering. Thus a pleasant sensation is communicated down the line, which greatly adds to the dignity of the pageant. Further on, upon the opposite side of the way, are stationed two individuals in similar raiment, each grasping remorselessly in his right hand a brass instrument of acoustic torture, with which he has strict injunctions to deafen the neighbourhood whenever a judge, or a high sheriff, gets in or out of the carriage upon any pretence whatever. The secret and rapid manner in which these high dignitaries dodge in and out of their conveyance may thus be accounted for:—they dread the fierce tempest of discord to which their appearance gives the cue, and seek to avoid it. But no! the buglers are not to be done out of their blow, and inflict it inexorably. A few beggars and tramps who have nothing else to do, lounge about with their hands in their pockets, watched by a detective or two, on duty from Forgeham. The usual dog is in attendance to create confusion when the procession is being formed. But neither carriage, nor coachman, nor footmen, nor javelins, nor trumpeters,

nor dog, arouse Steepleton from its doze. If it share the fate of the sleeping city in the fairy tale, and if there be a fair princess fast asleep somewhere, whose waking will restore it to life and animation, the Prince whose kiss is to arouse her, and it, is *not* Mr. Baron Bigwig. But now the important moment has arrived. The high sheriff has had his luncheon, and escorted by his deputy, appears in the hall of the hotel. Their custom is peculiar. They are attired in dress coats, black trousers, pumps, cocked hats, and swords. Ancient usage decrees that they shall appear in full court dress; modern prejudices do not sanction their "going the whole guy," and so they hit upon an ingenious compromise, and are ridiculous without being correct, thus preserving a rag and tatter of the old custom upon their own proper person and account.

"Attention" is the word of command; the javelin men form in line, the footmen open the door, and the high sheriff plunges into his carriage as if it were a bath. But he is no match for the trumpeters; they have seen him flash past, and he must take the consequences;—away go the bugles, away goes the carriage, away go the javelin men, in manner and form as we have attempted to describe; and away goes the dog to assist the confusion—all bent towards the judge's lodgings. The judge is wigged and waiting. Encumbered with his heavy scarlet robes, it is not likely that he will be able to elude the vigilance of

the wary buglers; their eagle glance catches sight of the point curl of his wig, as he steps forward upon the pavement, and he is instantly deafened for the next twenty minutes.

They then proceed round the corner to the courthouse, into which they are driven by another blast of trumpets. Here the commission of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery for the county of Green-shire is read, and Her Majesty's gracious will and pleasure made known to the public at large, represented on this occasion by the old woman who cleans out the court, and two small boys who have slunk in after the officials, and skirmish about the back benches, munching apples. Having performed this "important ceremony," the principal performers are blown once more into their carriage, and then blown into church, where they are preached at by the sheriff's chaplain, in a very long sermon, and blown into their conveyance once more upon its conclusion. More trumpetings announce the judge's arrival at his lodgings, and the high sheriff's return to his hotel, and then Steepleton has done with trumpeting for the day, and the commission is opened "with the usual formalities."

Now we may be told that this is all right and proper, and that such ceremonies have a great influence upon the lower classes, and tend to invest the law with proper dignity. No such thing! The great unwashed do not respect the livery servants; the

javelin men are simply absurdities ; the trumpeters do not overawe the small street boys ;—we have known them to have been bribed with a bite of an apple by these disrespectful urchins to let them have a blow on their own account. Odious comparisons have been drawn between the wig of the coachman and that of the judge, in favour of the former ; and truly, his lordship's appearance, viewed from the rear, as wrapped up in his robes, he is assisted into his equipage, is anything but dignified. If the importance of Mr. Baron Bigwig's vocation is to be judged by the procession in which he goes to fulfil it, then it sinks into utter insignificance when compared with that of Mr. Sawdust, who with his unrivalled circus enters Steepleton once a year, driving eighteen cream-coloured horses, preceded by a band of music, and followed by his brilliant *troupe* in skeleton gigs and firework wheels.

There is every necessity for "touting" for the mountebank ; there is none for puffing the judge,—he is a distinguished officer of the crown about to discharge very high and important functions, and we see no reason why he should not be allowed to set about them like any other gentleman having important duties to transact. We do not think that one prisoner more than the average would be found in the gaol, should he be permitted to do so, and not one less, were he to borrow Mr. Sawdust's eighteen-



in-hand drag and the Lord Mayor's show, with the wardrobe of the Princess' Theatre and Mr. Costa's orchestra for the occasion. The "usual formalities," then, are not useful; they are certainly not ornamental. As a pageant these score of old fellows in livery great coats, grasping uncouth weapons, which are utterly useless for any purpose whatever except to give trouble and create confusion, are by no means impressive. If it be decided that the dignity of the law is in such a state of decline that it requires external support to bolster it up, *then* by all means let us have a procession, and let the judge, and the jury, and the bar, go in state together to the courts, blow their own trumpets loudly, and strike terror and respect into the minds of Her Majesty's lieges. The old remnant which we preserve can have no such effect. It is merely stupid and useless imposing an irksome tax upon those gentlemen who must in turn undertake the duties that remain attached to the post of high sheriff, without conferring any benefit upon anyone in return. It is not confined to Steepleton or the Greenshire circuit; it is maintained with greater or less absurdity throughout England.

We have alluded to two recent cases in which these forms were dispensed with. Do not let it be supposed that we approve the conduct of the high sheriffs in these instances. The one put a public affront upon a distinguished gentleman who was in law and courtesy his guest; the association which

prompted the other, in sweeping away useless ceremony, went to work so violently that they lost sight entirely of the boundary where form ended, and use began. The sheriffs were both fined £100 by the offended judge. We can only say with the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, that we hope that the association which managed matters so badly in Suffolk may subscribe and pay the penalty for their sheriff. We are convinced that the judges do not desire the maintenance of trumpery show *outside* the court, but it is quite indispensable that a force should be in attendance for the preservation of order within its precincts, and the javelin men are fit neither by practice nor training for the service. They do not desire a procession to accompany, and a state coach to carry, them to and from their lodgings, but it surely is not an unreasonable demand upon their part that they shall be provided with an equipage suited to their rank and station, when they are called away from their homes, and their own domestic arrangements are no longer available. It is the sheriff's duty to make this provision ; it may be an inconvenience to do so, but that is no part of the question. We are all put to inconvenience, more or less, for the general benefit. Let him but do his duty in a plain, substantial, gentlemanly manner, and no judge, we are convinced, will find fault with him.

David Hay

# MANCHESTER PAPERS,

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## Series of Occasional Essays.

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TENDENCIES, AND RESULTS. BY J. D. MORELL, M.A.  
DESTITUTE AND CRIMINAL JUVENILES.  
DISCRETE DEGREES. BY L. H. GRINDON.

“It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea—a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below,—but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and windings, and mists and tempests in the vale below, so always that the prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.”—BACON.

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# MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY:

ITS CHARACTERISTICS, TENDENCIES, AND RESULTS.

BY J. D. MORELL, M.A.

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## I.

THE literary and intellectual life of Germany, during the last sixty or seventy years, presents an era of restless mental activity, such as is probably unparalleled in the whole history of human thought. If we go back one hundred years or less, we are almost startled to see what a blank German literature and science *then* presented, in comparison with the enormous surface they now cover in the republic of letters. The German language was at that time considered coarse and vulgar, incapable alike of playful elegance, of philosophic clearness, or of poetic refinement. Leibnitz, at the beginning of the last century, chose to write all his more popular philosophical works in French, rather than attempt to bend the Teutonic idiom to the expression of his high ideas; and Frederick the Great, less than a hundred years ago, refused to tolerate what was then considered the

German "jargon," even at the court of Berlin. The almost universal medium of instruction and intercourse upon all philosophic questions, throughout the whole country, was still the scholastic Latin of the middle ages.

Not only was the German language, however, comparatively speaking, unformed for all higher regions of thought, but the mind of the country was itself unawakened. Dry dogmatism in theology alternated, (as it always does wherever it exists) with supreme indifference in regard to religion. Public manners and morals were extremely low. Intemperance, especially, pervaded all classes of the community, the record of which Porson embodied, after his visit to the German literati of his age, in the characteristic stanza :—

I went to see Professor Rhunk,  
And spent the night in getting drunk :  
I went to see Professor Rhunken,  
And spent the night in getting drunken.

Gazing *now* along the vista which separates that era in their national development from the present, with what a varied and wondrous scene of mental activity is it filled up ! The task would be vain to attempt an enumeration of half the names which have achieved an honourable place in science, literature, or philosophy. Through the inexhaustible patience of German research, classical literature has assumed

hitherto unknown proportions ; oriental studies have obtained a fixed habitation in the west ; and philology generally has become a *science*. German sagacity has founded a school of historical criticism ; and Biblical investigation has been raised by it at length to an intelligible system. Poetry, too, triumphing over the original ruggedness of the Teutonic dialect, has there developed itself into a classic purity, by means of which the genius of the people has opened a new treasure both of thought and sentiment, which is fast becoming the common property of our whole European civilization.

Of all the subjects, however, in which the German mind has struck out a new and peculiar path, there is none more distinctive and more singularly *national* than its philosophy. The zeal and the boldness with which abstract speculation has been here carried forward, are altogether novel in modern times, and can only find a parallel in the most fruitful era of Greek contention ; and still more novel is the fact, that speculative philosophy, instead of being confined (as it usually is) to a few thinkers, has proved one of the most productive branches in the entire field of German literature, and has sunk down more deeply than any other into the thought and feeling of the people at large.

The peculiar *creative* spirit, however, which raised this eternal monument of mental effort, appears

now already to be fading away. Just as it was in Athens, when the age of Plato and Aristotle was past, and the learning of the schools became a mere commentary upon what the productive age had left behind;—so, in Germany, the philosophic literature of the present is devoting itself rather to writing the history and expounding the meaning of what has already been thought, than to the further development of *thought itself*. The Revolution of 1848 seems to have put a term to the purely abstract productivity of the national mind. Wearied with the past labours of speculation, the people have now begun to enquire;—What is the practical result to which it all tends? What is the application to be made of the principles that have been so laboriously evolved? And what form is the church, the state, and the social life of the country now to take under the guidance of that new light, which the nineteenth century has kindled?

The *history* of modern speculative systems, accordingly, forms at present the prominent feature in the literature of the philosophical faculty, properly so called: so that the great aim of metaphysical literature *now* is, to reproduce those systems in a simpler form, to divest them of their bristling technicalities, and to give us their *meaning*, in plain German,—or, as we should ourselves rather express it, *in plain English*. The earliest, or nearly earliest



of these attempts to give a popular review of the speculative philosophy of Germany from Kant to Hegel, was made by Professor Chalybæus, in a course of lectures which were delivered, not in the chair of a philosophical *auditorium*, but to a company of select literati at Dresden, in the winter of 1835 and 1836. These lectures were afterwards published, and have recently been honoured with two distinct translations into the English language.

We cannot but regret that the earliest, and in many respects the *least* suitable of the historical manuals above alluded to, has been selected for the information and edification of the English public. In the first place, having been written before the more *modern* German spirit was fairly inaugurated, and before the results of the then reigning systems were clearly seen, it stands upon a most disadvantageous point of view for making a clear and successful retrospect. Added to this, the attempt at popularizing was not then, properly speaking, commenced; the form in which the ideas were conveyed had not found a phraseology suited to the common intellect of humanity; so that the English reader will lose in poring over the pages of these translations the efforts, which nearly twenty additional years have made, to bring the history of German philosophy into a universally intelligible form. A dozen better manuals than that of Chalybæus might be mentioned in a single

breath; and I am glad to make it known that a translation of perhaps the very best and most extended of them all, I mean that by Professor Erdmann, of Halle, is now being made, by an enterprising young American, under the immediate eye of Professor Erdmann himself. When this translation shall be completed, the English metaphysician will have no excuse left for remaining ignorant of this, perhaps the most remarkable era in the whole history of metaphysical literature.

It has been for a long time fashionable in this country, to represent the modern German philosophy as a dry, scholastic jargon of unintelligible abstractions, mingled, here and there, with daring if not impious speculations respecting things "which it is not lawful for man to utter." More recently, the *suspicion* has oozed out, that there are really grains of gold and specks of diamonds amongst this immense mass of reputed rubbish. The rearers of these extravagant systems have been conceived of as so many mystic recluses, seated in their intellectual laboratories, far apart from all the world, trying to annihilate the universe, to which indeed they hardly seemed to belong, and then reconstructing it again in their own ideal fashion. But it comes out gradually, that most of them were really very earnest and practical men,—men who trusted their senses, and took an interest in human affairs as well as most others,—men too who had very decided opinions about moral duties and

political privileges. In place, moreover, of finding the world laughing at their "extravagant vagaries," it is found, that they have managed to impress their minds upon their age and country more than all our modern "practical philosophers" put together,—that they have been very Iconoclasts in the matter of old middle-age traditions, whether theological or political; and that having brought their country very near to the verge of a vast social revolution, their conclusions have now to be shielded from public view, by thousands of swords and bayonets, lest they should prove "too practical" to suit the purpose of irresponsible power. Such being the case, it is hardly possible even for the most self-satisfied of practical Englishmen, to ignore the existence of a series of—to say the least—very remarkable phenomena in modern history; and if he can possibly summon up some little belief in the secret power of theoretical ideas, apart from their immediate application, he will perhaps so far lay aside his former incredulity, as to follow us while we attempt to state, in as plain English as the subject admits, what the progress of this singular phase of human speculation really has been, and what are the results it is very likely yet to produce upon the world.

And let us premise, in the outset, that the spirit of the modern German Iconoclasm in regard to current beliefs, is a totally different thing to that railing infidelity of the last century, which prevailed so largely

in England and France. The spirit of the last century was at bottom a shallow, unaspiring, unbelieving sensualism, which based everything implicitly upon external evidence, which had no faith either in a reality or in a principle, so long as it could not trace them upwards from a given number of bodily sensations, which gave credit to no possible existence beyond individual phenomena, which viewed the universe only in its separate fragments—mind only as a secretion of the brain—and God only as the complex of natural phenomena. Disinterested love,—virtue for its own sake,—reverence for the infinite, whether veiled under the form of the true, the beautiful, or the good,—the spirit of nature as opposed to its fleeting forms,—the ideal in opposition to the real,—the eternally true in contrast with the seen and temporal; this and all similar language was, to the materialistic spirit of that age, an unmeaning babble, to which it could attach no distinctive ideas. It is often forgotten by those who are fain to sneer at modern “Spiritualism,” how near the European world had come, not a century ago, when the spiritualist school had well nigh gone out, to the utter loss of faith in all spiritual truth and high ideas; and that too at a time when the ordinary evidences of the popular Christianity were unassailed by anything approaching a learned or formidable criticism, and when the orthodox faith, if it only possessed



the requisite vigour, might have had all the argument its own way, and all the power of worldly influence to boot. It was not spiritualism, but something the very reverse, which fostered the doctrines of the French Encyclopædists, and but for the rehabilitation of the spiritualist schools, those doctrines would in all probability have been the popular creed of Europe at the present moment, despite the protests of all the reigning theologies.

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## II.

THE first true and striking representative of the modern German philosophic spirit, viewed in its entire breadth, and its manifold tendencies, was *Lessing*. And who were the men to whom Lessing placed himself in determined opposition? He did not oppose those only, or those mainly, who represented the stiff and lifeless orthodoxy of his age. It was the illuminati, the successors and partisans of the English deism and the French materialism—the men who were crying up the “*aufgeklärter Menschenverstand*” as the criterion of all truth, against whom he launched his most formidable weapons. “Should I be envious (he exclaims) against the world, because the present age seeks to enlighten it? Nay, should

I not rather desire from my very heart that every one may learn to think about religion in the light of sober reason? To advance this great end is in fact my only true aim; I do not wish to retain the old stagnant water, (of orthodoxy), only I do not desire to see it poured away, before we know where we can get any clearer:—I do not desire to see it poured out thoughtlessly, and then to have the child baptized in filth; for what is our new-fangled theology in relation to orthodoxy, but filth as compared to stagnant water? I despise the orthodox, and I despise still more the new-fashioned parsons, who are far too little of *theologians*, and yet far enough from being *philosophers*.” Such was the language of Lessing in reference to the shallow, materialistic rationalism of the last century. He took the orthodox in part under his protection, not because he sympathised with their formal dogmatism, but because he loved the true, the earnest, and the good, wherever it could be found, and therefore lifted his strong arm against those who in pretending to oppose only a dominant form of theology, were *in fact* cutting deep at the roots of all the greatest and noblest of human beliefs.

Lessing’s criticism, however, although intensely characteristic of the modern German spirit, moved only within a comparatively small circle of ideas. His principal aim was to weaken the power of theological dogmatism; to subject the doctrine of verbal

inspiration, upon which the current theology was built, to the severe test both of reason and historical criticism; to introduce the *spirit* of the Bible in place of the *letter*, as the supreme authority; to set up a religious *life* in place of a theological *form*. There is a striking similarity, in fact, between the whole spirit of Lessing's writings, and the efforts which have been made in England in more recent times, to disturb the quiet, unthinking, uncritical, and unproductive "worship of the letter," and thus bring the mind of Christendom to view its religion as a *life*, rather than a *creed*. Whether we have in *our* national history to weather the same storm of sweeping rationalism as that which succeeded Lessing in Germany, remains to be seen. Our consolation may be, that if we have to do so, the atmosphere will be assuredly cleared in the process, as it has been there, from many of the miasmata which now infect it. Lessing was not formed to grapple with the fundamental principles of philosophic truth; he felt how erroneous was the current scepticism, but he could not pursue it into its deepest recesses. It needed a man made of stronger and sterner materials to do this; and such a man appeared in the person of Emmanuel Kant.

## III.

KANT was pre-eminently the man of his age; the man, whom the age *formed* on the one hand, and *needed* on the other; and well did he accomplish the work assigned him in the field of human conviction. He stood, in fact, *midway* between the philosophical tradition of the past, and the all-crushing spirit of modern analysis; and by the almost unaided effort of his own mighty mind, bridged over the gulf which separated the one from the other. Kant was brought up in the Leibnitz-Wolfian school of philosophy,—a school which reduced every subject of human thought to the most precise definitions, and put the mere symmetry of a logical *form* in place of critical research into the *matter* of truth. On the other hand, he had been attached from the very earliest period of his mental development, to physical science; he had studied mathematics deeply, and furnished his mind with all the stores of knowledge derived from the applied sciences. So deeply indeed had he drunk in the spirit of the Newtonian philosophy, that he published a work on the Theory of the Heavens, which propounded the very same mechanical views by which De Lambert astonished the world in his “Lettres Cosmologiques sur la Constitution de l’Univers,” and that, too, *six years* before those letters appeared.



As Kant approached the middle period of life, the thought more and more grew upon him, that it was his mission to bring about an entire reorganization of philosophical thought, and, by so doing, to place the fundamental principles of human knowledge on a basis more suited to the enlarged scientific requirements of his age. He saw Europe deluged by the torrents of a materialistic scepticism, the floodgates of which had been opened in France to an unprecedented width, and which had let in a stream of popular unbelief, such as the reigning dogmatism vainly attempted to stem. Casting his gaze over Europe at large, his eye fell particularly upon *Hume*, as being by far the most robust and acute embodiment of the scepticism of the age. Hume's scepticism it was which thoroughly roused him from his "dogmatic slumbers," and gave the first direction to his mind in seeking the basis of a new and a deeper system.

Let us, then, revert for a moment to Hume, and see in what way he reduced the sceptical spirit of the age to a clear, reflective form. Hume accepted the materialistic principles which had been gradually developed by successive thinkers, as undoubted *truth*; *i.e.*, he looked upon the senses as the sole basis of all our ideas. What we actually experience as a matter of fact—in other words, what we actually feel as a phenomenon of our own consciousness—this, he affirmed, we must hold as something raised beyond all possible

doubt; but if we go beyond the region of sensible fact in which all men are agreed, if we go a single step into the region of *opinion*, then there springs up such a variety of views and phases of belief, that a calm judgment will of necessity come to the conclusion, that they are all alike the products of an imagination, stimulated and prompted either by custom, or habit, or association, or other similar causes. Amongst the matters of opinion, for example respecting the basis of which we have to pass such a judgment, are to be reckoned all the notions which men have entertained respecting religion, worship, and a Supreme Being, varying as they do with every age and every nation—all the current ideas of virtue and duty, which are well nigh as protean in their forms as those of religion itself—all the doctrinaire theories of political right—all the general conceptions, in fine, which we form of nature as a unity, or of cause and effect as something existing beneath the visible phenomena of the succession of events. This was the *plain English* of Hume's scepticism,—this the "*Weltanschauung*" (to use an expressive German term) which prevailed so largely at that time, and which he compressed into a few clear and apparently common-sense principles. The *moral* of it was, that we must make the best we can of human life; enjoy ourselves by means either of sense-gratification or intellectual luxury as much as possible;—forbear to trouble ourselves overmuch about

duty or responsibility ;—and, in fine, put no trust in anything whatever which does not appeal for its confirmation to human experience, in the most objective sense of that term.

To carry out these views consistently, Hume had attacked with all the force of his logic the principle of *causality*, as one of the best points on which to try the validity of his principles ; and it was exactly this point which roused the mind of Kant to combat, on purely metaphysical grounds, a system against which his stern moral nature had long revolted. The principle of causality was one which, to a mind, deeply imbued as his was with physical science, appeared naturally to lie at the very foundation of all the grandest discoveries ; nor was it possible that one, who had followed Newton step by step, and anticipated De Lambert in his cosmological theories, could very well sit down under the notion that we can find no basis for the application of that principle beyond the bounds of positive experience, and those specific cases in which the laws of association had been in operation. Whether, reasoned Kant, there may be some subtle essence, some unseen spiritual agency at work which we term a cause, or not, is by no means the question : the question is, *whether or not we are so constituted that there is an inward subjective law of our mental nature which obliges us to view successive events under the idea of causality*. If Hume had been

honest and consistent in carrying out his principles, he would have denied to mathematical truth, as well as all other, any rational certitude beyond mere experience. Once base the whole fabric of human knowledge upon sense, and no one has the least right to affirm the *necessity* of mathematical evidence ; nay, the axioms of geometry have no deeper ground of reality in the human mind, than an ordinary fact of experience which is true to-day and false to-morrow.

It is manifest, said Kant, that this is not the case ; that the human understanding, on the contrary, has certain laws of its own, not at all identical with mere sensation ;—that when the senses bring the *material* of knowledge to our view, that material must be grasped, appropriated, and converted into knowledge, according to certain fixed laws of thought, which are imposed upon us by the subjective necessity of our being. Instead, therefore, of denying any such universal element in human conviction, our great object should be to find out, if possible, what these laws are, what are the different modes or forms of thought under which we are obliged, by the constitution of our very nature, to view the connexion of things and events in the world without, and reduce them to a system. This is the real object proposed in the Critick of Pure Reason, and upon the successful issue of this attempt depends the possibility of metaphysics



generally—that is, the possibility of any knowledge beyond what is actually *given* in our sensations.

Let us then consider, says Kant, what we mean generally by a truth or a settled conviction. A truth is to us, a fixed, unalterable *judgment* of the mind, and the external form of such a judgment is a proposition. If I take any subject whatever, and add any predicate to it, I form a judgment, and verbally speaking, acknowledge a truth. Some judgments which we form, are simply *verbal*,—they are merely repeating in a more expanded form what is contained in the *idea* of the subject itself. Thus, if I say a European is a man, I am merely expressing what was already understood in the word European, and nothing more. These Kant terms analytical judgments. If, however, I add a *new* predicate to a given subject, then I gain by so doing an addition to my knowledge—I put two ideas together that were not before mentally united—I form, in short, a synthetic judgment. Synthetic judgments based on experience, we are constantly forming; every new piece of information we get leads to one: but the great question is whether we ever form a synthetic judgment from materials *not* given in experience; whether we can draw any real predicate out of our own minds; whether there is, or *can* be, such a thing as a *synthetic judgment à priori*. Upon the possibility of this again depends the possibility of our possessing any kind of purely rational

knowledge whatever,—and, consequently, any kind of metaphysics. Hence the question, which includes the whole problem of the criticism we are now considering, is—*How are synthetic judgments à priori possible?*

To solve this problem, Kant goes very systematically to work. In the Critick of Pure Reason he follows that two-fold division of his subject which characterised all the Wolfian school. But in the “Prologomena,” which he wrote subsequently, in order to furnish a more popular statement of his principles, he has proceeded in a less formal and more simple manner. There the enquiry falls under four heads: the first investigates the possibility of a pure *mathematics*, based solely upon rational grounds; the second investigates the possibility of a purely rational *science of nature*—that is, in the Kantian sense, the possibility of our pointing out a number of fundamental ideas, under which all our sensible experiences are united and rendered objects of thought. The third investigates the possibility of our reaching, by means of the pure reason, any knowledge of *supersensual realities*—any thing, that is, which lies entirely out of the range of our actual experience. The last enquiry investigates the possibility of uniting the results of all this previous criticism into a complete science. The first enquiry, in the language of Kant, is termed transcendental *Æsthetick*; the second, transcendental

Analytick ; the third, transcendental Dialektick; and the fourth, transcendental Methodology. The term *transcendental* was used simply to imply that in each case he was seeking a law, or subjective fact of our intellectual nature, which is prior to and transcends the region of our sensations and helps to mould them into given intelligible ideas.

To go through all the process of Kant's recondite analysis would be impossible in the space of a single article; we must content ourselves with barely indicating the results. By a close analysis of the perceptive faculty, Kant shews that all our sense-perceptions are governed by the two ideas of space and time; that these are the *forms* which render the multiplicity of sensuous impressions ever pouring in upon us, *intelligible*; that they arise from the very constitution of our perceptive faculties; and that they involve us, consequently, in a *subjective necessity* of viewing every thing as existing *in space and in time*. Since mathematics then are simply an expansion of the relations of space, he concludes, that a pure science of mathematics, carrying with it a subjective necessity to the reason, is an undoubted possibility. The idea of space being as it were a real mental law entering into all our sense-perceptions, the expansions and combinations of that idea must carry with them a positive necessity.

Next, with regard to the mode in which we com-

prehend nature around us, Kant has also shewn by a still more acute analysis, that we judge of every thing in nature under certain fundamental ideas, namely, *quantity—quality—relation—and modality*. These, he shews, are the abstract forms which lie *tacitly* in the human understanding, by virtue of its very constitution, and which bring order, unity, and intelligibility into what would otherwise be a mere crude mass of shapeless experiences. It will be easily seen how cautiously and skilfully Kant here goes between the extremes into which so many other philosophers had fallen. He is neither a sensualist on the one hand, for he acknowledges a large *formal* element lying *á priori* within the mind; neither is he an idealist on the other, for he shews that while the mind furnishes the forms, the matter of all positive knowledge must come from the world without. He entangled himself neither in Scylla nor Charybdis, but sailed unhurt through the dangerous straits of speculation, and landed us upon a theory respecting the genesis of our ideas, which, if it did not reach the final truth on the question, yet came far nearer to it than any previous attempt had done, cleared the subject of a vast number of misunderstandings, placed the chief problems in a new and far more commanding point of view, and proved of incalculable value in teaching us how to separate in every subject of human research, the forms of truth from the material elements.



But now came the great question which was to tax all the powers of his mind,—namely, whether there is any pathway by which the human mind can proceed *upwards* to the region of pure supersensual ideas. The former portion of his criticism had shown *how* we combine the matter and the form of truth within the region of experience, so as to arrive at length at a pure science both of mathematics and nature. The present portion is to decide whether we can ever go *beyond* this region, and determine scientifically and demonstrably the real existence of a soul in man—an abiding essence in nature—and a God in the universe. These three existences, it is evident, elude altogether the search of the *senses*. If we believe that the soul exists, we must do so on rational grounds only : if we accept a substratum underlying the phenomena of the world, we must do so on the like purely rational evidence ; if we maintain the existence of a God, we must hold it in the same manner, on grounds altogether apart from and transcending the bounds of sensible experience.

Now in discussing these questions, Kant shews that the human *reason* (Vernunft), as distinct from the logical understanding (Verstand), necessarily leads us to form these three ideas, as being the complex or unity of the three classes of phenomena answering to them ; *i.e.* first, the phenomena of consciousness ; secondly, the phenomena of sense ; and thirdly, the

phenomena of intelligent design. That is—the reason being a faculty which is ever striving after *unity* in its knowledge, seeks to complete its apprehension of mental phenomena by conceiving an absolute subject in which they co-exist, *i.e. a soul*; to sum up its views of nature by the absolute union of every single thing in a whole, that is, in *a universe*; and finally, to satisfy its ideas respecting power and possibility, by combining the whole under the conception of one all-perfect cause, *i.e. of a God*.

When, however, the reason begins to argue respecting the *objective reality* of these ideas, it involves itself in a series of fallacies and contradictions, which shew most clearly that it is not capable of arriving at any conclusion speculatively upon them. Thus the end of the whole enquiry leaves us with *the great problem of the universe* unanswered. It has guarded those three cherished beliefs of humanity, indeed, from the possibility of refutation, but, in doing so, it has also put them beyond the limits of a rational *proof*.

Kant, however, was not the man to sit down quietly under such a result. When he thus boldly drew with a master's hand the limits to which the power of pure reason could carry us, he knew he had another great faculty of our nature in reserve, on which he could yet build the conclusions he had hitherto failed to establish,—I mean *the will*. Strip-

ping away from the will all the phenomena of mere desire and aversion,—all the material influences which act upon us from without—he found, in the same way as he had before done in reference to the understanding, that there is an *á priori* element left ; an element of pure, innate *freedom* uttering its commands within us with an imperative voice, that cannot be mistaken. The forms or categories of the will, he shewed, are the fundamental moral laws to which we owe subjection, and which may all be reduced to the one great principle—“ Act so that you use humanity, both in your own person, and in the person of others, as an *end* and not as a *means* :” or, in other words, “ Let every one of your actions be such, as that it would serve for a *universal law of action* to the world.”

The outward world, he proceeded to shew, is the material by which we carry out the dictates of duty, and the commands of the will ; thus it acquires a substantial reality in the way of action, which it could never attain from mere speculation. The aim of all history is to educate man to the *highest moral action*—to make him *free* in the truest sense of the word, and enable him to strive after the *highest good* as the moral ideal of human existence. When we come down, however, to the facts of human life, we find that the highest good cannot be realized ; that there is a struggle between virtue and happiness,

which can only cease in some higher state of being and that consequently we can only arrive at what we feel and know to be the goal of our moral nature, on the supposition of an immortal state of existence hereafter.

Moreover, when we consider what is necessary to bring about a state of perfect bliss—to realise the *summum bonum* of human existence, we find that there is absolutely required a perfect co-operation of all the laws of nature on the one side, with the ideal aims of the human reason and conscience on the other. Now this co-operation we are unable ourselves to *produce*, because we are not the lords of nature on the one hand, nor can we associate virtue and happiness by any will of our own, on the other. The end of human existence, in fact, can only be reached on the supposition of there being *a supreme mind*, and an *absolute and intelligent will*, which can connect all these scattered elements of universal being, and bring them at last to harmony and perfection. Thus, where speculation fails us, we find ourselves under a *moral necessity* of admitting the reality of an immortal soul, and a Supreme Being. *Practice*, accordingly, with Kant, stands in dignity higher than *theory*,—morals higher than mere speculative reason. Theology itself, on his principles, can only be grounded on an ethical basis; and the world only be verified, as the great material of human duty.



Right, duty, moral action, these are the pillars of human existence; and the truths of religion are brought home to us at length as a solemn reality, when we find that they become necessary as motives to the highest virtue, and the only means of reconciling to our reason the present discrepancy which exists in the world, between moral action and human happiness.

If any one, then, should enquire what was the service Kant performed for his age—what the world gained from his life and labours, the answer will not lie very far off. At a period in which scepticism was rampant, and when those who shrank from it were only sheltering themselves under the tottering walls of old traditions, he came forward professing an unbending faith in *human nature* itself as a sacred depository of truth, and shewed that it was possible for us to possess a complete system of moral and scientific ideas, built up from materials lying ready at hand within and around us—a system, too, of such a character that it would relieve us for ever from the attacks of scepticism on the one side, and the miserable shifts of tradition on the other. But he did more than this: he shewed us the method of deep-searching criticism, by which the foundations of such a system could be laid,—pointed out how we were to separate the *forms* of thought from the outward materials, and verify the true value both of the one and the other. Added to

this, he swept away, with an irresistible force, all the harrassing attacks which were perpetually being made against the freedom of the human will, the sanctity of virtue, and the inviolability of human duty ;—grounded the moral law in the very constitution of the human reason ; and then pointed to a higher state of society in which a natural reign of justice should prevail, and in which piety, stripped of its follies and buffooneries, should be the simple handmaid of virtue in the individual, and of *right* to humanity at large. If any “ practical man ” think this a small service to humanity, we devoutly wish that he would perform a greater, or shew at least in what a greater one would consist.

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#### IV.

For a year or two after the Critick of Pure Reason appeared, there was almost an entire silence respecting it. The world at large could not at all comprehend its bearing; the more philosophic minds were quietly absorbing it. When it once began to tell, however, upon the age, it soon awakened an earnestness and vigour in the pursuit of purely speculative questions, which is probably unprecedented both in its depth and its extent. Yet still amidst the chorus of admi-

ration, there were occasionally to be heard notes of jarring discord. *Herder*, with his genial, half-philosophic, half-historical views of human truth, evinced a deep dissatisfaction at the way in which Kant had cut all tradition from under our feet, and made, as it were, a Divinity both of the pure and the practical reason. Others, again, especially *Jacobi*, though in many points agreeing with Kant, and awarding him the meed of sincere admiration, could not accept the contradictions in which he attempted to shew that the reason becomes involved, in seeking to verify its knowledge of supersensual things. Starting from the philosophy of perception, much in the style of Reid, *Jacobi* strove to maintain, that the human mind possesses a power of *intuition*, by means of which it is brought directly into contact with fundamental realities, which realities it can sufficiently verify through the very immediacy of its knowledge, without requiring any logical proof, and consequently without needing at all to implicate itself in any of the Kantian paralogisms. This power of immediate perception, of spiritual intuition, of direct insight into the regions of the true, the beautiful, and the good, he carried with him as a fundamental principle all through his long career of literary and philosophical activity, and introduced thus a genial faith-element amongst the hard logical constructions of the age, which has exerted a marked effect upon the course of

German speculation, in one form or another, even down to the present day.

Amongst the numerous disciples of Kant, there was one who shewed himself possessed of the modern spirit of criticism, even to a more intense degree than the master himself—I mean *John Gottlieb Fichte*, a man of whom the world has heard so much, but whom it has comprehended so little. Fichte was from the first a whole-hearted disciple of Kant; he admired him enthusiastically—regarded his method as the great discovery of the age—accepted the contradictions in which he had shewn the speculative reason to be involved, as accurate deductions,—but thought that they would vanish, if the principles involved in them were boldly carried out to their legitimate consequences. Kant himself had intimated that there might possibly be some higher principles in which those contradictions would disappear, and in which the results of the pure and the practical reason would perfectly coincide. Fichte was thus, in fact, only carrying out Kant's own suggestion, when he attempted to supply this deficiency—to clear up the last problem that was left unresolved—and to give to the critical philosophy one undivided basis, from which the whole of its conclusions would legitimately flow. Kant, as we have seen, had put the practical or ethical element decidedly *above* the purely speculative or rational,—this, also, Fichte accepted as a



great truth. The self or the *will* he regarded as the truest and intensest reality,—the type of all being,—the source of all activity ; and it was from this as the primary germ of existence, that he proposed to take his start,—in this that he conceived he had found the true solution of Kant's contradictions,—and on this, as the unit idea, that he now proceeded to build up his whole system of scientific truth. In the Kantian philosophy there was an unknown *x*, termed *substance*, *noumenon*, or *being per se*, which the speculative reason could not verify, but in which the practical reason was constrained to *believe*. Fichte cut the knot of the whole difficulty by transferring this unknown quantity *into the subject itself*, by shewing that it was a creation of the mind's own productive power, and not a reality standing in antagonism to it.

In this procedure there was nothing surely so very extravagant as some persons have imagined. Almost all philosophical thinkers had stopped short at the same difficulty. The most practical of them, those who placed implicit confidence in the senses, yet had again and again affirmed, that the senses told them of phenomena only, and could affirm nothing about the substratum in which they exist. And as to the phenomena themselves, where would they be if the percipient mind were not present in the creation? Where would be the hues of nature without the per-

ceiving eye?—where the harmonies of the world without the hearing ear?—what, in short, would the universe itself be if *the soul* were not there, as an element in its whole phenomenal existence?

In taking, then, the mind, or "*the me*," as the basis of all existence, Fichte seemed only to be laying the top-stone upon the whole Kantian system. Added to this, he was putting the grandeur of moral truth and moral action, in a still more striking light. Freedom, he shewed, was the basis of all *being*; by action man created his own universe around him, so that the very forms of the material world became but the "sensitized materials of human duty," and moral *law* the law of all existence. The state was but freedom organised—the reconstruction into one united whole of all those personalities, which had remained asunder in their individual capacity; the scholar was the highest and truest man—the educator of his race—the priest of truth: the aim and goal of all social life and civil society, was the free development of humanity up to perfect reason on the side of thought, and perfect right on the side of action. Under these influences, all the old traditionary principles of kingcraft and priestcraft must necessarily vanish away. Religion and morality become identical;—religious faith must be a perfect trust in the moral order of the universe—that moral order itself is God. The idea of God as substance, a being apart from and out of

the world, became on these principles an impossibility; nay, every attempt to conceive such a being, declared Fichte, could only prove AN IDOL. God exists simply in and through the world; he is not a person, but an external principle of moral action; and the complete subjection of the will to this moral ideal is the highest and only true piety: such a state, when once attained, is complete blessedness,—a blessedness in which heaven itself can alone consist.

Such were the main conclusions to which Fichte arrived in the first period of his philosophical career. The mode in which he worked them out *scientifically* we need not here exhibit. It will be sufficient simply to indicate this one explanation,—that he started as Kant did, from *the proposition* as the absolute form of all truth ( $a=a$ ); and from this as the foundation built up a complete formal system, which, he conceived, stood upon a most indisputable basis, and marched onwards to its completion by the most rigid logical consecution.

These conclusions of Fichte certainly *look* atheistic enough in their plain and obvious meaning; and yet Fichte, though hurried on by the ardour of speculation into such results, was very far from being what we usually term an atheist in his heart. The proof of this was soon to be tested by an event which made an epoch in Fichte's life, and operated most powerfully upon the whole course of his subsequent

speculations. An article which he had inserted in a philosophical journal, "on the ground of our belief in a divine government," drew down upon him from some of the officials of the Saxon government the direct charge of atheism, and ended in his virtual dismissal from his professorial chair at Jena. This event forms a deeply interesting point, not merely in Fichte's life, but in the historical development of our modern conceptions of science, religion, and humanity—of our whole philosophy of the universe.

The old "Weltanschauung" and the new, came here into direct collision, and all the happy dreams in which Fichte had indulged of a regenerated state of society, where reason and right should reign supreme—where the scholar would be the priest, and all the rest of mankind become willing devotees to his great mission—vanished away before the prejudices of a few ignorant Bureaucrats, who not only held their own opinions very tenaciously, but had the power, in a certain degree, to enforce them.

The contrast was certainly sufficiently striking. Here on the one side were a few old-fashioned officials, men who had personally very loose notions of morality both in theory and in practice ;—men who accepted as a tradition the verbal belief in a God and a state-Christianity ; but who, beyond the state side of the question, had little care either for the one or for the other. On the other side stood *Fichte*, a man of



intense intellectual energy,—of stern and stoical moral principles,—of a disposition to sacrifice every thing he possessed for truth ;—and who, though extreme in his speculative views, yet retained a deep heart-reverence for the Bible, as the grandest of moral disquisitions ; and even read it daily, accompanied with offerings of pious devotion, in the bosom of his family. No wonder that a charge of atheism from *these* men roused the indignation of his soul down to its very centre ; nor can we pass a very severe judgment upon him, when we read the burning pages in which he vindicated himself before the eyes of the world, and hurled back the charge of *practical* atheism upon his accusers.

What is that god (this is the spirit of his reply) for which you appear so zealous ?—*words*, nothing but *words*. Your forefathers have put together a set of phrases, and you have learnt to chatter the same phrases after them. You imagine that in using these forms of speech, and professing your assent to these propositions, you are *believing in God*, and paying homage to truth. Know, oh men ! that you are denying God, and desecrating truth. All your thought, in holding these propositions, is to stand well with the world ; or if perchance there be some little feeling left, that there really is a Being who takes notice of your vain repetitions, it is only with a view of getting all the enjoyment you can out of his

favour, that you propitiate him with your vows. If it were otherwise you would have a zeal for *truth* and for *right* ! If you really had any belief in God in your *hearts*, you would become like him, and act as the supreme father, the source of all good, acts towards his creatures. Your Deity is in fact an *idol* ; and that idol is made to be the guardian of your own selfishness. What is *my* atheism compared with this ? I do not pretend to hold a truth, when in fact I am only repeating a phrase. I only acknowledge as truth what I actually realise and possess within me,—what forms part of my own real life,—what mixes itself up in intimate relation with my own personality,—and evinces itself by moral energy and practical work for humanity at large. I reverence *all* that I find everywhere of good and great, and bow myself in deep adoration before the moral order of the world ;—to assert this I am ready to labour, or if need be to *die*—for death in the cause of right is life to the world after me. (See the “ Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus.”) From the whole spirit of this defence, it will be evident, that Fichte was only *speculatively* atheistical in his principles ; he retained all that inward sense of an infinite power—an infinite purity—and an infinite goodness, which forms the subjective basis of every man’s true religious life ; only his philosophic theory taught him to deduce every thing from the phenomena of his own

self-consciousness, and he had not yet found any formal method of translating these inward experiences into the language of objective truth.

The charge of atheism, however, and the necessity in which it involved him of appealing to the public in self-defence, worked a considerable modification in Fichte's views. For what was he, in fact, admitting, by the very appeal he made to public opinion as the judge and umpire in the strife between the state-theology on the one hand, and modern science on the other?—He was appealing clearly to a kind of “*communis sensus*,”—a universal moral consciousness, which knew nothing about “*the me*,” and the “*not me*,”—which possessed none of the privileges of learning, and had nothing to do with the “nature of the scholar.” Hence, driven by the stringent experiences of human life, he began to retreat step by step from his purely individual point of view. The *subjective* “Ego” on which he had at first built his whole system of science, glided almost imperceptibly into a kind of *absolute* “Ego,”—the ideal of all human personality combined, of which the individual is but one imperfect manifestation. The standpoint of *absolute knowledge*, as expressed by the principle of subjective idealism ( $a=a$ ), passed over insensibly into a *fundamental feeling*, lying deep in the universal bosom of humanity; and this fundamental feeling pointed to a law in the universe,

separate from, and lying far above, the phenomena of our individual subjective life. What comes to view in the individual consciousness, he now saw to be but the image of a still higher reality—the streaming forth of the universal life, the infinite thought, the Eternal mind, which fills every thing with its presence, which gives form and reality to all nature, and an infinite purpose to humanity in its historical development. The way to a blessed life is to rise upwards to the full consciousness of, and union with, the divine idea; not that we can in this way create for ourselves a Deity, but that, by self-abnegation, we can raise ourselves to a perfect harmony with the divine—to a life in God. Thus, then, the purely moral point of view with which Fichte originally started, ends at last in the development of a sublime religious mysticism.

To this point Fichte had arrived when the struggle for German freedom broke out. Carried away by the most ardent patriotism, he now threw aside his dry abstractions, and abandoned the study of syllogistic formulas for the study of human history, and the laws of human progress. The light of the living individual broke in upon the conceptions of mere abstract thinking;—the element of history entered into the substance of his philosophic speculation; and the very spirit which had so long dreamed of forcing the human reason into the admission of



one rigid system of science, now lived to know that nature is stronger than system; that the spirit of humanity is more real than speculation; and that the thought of the age, which, when it will, can throw up all kinds of abstract systems to the light of day, can also just as easily, when they have done their work, dismiss them into the regions of darkness and oblivion.

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## v.

THE philosophy of Fichte was undoubtedly one-sided; and though he himself earnestly attempted to correct the extreme subjective conclusions to which it led, he never succeeded, more than in a very partial degree, in doing so. Some of his early disciples, however, with far less moral force than himself, did not hesitate to carry out the principle of *the absolute supremacy of the will* to its culminating point, adapting the speculative principles of Fichte on this head at once to life and practice. This was more especially the case with *Friedrich Schlegel* and a few of the kindred minds with which he stood in intimate connexion. Schlegel, having accepted the absolute-ness of "*the me*" in theory, considered himself only consistent in so interpreting it as to deduce a

corresponding idea of human life,—one, that is, in which the will, breaking through all bounds of law and order, should assert for itself the most entire right of arbitrary caprice. Work he accordingly denounced as slavery, and declared the will to be free, only when it gave itself up to a *divine idleness*, sporting at pleasure with all existence, vegetating in lawless defiance of all established ideas of labour or duty, and giving itself up to the full bent of its own inward impulses. This idea of life is shadowed forth in the “Lucinde,” which aimed more especially at breaking down the restraints of marriage, in favour of the natural attraction of kindred minds to each other. That the subjective principle, driven to this excess, could maintain its ground against the better instincts of humanity, was plainly impossible; the *irony* with which it pursued all proprieties of human life, recoiled upon itself; the whole system passed into mere nihilism, and disappeared.

This precise point, however, in which the extreme subjective principle evaporated and passed away, is chiefly interesting as being the cradle of a new phase of thought, and a new view of human life, which has since played a highly important part in the literary history of Germany,—I mean *the modern romantic school*. The romantic school of the nineteenth century was the first powerful reaction which organised itself against the modern philosophic ideas on which

we have been discoursing, springing, as most reactions do, out of the excesses into which the reigning system had been driven. Minds weary with speculation, and urged on, step by step, to the verge of nihilism, are naturally unable to turn round, and quietly retrace their path; they look over the chasm to the brink of which they have arrived, and starting back with a convulsive horror of all speculation, take refuge, for the most part, in the first positive and authoritative system of connected ideas which may present itself to their view. So it was with Fr. Schlegel; so with Novalis and others, in whom the extreme subjective principle thus operated its own cure. Novalis died too young for it ever to be apparent what ultimate direction his ideas would have taken; but Schlegel, after having vainly tried to clip the wings of his speculative fancy by a rigid application of the laws of logic, sank back into the most misty middle-age view of life, and there tried to find rest for his spirit in the bosom of the Catholic church.

The romantic school, once commenced, soon began to extend itself over a very considerable surface of literary activity. Tieck threw around it the charm of his exquisite fiction; and even Schiller, though imbued with a large infusion of the old classic spirit, and something of the modern also, devoted a considerable portion of his genius to the development of the romantic element. Those who, like Schlegel, had

practically advocated a reckless moral licence ; or who, like Count Stolberg, and Leo the historian, had lived through the varied phases of actual licentiousness, having lost, in this way, all internal moral manhood, threw themselves, not unnaturally, into the arms of the confessor and the priest ; just as the woman of fashion in France takes the veil when the sunshine of her pleasure is over. The majority, however, contented themselves with setting up a middle-age picture of human existence, in place of that rigid philosophic system of ideas, which threatened to break down every cherished tradition, to subvert the old historic bases of society, to blot out all artificial distinctions of rank from amongst mankind, and to reconstruct the world of human society anew upon *reason* and *right*. To this point, however, we shall return, when treating of romanticism in its more recent phases.

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## VI.

THESE attempts of the romantic school, as far as the philosophic element is concerned, were soon cast into the shade by the rising star of *Schelling*, and the *Natur-philosophie*. Schelling possessed a temperament extremely different from that of Kant and Fichte ; though, strictly speaking, he took up



the thread of speculation where *they* had left off. His mind, instead of being cast in that rigid logical mould which characterised his predecessors, was decidedly genial and poetical in its tone and tendency. He was one of those young and ardent natures which arrive at an early maturity, and pour out their luxuriance of thought and fancy in the first gush of productive effort. Schelling's writings, accordingly, are far from being systematic, and still farther from being progressive and self-consistent throughout. He was roused early in life, by the genius of Fichte, to philosophic thought; and came forward virtually as his apologist and disciple, when Fichte himself was under the cloud of popular opposition and censure. But it was only for a brief period that he remained true to that subjective principle with which his philosophical career commenced. One work followed another with almost overwhelming rapidity; and that in a series by no means characterised by any definite logical development; a series which seemed rather like a succession of dissolving views, each brilliant and captivating for the moment, but then merging into some other form of speculation, equally beautiful and evanescent. Schelling's philosophical writings, accordingly, must rather be regarded as a succession of pregnant and suggestive *fragments*, than viewed in the light of one connected system of ideas. Their tendency, however, has uniformly been to bear away

from the subjective and critical extreme, towards the more objective, the more positive, and to some extent, even towards the romantic.

Fichte, as we have seen, had already idealised the general conception of human science; it was Schelling's great work to apply the ideal philosophy to the study of nature, the key-stone to his whole system being—*that all nature is, truly speaking, a manifestation of mind*. The philosopher, according to Schelling, must not be an every-day thinker; nor must he be one of those who are merely skilled in the formal processes of logic;—he must be, on the contrary, a man of true genius, a man who has the gift of *intellectual intuition*, and who, by virtue of this power of philosophic insight into the secret workings of nature, can look through the veil of the material, in which it is embosomed, and see the spiritual reality. The man who can so interpret nature will be in no danger, on the one side, of viewing it as dead matter, impelled by mechanical forces; nor, on the other side, of confounding it, as Fichte did, with the subjective or individual principle, the personal and percipient mind. He will see rather, that nature and soul, differing in their phenomenal existence, are one in their ultimate essence; and that the contrast between mind and matter, which must ever appear obvious enough upon the surface of things, vanishes when we trace them up to their first and inmost principle.

Viewed here, they are *absolutely one*. From this principle it was that the system of Schelling assumed the title of the *Identitäts Philosophie*.

It must in justice be confessed, that the mode in which Schelling conceived of nature as a system of living forces, homogeneous with mind itself, is one which has largely been gaining ground in modern times; and that too, amongst purely physical investigators. The more we penetrate into the *essence* of matter *as matter*, the more it is found that the problem eludes our search, and the nearer it brings us to the confines of what we call *the immaterial*. Schelling, to make good his ground in this respect, goes into a very minute exposition of the real elements out of which our whole conception of nature is compounded, and shews how they may all be viewed as the obvious results of *living forces*, engaged in a connected process of self-development. First, there are the forces of inorganic nature; and what other rational expression can we get for these, than that of an expansive and an attractive *power*, the two resulting at last in the phenomena of gravity? The science of mechanics, again, it is well known, measures matter merely as so much *force*; it is only the unphilosophic mind that views it as so much dead and immovable substance. To the forces of purely inorganic matter succeed those more ethereal powers which we know under the names of magnetism and electricity; the

mysterious connection of which with the primary phenomena of organization (we may remark in passing) is now largely believed, though not by any means adequately explained.

These forces bring us next, into the region of organization, which Schelling traces up through the phenomena, first, of reproduction, as seen throughout the vegetable world; then of irritability, as the incipient manifestation of animal existence; until at last we reach the first indication of *sensibility* itself. Having arrived at sensibility, the philosophy of nature hands us over to the philosophy of mind. Beginning with bare feeling, as the intermediate link between nature and the soul, Schelling traces the *ideal* side of the process just as he had done the real, through the different phenomena of sensation, intellection, and will, until *the individual* is complete, and begins to play his part on the broad theatre of the world. The human individual, striving after unity, next combines with other individuals, and forms a social state, and a civil government; and lastly, the entire progress of society in the world, forms the wondrous drama of human history.

Throughout the whole of this process, Schelling attempts to show that there is but one principle of mind and reason in operation. The absolute reason embodies itself even in what we term *inorganic* matter, and there developes powers on which the harmony of



the entire material universe [depends. The same reason enters as an organic law into the infinitesimal germs of vegetable life, and brings forth, on every side, forms of inexhaustible beauty. Reason next comes to consciousness in the kingdom of animated nature, and goes on building up the organic frame to an ever higher degree of perfection, until in man it reaches the stage of *self-consciousness*, and can gaze with intelligent wonder upon its own work. Finally, in society and in history it carries on a still further development, as the powers of universal humanity unfold, and urges us onwards along a career of progress, the law of which we can comprehend, but the consummation of which is involved in the mystery of futurity.

Such is the fundamental point of view from which Schelling started in his earlier philosophical efforts. With regard to his method, we have in the logical form through which these ideas were conveyed, the first clear manifestation of the triple dialectic process by which thought rolls forward from step to step, in its career of self-development, rising at each pulsation to a higher category, and constructing the form of every truth in its mighty progress. As this will come more fully before us when we treat of the *Hegelian* system, we leave it for the present without further exposition.

The later phases of Schelling's philosophy we need

not touch upon. They were chiefly characterized by unavailing attempts to reconcile the pantheistic standpoint which he first assumed, with the notion of a personal Deity, and with the fundamental dogmas of the Catholic faith. In doing this, he lost the freshness and charm of his first philosophic principles on the one hand, without solving the problem of religion, or satisfying the practical religious requirements of humanity, on the other. He merely glided step by step into a strained, unintelligible mysticism, and, without acknowledging it, became a foe to all purely philosophic speculation, and a tacit abettor of an antique romanticism. The followers of Schelling formed two distinct schools. Those who attached themselves to his Natur-philosophie (such as Oken, Steffens, Carus, and others), have really done good service in spiritualizing the physical philosophy of the age, without running into any censurable extravagance; while those who started from Schelling's later mysticism, such as Schubert, Baader, and others of smaller dimensions still, have done little else than revel in a species of sentimental mysticism, sometimes of more elevated, and at others, of a very mean and trifling character. But the influence of Schelling was not confined to Germany. His attempt to unite the process of the physical sciences in one affiliated line with the study of man, both in his individual constitution and historic development, has

also had a very considerable result out of his own country. No one, for example, who compares the philosophic method of Schelling with the "Philosophie Positive" of Auguste Comte, can have the slightest hesitation as to the source from which the latter virtually sprang. The fundamental idea is indeed precisely the same as that of Schelling, with this difference only,—that the idealistic language of the German speculator is here translated into the more ordinary language of physical science. That Comte borrowed his views from Schelling we can by no means affirm; but that the whole conception of the affiliation of the sciences, in the order of their relative simplicity, and the expansion of the same law of development, so as to include the exposition of human nature, and the course of social progress, is all to be found there,—no one, in the smallest degree acquainted with Schelling's writings, can seriously doubt.

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(TO BE CONCLUDED IN OUR NEXT.)

## DESTITUTE AND CRIMINAL JUVENILES.

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"Human virtue, if we went down to the roots of it, is not so rare. The materials of human virtue are everywhere abundant as the light of the sun : raw materials.—O wo, and loss, and scandal thrice and threefold, that they so seldom are elaborated, and built into a result ! That they lie yet unelaborated and stagnant in the souls of wide-spread dreary millions, fermenting, festering, and issuing at last as energetic vice instead of strong practical virtue."—*Carlyle*, —*Model Prisons*, p. 21.

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AT war with a powerful and stubborn foe, there would seem to be little hope of a nation calmly investigating the evils in its social system, and with earnest endeavour beginning the work of amendment. Yet beyond the pressure of increased taxation, and the sad gaps in some thousands of families, the actual miseries of war touch us not in England. Without misgiving, the majority of the nation trusts the direction of its powerful influence to the hands of a few well-known men, whilst philanthropic minds may busy themselves practically in home affairs. In nothing is this more strikingly manifested than in the frequent efforts to answer the question of "what is best to be done with our juvenile criminals?" In town and country, it is beginning to be felt that the old system of treatment is wrong, and to be seen that to "train up a child in the way he *should* go," is, after all, worth a trial.



Extensively, this movement is but of yesterday; five years have not gone by since "REFORMATORY SCHOOLS," the earnest, hopeful, and christian work of a noble spirit, moved the world to compassionate tears by its clear statement of the real facts about us; and but two years since, the Birmingham Prize Essays were published, confirming, with additional information, Miss Carpenter's views, and enforcing with eloquence and lofty argument, the "duty of society to save the young, as far as possible, from the commission of sin, and to save them, as far as possible, from becoming worse after its commission."

Many pens have subsequently been engaged, and since the visit of M. Demetz (the founder of the Mettray School), to England, the crop of public meetings has given promise of a golden harvest, and attracted many labourers to this long-neglected field.

From the works named above, and from the valuable Report of the Conference at Birmingham in 1851, we shall cull a few of the more impressive and characteristic facts, our object being to bring within a small compass such a statement of the subject under notice, as will induce those who are indifferent, if there be any, to become earnest, and those who sympathize, to become workers.

Without dwelling upon the causes of juvenile crime and destitution—which would require a long paper in itself—it would be too glaring an omission to pass

over the important fact, that a considerable proportion of the outcast children of society are orphans, and that most are the offspring of drunken and degraded parents.

"It has been calculated that there are 700 orphans committed to the prisons of our country every year; that there are 2,000 committed of those who are deprived of one of their parents; so that there are nearly 3,000 children annually left without their natural guardians to guide them into the paths of duty, and to instil into them the practice of virtue. Look at the manner in which many of them become criminal. A man, hardened in crime, gathers these children round him, and makes them his agents; he sends them to beg, to pick pockets, and teaches them how to do it; such instances are known to me. He takes them to the very shops they are to rob, points out the shoes they are to steal, the gown-pieces they are to filch; and being less expert than the adult they are discovered, and thrown into prison. Thus while the older villain escapes, the child begins his criminal life, which we know too frequently ends in his being sent out of the country as a transported felon."\*

A brutal parent said to Mayhew, the author of "London Labour and the London Poor,"—

"I used to take my little boy, when only four years old, to the public house, and make him drunk with whatever I drank myself." "I have seen," said another, "a baby of five years old reeling drunk in a tap room. His

\* Rev. W. C. Osborn, at Birmingham Conference, 1851.

governor did it for the lark of the thing—to see him chuck his-self about—sillified like.” Another informant declared that he overheard a proposal “for a quartern and a two-out (glass) between a couple of shoeless boys under nine years old. One little fellow of eleven, on being remonstrated with, said that it was the only pleasure in life that he had, and he weren’t a-going to give that up.”\* Herding promiscuously in filthy houses, “untaught, mistaught, maltreated, neglected, regularly trained to vice, or fairly turned into the streets to shift for themselves,”—this is the condition of these poor unhappy children.

“No softening memory of sorrow, wrong, or trouble enters here, because this wretched mortal from his birth has been abandoned to a worse condition than the beasts, and has, within his knowledge, no one contrast, no humanizing touch, to make a grain of such a memory spring up in his hardened breast: all within this desolate creature is a barren wilderness. \* \* \* Woe, tenfold, to the nation that shall count its monsters such as this, lying here by hundreds and by thousands.”†

In a country which annually subscribes tens of thousands of pounds, for the purpose of taking to benighted nations and painted savages that Bible which hundreds of thousands of its own children have never been taught to read; where millions of pounds are annually received by an army of trained men,

\* Juvenile Delinquency, by M. Hill, page 57.

† Dickens’ *Haunted Man*, page 142.

*preachers* of the gospel of Jesus Christ ; in a country whose “middle class annually increase their capital by fifty millions sterling, and whose working classes squander fifty millions in intoxicating drinks and tobacco,”—it is a matter of wonder that practical men can so overlook the money view, and religious men the moral aspect, of this, the monster evil of the social state. It is, indeed, no light matter. The average annual number of juveniles under 17 years of age, actually convicted, is variously estimated. It may, however, with certainty be taken at 15,000. But we must remember that this number does not include the most expert, daring, and perfectly-trained juvenile offenders, nor those orphaned, destitute, and uncared-for children, who form the layer next above, and pressing upon, the actual criminal class ; so that, altogether, “it is calculated that there are in England 150,000 children either criminals already, or training to become so.”\*

Though there are, doubtless, occasional crimes of the worst class committed by juveniles of a most unnaturally stimulated precocity, yet it is a fact that the great majority of commitments are for petty offences.

“It is no uncommon thing to read in the newspapers of young urchins found in a state of destitution, or in the commission of some petty delinquency, commiserated by

\* Prize Essay, by C. F. Cornwallis ; § 29, p. 350.



the magistrate, who expresses his pity for their unfortunate condition, and laments that he has no other place than a criminal's gaol to which he may consign them. The mind of the child thus becomes familiarised with a gaol—a prison is at once disarmed of its terrors and its shame.”

“I have, sometimes, cases tried before me,” says Serjeant Adams, “for stealing penny tarts, oranges, two or three apples, and articles of that kind. In one case, about two months ago (March 1847), a child 9 years of age, who was wholly unknown to the police, was tried before me for taking a little toy hammer, value 1d., from a basketful which was placed at a shop door.”\*

Further, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, 15th May, 1849, Mr. Pearson, a very high authority, says:—

“The prison inspectors' returns, carefully examined, prove that 80 per cent. of all the commitments were for larcenies, misdemeanors, juvenile delinquencies, acts of vagrancy, and other petty offences, the moral and legal gravity of which was fixed at so low a point, that the punitive and reformatory justice of the country was satisfied by sentences of imprisonment varying from 7 days to 6 months.”

Ignorance and idleness seem to be the chief causes of this floating mass of vice; and a culpable ignorance and guilty apathy appear to us most naturally to account for its neglect by society. The court and aristocracy can scarcely be hoped to have a true know-

\* Quoted in “Reformatory Schools,” page 288.

ledge, for all that might offend is carefully hidden from noble eyes; the middle classes generally are either too busy in the acquisition of capital or in selfish gratification and glorification, to care much for the well-being of that mass which they rarely see, and only hear of in the police reports; the labouring classes are not sufficiently educated to exercise a prudential foresight, or to control their grosser desires; and thus the generation of want and crime is consummated. Virtuous society holds itself irresponsible for the bastard twins; but the fates and destinies are inexorable, and when the tax-gatherer calls with his demand of five shillings in the pound, for police and poor rates, we rub our eyes and "wonder what we shall have to pay next." Perhaps it would have been wiser, long ago to have asked, Why are we paying so much? and what becomes of it? We live in the golden age—let us briefly examine what we have done with "the 'raw material' we have received in exchange for our drain of gold."

Until the session, 1854, of Parliament, perhaps even now, it may be said, "the only school provided in Great Britain by the state, for her children, is THE GAOL!" We seem to have hit upon the most useful plan possible for making this school effective, by confining the scholars there, "terms varying from 7 days to 6 months," so that they may, after each lesson, go forth into the world to test their acquirements, and

return frequently and periodically, until fully initiated into the arcana of the prison guild. For juveniles this is certainly an expensive boarding school. What are the facts in regard to cost? Mr. Pearson, before quoted, says,

“Milbank Prison is said to have cost the enormous sum of £500 per prisoner. The prison inspectors said that York Gaol had been enlarged, at a cost of £1,200 per prisoner; and Reading Prison Palace, called the Model County Gaol and House of Correction, cost upwards of £49,000, though the daily average of prisoners was but 140, being equal to £350, or at £5 per cent. £17 18s. per annum for the lodging of every prisoner, man, woman, and child, confined within its walls. This was denominated the model gaol; and if its expensive construction should be carried throughout the country, it would require six millions sterling to furnish the same princely accommodation for the average number of prisoners confined in the various gaols of the kingdom.”

The Rev. W. C. Osborn, in a speech at the Birmingham Conference, 1851, states, that he had kept an account of 55 children, cases of first committals, and that in the six years subsequent to their first committal, they had

“Cost us a sum of money that would have kept them at a boarding-school for the whole time. Aye, and having cost all this money, in what position are they at the expiration of the six years? Fifteen of them have been transported, five have died, five of them are living we know not how or where; but there are about thirty of

them in a condition which must, sooner or later, issue in their being sent to one of our penal colonies. \* \* \* Now in the returns laid before Parliament, on the motion of Mr. Monckton Milnes, it appears that there were, in 1848 and 1849, throughout the country, no less than 7000 *first committals of persons under 17 years of age*. But I will take them at 5,000, and assuming that Bath presents a fair average of cost, the amount lost to the country, or expended on those children alone who are committed for the first time, is half a million per annum. That is a startling assertion, certainly, but it is fully borne out by the statements as to the cost of juvenile crime, made by Serjeant Adams, Mr. Rushton, and other witnesses examined by the select committees of the two Houses of Parliament.”

This is, however, only the cost in Money; we cannot evade the fact that we are *individually responsible* for that Crime which results from the *neglected evils* in our social polity. “In the position in which I am placed”\* (says the speaker last quoted), I have opportunities of knowing the condition of these children; and although the system adopted at Bath is, I believe, as good as, if not better than, that adopted elsewhere, yet I must say, that our treatment of these poor destitute creatures has been, and is, most cruel, unjust, and unchristian. \* \* I cannot help feeling that our conduct towards them is most unjustifiable; and I trust that God will not visit us with his anger



for our treatment of these poor, ignorant, sinning, yet unconsciously guilty creatures." And that long-tried, wise, and hopeful friend of prisoners, the chaplain of Preston Gaol, says—"Society has acted towards its criminals as if they *would* not be otherwise—when, in fact, they scarcely *could* be otherwise." In his last report, the Rev. John Clay says—"I have been able to show, during several successive years, that of the discharged prisoners who returned to their homes (in the County), after undergoing the sentences of imprisonment passed on them at the sessions, upwards of 60 *per cent.* have given satisfactory evidence of decided moral improvement, or of complete and permanent reformation." Yet, though the experiment of reformatory influences has been tried since 1843 in Preston, and subsequently in several other prisons, where "its good effects were as indisputable as they were extensive,"—yet, "in more than two-thirds of our gaols, prisoners for trial are permitted to herd together, and to form themselves into mutual instruction societies, for propagating the knowledge and practice of crime."

Let us look at the consequences of this ordinary prison system, and compare them with the results obtained by a different method of treatment. To make a criminal at a great expense to the country, and ruin to the man,—or to instruct and reform the boy, so that he may become an honest man and

worker in society,—that is the question. Hitherto the former course seems to have been extensively preferred. We are, however, with characteristic slowness beginning to believe that it is better to reform. The Rev. John Clay tells us,—

“It is not taking too much for granted, to say that criminals, sentenced to transportation before they reach 31 years of age, have commenced their criminal career at a time of life when they should have been learning a better way ; but society has “*ignored*” their very existence. Let us see what society pays for its indifference. Offenders, generally, are not sentenced to transportation until they have appeared at the bar four or five times. I will, therefore, suppose the expense of between three or four prosecutions at assizes or sessions to be £50. The average imprisonment of each offender, *before* transportation, may be taken at three years, and the expense of it at £65 ; three years probation in separate confinement at Parkhurst, or public works, £50 ; removal to the Colonies, &c. &c., £35 ; total, £200. So that when 3,000 sentences of transportation are passed in a year, we may consider them tantamount to a notification to the public that a last instalment of a sum exceeding half a million sterling is about to be called for ! To be as precise as the nature of this enquiry will allow, the 2,728 convicts under 31 years of age, to whom I have already alluded as having run the career of juvenile criminality, represent a cost *waste* of £545,600 ! But let it be remembered that the felony of this kingdom—and whether juvenile or adult, it belongs to this question to consider the fact—is not maintained,

while at large, for nothing. Having investigated, to a considerable extent, the rates of income derived by thieves from their practices, and having obtained estimates of the same thing from intelligent and experienced convicts themselves, I believe myself to be within the real truth, when I assume such income to be more than £100 a-year for each thief! Well, then, allowing only two years' full practice to one of the dangerous class previous to his sentence of transportation, I do not know how the conclusion can be escaped that, in one way or another, the public—the easy, indifferent, callous public—has been, and is, mulcted to the amount of more than a million sterling, by and on account of its criminals annually transported! But its criminals who are not transported!—still living on their dishonest gains, or in our costly prisons! We must not forget them in our calculations of the cost of crime, though it will be sufficient for my present purpose merely to refer to them, and to say that I am convinced that their cost to the community *in* and *out* of prison amounts annually to some millions!"

This is no exaggerated picture; now look on this:—

"Upon an average of cases we find that five years' training in the Industrial Schools is sufficient to make the child a useful member of society; and suppose the expense to amount to £5 per annum, we have then the choice of making one of these children an honest and virtuous member of society for £25; or of sending him ultimately into a penal settlement, at a cost, including his previous training in crime, of about £300. It appears to me that there can be little choice to a wise man in the matter."\*

\* A. Thomson, Esq.—Birmingham Conference Proceedings, p. 83.

This is spoken by a gentleman of long experience and full knowledge of the working of the Aberdeen Industrial Schools—one of the earliest, and perhaps the most successful, of reformatory efforts.

Further, “At Stretton-on-Dunsmore, there is, I believe, the earliest institution in existence, at which an attempt has been made to reform the juvenile criminal without the aid of walls, and locks and bars. The system adopted is a system of kindness and persuasion, blended, nevertheless, with salutary coercion and correction. This is effected by daily setting before him the comforts of a well-ordered family — by occupying and interesting his mind — by sending him on little embassies of confidence, and exciting in him a feeling of respect for himself and his own character, and inducing him to participate in that *esprit du corps* which regards the honour of the institution, of which he is a member, as if it were his own.”\*

In the year 1827 it was ascertained that 48 per cent. of those who had been subjected to the experiment, were permanently reformed. The proportion of reformatations has gradually risen to 58, 64, and in 1851, to 68 per cent. At a cost, in 1827, per reformation, of £40; in 1844, of £26; in 1846, £30; in 1851, £29.

“But as the system has been in operation from the year 1818 to the present time, that is, for no less a period than 43 years, (1851), I think we are safe in concluding that

\* The Rev. H. T. Powell, Chaplain Warwick County Asylum—  
at Birmingham Conference, page 86.



the reformation of a criminal boy may be effected on an average, at a cost of £30. It therefore costs rather more than double to bring up children in crime, than it does to reform and restore them to society; for the Liverpool magistrates have long ago asserted,—what has since been tested by the actual cost of unselected juvenile cases,—that when a child has once been entered as an inmate of a gaol, the probability is that before he is transported he will have cost £63.”

The agricultural colony at Mettrai, in France, under M. Demetz, we need not more than mention here,—the speeches of M. Demetz in his recent visit must be fresh in the memory of all who take any interest in the subject, and these who do not, may perhaps be led to do so, by reading Lord Leigh’s account of his visit to Mettrai, published in the *Times*, of Tuesday, 25th Dec. and *Manchester Guardian*, 26th Dec. 1855,

At this truly Model Institution the whole average cost of reforming a youth is forty-two pounds, and the reformations reach 90 per cent !

Here is a statement\* of the total cost to the country of each juvenile delinquent.

In Gaol. ....	£63	0	0
At Parkhurst Government Prison ..	43	10	5½
At Mettrai .....	42	0	0
At Stretton-on-Dunsmore .....	31	0	0
At an Industrial School .....	18	0	0

\* From Hill’s Prize Essay, page 201.

In the reformatory attempts in this country, two great difficulties have hitherto always been in the way; the want of legal authority to detain juveniles in any school; and the dependence of these schools upon voluntary subscriptions for their support. Insufficiency of funds has been the cry of almost every Reformatory and Ragged School, and from this cause alone more than one has been nigh unto dissolution; whilst the lack of legal power of detention has caused misery and sorrow that might make the angels weep.\* These difficulties were, however, removed to a great extent, by an Act of Parliament passed in August, 1854. We subjoin an abstract, and commend it to the careful attention of our readers.

“Whereas, Reformatory Schools, for the better training of juvenile offenders, have been and may be established by voluntary contributions in various parts of Great Britain, and it is expedient that more extensive use should be made of such institutions, be it enacted, &c. &c., as follows:—

“Clause 1. On application from any voluntary institution to the Secretary of State, one of Her Majesty’s inspectors of prisons shall visit the school, and should he give a satisfactory report as to the efficiency of the school, &c., such school shall be held to be a Reformatory School under the provisions of the act, on condition that said inspector shall be allowed to continue to visit and report such school; which, if at any time in an unsatisfactory

\* For Facts, see “Reformatory Schools,” page 268.

condition, shall cease to be a Reformatory School within the meaning of the act.

“ Clause 2. Whenever, after the passing of this act, any person under the age of 16 shall be convicted of any offence punishable by law, the magistrate or sheriff, &c., after passing sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than 14 days, shall at the same time direct that such youthful offender be sent, at the termination of his prison punishment, to some one of these Reformatory Schools, to be detained there for a period of not less than two years, and not exceeding five years; provided that the Secretary of State for the Home Department may at any time order such offender to be discharged from any such school.

“ Clause 3. Gives power to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to defray either the whole cost of maintenance at a Reformatory School of such juvenile offenders, at such a rate per head as shall be determined upon by them, or such portion of such cost as shall not have been recovered from the parents or step-parents of such children, as hereinafter provided, or such other portions as shall be recommended by the Secretary of State.

“ Clause 4. Gives power to magistrates to imprison, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding three months, any refractory inmate, or any one absconding from such Reformatory Institutions.

“ Clauses 5 and 6. Give power to magistrates, &c., to compel the parents or step-parents of juvenile offenders, if of sufficient ability, to pay a sum not exceeding five shillings per week towards the maintenance of their criminal children, while remaining in such Reformatory Schools.

“ Clause 7. Gives power to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Home Department, if he shall think fit to do so, to remove any such youthful offender from one Reformatory School to another, provided always that such removal shall not increase the period for which such offender was sentenced to remain in a Reformatory School.

“ Clause 8 and last states, This act shall not apply to Ireland.”

“ A parliamentary return moved for by Mr. Miles last session, showed that the whole number of certified Reformatory Schools, exclusive of that at Redhill, are capable of maintaining only 420 children. The whole amount of accommodation of which judges and chairmen of quarter sessions can avail themselves under the provisions of ADDERLEY’S act, may therefore be taken as sufficient for 600 or 700 children, while the grand total of criminals of this class actually convicted during the last year for which returns have been made up (1851) was upwards of 17,000.”\*

In other words, there was not, a short time ago, sufficient accomodation in all the Juvenile Reformatories in the country for the *orphan children* annually committed to our gaols !

Without examination of the grave defects, where so much is good, in this last and greatest step in the true path towards better criminal legislative measures, we may quote Lord Leigh, who says—

“ M. Demetz, and other French reformers, congratulate

\* Manchester Guardian, 14th December, 1855.



themselves upon the superiority of the French law over the English; as they are able to receive children *direct into their institutions*, whereas our law sends them first to *prison*, and thereby disqualifies them for ever for the army and navy."

We have now given a brief glance at the nature, extent, and cost of juvenile crime generally; at the utterly inadequate, but we hope quickly increasing means employed for saving these miserable children from ruin; and we shall now rapidly walk through our own great, populous, very rich, and immoral town, noting what we see done, and what left undone, by energetic Manchester men, in this important work.

"The extent of juvenile crime in Manchester and the neighbourhood, will be seen by reference to the reports of the chaplains of the two gaols of the town. It appears that the number of committals to the New Bailey, in the year ending September 29th, 1855, was 547 males under seventeen years of age, showing a large increase, the number having been 478 in 1854, and only 355 in 1853. In the City Gaol, the number for the two years 1854 and 1855 is the same, viz. 327 in each year; but as this includes 54 re-committals in 1855, against 58 in 1854, the number of *individuals* committed in 1855 was 273, against 269 in 1854. Of these, 22 were under 12 years, 61 between twelve and fourteen, and 190 between fourteen and seventeen years of age.

"But while the increase of crime has led, within the last few years, to a vast expense in the erection of the

new City Gaol, and while already it is found necessary to expend at least £24,000 upon the enlargement of that building, no effort, beyond the very limited one in Angel Meadow, has been made for the reformation of the offenders."

The number of known juvenile male criminals, under 17 years of age, in Manchester, is between 800 and 900; let us now look at the extent of the source from which this force is recruited. The number of children neither at school nor in employment in the Borough of Manchester, over 3 and under 14 years of age, is 30,100; the total number of children who have never attended a day school is 23,884, of whom 5,385 are over 10 and under 14 years of age. The amount of day and sunday school accommodation in the Borough, is calculated as sufficient for 44,109; whilst the number of children over 3 and under 14, is 69,545.

So that there is a huge floating capital of idleness, upon which the vicious and profligate fearlessly draw; but which, sooner or later, society will have inevitably to repay, and that with an accumulation of interest terrible to calculate.

And yet Manchester, that by its enterprise has risen to the first rank among commercial cities, the centre of a restless activity whose vast products largely employ the mercantile marine of two mighty empires; —Manchester, that by its skill in political organization

has agitated the kingdom throughout its vast circumference, by its indomitable force created for the leaders of that agitation a European fame, and obtained for itself the distinction of being radical and ultra-reformatory ;—Manchester, that builds palaces for the housing of its wares, and is considered to be the most practical community of the age—Manchester, alas ! that with this giant power seems to have lost the finer feelings of its great heart, we say it with a deep sense of shame, has not a Reformatory capable of lodging the 22 poor criminal children under 12 years of age, incarcerated in her expensive, and, alas ! insufficient gaol !

This is no exaggeration ; we find by the Report of the Mayes-street School, dated 7th Dec., 1855, that,

“ In the 15 months during which your school has been open, no less than 88 convicted criminals, between the ages of 12 and 18, have presented themselves for admission ; besides 15 who had been apprehended though not convicted, and a number of others who, though they had been neither convicted nor apprehended, were, by habit and repute, thieves, or were discovered to have been living with thieves in well-known haunts of crime. Only a small number of these applicants could of course be admitted ; though the fact of making voluntary application to an institution of this kind, is *prima facie* evidence of a desire to reform.”

Here, then, we have numbers of the criminal class

coming anxiously, with sorrowing hearts and new-born, weak perhaps, but living resolutions, asking in vain that they may be snatched from the position to which they seemed but now doomed. Truly this is asking for bread and receiving a stone. Nor can public ignorance of these facts be pleaded here. In an article dated 21st April, 1855, in the *Manchester Guardian*, a paper read we suppose by some thousands of christian men and women, it is stated—

“There is a Reformatory Institution in Mayes-street which is not of a character to pass government inspection, principally on account of its wanting the out-door ground specified as requisite for a play-ground. In consequence of this deficiency, it cannot receive support from the public funds allotted for the purpose, nor can the magistrates commit children to its walls, with the power of legal detention over them. Whatever good the institution does, is done at the expense of private resources; but the accommodation it affords is so scanty that only about 20 children can sleep on the premises, and about 60 attend the school,—all being of the very lowest class. To shew, however, what good it is actually performing, in the face of a demand for at least ten times its limited means, we cannot too simply repeat the most shocking story we ever remember to have heard. Not more than a month ago, nine criminal children voluntarily presented themselves to Mr. Graham, the resident master of this school, and implored him to take them in and save them. Only two of the number, selected as apparently the most promising, could be received; and we are informed that the accommodation



at the disposal of the institution did not justify even their admission. Seven out of the nine—most probably at the last moment of hope and conscience which they will ever experience—were flung back upon the haunts, the associations, and the absolute necessities of crime. Their future can be nothing but desperate; but we do say in all earnestness, that no retaliation which they can inflict upon society can be greater than it has deserved at their hands. No just judgment, human or divine, will hold them to have given worse than they have received. What else is left for them, but to ‘curse God and die?’ ”

What was the result of this extraordinary statement so far as Manchester is concerned? In the matter of money, absolutely nil! Yet this is only one instance of refusals; we are informed upon undoubted authority that such cases are of frequent recurrence.

There are, in Manchester and Salford two other Ragged and Industrial Day Schools,—one in Byrom-street, the other in Greengate; another in Sharp-street, for Evening and Sunday instruction, and one other, which we only know by report, in St. Ann’s Sunday School. Doubtless these all do good. They are the first efforts, with poor tools, to break up and prepare a stubborn soil. But from our personal visits to these Ragged Schools, we are convinced that their praises are too loudly sung, and the good they are supposed to do greatly over-estimated. We speak this with the best feeling, but as our impression of the facts. For instance, at the Salford School there

is an attendance of 70 children, say 50 boys and 20 girls, and this number is under the charge of a master and matron; clearly they have more work than can be done *well* by two persons. The children are supplied with three meals during the day, "at a cost of not more than 1s. 4d. per head per week, yet their food is always wholesome, nutritious, and sufficient."

"The boys have been," says the Report of the Salford Ragged School, "employed in making canvas bags for coffee, sorting bristles, and recently, in making sacks and door-mats. The girls have been chiefly employed in learning to sew, scarcely any of them being able even to hold a needle properly when they came. The progress of the children has been encouraging,—*the interest manifested in their Bible lessons very pleasing, and not altogether without beneficial result.*"

The italics are our own. We have always noticed the reverse of this statement, and have been pained to see a persistence in dry catechetical routine of barren Old Testament history, when an hour's talk with the children on some "common thing," based on a New Testament narrative or expression, would have held their attention, and informed their minds. The wants here are, obviously, more teachers, a better method of instruction, and extended watchfulness over the children. Personal cleanliness, discipline of body, singing, and by kind treatment awakening the sleeping sympathies of childhood, (in boys and girls who have known no childhood), thus leading them into a

condition where the acquisition of reading, writing, and calculation will be a pleasure, and not a dry task, are duties that require more attention than one master can devote to fifty scholars. But it is said, if all this be done with Ragged-School children, you are doing an injustice to the children of the poor, honest, labouring classes. All we can reply is, then the sooner we cease “to dispute on this or that plan for educating the entire population, the better ; for in the meantime we are suffering *souls to go perishing* day after day.” We believe this literally.

But supposing these Ragged Schools of ours in Manchester and Salford to be models of industrial training, they are unable to accommodate more than 300 children, and with their evening auxiliaries, not more than, at the utmost, 600 children ; whilst in Salford alone there are more than 1,000 children whose parents are unable to pay at all for a school, and many children without parents ; and in Manchester, the number of the same class, calculated in the same ratio to the population, will be about 4,000. The willingness of these extremely poor, neglected people to send their children to school, and that tidily and with thankfulness, is proved by the experiment of the Model Secular School, in Jackson’s Row ; which, we may add, it would be well if our leading talkers and able schemers upon education would visit. That they have not done so we are sadly conscious.

This school is almost entirely supported by a few men, and doubtless will have to be closed without more general and increased support.

It is painfully manifest that mere voluntary effort does not effect the work, either of criminal reformation, or the education of destitute children. What then is to be done? During the compilation of these pages, we have received the prospectus for a proposed "Manchester and Salford Reformatory for Juvenile Criminals," originating with the gentlemen whose active benevolence has kept open the one named before, in Mayes-street. They state that

"Their committee believe that the wants of the case can only be fully met by voluntary institutions, founded upon a Christian and benevolent basis; that those institutions will be best controlled by private individuals, both magistrates and others; but that being thus founded, and in part supported by private benevolence, they will have an irresistible claim to government assistance when, being subjected to proper inspection, they are found to be efficiently conducted; and they see no reason to despair of such assistance being readily afforded them."

We sincerely wish them "God speed," and earnestly urge our fellow citizens to render their aid to this serious undertaking. The truth and justice of the principle, however, "that the case can only be fully met by voluntary institutions," we can by no means admit. We think the experience of all our



voluntary educational schools in Manchester proves the reverse, and none more so than the experience of Mayes-street. We feel strongly that the most effectual method of dealing with a social evil of this magnitude would be for the local government to take it in hand, raising the necessary funds, by a tax on the whole borough, for a purpose which would benefit all. "For Middlesex a special act has been obtained, giving power to raise a rate for the establishment of a school."\* We see no more reason why private benevolence should be turned from its legitimate channels, and taxed with the general reformation of criminals, and the instruction of destitute children, than that it should support our gaols and subscribe the highway rate. The cases appear to us parallel. We urge, therefore, the subject of juvenile reformation and industrial schools upon the several members of the Town Council, and instead of voting £24,000 to be spent in increased accommodation for prisoners, let us hope to see the first steps taken towards making the present gaol too large.

We believe, judging from the results at the tried Reformatories in this country and elsewhere, especially at Mettrai and Hamburg, that the expenditure of a tax of one penny in the pound on the property in Manchester and Salford, for the prevention of crime and reformation of criminals, would ultimately

\* "Quarterly Review," page 61. January, 1856.

effect a change in the criminal returns of these boroughs more beneficial than the most hopeful worker in this field has imagined.

At any rate, whether by voluntary schools, by local taxation and management, or by private personal endowment, we pray most fervently that *something* may be done to stay this widening stream of vice that pollutingly mingles with the life-blood of our country. It is a fearful thing to wander out into the dismal streets, where these dreadful existences fester, and rot, and breed, in their squalor and moral degradation; and to remember that these thousands of our fellow-creatures, spawned in the very heart of our centres of civilisation,—our brothers and sisters, according to that Gospel heralded by the ineffable tidings, “peace on earth, good will to men,”—are living ignorant of the being of a Christ, and regardless both of God and man. Let us remember, as we pass by the hideously-glaring dram-shop, at the corner of the alley, where sin and shame crouch in the darkness, that the poor shadow of a child, standing by its wretched mother, its features sharpened by want, its eyes sunken by hunger, yet kindled into fire by the cursed infanticidal dram, that *he* is most truly an object worthy of our deepest compassion, and our tenderest care. We cannot with impunity ignore this responsibility; it is appallingly true, as Dickens tells us, that

“There is not one of these—not one—but sows a harvest

that mankind MUST reap. From every seed of evil in this boy, a field of ruin is grown that shall be gathered in, and garnered up, and sown again in many places in the world, until regions are overspread with wickedness enough to raise the waters of another Deluge. Open and unpunished murder in a city's streets would be less guilty in its daily toleration, than one such spectacle as this."

"There is not a father by whose side, in his daily or his nightly walk, these creatures pass; there is not a mother among all the ranks of loving mothers in this land; there is no one risen from the state of childhood, but shall be responsible in his or her degree for this enormity. There is not a country throughout the earth on which it would not bring a curse. There is no religion upon earth that it would not deny; there is no people upon earth it would not put to shame."

T. R. W.

JANUARY 16, 1856.

## DISCRETE DEGREES.

BY LEO H. GRINDON.

To classify the objects of material nature has from time immemorial, been a chief and sedulous aim of philosophy. Whether a complete and absolute System of Nature will ever be realized, he would be a bold man who would either assert or deny. One thing is certain, that the only highway to it is ANALOGY. Analogy as it exists among natural objects and phenomena, is not, as often supposed, mere casual and superficial resemblance, though it is perfectly true that such resemblance exists; analogy, rightly so called, is a part of the very method, order, and constitution of things. The relations for which it is the collective name are what Lord Bacon aptly calls the "respondences" of Nature, and the study of which he so earnestly enforces in the Advancement of Learning;—"Neither," says he, "are these of which we have spoken, and others of like nature, mere resemblances, (as men of narrow observation may possibly imagine), but one and the very same seals and footsteps of Nature, impressed upon various subjects and objects. Hitherto this branch of science hath not been cultivated as it ought. In the writings



emanating from the profounder class of wits, you may find examples thinly and sparsely inserted, for the use and illustration of the argument, but a complete body of these axioms no one hath yet prepared, though they have a primitive force and efficacy in all science, and are of such consequence as materially to conduce to the understanding of the Unity of Nature, which latter we conceive to be the office and use of PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA." No portion of nature is properly seen—it may be questioned whether it even be intelligible—till its analogies with the other portions are scrutinized and applied ; the man who disregards them can never be anything more than a sectarian, while he who uses them—not in the way of a trifler, as the end of his enquiries, but as a philosopher, for their value as a means—proves that it is they alone which can render the mind cosmopolitan, and truly instruct us in the arcana of creation. A man may be a very good chemist, as regards re-agents and atomic weights ; he may be a very good botanist, as regards nomenclature and morphology ; but in either case, this is only to be a *savant* ; he is no philosopher till he can gather new insight into his chemistry or his botany, by virtue of its analogies with other shapes of truth, and feel the centrality, as to essentials, of every science. For the true analogist, whatever his particular preference, however he may shift his standing-ground, always finds himself in the *middle*

of nature, his especial theme for the time being, the clue and text-book to the whole. To perceive clearly what is proper to the race in general, and at the same time the varied circumstances which pertain to its expression in the individual ; disengaging the simple idea from the manifold utterances, yet enjoying it with an equal fullness in every one of them ; is at once the test and the characteristic of the true philosopher.

That nature is a magnificent Unity has long been understood. The broad, general analogy of plants and animals, for example, is obvious and acknowledged ; the analogies between particular tribes of the two great divisions of organised beings are also plain and undisputed. Concurrent with this view is the idea of a "chain of nature," extending from the atom of dust, through minerals, plants, and animals, successively, up to man ; an idea for ages certified by the authority of Aristotle, and invigorated with new life a century ago by the enthusiasm of the celebrated Genevese naturalist, Charles Bonnet. On our apprehension of this doctrine of the CHAIN, how much of it is sound, and how much of it is false, depends almost entirely the true understanding of the analogies of nature. As popularly regarded, it has its likeness in Bishop Berkeley's famous book called "Siris," which begins with the medicinal virtues of tar-water, and insensibly mounting upwards, through every variety

of learning, ends in a discourse upon the Trinity. The genuine chain of nature is another thing altogether. Plants are higher in the scale of being than minerals, and animals than plants; and in each of these great departments of nature there are series of forms more and more complex; even in the mineral kingdom there is the appearance of a linear sequence; but, as every student of Cuvier, Swainson, and Lindley is well aware, the seemings which look like the evidence and verification of the supposed chain, prove, not as most frequently happens in matters of testimony, *too little*, but *too much*. Narrowly examined, they prove, not that there is *a* chain, but that there are thousands, nay, millions of chains. Here it is important to remark that by the term "nature" we are not to understand simply what at this moment surrounds us; that is to say, as regards the organic part of nature, merely the *living* species of plants and animals. Nature, rightly spoken of, includes all the *extinct* species that have once lived upon our planet, as well as the species by which they have been superseded. Hence, to a genuine chain of nature, every fossil plant, and every fossil skeleton and shell, is needful, and, consistently herewith, every species of fossil takes its place in some *living* series. The Calamites of the coal formation fall in with the Equisetaceæ of our marshes and damp woods; the Lepidodendra are intermediate between living Lyco-

podaceæ and Coniferæ. In the animal kingdom it is more striking still. No living species of animals have wider intervals between them than those belonging to the Pachydermata, or family of the rhinoceros and elephant. But in the ages when the tertiary strata were deposited, this tribe of quadrupeds was far more abundant than now; the fossil species supply the links which are needed to unite the existing kinds, and complete the series. Of the reptilian creatures we now similarly possess only a remnant. This earth was for thousands of years the abode of multitudes of species no longer to be found alive, the Ichthyosaurus, the Plesiosaurus, and the Iguanodon: the fossil and the living taken together make up the chain to which they are mutually indispensable. Nature and the chains of nature thus know nothing of past and present. The relics of bygone ages are not relics of extinct systems, simply of extinct species. The Trilobites and Pterodactyles, the Sigillarias and the Lepidodendra, are as much a part of the chain of being as the zebra and the camel, the oak and the myrtle-tree, and are fully as essential to its completeness.

It is possible, unquestionably, and easy, to pick out a series of forms which can be placed in a kind of serial order. But to effect this, as many more must be left aside, which cannot be incorporated, or at least



into the same series. A true, universal chain of being would not only provide places for all things without exception, but demand them as indispensable to its construction. Instead of this, we find things related by so curious a variety of particulars, that if we attempt seriously to arrange them in an exact series and gradation, violence is done at every moment to some close affinity, one point of resemblance being necessarily neglected for the sake of another ; so that the determination where each species shall be located, becomes, after all, a mere pastime of the fancy. Plants, for example, are usually said to touch upon animals through the "zoophytes," such as the Sertularias, and those lovely marine productions called sea-anemones, sea-carnations, and sea-marigolds, now no longer a mystery to any one who will wend his way to the "Vivarium" of a Zoological Garden. But if spontaneous movement, and an exquisite complexity and elaborateness of organization be of any worth in the estimate of what is creature-like in plants, the sensitive, and the moving plants have at least an equal right to the nearest place. On the part of these, however, we find as little essential likeness to those minute forms of animal life which the doctrine of the chain throws to the bottom of the scale, or the point where vegetable ends, and animal begins, as exists between a brilliant crystal and the red-snow plant. The notion of *links* is

equally hypothetical. Doubtless, there are multitudes of curious organisms which, from some peculiarity of structure, appear like intermediates, as the whale, which in an arbitrary and popular sense, conjoins fishes to mammals. But it is no link in the strict sense of the word, any more than such plants as the water-crowfoot and water-parsley are links between Exogens and sea-weeds by virtue of the sea-weed-like aspect incidental to their aqueous habitat. Lithophytes, zoophytes, anthozoa, are mere names. None of the structures so termed are actually dual. Nowhere in the world is there an object which may be referred with propriety or indifferently to the mineral kingdom or to the vegetable, to the vegetable kingdom or to the animal. The dispute not yet settled, as to whether those beautiful little specks of life, the Desmidiæ, so rich in reward to the microscopist, be animals or vegetables, merely shews that we are yet in ignorance of their essential nature. It is but a little while since opinions were equally divided respecting the sponges, the corallines, the sertularias, and even the fungi, which last were thought about the time of Ellis to be built up by insects, as corals are by polyps. One adventurous author hinted that the latter grew from the corpses of the beautiful meteors called "falling-stars," after descending like exploded and empty rocket-cases. Natural history, like theology, and every other great

system of truth, always has its mysteries, though they are not always the same mysteries, either absolutely or relatively. Isis still presents her countenance veiled as of old; take courage, nevertheless; while she with disdain rejects the mere dissector and nomenclator, who cares only to inspect her as an anatomist; to him who looks upon her with the eyes of a lover, she will grant divinest glimpses. Mystery in natural history, as everywhere else, is only where we do not bring a pure and poetic love.

The different parts of nature are connected with one another, not by links, but by specific laws of apposition and relation, for which there is no better or more expressive name than DEGREES. Wanting a right knowledge of Degrees, it is impossible to investigate successfully the analogies of Nature; possessed of it, the task becomes easy. Degrees are everywhere present; everywhere, likewise, they appear under two great species, CONTINUOUS Degrees, and DISCRETE Degrees; the one pertaining to latitude, the other to altitude, the first to Extension, the second to Elevation;—not the latitude and altitude, the extension and elevation, which belong to *space*, but those correspondent properties and relations of things, as to their *natures*, which latitude and so forth, spacially represent and furnish names for. The importance of the distinction is immense. In the law of Discrete Degrees, as distinguished from Continuous Degrees,

and brought to bear on our researches as a new and special philosophic appliance, we realize, in fact, one of those sterling principles without which our knowledge, however plentiful, is only a heap of rough material, ready to build with, but as yet unpiled. Intelligently applied, it clears away difficulties that are insuperable before; it puts us on our guard against merely apparent truths, and rectifies and shews the *rationale* of such as are genuine; and while it exposes what is false in our preconceived ideas, becomes a means and pathway to new and accurate ones. It is not too much to say that it has been the want of an enlarged and philosophical recognition of the law of Discrete Degrees, as distinct from Continuous Degrees, which has led to many of the grossest errors of materialism; to the weary, iterated and reiterated, but still fruitless controversy concerning Instinct and Reason; to the popular misconception of the chain of Nature; and, though last, not least, to the mischievous hypothesis of "progressive development," as propounded in the "Vestiges." Let us proceed, however, to shew wherein the difference consists.

Continuous Degrees are those which mark the development and progress of a given thing, from the time of its beginning to that of its completion. Thus, the progress of the day is by continuous degrees; the night melts into the dawn, the dawn into morn-



ing, the morning into noon. The influx of the tide upon the shore is by continuous degrees; from low water to high, is one long, unintermittent flow, and the same when the waves retire. The march of the seasons is by continuous degrees; so is the tinting of the leaves in autumn, commonly called the *fading* of the leaves. Were another example needed, we might cite the various conditions of which *water* is susceptible. According to the amount of caloric present in it, we have ice, water properly so called, or steam. Between the solid glacier and the white clouds from the locomotive, there is an exact continuity and gradation, and either extreme is convertible into the other.

Discrete Degrees pertain, not like Continuous Degrees, to single subjects or objects, but to *series*; in fact they can only exist where there are at least *two* entirely distinct natures. The difference may be illustrated under the image of a splendid mansion. Discrete Degrees are represented in its successive floors; Continuous Degrees in the suites of apartments which they severally comprise. Let us move about as much as we will on a given floor, we are still on the same level; it is only when we ascend to a higher, or descend to a lower, that we essentially change our position; the change is then, however, absolute and complete. So is it in Nature. First we have vast platforms, one above another; secondly,

on every platform innumerable chambers and noble galleries, respectively adapted and appropriated to some special use; possessing their own peculiar interest and attractions; also their lowest, superior, and most honourable places; pointing, moreover, to the platform next above, and prefiguring and pre-signifying its contents, but never actually merging into or coalescing with it. The primary platforms are the three great kingdoms of Minerals, Plants, and Animals. Each of these comprises a number of minor platforms, and each of these latter a multitude of still finer. The first are occupied by the various tribes, classes, and natural orders of beings; the last by genera and species, organs and organic tissues. "All flesh is not the same flesh; there is one flesh of men; another of fishes; and another of birds." Varieties, it may be observed, or the temporary modifications which take place within the circle of the species they belong to, are in all cases illustrations of continuity. Thus, the thousand varieties of apples have only *continuous* degrees between them; but between the apple, the pear, and the quince, as distinct species, the degrees of relation are *discrete*. The *prefigurations* of the superior platforms by the lower, are strikingly beautiful. The mineral world prefigures the vegetable in its arborescent crystallizations, and in its lucid, symmetrical, and gaily-tinted spars and salts; the vegetable world prefigures the animal in

its organic structure, its vital economy, and the innumerable fascinating phenomena which have led sportive imaginations in every age to deem flowers possessed of feeling and sentiment, emotions and ideas.

Vivunt in Venerem frondes, omnisque vicissim;  
 Felix arbor amat; nutant ad mutua Palmæ  
 Fœdera; Populeo suspirat Populeos ietu,  
 Et Platani Platanis; Alnoque assibilat Alnus.\*

Similarly, chemical and physical phenomena prefigure instinct, and instinct prefigures reason, between which forces there are discrete degrees as decided as those which separate plant from mineral, and animal from plant. A volume might be written on the *pre-figurations* of nature. Nothing in the world is an ending as to its significance; complete as to its form and specific functions, everything is, at the same moment, an intimation of some other thing to follow; a sign of something higher and more living, to appear in due course, and in turn announce and prefigure a yet higher.

The prime, characteristic difference, accordingly, between relations by continuity, and relations by discrete degrees, is that, while Continuity is like a

\* The tender boughs live together in love, and the happy trees pass their time entirely in embraces. Palms nod to each other; the poplar, smitten with the poplar, sighs; whilst planes and alders tell their affections in melodious whispers.—CLAUDIAN, *Epith. in nupt. Honorii et Mariæ*.

running stream, things separated by discrete degrees have original and independent planes, alike of beginning and of end. The former is identified with Change; the latter imply complete and absolute stoppage. Where things are parted by a discrete degree, the commencement of the new one is not, as with continuity, where the inferior or prior one left off, but on a higher level, and under the influence of new principles. Hence nothing which lies on a lower plane can "develope" into a form proper to the plane above. The discrete degree pronounces, once for all, Thus far and no farther. This is chiefly manifest in the three great kingdoms of nature. Plants do not ensue upon arborescent crystallizations, any more than animals ensue upon sensitive plants; every ending is absolute, and every beginning *de novo*, initiating an altogether nobler mode of existence, which culminates after its own manner, and is then succeeded by another. The law of Discrete Degrees gives the final answer to the doctrine of the "Vestiges." Viewing nature by the light of this great law, "progressive development" is seen to be not only a non-existent principle, but an impossible one, *i.e.* as regards the aggregate of nature. Progressive development there is, and abundance of it, in connection with specific platforms. Wherever the law of sequence is by Continuous degrees, we have progressive development. Hence we may understand,



as above hinted, how the doctrine of the Vestiges originated. It was in confounding Discrete Degrees with Continuous Degrees, or rather, in not discriminating between them, but referring all phenomena to Continuity. Were the Vestiges to be re-written according to the teachings of Discrete Degrees, giving due weight, wherever proper, to the law of Continuity, instead of a kind of serious, *quasi*-philosophical travestie of the metamorphoses of the Roman poet, we should have a storehouse of sound and satisfying instruction. It is "progressive development" which makes nature overflow with those magnificent and endless phenomena of transmutation which adorn it with its brightest charm. It is this which turns the weed into a lustrous flower, and the austere berry into the juicy fruit. Here, however, its scope and function end. The flower can never develope into another kind of flower, nor the fruit into one in the least unlike itself.

So far from being true that the ending of one kingdom of nature even *touches* the foundation of the succeeding, as continuity implies, each kingdom of nature, as it ascends towards its maximum, instead of approximating closer and closer to the next above, and eventually passing into it, in reality becomes more and more remote. Mineral, Plant, and Animal are three temples: the first of Doric architecture, the second of Ionic, the third of Roman. Each

temple is built on a plan of its own ; the foundations have a measure of uniformity ; but while the Doric pillars are simple shafts, the loftier and fluted Ionic are crowned with beautiful curling volutes, and the Composite, loftier still, with all the ornament that tasteful luxury can engraft. The animal and vegetable worlds are ordinarily thought not only to adjoin, but to *intermingle*. It is true that between the first animalcules and the first vegetalcules there is a seeming identity ; true, moreover, that the two classes of beings retain a kind of parallelism for a little distance. Both begin with the simple vesicle, the globe in miniature, the cylinder, and the disc, seeming to measure with their fine geometry the space which by and by they are to fill so admirably. Experimenting more boldly as they proceed, the bells and vases of the polyps and the coral-creatures pair with the cups of the lichen and the thecæ of the mosses. The divergence, however, rapidly becomes so wide, and the culminating extremes are so far asunder, as to prove them wholly distinct ideas of Almighty wisdom. Each kingdom starts on a platform of its own, as physiology will some day demonstrate ; growing more distinct with every step, at last it enjoys a perfection no less peculiarly its own, the consideration of which aids in assuring us of the entire distinctness of the beginnings. Descending from the capitals to the pedestals, we learn that the animal differs as widely

from the vegetable as both differ from the mineral. Were the various properties which are distributed among the members of the vegetable kingdom, as most justly remarked by Dr. Harris, in the Pre-Adamic Earth, to be all concentrated in a single individual, that individual would still be inferior to the ignoblest brute. Though the several perfections are totally unlike, there is still a fine harmony between them. The perfection of the mineral kingdom in the brilliant Crystal, harmonises with the perfection of the plant in the odorous and glowing Blossom, and both harmonise with the perfection of the animal, which resides in its vast powers of body and external sense. Brutes are possessed of these vast powers, because the ascent of the brute creation towards its maximum is *away from* man rather than in the direction of him, just as the mineral series divaricates from the plant, and the plant series from the animal. For man, though the head and archetype of all things, is no part of a specific chain, but a series in himself, at once a beginning and an end. Everywhere the maximum of the lower realm is more glorious than the minimum of the next above ; man, accordingly, is excelled by the brutes he rules over, in swiftness, in eyesight, in delicacy of touch and smell, because these things, though the maximum of brute life, belong to the mere basis of humanity ; all

creatures, however, in his *own* maximum, he transcendently excels, vindicating the supreme majesty of intellect. The perfection of the several orders of being does not reside, or at least, *necessarily*, in the forms which seem to be connecting links with the order next above; these forms are the *prefigurative* members of their order, not the culminating. The perfection and termination of each realm, and of each tribe, and class, and genus, is in the maximum realization of its archetype. Quadrupeds, for example, do not terminate with the monkeys; their archetype and maximum is the *lion*—the acknowledged king of beasts from the beginning. The same in the vegetable world. Endogens do not consummate in the Smilax, though it prefigures, in its netted leaves, the Exogens overhead; they consummate in the princes of their archetype, the stately Palms. In regard to *maximum* and *minimum*, as spoken of the separate departments of nature, it is essential to remember carefully that there is no such thing as *defect* in the works of God. The tender moss is as perfect in its little sphere as the lordly forest-tree. Nothing is positively or absolutely inferior. “Higher forms” are simply such as are more complex in their organisation than certain other forms. To the simple organisation of the plant, for instance, in the animal are added nerves, endowing it with the sensation which the plant has not.



Rightly, then, to proceed in our search for the System of Nature, we have first to refer every fact to its place, either in a series of Continuous degrees, or a series of Discrete degrees. Then we see, for the first time, its true relation to other facts that resemble it; we have a clue to the antecedent facts, and by asking what, by analogy, our fact prefigures, we learn in what direction to bend our exploring steps. For while everything holds a place in some series, either of continuous degrees or of discrete degrees; everything also prefigures and presignifies something on a higher plane than its own, and is at the same time the fulfilment of a prefiguration delineated upon a lower one.

Everything, moreover, has its analogy in the other kingdoms of nature, so that, *mutatis mutandis*, knowing the true position of a fact in any branch of natural history, we have a key to its corresponding facts in all other branches, and are in a position to generalise with success.

The bearing of the doctrine of Discrete Degrees upon the long and wearily-disputed question as to the difference between Instinct and Reason, is direct and most important. If there be one truth in philosophy more practically valuable than another, it is that of the Correspondence between the material *forms* of nature, and the underlying, constructive, governing *forces*, which, though as really present, are

yet not obvious to the senses; seeing that when carefully and methodically made use of, it becomes an immediate and reliable clue to the unseen. The objects of nature are pictures universally of its underlying forces. By correspondence, we perceive that the relations of each of them are the same; that is to say, in the forces, as well as in the objects, there are degrees of Continuity; they are distinguished at the same moment by Discrete Degrees. What the three great kingdoms of minerals, plants and animals are, as regards form, structure, and discrete distinctiveness—the same is that grand threefold LIFE which is manifested in the sustentation of inorganic nature; in the phenomena of instinct; and in the operations of reason. For the sustaining energy which fills the world, and on which all things, both animate and inanimate, depend, various as it appears in its effects, in its essence is the same. The differences which apparently pertain to it, come of the differences of the receptacles, and their varied capacity of reception. Inorganic nature receives it one way; the organized material frames of plants and animals receive it in another; that wondrous spiritual organism which we call the soul, receives it in a third. Each manifestation has its peculiar phenomena; those of the lowest are the circumstances of which chemistry and physics take cognizance; the phenomena of the second belong

to physiology and instinct; those of the highest furnish the facts on which psychology, or the science of mind, is in process of being erected. Between these three the discrete difference is so vast, that although each lower degree furnishes prefigurations of the one above, so close and admirable that it is impossible to be blind to them, nothing which can ever transpire in the economy of nature can either fill the chasm or bridge it over. As in the three kingdoms of material forms, so here there is spoken once for all, and for each, Thus far, and no farther. Hence the utter impotency of attempts to explain physiological phenomena on purely physical principles; and the futility of all endeavours to run the physiological into those which pertain to mind, and interpret the latter by the former. Materialism, or the doctrine which seeks to explain psychological phenomena on purely physiological principles, not only fails utterly and hopelessly, but leads us into infinitely greater difficulties. Never, accordingly, was a speculation wider of the truth than that of Helvetius, Condillac, Smellie, and those other writers who contend that reason is only the *maximum development* of instinct,—in other words, that reason simply means “more instinct,” and instinct “less reason;” it is amalgamating the two forces into the same contra-natural unity as to Expression, which is

asserted of the kingdoms of plant and animal by the disciples of the Chain, and doubtless may be referred to that doctrine, *i.e.* to the mistaken notion of the universal concatenation of things, as its source and foundation.



TRACTS FOR PRIESTS AND PEOPLE.



TRACTS  
FOR PRIESTS AND PEOPLE.

No. I.

*RELIGIO LAICI.*

BY THOMAS HUGHES,

AUTHOR OF "TOM BROWN'S SCHOOL DAYS," ETC.

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## P R E F A C E.

THE title of this series will explain its general purpose. Each particular tract we hope will explain itself. They are suggested by the present condition of religious feeling in England. They will not be confined to the topics which are treated of in any particular volume. The writers will express frankly their differences from each other, but they do not shrink from the responsibilities which are involved in a joint publication.



# TRACTS FOR PRIESTS AND PEOPLE.

No. I.

## RELIGIO LAICI.

ALL who look at the title of this essay, and then at the name of the writer, have a right to ask, why it has been written. They may fairly say, 'We can understand why any man who is a finished scholar, who has earned a hearing as a critic, or philosopher, should write on these subjects at this time; but a man who is neither a divine, a scholar, a critic, nor a philosopher, what can he have to say? Surely he at least might hold his tongue.'

I answer :—' I am no scholar, or critic, I know nothing of natural science, very little indeed of controversial theology. If the controversy had remained in the high regions of scholarship, criticism, or science, no one would have been troubled with any word of mine. I have neither head nor time for such matters. But this is not so. It is time for every man who has a faith, and can get a hearing, to speak out. For the debate has come down to the every-day working world. Men and women occupied with the common work of life—who are earning their bread in the sweat of their brows, and marrying, and bringing up children, and struggling, and sinning

and repenting—feel that the questions which schoolmen are discussing are somehow their questions. Not indeed in form, for not one in a thousand of the persons whose minds are disturbed just now care to make themselves acquainted with the forms and modes of the particular controversies which are raging. If they try to do so, they soon throw them aside with impatience. They feel, ‘No, it is not this. We care not what may be said about ideology, or multitudinism, or evidential views, or cosmogonies. At the bottom of all this we suspect—nay, we know—there is a deeper strife, a strife about the very foundations of faith and human life. We want to know from you learned persons, whether (as we have been told from our infancy) there is a faith for mankind, for us as well as for you, for the millions of our own countrymen, and in all Christian and heathen lands, who find living their lives a sore business, and have need of all the light they can get to help them.’

It cannot be denied. The sooner we face the fact the better. This is the question, and it has to be answered now, by us living Englishmen and Englishwomen: the deepest question which man has to do with, and yet—or, rather, therefore—one which every toiling man must grapple with, for the sake of his own honesty, of his own life.

There is nothing to be gained by shutting our eyes any longer to the fact, that doubt as to what answer must be given to this question is very widely spread amongst us. An attempt to answer it—or at any rate to clear away some of what the authors believe to be



hindrances to an answer—has been made by the writers of the *Essays and Reviews*. In my humble opinion, this attempt is wrong in principle. But I must say that the aim of that book is, not to set up any deistic or pantheistic philosophy in the place of Christianity, but to claim for English Churchmen the right of honest and free inquiry in the realm of nature and the history of man as a necessary step to the spread of a spiritual Christianity. I do not think they have taken the right method of confirming our English faith, or that this book of theirs will confirm it; but I fear nothing from such inquiries. What I do fear is the dishonesty of the attempts which have been made to put them down, and to stifle free inquiry. It is sad to see all our English Bishops, and eight thousand clergymen, trying to make scapegoats of these men, as if they too were not on their trial before God and their country. Let them stand forward and say what they believe, that we may know.

The doubts which have now to be met have, as was sure to be the case, taken more hold on our young men than on any others amongst us. For many years I have been thrown very much into the society of young men of all ranks. I spend a great part of my time with them. I like being with them, and I think they like being with me. I know well, therefore, how rare anything like a living faith—a faith in and by which you can live, and for which you would die—is amongst them. I know that it is becoming rarer every day. I find it every day more difficult to get them to speak on the subject: they will not do so unless you drive them to it.

I feel deeply that for the sake of England they must be driven to it, and therefore that it is the bounden duty of every man who has any faith himself, and who has a chance of being listened to by them, to speak out manfully what he has to say, concealing nothing, disguising nothing, and leaving the issue to God.

I would ask for a hearing, then, from young men. I will be as short as I can, and as plain as I can. This is no time and no subject for special pleading, and I have no adversaries over whom I want to triumph. Nor is there any question whatever involved in the great controversy on which I should not be glad to speak out what I think. On the contrary, my whole object is to speak out, openly and affectionately, not stepping lightly over or shirking altogether ground which I know that my hearers believe to be unsound, and unable to bear an honest man's weight. I solemnly declare that I know of none such.

Every man who has watched the signs of the times must have been looking for some such crisis as the present one for years. That which has been called the 'negative theology' has been spreading rapidly, though for the most part silently. In the first instance it may have been simply 'a recoil from some of the doctrines which are to be heard at church and chapel; a distrust of the old arguments for, or proofs of, a miraculous revelation; and a misgiving as to the authority, or extent of the authority of the Scriptures.' But, as was sure to be the case, the 'negative theology' could not stop, and has not stopped, here. Men who have come across these

recoils, distrusts, misgivings, will soon find (as many of you have found), if they are honest and resolute with themselves, that there is another doubt underlying all these, a doubt which they may turn from in horror when it is first whispered in their hearts, but which will come back again and again. That doubt is whether there is a God at all, or rather, whether a living, personal God, thinking, acting, and ruling in this world in which we are, has ever revealed Himself to man.

This is the one question of our time, and of all times ; upon the answer which nations or men can give to it hang life and death.

There are some of you, I fear I may say many of you, who will answer at once, ‘ No : it is not possible ; at any rate there has never been such a revelation. What we in England (along with the rest of Christendom) have put forward and upheld, as such a revelation, is crumbling to pieces in our hands. It was an invention of man, a nobler invention perhaps than any which went before it, but full of the usual superstitions which broke up all its predecessors, and are now breaking it up.’ And those amongst you who would say this would point to this volume of *Essays and Reviews*, and ask how after that we can seriously stand up for the old faith.

It is to these of you that I would in the first instance specially address myself. Let us see how the case stands. I wish to put the case as favourably for you as I can, with this one remark as to the *Essays and Reviews* (which I am bound in justice to the writers to

put forward at once and emphatically), that I do not find in them what you say is there. You say then that this book destroys, or, at any rate, that it has given the finishing stroke to, much old superstition, that had stiffened about the religious mind of England, and had made her worship little better than an idolatry. In the first place, the belief in miracles, including the Incarnation of our Blessed Lord, must be acknowledged to be henceforth impossible. For the notion of a domain of intellect and knowledge, in which man can and may use his reason, and a boundless region of spiritual things beyond, which is the sole dominion of faith—from the threshold of which region reason retires gracefully, admitting that ‘What is not a subject for a problem may hold its place in a creed’—is too utterly un-English to do more than offer a momentary resting-place for a few timid spirits who are still encumbered with some of the old trappings.

Then Prophecy must be given up, unless we are content to accept, what you are quite ready to grant us, that what we call prophecies are, generally, noble old Eastern poems, full of symbolism, like other Eastern poems, but referring (so far as they refer to any events at all) to events happening under the writers’ eyes.

The Inspiration of Scripture follows. Scholars have already proved beyond a doubt that most of the books were not written by the persons, or at the times, by whom and at which they profess to have been written. Every year is knocking greater holes in them, throwing discredit on fresh places in their narrative. If we like



to retain them as very remarkable old books of a remarkable people, well and good. You would yourselves probably put them above the Vedas, the Koran, or Homer. But if we claim more than this for them, we must look to it, and not complain at the work of dissection, inspection, analysis, which has to be carried out rigorously, let the results be what they will.

Lastly, although you do not feel so sure on this point as on all the others, you must say the evidence is getting so strong—what with Messrs. Crosse and Weekes' experiments, Mr. Darwin's patient investigations, even Mr. Owen's admissions, which, on such a point, are of enormous value—that we had better give up 'creation' altogether. It cannot hold out above a year or two, just long enough to give the philosophers time to finish their experiments. Better give it up at once, and save ourselves humiliations in the future.

I am not aware that there are any other special points which you would press on me. I cannot see why there need be. If one thinks for a moment what is implied in the above admissions, one must at once grant that you have made a pretty clean sweep. Any residuum is not worth haggling over.

Well, I say, be it so. I wish to put myself honestly at your point of view. Let us then give up revelation altogether. It requires a greater effort than I am able to make, but I will do my best. Let the four Gospels first sink into mere legends, and then be lost like a decade of Livy. Let it come to be utterly denied, that there is a Son of Man and Son of God. But let the

idea of Jesus, as a beautiful and noble mythical personage, a name to be placed in the same category with, but perhaps higher than, those of Vishnu, Balder, Hercules, float down on the stream of time, to have such effect on the hearts and wills of men, as all beautiful and noble ideas will have, and no more. With our Lord must go all belief in a personal God: at least, I do not see myself how any such belief can be then held, and I take it you would not deny that so it must be. You would probably decline, however, to make any confession on this point. The negative theology, infidelity, and orthodoxy of a certain kind, here join forces, and you would agree with Mr. Mansel, that as man *cannot* know God in any such sense as St. Paul and others seem to have believed that he might, it is worse than useless for him to waste any more of his own and the world's time in getting back again and again by different roads to the old impossibility.

Having thus to the best of my power put myself where you wish to put me, given you all you can ask, I must in my turn ask you what you are going to set up instead. You cannot leave me, you cannot stand yourselves, on a simple negation. The world is going on turning as it has been used to do, night succeeding day, and generation generation; nations are waking into life, or falling into bondage: there is a deal of wonderful work of one sort or another going on in it, and you and I in our little corner have our own share of work to get done as well as we can. Now you have put out my old light, and some light or other I must

have, and you would wish me to have. What is it to be?

You will answer probably, that I have touched the heart of the matter in putting my question. Night follows day, and generation generation. All things are founded on a 'permanent order,' 'self-sustaining and self-evolving powers pervade all nature.' Of this order and these powers we are getting to know more every day; when we know them perfectly, man, the colossal man, will have reached the highest development of which he is capable. We need not trouble ourselves about breaking them, or submitting to them, some of you would add, for we cannot either break them or submit to them. They will fulfil themselves. It is they, these great generalizations, which are alone acting in, and ruling the world. We, however eccentric our actions may be, however we may pride ourselves on willing and working, are only simple links in the chain. A general *law of average* orders the unruly wills and affections of sinful men.

But here I must ask, on what is this permanent order, on what are these laws which you tell me of, founded? I acknowledge a permanent order, physical laws, as fully as you can, but I believe them to be the expressions of a living and a righteous will; I believe a holy and true God to be behind them, therefore, I can sit down humbly, and try to understand them, and when I understand, to obey. Are the permanent order, the laws you speak of, founded on a will? If so, on whose will? If on the will of *a* God, of what God? Of a God who

has revealed His character, His purpose, Himself, to you? If so, where, how, when?

But if you tell me that these laws, this order, are not founded on any living will, or that you do not know that they are, then I say (in the words of one of the Essayists) you are holding out to me ‘an iron rule ‘which guides to nothing and ends in nothing—which ‘may be possible to the logical understanding, but is ‘not possible to the spirit of man,’ and you are telling me, since worship is a necessity of my being, to worship that. In the name and in the strength of a man, and a man’s will, I utterly reject and defy your dead laws, for dead they must be. They may grind me to powder, but I have that in me which is above them, which will own no obedience to them. Dead laws are, so far as I can see, just what I, and you, and all mankind, have been put into this world to fight against. Call them laws of nature if you will, I do not care. Take the commonest, the most universal: is it or is it not by the law of nature that the ground brings forth briars and all sorts of noxious and useless weeds if you let it alone? If it is by the law of nature, am I to obey the law, or to dig my garden and root out the weeds? Doubtless I shall get too old to dig, and shall die, and the law will remain, and the weeds grow over my garden and over my grave, but for all that I decline to obey the law.

I see a law of death working all around me; I feel it in my own members. Is this one of your laws, a part of the ‘permanent order,’ which is to serve me instead of the God of my fathers? If it be, I mean to resist it



to the last gasp. I utterly hate it. No noble or true work is done in this world except in direct defiance of it. What is to become of the physician's work, of every effort at sanitary reform, of every attempt at civilizing and raising the poor and the degraded, if we are to sit down and submit ourselves to this law?

Am I never to build a house, out of respect to the law of gravitation? Sooner or later the law will assert itself and my house will tumble down. Nevertheless I will conquer the law for such space as I can. In short, I will own no dead law as my master. Dead laws I will hate always, and in all places, with all my heart, with all my soul, with all my mind, and with all my strength.

But besides rebellions against your laws of nature, and your permanent order, you must be prepared for another result of your work. You have destroyed revelation, but have you destroyed, can you destroy, the superstitious element (as you would call it, perhaps) in man? Granted that you have shown me that what I held to be my knowledge of God is all moonshine, I tell you that I shall not give up thinking about a God for all that. I tell you that I shall make gods for myself, in my own image, in the image of devils. The history of the world tells you that I shall do this, that all men will do it. By which of your laws are you going to lay all the devilish conceptions of God which will soon be let loose on the world?

I will follow this part of my subject no further. If I have misunderstood those of you to whom the above remarks are chiefly addressed, it is not for want of trying

to understand you, but of capacity for making out what you mean.

And now let me turn to the other part of the subject. I have been speaking of that which I cannot believe; let me speak to you of that which I do believe, of that which I hold to be a faith, the faith, the only faith for mankind. Do not turn from it because it seems to be egotistic. I can only speak for myself, for what I know in my own heart and conscience. While I keep to this I can speak positively, and I wish above all things to speak positively.

I was bred as a child and as a boy to look upon Christ as the true and rightful King and Head of our race, the Son of God and the Son of man. When I came to think for myself I found the want, the longing for a perfectly righteous king and head, the deepest of which I was conscious—for a being in whom I could rest, who was in perfect sympathy with me and all men. ‘Like as the hart desireth the waterbrooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, oh God. My soul is athirst for God, yea, even for the living God,’—these, and the like sayings of the Psalmist, began to have a meaning for me.

Then, the teaching which had sunk into me unconsciously rose up and seemed to meet this longing. If that teaching were true, here was He for whom I was in search. I turned to the records of His life and death. I read, and considered, as well as I could, the character of Christ, what He said of Himself and His work; His teaching, His acts, His sufferings. Then, when I was

as young as most of you to whom I am now speaking, I found that this was indeed He. Here was the Head, the King, for whom I had longed. The more I read and thought, the more absolutely sure I became of it. This is He, I wanted no other then, I have never wanted another since. Him I can look up to and acknowledge with the most perfect loyalty. He satisfies me wholly. There is no recorded thought, word, or deed of His that I would wish to change—that I do not recognise and rejoice in as those of my rightful and righteous King and Head. He has claimed for me, for you, for every man, all that we can ask for or dream of, for He has claimed every one of us for His soldiers and brethren, the acknowledged children of His and our Father and God.

But this loyalty I could never have rendered, no man can ever render, I believe, except to a Son of man. He must be perfect man as well as perfect God to satisfy us—must have dwelt in a body like ours, have felt our sorrows, pains, temptations, weaknesses. He was incarnate by the Spirit of God of the Virgin. In this way I can see how He was indeed perfect God and perfect Man. I can conceive of no other in which he could have been so. The Incarnation is for me the support of all personal holiness, and the key to human history.

What was Christ's work on earth? He came to manifest, to make clear to us, the will and nature of His Father, our God. He made that will and nature clear to us as the perfectly loving and long-suffering and righteous will and nature. He came to lead us

men, His brethren, back into perfect understanding of, and submission to that will—to make us at one with it; and this He did triumphantly by His own perfect obedience to that will, by sacrificing Himself even to death for us, because it was the will of His and our Father that He should give Himself up wholly and unreservedly; thus, by His one sacrifice, redeeming us, and leaving us an example that we, too, should sacrifice ourselves to Him for our brethren. Thus I believe in the Atonement.

Again, Christ was not only revealed to those who saw Him here. He did not only go about doing His Father's will here on earth for thirty-three years, eighteen hundred years ago, and then leave us. Had this been so, He would certainly in one sense have been revealed, in the only sense in which some orthodox writers seem to teach that He has been revealed. He would have been revealed to certain men, at a certain time, in history, and to us in the accounts which we have of Him in the Gospels, through which accounts only we should have had to gain our knowledge of Him, judging of such accounts by our own fallible understandings. But He said, 'I will be with you always, even to the end of the world,'—'I will send my spirit into your hearts to testify of me;' and He has fulfilled His promise. He is revealed, not in the Bible, not in history, not in or to some men at a certain time, or to a man here and there, but in the heart of you, and of me, and of every man and woman, who is now, or ever has been, on this earth.



His Spirit is in each of us, striving with us, cheering us, guiding us, strengthening us. At any moment in the lives of any one of us we may prove the fact for ourselves; we may give ourselves up to His guidance, and He will accept the trust, and guide us into the knowledge of God, and of all truth. From this knowledge (more certain to me than any other, of which I am ten thousand times more sure than I am that Queen Victoria is reigning in England, that I am writing with this pen at this table) if I could see no other manifestation of Christ in creation, I believe in the Trinity in Unity, the name on which all things in heaven and earth stand, which meets and satisfies the deepest needs and longings of my soul.

The knowledge of this name, of these truths, has come to me, and to all men, in one sense, specially and directly through the Scriptures. I believe that God has given us these Scriptures, this Bible, to instruct us in these the highest of all truths. Therefore I reverence this Bible as I reverence no other book; but I reverence it because it speaks of Him, and His dealings with us. The Bible has no charm or power of its own. It may become a chain round men's necks, an idol in the throne of God, to men who will worship the book, and not Him of whom the book speaks. There are many signs that this is, or is fast becoming, the case with us; but it is our fault, and not the Bible's fault. We persist in reading our own narrowness and idolatry into it, instead of hearing what it really is saying to us. I shall have to speak of Inspiration presently; but in

England, whoever will make a confession of faith, must put in the front of it his belief about the Bible.

I do not know that there are any other great doctrines of our Church on which you would wish me to speak. If there are, I can only say that it is not from any wish to keep back my belief as to them that I pass them over. I hold them all, so far as I know, and simply, and in the natural sense, and am ready to give a reason for my faith to any one. Of the subjects not articles of the creed, such as miracles, inspiration, prophecy, future rewards and punishments, which are specially troubling you and the English people, I will now speak.

I believe that the writers of Holy Scripture were directly inspired by God, in a manner, and to an extent, in and to which no other men whose words have come down to us have been inspired. I cannot draw the line between their inspiration and that of other great teachers of mankind. I believe that the words of these, too, just in so far as they have proved themselves true words, were inspired by God. But though I cannot, and man cannot, draw the line, God himself has done so; for these books have been filtered out, as it were, under His guidance, from many others, which, in ages gone by, claimed a place beside them, and are now forgotten, while these have stood for thousands of years, and are not likely to be set aside now. For they speak, if men will read them, to needs and hopes set deep in our human nature, which no other books ever have spoken to, or ever can speak to, in the same way—they set forth His government of the

world as no other books ever have set it forth, or ever can set it forth.

But though I do not believe that the difference between the inspiration of Isaiah and Shakespere is expressible by words, the difference between the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures—the Bible as a whole—and any other possible or conceivable collection of the utterances of men, seems to me clear enough. The Bible has come to us from the Jewish nation, which was chosen by God as the one best fitted to receive for all mankind, and to give forth to all mankind, the revelation of Him—to teach them His name and character—that is, to enable them to know Him, and, in knowing Him, to feel how they and the world need redemption, and to understand how they and the world have been redeemed. This Bible, this Book of the chosen people, taken as a whole, has done this, is in short the written revelation of God. This being so, there can be no other inspired book in the same sense in which the Bible is inspired, unless we, or some other world, are not redeemed, require another redemption and another Christ. But as we and all worlds are redeemed, and Christ is come, and God has revealed His name and His character in Christ so that we can know Him, the Bible is and must remain *the* inspired Book, the Book of the Church for all time, to which nothing can be added, from which nothing can be taken, as they will find who try to take from it or add to it. There may be another Homer, Plato, Shakespere; there can be no other Bible.

As to the prophecies of Christ in the Bible, believing that Book to be *the* inspired Book, the written revelation of God, of course I must expect to find it full of passages referring to Him who was to show forth the nature and character of God to men. The longing for a Deliverer and Redeemer of himself and his race was the strongest and deepest feeling in the heart of every Jewish patriot. His whole life was grounded and centred on the promise and hope of such an one. Just therefore when his utterances would be most human and most noble, most in sympathy with the cries and groanings of his own nation and the universe, they would all point to and centre in that Deliverer and Redeemer—just in so far as they were truly noble, human, and Godlike, they would shadow forth His true character, the words He would speak, the acts He would do. Doubtless the prophet would have before his mind any notable deliverance, any noble sufferer, or deliverer of his own time; his words would refer to these. But from these he would be inevitably drawn up to the great promised Deliverer and Redeemer of his nation and his race, because he would see after all how incomplete the deliverance wrought by these must be, and his faith in the promise made to his fathers and to his nation—the covenant of God in which he felt himself to be included—would and could be satisfied with nothing less than a full and perfect deliverance, a Redeemer who should be the Head of men, the Son of Man and the Son of God.

Men may have insisted, may still insist, on seeing



all sorts of fanciful references to some special acts of His in certain words of the Bible. But I must again insist that men's fancies about the Bible and Christ are not the question, but what the Bible itself says, what Christ is. The whole book is full of Him, there is no need to read Him into any part of it as to which there can be any possible doubt.

Holding this faith as to the Scriptures, I am not anxious to defend them. I rejoice that they should be minutely examined and criticised. They will defend themselves, one and all, I believe. Men may satisfy themselves—perhaps, if I have time to give to the study, they may satisfy me—that the Pentateuch was the work of twenty men; that Baruch wrote a part of Isaiah; that David did not write the Psalms, or the Evangelists the Gospels; that there are interpolations here and there in the originals; that there are numerous and serious errors in our translation. What is all this to me? What do I care who wrote them, what is the date of them, what this or that passage ought to be? They have told me what I wanted to know. Burn every copy in the world to-morrow, you don't and can't take that knowledge from me, or any man. I find them *all* good for me; so, as long as a copy is left, and I can get it, I mean to go on reading them all, and believing them all to be inspired.

Perhaps the subject of miracles has been the most trying of all to the faith of many of you. You cannot reverence a book which states, broadly and simply, that events happened which, you say, were contrary to the

order of the universe, irregular and capricious exercises of power. And yet, although such of the miracles as cannot be explained by natural causes were breaches of order and law, we Churchmen cite them as evidences that the performers of them were testifying for a God of order and law, and assuming to do them in His name. Moreover, you complain that we will not let you deal with them freely, but cry out that you are blaspheming when you attempt ever so reverently to look at miracles through your reason.

I will answer your complaint first. We Churchmen no doubt have often so argued, are arguing so at this day. Whenever we have done so, or are doing so, we are going directly in the teeth of our Lord's teaching. He expressly invited the men of His time to exercise their reason on His miracles. He said, 'If I do not the works of my Father' (of the God of order) '*believe me not*. But if I do, though you believe not me, believe the works.' Exercise your reason, hear what I tell you of your Father's character, and then say whether these works are the works you would look for from a loving and righteous Father. I do not want to justify Churchmen in this matter; and Christ, if you will read His words, and not take our interpretation of them, needs no justification.

Now as to His miracles. Our Lord came proclaiming a kingdom of God, a kingdom ordained by God on this earth, the order and beauty of which the unruly and sinful wills of men had deformed, so that disease, and death, and all miseries and disorder, had grown up and

were destroying the order of it, and thwarting the perfectly loving will of God.

In asserting this kingdom and this order, our Lord claimed (as He must have claimed if He were indeed the Son of God) dominion over disease and death. This dominion was lower than that over the human heart and will, but He claimed it as positively. He proved His claim to be good in other ways, but specially for our present purpose by healing the sick, raising the dead. Were these works orderly or disorderly? Every one of them seems to me to be the restoring of an order which had been disturbed. They were witnesses for the law of life, faithful and true manifestations of the will of a loving Father to His children.

Yes, you may say, but He did other miracles besides these of healing. He turned water into wine, stilled the waves, multiplied loaves and fishes. These at any rate were capricious suspensions of natural laws. You say you believe in natural laws which have their ground in God's will. Such laws He suspended or set aside in these cases. Now were these suspensions orderly?

I think they were. The natural laws which Christ suspended, such as the law of increase, are laws of God. Being His laws, they are living and not dead laws, but they are not the highest law; there must be a law of God, a law of His mind, above them, or they would be dead tyrannous rules. Christ seems to me to have been asserting the freedom of that law of God

by suspending these natural laws, and to have been claiming here again, as part of His and our birthright, dominion over natural laws.

All the other miracles, I believe, stand on the same ground. None have been performed except by men who felt that they were witnessing for God, with glimpses of His order, full of zeal for the triumph of that order in the world, and working as Christ worked, in His spirit, and in the name of His Father, or of Him. If there are any miracles which do not on a fair examination fulfil these conditions—which are such as a loving Father educating sons who had strayed from or rebelled against Him would not have done—I am quite ready to give them up.

Again, as to the Mosaic cosmogony, which many of you think is enough to sink the Church of England and all other Christian bodies who pretend to hold to it, I shall not be dealing fairly with you unless I tell you what I think about it.

I own that I have never troubled myself very much upon the subject, but I give you my view as the view of a layman, who has just given so much attention to the questions raised about it as to satisfy his own mind. Take my view for what it is worth, and for nothing more; it satisfies me, and is honest at any rate. I don't particularly value it, am quite ready to change it to-morrow if you will show me a better. If all cosmogonies were to disappear to-morrow, I should be none the poorer. As nothing will make me believe that God did not create the earth, and man to rule it,



no faith of mine hangs on them ; I sincerely pity those who are so much troubled about them on both sides.

I always felt the first chapter of Genesis to be a very noble and beautiful history of creation, before I ever knew of the doubts as to its authenticity, or thought of considering whether the days there mentioned were days of twenty-four hours or any measures of time at all. What impressed me most in it then was, the order and harmony of the whole, and the way in which every stage is leading up through man to God.

When I came to read it with the geological and other objections in my head, at first I quite thought that it must be an interpolation—the mere human utterance of some reverent but dogmatic old Rabbi. I held this belief for some time, but, coming back to the account again and again, I began to feel that I had been too hasty. The key-verse of the whole first chapter—  
' So God created man in His own image, in the image  
' of God created He him, male and female created He  
' them '—seemed to point out, that creation in this chapter cannot mean the giving of outward visible form. In this place it cannot of course ; because, as God has no outward visible form, man could not in *that* sense be created in His likeness ; and if not in this place, which is the key and crown of the whole, could the word have that meaning in the rest of the chapter ? Again, if God created ' male and female ' at once, what was the meaning of the history of Eve's creation in the second chapter ? Then, on looking closely at the second chapter, I found, that if I took words in their proper sense,

the accounts of creation in the first and second chapters could not refer to the same creation. I found, moreover, that the account of creation in the second chapter referred back to a former one. 'The Lord God made ' the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field ' *before* it was in the earth, and every herb of the field ' *before* it grew : ' and then the second chapter goes on to state *how* the plants grew—' there went up a mist ' from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ' ground '—and then how *a man* was created, and then how beasts were created, and lastly how *a woman* was created. Each account seemed complete in itself, and not to clash with, but to refer to, the other as a separate act of creation. Could they be reconciled?

Then an explanation I had read in books for which I had the greatest reverence, but which had always seemed to me far-fetched, and which I had therefore never tried to master, came before me in a new light. I mean, that the first chapter is speaking of creation in the mind of God, the second, of the clothing in visible material form of that which before ~~had~~ substance in His mind ; in short, what we commonly mean by creation. Then I asked myself, Is this natural?—would one expect to find such a double account? It seemed to me that one would. I tried it (as the nearest analogy I could get) by the case of some invention of a man, such as the steam engine. Here I found that the highest invention must be first in the mind of the inventor ; that after that highest invention has dawned on him, he proceeds to clothe his invention in material

form. This explanation has always satisfied me since, though I quite admit that it is nothing but a speculation. Very possibly it may not meet many of the difficulties. There may be quite as many geological objections to the account of creation in the second as to that in the first chapter. As I said at the outset, I only give it you for what it is worth.

But you have another charge against Christianity. You say it is after all a selfish faith in which, however beautiful and noble the moral teaching may be, the ultimate appeal has always been to the hope of reward and fear of punishment. You will tell me that in ninety-nine of our churches out of a hundred I shall hear this doctrine, and shall find it in ninety-nine out of every hundred of theological or religious works.

If it be so I am sorry for it. But I am speaking of Christ's Gospel, and I say that you will not find the doctrine you protest against there. I cannot go through our Lord's teaching and His disciples' to prove this. I ask you to read for yourselves, bringing honest and clear heads to the study, and not heads full of what you have thought, or this and the other man has preached or written, and I say that then you will give up this charge.

But, as I have tried to do in all other cases, so here, I will tell you exactly what my own faith on this matter is.

Christ has told me that the only reward I shall ever get will be 'life eternal,' and that life eternal is to know God and Him. That is all the reward I care about.

The only punishment I can ever bring on myself will be, to banish myself from His presence and the presence of all who know Him, to dwell apart from Him and my brethren, shut up in myself. That is the only punishment I dread.

But this reward He has given us already, here. He has given us to know God, and knowing God involves entering into His kingdom, and dwelling in it. That kingdom Christ has opened to you, and to me, here. We, you and I, may enter in any hour we please. If we don't enter in now, and here, I can't see how we are ever likely to enter in in another world. Why should not we enter in? It is worth trying. There are no conditions. It is given for the asking.

I think you will find it all you are in search of and are longing for. Above all, you will find in it and nowhere else rest, peace—‘not a peace which depends upon pacts and bargains among men, but which belongs to the very nature and character and being of God. Not a peace which is produced by the stifling and suppression of activities and energies, but the peace in which all activities and energies are perfected and harmonised. Not a peace which comes from the toleration of what is base or false, but which demands its destruction. Not a peace which begins from without, but a peace which is first wrought in the inner man, and thence comes forth to subdue the world. Not a peace which a man gets for himself by standing aloof from the sorrows and confusions of the world in which he is born, of the men whose nature he shares, choosing a



‘ calm retreat and quiet scenery and a regulated atmosphere ; but a peace which has never thriven except in those who have suffered with their suffering kind, who have been ready to give up selfish enjoyments, sensual or spiritual, for their sakes, who have abjured all devices of escape from ordained toils and temptations ; the peace which was His who bore the sorrows and sins and infirmities of man, who gave up Himself that He might become actually one with them, who thus won for them a participation in the Divine nature, an inheritance in that peace of God which passeth all understanding.’

This kingdom of God is good enough for me at any rate. I can trust Him who has brought me into it to add what He will, to open my eyes, and strengthen my powers, that I may see and enjoy ever more and more of it, in this world, or in any other in which He may put me hereafter. Where that may be is no care of mine ; it will be in His kingdom still, that I know ; no power in Heaven, or Hell, or Earth can cast me out of that, except I myself. While I remain in it I can freely use and enjoy every blessing and good gift of His glorious earth, the inheritance which He has given to us, His Father’s children, His brethren. When it shall be His good pleasure to take me out of it, He will not take me out of but bring me into more perfect communion with Him and with my brethren. He nourisheth my heart with good things on this earth, He will not cease to do this anywhere else. He reveals Himself to me here, though as a man I cannot take in His full and

perfect revelation, but when I awake up after His likeness I shall be satisfied—and not till then.

There is another stumbling-block in the way of many of you, quite apart from such doubts as I have been speaking of hitherto, on which I must say a few words. You are revolted and kept at arm's-length by the separatist and exclusive habits and maxims of those who profess to have the faith which you want. Many of them are kind, exemplary men, but just because they are Christians, and in so far forth as they are Christians, they are calling to you to come out from amongst the people of the world—to separate yourselves from an adulterous generation.

Against this call something which you know to be true and noble in you rises up. You have felt that what your age is crying out for is, union. You acknowledge the power of that cry in your own hearts. You want to feel with all men, and for all men. If you need a faith at all, it is one which shall meet that cry, which shall teach you how all men are bound together; not how some may be separated from the rest. You will not be false to your age. You will have no faith at all, or a faith for all mankind.

Keep to that; take nothing less than that; only look again and see whether that is not just what Christ offers you. Again I urge you not to look at His followers, real or professing—look at Him, look at His life.

Was He exclusive? Did ever man or woman come near Him and He turn away? Did He not go amongst all ranks, into every society? Did He not go to the

houses of great men, and rulers; of Pharisees, of poor men, of publicans? Did He not frequent the temple, the market-place, the synagogue, the sea-shore, the hill-side, the haunts of outcasts and harlots? Was He not to be found at feasts and at funerals? Wherever men and women were to be found, there was His place and His work; and there is ours. He who believes in Him must go into every society where he has any call whatever. Who are we that we should pick and choose? The greatest ruffian, the most abandoned woman, that ever walked the face of this earth, were good enough for our Lord to die for. If He sends us amongst them, He will take care of us, and has something for us to do or speak, for or to them. The greatest king, the holiest saint on earth, is not too high company for one for whom Christ died, as He did for you and me. So, if He sends us amongst great or holy people, let us go, and learn what He means us to learn there.

I know how deeply many of you feel and mourn over the miseries and disorder of England and the world—how you long to do something towards lightening ever so small a part of those miseries, rescuing ever so small a corner of the earth from that disorder. I know well how earnestly many of you are working in one way or another for your country and your brethren. I know what high hopes many of you have for the future of the world, and the destiny of man. I say, mourn on, work on; abate not one jot of any hope you have ever had for the world or for man. Your hopes, be they what they may, have never

been high enough—your work never earnest enough. But I ask you whether your hopes and your work have not been marred again and again, whether you have not been thrown back again and again into listlessness and hopelessness, by failures of one kind or another, whether you have not felt that those failures have been caused more or less by your own uncertainty ; by your having had to work and fight without a leader, with comrades to whom you were bound only by chance, to journey without any clear knowledge of the road you were going, or where it led to ?

At such times have you not longed for light and guidance ? what would you not have given for a well of light, and hope, and strength, springing up within you and renewing your powers and energies ? What would you not have given for the inward certainty that the road you were travelling was the right one, however you might stumble on it ; that the line of battle in which you stood was the line for all true men, and was marching to assured victory, however it might waver and break at the point which had been given you to hold, whatever might become of you ? Well, be sure that light and guidance, that renewal of strength and hope, that certainty as to your side and your road, you are meant to have ; they have been prepared, and are ready, for every man of you, whenever he will take them. The longings for them are whispered in your hearts by the Leader, whose cross, never turned back, ever triumphing more and more over all principalities and powers of evil, blazes far ahead in the van of our



battle. He has been called the Captain of our Salvation, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Lamb who was slain for the world; He has told us His own name, the Son of God and the Son of man; He has claimed to be the redeemer, deliverer, leader of mankind.

My younger brothers, I am not speaking to you the words of enthusiasm or excitement, but the words of sober every-day knowledge and certainty. I tell you that all the miseries of England and of other lands consist simply in this and in nothing else, that we men, made in the image of God, made to know Him, to be one with Him in His Son, will not confess that Son, our Lord and Brother, to be the Son of God and Son of man, the living Head of our race and of each one of us. I tell you that if we would confess Him, and lay hold of Him, and let Him enter into and rule and guide us and the world, instead of trying to rule and guide ourselves and the world without Him, we should see and know that the kingdom of God is just as much about us now as it will ever be. I tell you that we should see all sorrow and misery melting away and drawn up from this fair world of God's like mountain mist before the July sun.

Three more words and I have done. I am not asking you to adopt any faith of mine. But as you would do good work in your generation, I ask of you to give yourselves no peace till you have answered these questions, each one for himself, in the very secret recesses of his heart, 'Do I, does my race, want a head? Can we be satisfied with any one less than a Son of man and a

Son of God? Is this Christ, who has been so long worshipped in England, He?’

If you can answer, though with faltering lips, ‘Yes, this is He,’ I care very little what else you accept, all else that is necessary or good for you will come in due time, if once He has the guidance of you. I have not been confessing my faith to convert you to any opinions whatever. I would most gladly have said anything I had to say in some other form had it been possible, for this is a very disagreeable form to me, and one which is almost certain to be misunderstood. But, looking most anxiously at late doings and writings, feeling most deeply the awful importance of the crisis to our Church and our country, and longing to say some deliberate word to the many of you whom I do know, and who I believe will read this for my sake, I have come to feel that it is the only thing to do. You have a right to say to every one, whatever his rank or position in the Church, who comes forward now to speak to you, ‘No anonymous stabbings from behind. Stand out in your own names. And now, tell us—not what we are *not* to believe, we can discover plenty of that for ourselves without your help—but, what we are to believe. And before all other things, just tell us this, Have *you* any faith? What is it? Has it answered?’

I have replied to the two first questions as openly and clearly as a paper of this kind and my own power of saying what I mean will allow. To the third I say now, Yes, it has answered. My faith has been no

holiday or Sunday faith, but one for every-day use ; a faith to live and die in, not to argue or talk about. It has had to stand the wear and tear of life ; it was not got in prosperity. It has had to carry me through years of anxious toil, and small means, through the long sicknesses of those dearer to me than my own life, through deaths amongst them both sudden and lingering. Few men of my age have had more failures of all kinds ; no man has deserved them more, by the commission of all kinds of blunders and errors, by evil tempers, and want of faith, hope, and love.

Through all this it has carried me, and has risen up in me after every failure and every sorrow, fresher, clearer, stronger. Why do I say '*it?*' I mean He. He has carried me through it all ; He who is your Head and the Head of every man, woman, child on this earth, or who has ever been on it, just as much as He is my Head. And He will carry us all through every temptation, trial, sorrow we can ever have to encounter, in this world or any other, if we will only turn to Him, lay hold of Him, and cast them all upon Him as He has bidden us.

My younger brothers, you on whom the future of England, under God, at this moment depends, will you not try Him ? Is He not worth a trial ?

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ON THE  
INFLUENCE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE  
UPON INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION:

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION  
OF GREAT BRITAIN,

*Before H.R.H. Prince Albert.*

BY  
WILLIAM WHEWELL, D.D., F.R.S.

MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.



ON THE  
INFLUENCE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE  
UPON  
INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.

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THE managers of the Royal Institution having determined to provide for their members and others a series of Lectures upon Education, and having expressed their wish that I should offer to the audience here assembled any views which may appear to me suited to such a purpose, I venture to do so, relying upon an indulgence which I have more than once experienced here on similar occasions. Of such indulgence I strongly feel the need, on various accounts, but especially on these *two*—first, that being so unfrequently in this metropolis, I do not know what trains of thought are passing in the minds of the greater part of my audience, who live in the midst of a stimulation produced by the lively interchange of opinion and discussion on the prominent questions of the day, to one of which what I have now to say in a great degree refers; and next, that in this hall, where you are accustomed to listen.

to the most lively explanations of scientific discoveries, illustrated by the most skilful and striking experiments, *I* have to present to you a series of remarks on subjects more or less abstract and vague, without being able to aid my exposition by anything addressed to the eye. The pictures which words can give of abstruse and general mental conceptions, when they alone form a diorama on which the mental eye of an assembly is to be directed for a whole hour, always appear to me to be in great danger of fading away into a dream of cloudland or a vacant blank. However, as to that point, I have an advantage in speaking on the History of Science, which is my present subject, in this room. To those of you who are in the habit of coming here, the walls must appear, from their customary aspect, to be hung with pictures which illustrate my theme. The striking facts in the history of science which you have presented to you in this place, week after week, are illustrations, in particular cases, of the general views which I have to offer to you ; and if such expressions as *experience* and *theory*, *discovery* and *generalization*, *Baconian ascents* to comprehensive *axioms*, and *descents* thence to wonderful *works*—if such expressions be in danger of being *to others* vague and empty sounds, to *you* they will be, I may trust, all enlivened and embodied by what you have again and again seen here.



The subject on which I am desirous of making a few remarks to you at present is this; *The Influence of Scientific Discovery upon Intellectual Education*:—the influence of the scientific discoveries of any period upon the intellectual education of the succeeding period: the influence, that is, of the intellectual achievements of one or two gifted men, at various epochs of the world's history, upon all those persons, in the next succeeding generations, who have aimed to obtain, for themselves or for their children, the highest culture, the best discipline, of which man's intellectual faculties are capable. I wish to show that there has been such an influence, and that it has been great at all periods; that is, at all those periods of intellectual energy and activity which come within the conditions of the terms;—all periods which have been periods of *discovery*. I wish to show that this influence has been so great, that its results constitute, at this day, the whole of our intellectual education;—that in virtue of this influence, intellectual education has been, for those who avail themselves of the means which time has accumulated, progressive;—that our intellectual education now, to be worthy of the time, ought to include in its compass elements contributed to it in every one of the great epochs of mental energy which the world has seen;—that in this respect, most especially, we are, if we know how to

use our advantages, inheritors of the wealth of all the richest times ; strong in the power of the giants of all ages ; placed on the summit of an edifice which thirty centuries have been employed in building.

Perhaps I shall most simply make myself intelligible by stating plainly and frankly a proposition which I wish to illustrate by various examples, as it has been exemplified in various ages and countries. The proposition is this : That every great advance in intellectual education has been the effect of some considerable scientific discovery, or group of discoveries. Every improvement of the mental discipline of those who stand in the forefront of humanity has followed some signal victory of their leaders ; every addition to the means of intellectual culture has been the result of some extraordinary harvest, some more than ordinary bounty of the intellectual soil, bestowed on the preceding years.

Without further preface, let us proceed to examples. The first great attempt made for the improvement of intellectual education, so far as history tells us, was that undertaken and prosecuted with persevering vigour by Socrates and Plato. The aim of those philosophers was, I say, mainly and peculiarly, an improvement of the *intellectual education* of their countrymen. The Athenians of that time,—I mean, the more eminent and affluent classes of

them,—had already an education in a very considerable degree elaborate, and large and elevated in its promises. The persons by whom this education was, in its higher departments, conducted—the teachers whom Socrates and Plato perseveringly opposed—have been habitually called *the Sophists*; because, though at the time their ascendancy was immense, in the course of ages Plato's writings have superseded theirs, and he so describes them. But it has been shown recently, in the most luminous and striking manner, by one among ourselves, that the education which these teachers professed to give, and frequently gave, was precisely what we commonly mean by *a good education*. It was an education enabling a young man to write well, speak well, and act efficiently, on all ordinary occasions, public and private. The moral doctrines which they taught, even according to the most unfavourable representation of them, were no worse than the moral doctrines which are most commonly taught among ourselves at the present day,—the morality founded upon *utility*; but many of them repudiated this doctrine as sordid and narrow, and professed higher principles, which they delivered in graceful literary forms, some of which are still extant in the books which we put in the hands of the young.

Such were the Sophists, against whom Socrates

and Plato carried on their warfare. And why did Socrates and Plato contend against these teachers ; and how was it that they contended so successfully, that the sympathy of all posterity has been with them in their opposition ? It was because Socrates and Plato sought for solid principles in this specious teaching, and found none. It was because, while these professors of speaking well and acting well imparted their precepts to their pupils, and exemplified them by their practice, they could not bear the keen cross-questioning of Socrates, when he tried to make them tell what it was *to speak* WELL and *to act* WELL ; they could not tell Plato what was that ‘ First Good, First Perfect, and First Fair,’ from which everything else derived goodness, beauty, and perfection. Socrates and Plato were not content with illustrations, they asked for principles ; they were not content with rhetoric, they wanted demonstration ; it was not enough for them that these men taught the young Athenian to *persuade* others, they wanted to have him *know*, and to know *what* he *knew*. These were the demands, as you will many of you recollect, that recur again and again in the Platonic Dialogues. This is the tendency of all the trains of irresistible logic which are put in the mouth of Plato’s imaginary Socrates. *What* do we know ? *How* do we know it ? *By* what reasoning ? *From* what princi-



*ples* ? These questions are perpetually asked. They are never completely answered. The respondent always breaks down at some point or other ; and then Socrates says, with his calm irony, ‘ How disappointing ! How vexatious ! We are where we were ! We must begin again. We have not yet found what we were seeking. We have not yet got hold of the real and essential truth.’

And what was it that had put Socrates and Plato upon this eager and obstinate search of a real and essential truth ? How was it they could not be satisfied without it ? Why might not that which had been taught by the wise and eloquent men of previous generations suffice for *their* generation ? Why must their inquiries go further than the inquiries of their ancestors had done ? This real and essential truth which they sought, what had put the notion of it into their heads ? What had made them think that such a thing could be found ? Had they seen any example of such truth ; had they seen any specimen of this treasure, which they sought for with so vehement and persevering a quest ?

*Yes* : for this is the point to which I wish to draw your attention ; they *had* seen specimens of this treasure. They had had placed before them examples of real and certain truth ; they had been admitted to contemplate clear and indisputable truths ; truths

which they could demonstrate to be true ; truths which they could trace to principles of intuitive evidence ; truths which it did not appear to be speaking too highly of, if they called them necessary and eternal.

Such truths they had already seen and known ; for they had known some of the truths of *geometry*. No doubt some of these truths,—the truths of geometry,—some casual and happy guesses—had been known at a much earlier period. Pythagoras had known that the squares on the two sides of a right angled triangle are equal to the square on the third. But the lore of Pythagoras, imparted in a mysterious manner to an initiated few, had long crept stealthily among the secret societies of the Italian coast, and hardly made its way, in any considerable degree, into Greece, till it was introduced by Plato and his friends. But the age of Plato was an age of great geometrical discovery in Greece. The general body of geometry, such as it exists to this day, was then constructed. Plato himself was an eminent geometer, not only by geometrical discoveries which he made, but still more by his clear and strong perception of the importance of the study. He repeatedly exhorts his fellow-countrymen to pursue this study ; he promises that it shall lead them to a true view of the heavens ; he discerns how this is to be done ; he points out new branches of mathematical science which must be

constructed for this purpose ; he repeatedly refers to the Definitions, the Axioms, the Proofs of Geometrical Propositions ; he writes over the gate of the gardens of Academus, where his disciples meet to listen to his teaching—Οὐδεὶς ἀγεομέτρητος εἰσίστω. ‘Let no one enter who is destitute of Geometry.’

And why this requirement ? Why this prohibition ? What was the need of Geometry for his disciples ? What use was he to make of it ? What inference was he to draw from it when they had it ?

Precisely the inference which I have mentioned ;—that there was a certain and solid truth ; a knowledge which was not mere opinion ; science which was more than seeming : that man has powers by which such truth, such knowledge, such science, may be acquired ; that therefore it ought to be sought, not in geometry alone, but in other subjects also ; that since man can know, certainly and clearly, about straight and curved in the world of space, he ought to know,—he ought not to be content without knowing,—no less clearly and certainly, about right and wrong in the world of human action. That man has such powers, was the beginning of Plato’s philosophy. To use them for such purposes was the constant aim of his mental activity. The impression which had been left upon his mind by the geometrical achievements of his contemporaries, and by those which he himself began, was,

that the powers by which such discoveries are made are evidences of the exalted nature of the human mind; of its vast profundity; of its lofty destiny. He repeatedly, and with obvious gratification, refers to geometrical truths as evidences of the nature of the human mind, and even of its hope of immortality. Since the mind can thus reason *to certain truths*, it must have in it the principles *of truth*; and whence did it derive them? Since it can know what it has not learned from the *senses*, it must have some *other* source of knowledge; and how much is implied in this! Since it can conceive and bring forth eternal truths, how can it be the child of a day, a transient creature, born one moment and perishing the next?

Perhaps it may serve to add distinctness to the account I am trying to give you of Plato's teaching, if I give you, in his own way, an example of this teaching of his. It shall be very brief. In Plato's Dialogue, called *Meno*, Socrates, in discourse with Meno the Thessalian, is trying to discover what Virtue is: and pressing his inquiry from point to point, and finding the truth perpetually escape him, he is led to ask, at last, 'What is meant by *discovering* anything? Can we do it? If so, how?' And on this, with more of direct assertion than he commonly ventures upon, he declares that we *can* do



it, and that he will show how we do it. He calls up a young and intelligent boy, an attendant of Meno, and he propounds to him a geometrical problem, simple, yet not quite obvious. He draws a diagram in the sand, and asks him various questions as to the lines which serve to illustrate this problem: and the boy, though at first he says he does not know, is soon led to answer rightly to these interrogations, by his natural apprehension of the relations of space. At every step, Socrates says, ‘You see I tell him nothing. He goes on towards the truth, but I do not teach him. He finds it in his own mind. He does not learn from another, he recollects what he has already known. His knowledge is recollection. His science is reminiscence.’\*

This doctrine—that knowledge is recollection, that science is reminiscence—is the main result deduced in the *Meno* from this geometrical investigation. In that Dialogue, as I have said, the doctrine is applied to illustrate the nature of the discovery of truth in general. In the *Phedo*—that Dialogue which has so deeply moved thoughtful men in every age, in which Socrates, standing before the gates of death, reasons with his weeping friends as to what he shall find beyond them—this same doctrine is employed to warm

\* This portion of Plato’s Dialogue, the *Meno*, was given briefly in the Lecture, a diagram being exhibited. See the Note.

their hopes and elevate their thoughts. Since, it is argued, the soul thus contains in itself the principles of eternal truth, it must be itself eternal. But it is not with this purpose that I here refer to the use thus made of geometrical reasoning. My object is to establish this view:—that the great step in pure scientific discovery, made by the Greeks of Plato's time,—the construction of a connected and comprehensive body of geometrical truths, led to the conviction that geometry was an immensely valuable element in intellectual education. The apprehensions of such truths threw a new light upon the nature of all truth, and the means of attaining to it. It was seen that, thenceforth, they who were altogether ignorant of geometry, were destitute of the best means then known, of showing them what is the genuine aspect of essential truth,—what is the nature of the intellectual vision by which it is seen,—what is the consciousness of intuitive power on which its foundations rest. And thus, in virtue of the geometrical discoveries of the Platonic epoch, geometry became a part of the discipline of the Platonic school;—became the starting point of the Platonic reformation of the intellectual education of Athens;—became an element of a liberal education. And not only became so then, but has continued so to this day: so that among ourselves, and in every other

country of high cultivation, no education is held to be raised on good foundations which does not include geometry,—*elementary* geometry, at least,—among its component portions. And thus, in our Education, as in our Science, the completest form, in the latest time, includes and assumes the earliest steps of real progress: and this is so, in the one case as in the other; because the one must always depend on the other; because the progress of Education is affected, at every great and principal step, by the progress of Science.

You will not be surprised to be thus told that our modern education has derived something from the ancient Greek education, because you know that our modern science has derived much from the ancient Greek science. You know that our science, in the ordinary sense of the term, has derived little from the ancient Romans;—little, that is, which is original; and therefore you will not be surprised, if our education have derived little from the Roman education. If the fact were so, it would still be a negative illustration of the doctrine which I am trying to elucidate;—the dependence of the progress of education on the progress of science. But if we take the term *science* in a somewhat wider acceptation, we shall derive from the Roman history, not a *negative*, but a *positive* exemplification of our proposition. For in that wider

sense, there *is* a science of which Rome was the mother, as Greece was of geometry and mathematics. The term *Science* may be extended so widely, as to allow us to speak of the Science of Law—meaning the doctrine of Rights and Obligations, in its most definite and yet most comprehensive form;—in short, the Science of Jurisprudence. In this Science, the Romans were really great discoverers: or rather, it was they who made the subject a Science:—who gave it the precision of a Science, the generality of a science, the method of a Science. And how effectually they did this, we may judge, from the fact that the jurisprudence of Rome is still the basis, the model, the guide, the core of the jurisprudence of every civilized country;—of our own, less than most, but still, in no small degree, of our own. The imitators and pupils of the Greeks in every other department of human speculation, in jurisprudence, the Romans felt themselves their masters. Cicero says, proudly, but not too proudly, that a single page of a Roman jurist contained more solid and exact matter than a whole library of Greek philosophers. The labours of jurists deserving this character, which thus began before Cicero, continued through the empire, to its fall;—continued even beyond its fall. As Horace tells us that captive Greece captivated the conqueror and taught him arts; so Rome subdued, subdued the



victor hordes, and taught them law. The laws of Rome gave method to the codes of the northern nations, and are the origin of much that is most scientific in the more recent systems of legislation. That general law is a science, we owe to the Romans; and we in England may be reminded of this, by our inability to translate the Roman word by which this science is described: for though the term, *Jus*, is the root of *jurist*, and *jurisprudence*, and the like, it is, as yet, hardly naturalized in its technical sense, as designating the general Doctrine of Rights and Obligations: nor have we any word which has that meaning, as *Droit* has in French, and *Recht* in German.

Here is a great science, then, of which the discoverers were the Romans: can we trace, as according to our view we ought to be able to trace, any corresponding great step in intellectual discipline? Was *jus* a prominent part of Roman education? Is Roman jurisprudence a prominent part in the liberal education in modern times? To both these questions we must answer most emphatically, *Yes*. The law of Rome was the main part of the education of the Roman youth. Cicero reminds his brother Quintius, that they had learnt the old laws, and the formulæ of legal proceedings, by heart, as a sort of domestic catechism or nursery rhyme. Every Roman of eminence spent the early part of his morning in giving legal

opinions to his clients :—not like our Justices of the Peace, when appealed to as a magistrate, but as an adviser and protector : and every young member of the aristocracy had to fit himself for this office. Every young Roman of condition was a Roman jurist. And the study of the law, thus made a leading branch of a liberal education, continued so through the middle ages—continues so still. It occupied the great Italian universities—Bologna, Pisa, Padua, and the like—in the darkest parts of the dark ages. It occupies most of the universities of Europe to this day. The Roman law is still the main element of the liberal education of Italy, of Germany, of Greece, and, in some degree, even of France and Spain. In Germany its prevalence has been such, that in recent times all the great moral controversies have been debated in the most strenuous and searching manner *in terms* of the *Civil Law* ; as the Roman law is still called all over Europe. And we shall hardly doubt, if we look into the matter, that these legal studies have given to the well-educated men of those countries a precision of thought, and an exactness of logic on moral subjects, which, without such a study, would not have been likely to prevail. To define a Right or Obligation, to use proper terms in framing a law, in delivering a judicial sentence, in giving a legal opinion, is precisely the merit of an accomplished

jurist ; as is emphatically asserted by Cicero. And even our own law, fragmentary and unscientific as it is, is not without a value of the same kind, as an instrument of a liberal education. It may be a means of giving exactness to the thoughts, method and clearness to the reasoning, precision to the expressions of men, on the general interests of man and of society ; and is *so* recommended, and often so employed, by those who are preparing for active life. Of the moral sciences, without some study of which no education can be complete, the science of jurisprudence is most truly a science, and most effectually a means of intellectual discipline. And, as you see, the use of such discipline in education, dates from the period of that great advance in speculation on moral subjects and social relations, by which jurisprudence became a science.

And thus two of the great elements of a thorough intellectual culture, Mathematics and Jurisprudence, are an inheritance which we derive from ages long gone by ; from two great nations ; from *the* two great nations of antiquity. They are the results of ancient triumphs of man's spirit over the confusion and obscurity of the aspects of the external world ; and even over the waywardness and unregulated impulses of his own nature, and the entanglements and conflicts of human society. And being true sciences,

they were well fitted to become, as they became, and were fitted to continue, as they have hitherto continued, to be main elements in that discipline by which man is to raise himself above himself; is to raise,—since that is especially what we have now to consider,—his intellect into an habitual condition, superior to the rudeness, dimness, confusion, laxity, insecurity, to which the *undisciplined* impulses of human thought in all ages and nations commonly lead.

And before we proceed any further, let us consider, for an instant, that such an education, consisting of the elements which I have mentioned, might be, and would be, in well conducted cases, an education of no common excellence, even according to our present standard of a good intellectual education. A mind well disciplined in elementary geometry and in general jurisprudence, would be as well prepared as mere discipline can make a mind, for most trains of human speculation and reasoning. The mathematical portion of such an education would give clear habits of logical deduction, and a perception of the delight of demonstration; while the *moral* portion of the education, as we may call jurisprudence, would guard the mind from the defect, sometimes ascribed to mere mathematicians, of seeing none but mathematical proofs, and applying to all cases mathematical processes. A young man well imbued with these, the



leading elements of Athenian and Roman culture, would, we need not fear to say, be superior in intellectual discipline to three-fourths of the young men of our own day, on whom all the ordinary appliances of what is called a *good education* have been bestowed. Geometer and jurist, the pupil formed by this culture of the old world, might make no bad figure among the men of letters or of science, the lawyers and the politicians, of our own times.

But there is another remark which I must make, tending to show the *defect* of this education of antiquity, as compared with the intellectual education of our own times ; or rather, as compared with what the education of our own times ought to be. The subjects which I have mentioned, geometry and jurisprudence, are both *deductive* sciences ;—sciences in which, from certain first principles, by chains of proof, conclusions are deduced which constitute the doctrines of the science. In the one case, geometry, these first principles are given by intuition ; in the other, jurisprudence, they are either rules instituted by authority and consent, or general principles of human nature and human society, obtained from experience interpreted by our own human consciousness. We deduce properties of diagrams from geometrical axioms ; we deduce decisions of cases from legal maxims. Jurisprudence, no less than

geometry, is a deductive science ; and has been compared with geometry, by its admirers, for the exactness of its deductive processes. They have said (Leibnitz and others) that jural demonstrations are as fine examples of logic as mathematical ; and that pure reason alone determines every expression of a good jurist, no less than of a good mathematician ; so that there is no room for that play of individual character, which shows itself in the difference of style of different authors. But however perfectly the habits of *deduction* may be taught by these studies, such teaching cannot, according to the enlarged views of modern times, compose a complete intellectual culture. Induction, rather than deduction, is the source of the great scientific truths which form the glory, and fasten on them the admiration of modern times ; and a modern education cannot be regarded as giving to the intellect that culture, which the fulness of time, and the treasures of knowledge now accumulated, render suitable and necessary, except it convey to the mind an adequate appreciation of and familiarity with the *inductive* process, by which those treasures of knowledge have been obtained. As the best sciences which the ancient world framed supplied the best elements of intellectual education up to modern times ; so the grand step by which, in modern times, science has sprung up into a magnitude and majesty

far superior to her ancient dimensions, should exercise its influence upon modern education, and contribute its proper result to modern intellectual culture.

Who is to be taken as the representative of the great epoch of the progress of science in modern times ; that is, beginning from the sixteenth century? In different ways, Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, Newton, may seem best suited to occupy that position. But Galileo's immediate influence was limited, both as to subjects and as to the number of admirers. It was when Descartes summed up into a *system* the discoveries of Galileo and his disciples, and added to them inventions of his own, some true, many captivating, that the new physical philosophy acquired a large and vigorous hold upon Europe north of the Alps. In France especially, always eager in its admiration of intellectual greatness, Descartes was unhesitatingly regarded as the great man who brought in a new and more enlightened age of philosophy. Indeed, for a large portion of philosophy, he is still so regarded by French philosophers ; and though his influence in metaphysics is to be distinguished from his authority in physics, still the ascendancy of his more abstract and general philosophical opinions was closely connected with his recognised eminence as a physical philosopher, and with the admiration which his system of the universe

obtained. The Cartesian philosophy was the proclaimed and acknowledged antagonist of the Aristotelian philosophy ; it was the new truth of which the standard was raised against the old falsehood. Any one acquainted with the French literature of the seventeenth century, will recollect innumerable illustrations of this view of the matter. You remember, perhaps (as an example), the noted passage in Fontenelle's lively dialogues on *The Plurality of Worlds*. There, the sages of antiquity, the Pythagorases, Platos, Aristotles, are represented as looking at the spectacle of the universe, like so many spectators in the pit of the Opera House looking at the ballet. The subject of the ballet is supposed to be, Phaëton carried away by the winds : and to represent this, the dancer who enacts the part of Phaëton, is made to fly away through the upper part of the scene, to the great admiration of the gazers. The more speculative of these attempt to explain this extraordinary movement of Phaëton. One says, ' Phaëton has an *occult quality*, which carries him away.' This is the Aristotelian. Another says, ' Phaëton is composed of certain *numbers*, which make him move upwards.' This is the Pythagorean. Another says, ' Phaëton has a longing for the top of the theatre. He is not easy till he gets there.' This is the philosophy which explains the universe by Love and Hate.



Another says, 'Phaëton has not naturally a tendency to fly; but he prefers flying to leaving the top of the scene empty.' This is the doctrine of the *fuga vacui*, nature's horror of a vacuum. And after all this, says the speaker, comes Descartes, and some other moderns; and they say, Phaëton goes up, because he is drawn by certain cords, and a weight, heavier than he is, goes down behind the scenes. And in truth, the physical philosophy of Descartes did contain the greater part of the true explanation of the phenomena of the universe, which was known up to this time. It contained the principles of Mechanics, with few errors: the principles of Optics, and the beautiful explanation of the rainbow, in the discovery of which Descartes had so large a share; and a true system of Astronomy, so far as the mere motions are concerned. And Descartes's peculiar invention, the hypothesis of *tourbillons*,—vortices or whirlpools of celestial fluid, by which these motions are produced—though false, was not only separable from the other parts of the system, but was capable, by modifications, of expressing many mechanical truths, as the Bernoullis, and other mathematicians who retained it for a century, often showed. In England, as in France, the Cartesian philosophy meant the Mechanical Philosophy, as opposed to the philosophy of sympathies and antipathies, occult

qualities, arbitrary notions of Nature, and the like. The Cartesian philosophy, in this sense, was introduced into England; but I doubt whether the doctrine of vortices was ever accepted here to any considerable extent. It has been made, I may be allowed to say, ignorantly and absurdly made, an accusation against the University of Cambridge, that the Cartesian system found acceptance there. Such an event showed a promptitude in accepting new scientific views, which has repeatedly been exemplified there. But I much doubt whether the Cartesian system was *ever* presented to Cambridge students, without a refutation of the vortices being put in the notes on the same page. Assuredly it was not taught for more than a few years in any other form: but I believe, not at all. And in like manner, in other places, the new mechanical philosophy, Cartesian in France, Newtonian in England, rapidly superseded the verbal dogmatism of the middle ages.

And with this triumph of the new opinions, as a revolution in science, came the introduction of the new doctrines as a revolution, or extension, in education. The Cartesian philosophy,—instantly, in England transformed into the Newtonian philosophy, on the publication of Newton's mighty discoveries,—was eagerly received, from its

very first appearance, and incorporated with the elements of a liberal education, both in Newton's own university, and elsewhere. And not only were the new theories of the solar system rapidly diffused, by means of lectures, books, and in other ways; but the principles by which such theories are collected from observation,—the principles of that induction, on which this great fabric of science rests,—became objects of attention, respect, and praise. Bacon, with his majestic voice,—the trumpeter who stirred up the battle, as he himself calls himself,—had already prepared men's minds for this feeling of respect and admiration for inductive discovery, even while the movement was only beginning: and in this country at least, many persons, Gilbert, Cowley, and others, had rëechoed the sentiment which he expressed. He had declared that knowledge, far more ample and complete than had yet been obtained by man, was to be gained by the use of new methods of investigation: and the succeeding time, having produced noble examples of such knowledge, had made men see that they had entered upon a new epoch of science. And it was natural and desirable that in this, as in other cases, the possession of a body of new truths, and the admiration of the method by which these had been acquired, should operate upon the culture of the

intellect, among those who sought the best means of such culture ;—should introduce new elements into liberal education ;—should make it a part of the mental discipline of the best taught classes, that they should learn to feel the force and see the beauty of *inductive* reasoning ; as the older elements of a liberal education, mathematics and jurisprudence, had been employed, among other uses, to make men feel the force, and see the beauty, of deductive reasoning.

And thus we are naturally led to ask, Has this been done ? Has education in its most advanced form been thus extended ? Is there, in the habitual culture of the intellect, in the best system of education, this cultivation of the habit, or at least of the appreciation, of inductive teaching in science ? How is such culture to be effected ? How are we to judge whether it has been effected ?

These are very large questions, and yet the time admonishes me, if nothing else did, that I must be very brief in any answers that I may give to them. I must content myself with a hint or two bearing upon the subject. And first, of the mode in which this culture of the inductive habit of mind, or at least appreciation of the method and its results, is to be promoted ; if I might presume to give an opinion, I should say that one obvious mode of effect-



ing this discipline of the mind in induction is, the exact and solid study of some portion of inductive knowledge. I do not mean the mechanical sciences alone, Physical Astronomy and the like; though these undoubtedly have a prerogative value as the instruments of such a culture; but the like effect will be promoted by the exact and solid study of any portion of the circle of natural sciences;—Botany, Comparative Anatomy, Geology, Chemistry, for instance. But I say, the *exact* and *solid* knowledge; not a mere verbal knowledge, but a knowledge which is real in its character, though it may be elementary and limited in its extent. The knowledge of which I speak must be a knowledge of things, and not merely of names of things; an acquaintance with the operations and productions of nature, as they appear to the eye, not merely an acquaintance with what has been said about them; a knowledge of the laws of nature, seen in special experiments and observations, before they are conceived in general terms; a knowledge of the types of natural forms, gathered from individual cases already made familiar. By such study of one or more departments of inductive knowledge, the mind may escape from the thralldom and illusion which reigns in the world of mere words.

But there is another study which I may venture to mention, of a more general and literary kind, also

eminently fitted to promote an appreciation of the nature and value of the inductive treatment of nature. I mean, the History of the Natural Sciences ; for in such history we see how, in the study of every portion of the universe, the human mind has ascended from particular facts to general laws ; and yet in every different class of phenomena, by processes very *different*, at first sight at least. And I mention this study, of the history of science, and especially recommend it, the rather, because it supplies, as I conceive, a remedy for some of the evils which, along with great advantages, may result from *another* study which has long been, and at present is, extensively employed as an element of a liberal education—I mean the study of *Logic*. The study of Logic is of great value, as fixing attention upon the conditions of deductive proof, and giving a systematic and technical view of the forms which such proof may assume. But by doing this for all subjects alike, it produces the impression that there is a close likeness in the process of investigation of truth in different subjects ;—closer than there really is. The examples of reasoning given in books of Logic are generally so trifling as to seem a mockery of truth-seeking, and so monotonous as to seem idle variations of the same theme. But in the History of Science, we see the infinite variety of nature ; of mental, no less than

bodily nature ; of the intellectual as well as of the sensible world. The modes of generalization of particulars,—of ascent from the most actual things to the most abstract ideas,—how different are they in botany, in chemistry, in geology, in physiology ! yet all most true and real ; all most certain and solid ; all of them genuine and indisputable lines of union and connexion, by which the mind of man and the facts of the universe are bound together ; by which the universe becomes a sphere with intellect for its centre ; by which intellect becomes in no small degree able to bend to its purposes the powers of the universe.

The history of science, showing us how this takes place in various forms,—ever and ever new, when they seem to have been exhausted,—*may* do, and carefully studied, *must* do, much to promote that due apprehension and appreciation of inductive discovery : and inductive discovery, now that the process has been going on with immense vigour in the nations of Europe for the last three hundred years, ought, we venture to say, to form a distinct and prominent part of the intellectual education of the youth of those nations. And having said this, I have given you the ultimate result of the reflections which have occurred to me on this subject of intellectual education, on which I have ventured to address you. And here, therefore, I might

conclude. But if it did not weary you, I should wish to make a remark on the other of the two questions which I asked a little while ago. I then asked how is such a culture to be effected? and also, how are we to judge whether it has been effected?

With regard to the latter question, the remark which I have to make is briefly this.—In the inductive sciences, every step of generalization is usually marked by some *word*, which, adopted to mark that step, acquires thenceforth a fixed and definite meaning; and is always to be used in the sense so given it, not in any other way in which other resemblances or incidents may suggest. And the definition of *technical words* in inductive science, is contained in the history of the science; is given by the course of previous research and discovery. ‘The history of science is our dictionary; the steps of scientific induction are our definitions.’ Now this being so, we may remark that when we hear a man, in the course of an argument, asking for Definitions, as something by which error is to be avoided and truth learned, such a demand is evidence that his intellectual training has been deductive, not inductive—logical, not scientific. In geometry, and in other demonstrative sciences, Definitions are the beginning of the science—the fountains of truth. But it is not so in the inductive sciences. In such sciences, a Definition



and a Proposition commonly enter side by side—the definition giving exactness to the proposition ; the proposition giving reality to the definition.

But further :—as technical terms, appropriate to a precise and steady sense, mark every step of inductive ascent in science, the exact and correct use of the technical terms of science is evidence of good inductive culture of the mind ; and a vague and improper use of such terms, is evidence of the absence of such culture. When we hear men speak, as we often do, of *impetus* and *momentum*, of *gravity* and *inertia*, of *centripetal* and *centrifugal force*, and the like, using the terms mostly by guess,—and assuming oppositions and relations among them which do not exist ;—as, for instance, when they oppose the centrifugal and centripetal force, as if they were *forces* in the same sense ;—we cannot help saying that such persons, however ingenious and quick they may be in picking a possible meaning out of current words, by means of their etymology, or any other casual light, have not the habit of gathering the meaning of scientific words from the only true light, the light of induction.

And this remark may not be without a special use, if we recollect that there are at present a number of scientific words current among us, which are applied with the most fantastical and wanton vague-

ness of meaning, or of no meaning. At all periods of science, probably, scientific terms are liable to this abuse, after scientific discoveries have brought them into notoriety, and before the diffusion of science has made their true meaning to be generally apprehended. The names, indeed, of *attraction*, *gravitation*, and the like, have probably now risen, in a great degree, out of this sphere of confusion and obscurity, in which any word may mean anything. But there are words—belonging to sciences which have more recently reached scientific dignity,—which words every one pursuing fancies which are utterly out of the sphere of science, seems to think he may use just as he pleases. *Magnetism* and *Electricity*, and the terms which belong to these sciences, are especially taken possession of for such purposes, and applied in cases in which we know that the sciences from which the names are ‘conveyed’ have not the smallest application. Is Animal Magnetism anything? Let those answer who think they can: but *we* know that it is not *Magnetism*. When I say *we*, I mean those who are in the habit of seeing in this place the admirable exhibitions of what Magnetism is, with which you have long been familiar. And assuredly, on the same ground, I may say that you have been shown, and know, what Electricity is, and what it can do; and what it cannot do, and what

is not Electricity. And having had the opportunity of seeing this, you, at least, have so much of the culture of the intellect which inductive science supplies, as not to suppose that your words would have any meaning, if you were to say of any freak of fancy or will, shown in bodily motion or muscular action, that it is *a kind of Electricity*.

NOTE TO p. 13.

EXTRACT FROM THE "MENO" OF PLATO.

*S.* Tell me, boy, do you know that this figure is a square?—*B.* Yes, I know.

*S.* Because all these four lines are equal (its sides)?—*B.* Yes.


*S.* And also these other two lines are equal, which are drawn across the middle? (the diagonals.)—*B.* Yes.

*S.* May there be a square greater or less than this?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* May there be a square twice as great as this?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* How long must one side be, that the square may be twice as great?—*B.* Twice as long as the side of the first square.

You see, Socrates says, I tell him nothing, I only ask him questions. And now he thinks he has answered right. But I must revive his recollection, that he may see his error.—So you say that the square on a double line will be double of the first square? You know I mean a square, not a figure that is long one way and narrow the other; but as broad as it is long, like this square, only twice as large. Now let us fit to one end of the first square, a second square which is equal to it. And let us fit two other squares of the same size to the sides of those two squares. Then we have a new square, have we not?—*B.* Yes.



*S.* And how many times is it greater than the first square?—*B.* Four times greater.

*S.* Not twice as great, which you said?—*B.* No: four times.

*S.* Well: but how long must the line be that the square upon it may be twice as great as the first square?—*B.* I do not know.

Now, says Socrates, mark, that out of this not knowing, he will come to know, by seeking with me, just as he comes to know when I question him without my telling him anything. You will see that I do not give him my opinion, I only get at his.—If we draw a line across this first square, from corner to corner, (the diagonal), it cuts it into two equal parts, does it not?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* And if in this square, which is made up of the four squares, we draw the four diagonals, so as to cut off the four outside corners, each of these diagonals will cut one of the squares into two halves?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* And these four diagonals will be equal, and will make a new square?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* And this square is made up of the four inside halves of the four squares, is it not?—*B.* It is.

*S.* But the first square is made up of two such halves, is it not?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* And how much is four times greater than twice?—*B.* The double of it.

*S.* Then how many times is the new square greater than the first square?—*B.* It is the double of it.

*S.* Then you have got a square which is the double of the original square?—*B.* Yes.

*S.* Namely, the square upon the diagonal of the original square?—*B.* Yes.

You see, Socrates says, he was really possessed of all his knowledge before. Those who do not know, have still in their minds a latent knowledge.



OBSERVATIONS ON MENTAL  
EDUCATION :

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION  
OF GREAT BRITAIN,

*Before H.R.H. Prince Albert.*

BY

PROFESSOR FARADAY, F.R.S.



OBSERVATIONS  
ON  
MENTAL EDUCATION.

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I TAKE courage, Sir, from your presence here this day, to speak boldly that which is upon my mind. I feared that it might be unpleasant to some of my audience, but as I know that your Royal Highness is a champion for and desires the truth, I will believe that all here are united in the same cause, and therefore will give utterance, without hesitation, to what I have to say regarding the present condition of Mental Education.

If the term education may be understood in so large a sense as to include all that belongs to the improvement of the mind, either by the acquisition of the knowledge of others, or by increase of it through its own exertions, then I may hope to be justified for bringing forward a few desultory observations respecting the exercise of the mental powers in a particular direction, which otherwise might seem out of place. The points I have in view are general, but they are manifest in a striking manner, among the physical matters which have

occupied my life ; and as the latter afford a field for exercise in which cogitations and conclusions can be subjected to the rigid tests of fact and experiment—as all classes employ themselves more or less in the consideration of physical matters, and may do so with great advantage, if inclined in the least degree to profit by educational practices, so I hope that what I may say will find its application in every condition of life.

Before entering upon the subject, I must take one distinction which, however it may appear to others, is to me of the utmost importance. High as man is placed above the creatures around him, there is a higher and far more exalted position within his view ; and the ways are infinite in which he occupies his thoughts about the fears, or hopes, or expectations of a future life. I believe that the truth of that future cannot be brought to his knowledge by any exertion of his mental powers, however exalted they may be ; that it is made known to him by other teaching than his own, and is received through simple belief of the testimony given. Let no one suppose for a moment that the self-education I am about to commend in respect of the things of this life, extends to any considerations of the hope set before us, as if man by reasoning could find out God. It would be improper here to enter upon this



subject further than to claim an absolute distinction between religious and ordinary belief. I shall be reproached with the weakness of refusing to apply those mental operations which I think good in respect of high things to the very highest. I am content to bear the reproach. Yet, even in earthly matters, I believe that the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; and I have never seen anything incompatible between those things of man which can be known by the spirit of man which is within him, and those higher things concerning his future which he cannot know by that spirit.

Claiming, then, the use of the ordinary faculties of the mind in ordinary things, let me next endeavour to point out what appears to me to be a great deficiency in the exercise of the mental powers in every direction; three words will express this great want, *deficiency of judgment*. I do not wish to make any startling assertion, but I know that in physical matters multitudes are ready to draw conclusions who have little or no power of judgment in the cases; that the same is true of other departments of knowledge; and that, generally, mankind is willing to leave the faculties which relate to judgment almost entirely uneducated, and their decisions at

the mercy of ignorance, prepossessions, the passions, or even accident.

Do not suppose, because I stand here and speak thus, making no exceptions, that I except myself. I have learned to know that I fall infinitely short of that efficacious exercise of the judgment which may be attained. There are exceptions to my general conclusion, numerous and high ; but if we desire to know how far education is required, we do not consider the few who need it not, but the many who have it not ; and in respect of judgment, the number of the latter is almost infinite. I am moreover persuaded, that the clear and powerful minds which have realized in some degree the intellectual preparation I am about to refer to, will admit its importance, and indeed its necessity ; and that they will not except themselves, nor think that I have made my statement too extensive.

As I believe that a very large proportion of the errors we make in judgment is a simple and direct result of our perfectly unconscious state, and think that a demonstration of the liabilities we are subject to would aid greatly in providing a remedy, I will proceed first to a few illustrations of a physical nature. Nothing can better supply them than the intimations we derive from our senses ; to them we trust directly ; by them we become acquainted with exter-

nal things, and gain the power of increasing and varying facts upon which we entirely depend. Our sense perceptions are wonderful. Even in the observant, but unreflective infant, they soon produce a result which looks like intuition, because of its perfection. Coming to the mind as so many data, they are stored up, and without our being conscious of it, are ever after used in like circumstances in forming our judgment; and it is not wonderful that man is accustomed to trust them without examination. Nevertheless, the result is the effect of education: the mind has to be instructed with regard to the senses and their intimations through every step of life; and where the instruction is imperfect, it is astonishing how soon and how much their evidence fails us. Yet, in the latter years of life, we do not consider this matter, but, having obtained the ordinary teaching sufficient for ordinary purposes, we venture to judge of things which are extraordinary for the time, and almost always with the more assurance as our powers of observation are less educated. Consider the following case of a physical impression, derived from the sense of touch, which can be examined and verified at pleasure:—If the hands be brought towards each other so that the tips of the corresponding fingers touch, the end of any finger may be considered as an object to be felt by the

opposed finger, thus the two middle fingers may for the present be so viewed. If the attention be directed to them, no difficulty will be experienced in moving each lightly in a circle round the tip of the other, so that they shall each feel the opposite, and the motion may be either in one direction or the other—looking at the fingers, or with eyes employed elsewhere—or with the remaining fingers touching quiescently, or moving in a like direction; all is easy, because each finger is employed in the ordinary or educated manner whilst obeying the will, and whilst communicating through the sentient organ with the brain. But turn the hands half way round, so that their backs shall be towards each other, and then, crossing them at the wrists, again bring the like fingers into contact at the tips. If it be now desired to move the extremities of the middle fingers round each other, or to follow the contour of one finger by the tip of the opposed one, all sorts of confusion in the motion will ensue; and as the finger of one hand tries, under the instruction of the will, to move in one course, the touched finger will convey an intimation that it is moving in another. If all the fingers move at once, all will be in confusion, the ease and simplicity of the first case having entirely disappeared. If, after some considerable trial, familiarity with the new circumstances have removed



part of the uncertainty, then, crossing the hands at the opposite sides of the wrists will renew it. These contrary results are dependent not on any change in the nature of the sentient indication, or of the surfaces or substances which the sense has to deal with, but upon the trifling circumstance of a little variation from the direction in which the sentient organs of these parts are usually exerted, and they show to what an extraordinary extent our interpretations of the sense impressions depend upon the experience, *i.e.*, the education which they have previously received, and their great inability to aid us at once in circumstances which are entirely new.

At other times they fail us because we cannot keep a true remembrance of former impressions. Thus, on the evening of the eleventh of March last, I and many others were persuaded that at one period the moon had a real green colour, and though I knew that the prevailing red tints of the general sky were competent to produce an effect of such a kind, yet there was so little of that in the neighbourhood of the planet, that I was doubtful whether the green tint was not produced on the moon by some aërial medium spread before it, until, by holding up white cards in a proper position, and comparing them with our satellite, I had determined experimentally that the effect was only one of contrast. In the midst of

the surrounding tints, my memory could not recall the true sentient impression which the white of the moon most surely had before made upon the eye.

At other times the failure is because one impression is overpowered by another ; for as the morning star disappears when the sun is risen, though still above the horizon and shining brightly as ever, so do stronger phenomena obscure weaker, even when both are of the same kind ; till an uninstructed person is apt to pass the weaker unobserved, and even deny their existence.

So, error results occasionally from believing our senses : it ought to be considered, rather, as an *error of the judgment* than of the sense, for the latter has performed its duty ; the indication is always correct, and in harmony with the great truth of nature. Where, then, is the mistake ?—almost entirely with our judgment. We have not had that sufficient instruction by the senses which would justify our making a conclusion ; we have to contrive extra and special means, by which their first impressions shall be corrected, or rather enlarged ; and it is because our procedure was hasty, our data too few, and our judgment untaught, that we fell into mistake ; not because the data were wrong. How frequently may each one of us perceive, in our neighbours, at least, that a result like this derived from the observation

of physical things, happens in the ordinary affairs of common life.

When I become convicted of such haste, which is not unfrequently the case, I look back upon the error as one of ‘presumptuous judgment.’ Under that form it is easily presentable to the mind, and has a useful corrective action. I do not think the expression too strong; for if we are led, either by simplicity or vanity, to give an opinion upon matters respecting which we are not instructed, either by the knowledge of others, or our own intimate observation; if we are induced to ascribe an effect to one force, or deny its relation to another, knowing little or nothing of the laws of the forces, or the necessary conditions of the effect to be considered; surely our judgment must be qualified as ‘presumptuous.’

There are multitudes who think themselves competent to decide, after the most cursory observation, upon the cause of this or that event (and they may be really very acute and correct in things familiar to them):—a not unusual phrase with them is, that ‘it stands to reason,’ that the effect they expect should result from the cause they assign to it, and yet it is *very difficult*, in numerous cases that appear plain, to show this reason, or to deduce the true and only rational relation of cause and effect. In matters connected with natural philosophy, we have wonderful

aid in the progress and assurance in the character, of our final judgment, afforded us by the facts which supply our data, and the experience which multiplies their number and varies their testimony. A fundamental fact, like an elementary principle, never fails us, its evidence is always true; but, on the other hand, we frequently have to ask what is the fact?—often fail in distinguishing it,—often fail in the very statement of it,—and mostly overpass or come short of its true recognition.

If we are subject to mistake in the interpretation of our mere sense impressions, we are much more liable to error when we proceed to deduce from these impressions (as supplied to us by our ordinary experience), the relation of cause and effect; and the accuracy of our judgment, consequently, is more endangered. Then our dependence should be upon carefully observed facts, and the laws of nature; and I shall proceed to a further illustration of the mental deficiency I speak of, by a brief reference to one of these.

The *laws of nature*, as we understand them, are the foundation of our knowledge in natural things. So much as we know of them has been developed by the successive energies of the highest intellects, exerted through many ages. After a most rigid and scrutinizing examination upon principle and trial, a definite expression has been given to them; they



have become, as it were, our belief or trust. From day to day we still examine and test our expressions of them. We have no interest in their retention if erroneous; on the contrary, the greatest discovery a man could make would be to prove that one of these accepted laws was erroneous, and his greatest honour would be the discovery. Neither would there be any desire to retain the former expression:—for we know that the new or the amended law would be far more productive in results, would greatly increase our intellectual acquisitions, and would prove an abundant source of fresh delight to the mind.

These laws are numerous, and are more or less comprehensive. They are also precise; for a law may present an apparent exception, and yet not be less a law to us, when the exception is included in the expression. Thus, that elevation of temperature expands all bodies is a well-defined law, though there be an exception in water for a limited temperature; because we are careful, whilst stating the law, to state the exception and its limits. Pre-eminent among these laws, because of its simplicity, its universality, and its undeviating truth, stands that enunciated by Newton (commonly called the *law of gravitation*), that matter attracts matter with a force inversely as the square of the distance. Newton showed that, by this law, the general condition

of things on the surface of the earth is governed ; and the globe itself, with all upon it, kept together as a whole. He demonstrated that the motions of the planets round the sun, and of the satellites about the planets, were subject to it. During and since his time, certain variations in the movements of the planets, which were called irregularities, and might, for aught that was then known, be due to some cause other than the attraction of gravitation, were found to be its necessary consequences. By the close and scrutinizing attention of minds the most persevering and careful, it was ascertained that even the distant stars were subject to this law ; and, at last, to place as it were the seal of assurance to its never-failing truth, it became, in the minds of Leverrier and Addams (1845), the foreteller and the discoverer of an orb rolling in the depths of space, so large as to equal nearly sixty earths, yet so far away as to be invisible to the unassisted eye. What truth, beneath that of revelation, can have an assurance stronger than this!

Yet this law is often cast aside as of no value or authority, because of the unconscious ignorance amidst which we dwell. You hear at the present day, that some persons can place their fingers on a table, and then elevating their hands, the table will rise up and follow them ; that the piece of furniture, though heavy, will ascend, and that

their hands bear no weight, or are not drawn down to the wood ; you do not hear of this as a conjuring manœuvre, to be shown for your amusement, but are expected seriously to believe it ; and are told that it is an important fact, a great discovery amongst the truths of nature. Your neighbour, a well-meaning, conscientious person, believes it ; and the assertion finds acceptance in every rank of society, and amongst classes which are esteemed to be educated. Now, what can this imply but that society, speaking generally, is not only ignorant as respects education of the judgment, but is also ignorant of its ignorance. The parties who are thus persuaded, and those who are inclined to think and to hope that they are right, throw up Newton's law at once, and *that* in a case which of all others is fitted to be tested by it ; or if the law be erroneous, to test the law. I will not say they oppose the law, though I *have* heard the supposed fact quoted triumphantly against it ; but as far as my observation has gone, they will not apply it. The law affords the simplest means of testing the fact, and if there be, indeed, anything in the latter new to our knowledge (and who shall say that new matter is not presented to us daily, passing away unrecognised), it also affords the means of placing *that* before us separately in its simplicity and truth. Then why not consent to apply the knowledge we

have to that which is under development? Shall we educate ourselves in what is known, and then casting away all we have acquired, turn to our ignorance for aid to guide us among the unknown? If so, instruct a man to write, but employ one who is unacquainted with letters to read that which is written; the end will be just as unsatisfactory, though not so injurious, for the book of nature, which we have to read, is written by the finger of God. Why should not one who can thus lift a table, proceed to verify and simplify his fact, and bring it into relation with the law of Newton? Why should he not take the top of his table (it may be a small one), and placing it in a balance, or on a lever, proceed to ascertain how much weight he can raise by the draught of his fingers upwards; and of this weight, so ascertained, how much is unrepresented by any pull upon the fingers downward? He will then be able to investigate the further question, whether electricity, or any new force of matter, is made manifest in his operations; or whether action and reaction being unequal, he has at his command the source of a perpetual motion. Such a man, furnished with a nicely constructed carriage on a railway, ought to travel by the mere draught of his own fingers. A far less prize than this would gain him the attention of the whole scientific and commercial world;



and he may rest assured, that if he can make the most delicate balance incline or decline by attraction, though it be only with the force of an ounce, or even a grain, he will not fail to gain universal respect and most honourable reward.

When we think of the laws of nature (which by continued observation have become known to us), as the proper tests to which any new fact or our theoretical representation of it should, in the first place, be subjected, let us contemplate their assured and large character. Let us go out into the field and look at the heavens with their solar, starry, and planetary glories; the sky with its clouds; the waters descending from above or wandering at our feet; the animals, the trees, the plants; and consider the permanency of their actions and conditions under the government of these laws. The most delicate flower, the tenderest insect, continues in its species through countless years; always varying, yet ever the same. When we think we have discovered a departure, as in the *Aphides*, *Medusæ*, *Distomæ*, &c.,\* the law concerned is itself the best means of instituting an investigation, and hitherto we have always found the witness to return to its original testimony. These frail things are never ceasing, never changing, evidence of the

\* See Claparède's Account of Alternating Generation and the Metamorphoses of Inferior Animals.—*Bib. Univ.*, Mar. 1854. p. 229.

law's immutability. It would be well for a man who has an anomalous case before him, to contemplate a blade of grass, and when he has considered the numerous ceaseless, yet certain, actions there located, and his inability to change the character of the least among them, to recur to his new subject; and, in place of accepting unwatched and unchecked results, to search for a like certainty and recurrence in the appearances and actions which belong to it.

Perhaps it may be said, the delusion of table-moving is past, and need not be recalled before an audience like the present;\*—even granting this, let us endeavour to make the subject leave one useful result; let it serve for an example, not to pass into forgetfulness. It is so recent, and was received by the public in a manner so strange, as to justify a reference to it, in proof of the uneducated condition of the general mind. I do not object to table-moving, for *itself*; for being once stated it becomes a fit, though a very unpromising subject for experiment; but I am opposed to the unwillingness of its advocates to investigate; their boldness to assert; the credulity of the lookers-on; their desire that the reserved and cautious objector should be in error; and I wish, by calling attention to these things, to

\* See note, p. 88.

make the general want of mental discipline and education manifest.

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Having endeavoured to point out this great deficiency in the exercise of the intellect, I will offer a few remarks upon the means of subjecting it to the improving processes of instruction. Perhaps many who watch over the interests of the community, and are anxious for its welfare, will conclude, that the development of the judgment cannot properly be included in the general idea of education; that as the education proposed must, to a very large degree, be of *self*, it is so far incommunicable; that the master and the scholar merge into one, and both disappear; that the instructor is no wiser than the one to be instructed, and thus the usual relations of the two lose their power. Still, I believe that the judgment may be educated to a very large extent, and might refer to the fine arts, as giving proof in the affirmative; and though, as respects the community and its improvement in relation to common things, any useful education must be of *self*, I think that society, as a body, may act powerfully in the cause. Or it may still be objected that my experience is imperfect, is chiefly derived from exercise of the mind within the precincts of natural philosophy, and has not that generality of application which can make it of any value to society

at large. I can only repeat my conviction, that society occupies itself now-a-days about physical matters, and judges them as common things. Failing in relation to them, it is equally liable to carry such failures into other matters of life. The proof of deficient judgment in one department shows the habit of mind, and the general want, in relation to others. I am persuaded that all persons may find in natural things an admirable school for self-instruction, and a field for the necessary mental exercise; that they may easily apply their habits of thought, thus formed, to a social use; and that they ought to do this, as a duty to themselves and their generation.

Let me first try to illustrate the former part of the case, and at the same time state what I think a man may and ought to do for himself.

The *self-education* to which he should be stimulated by the desire to improve his judgment, requires no blind dependence upon the dogmas of others, but is commended to him by the suggestions and dictates of his own common sense. The first part of it is founded in mental discipline: happily it requires no unpleasant avowals; appearances are preserved, and vanity remains unhurt; but it is necessary that a man *examine himself*, and *that* not carelessly. On the contrary, as he advances, he should become more and more strict, till he ultimately prove a sharper



critic to himself than any one else can be ; and he ought to intend this, for, so far as he consciously falls short of it, he acknowledges that others may have reason on their side when they criticize him. A first result of this habit of mind will be an internal conviction of *ignorance in many things respecting which his neighbours are taught*, and, that his opinions and conclusions on such matters ought to be advanced with reservation. A mind so disciplined will be *open to correction upon good grounds in all things*, even in those it is best acquainted with ; and should familiarize itself with the idea of such being the case : for though it sees no reason to suppose itself in error, yet the possibility exists. The mind is not enfeebled by this internal admission, but strengthened ; for, if it cannot distinguish proportionately between the probable right and wrong of things known imperfectly, it will tend either to be rash or to hesitate ; whilst that which admits the due amount of probability is likely to be justified in the end. It is right that we should stand by and act on our principles ; but not right to hold them in obstinate blindness, or retain them when proved to be erroneous. I remember the time when I believed a spark was produced between voltaic metals as they approached to contact (and the reasons why it might be possible yet remain) ; but others doubted the fact and denied the proofs, and on

re-examination I found reason to admit their corrections were well founded. Years ago I believed that electrolytes could conduct electricity by a conduction proper; that has also been denied by many through long time: though I believed myself right, yet circumstances have induced me to pay that respect to criticism as to reinvestigate the subject, and I have the pleasure of thinking that nature confirms my original conclusions. So though evidence may appear to preponderate extremely in favour of a certain decision, it is wise and proper to hear a counter-statement. You can have no idea how often and how much, under such an impression, I have desired that the marvellous descriptions which have reached me might prove, in some points, correct; and how frequently I have submitted myself to hot fires, to friction with magnets, to the passes of hands, &c., lest I should be shutting out discovery;—encouraging the strong desire that something might be true, and that I might aid in the development of a new force of nature.

Among those points of self-education which take up the form of *mental discipline*, there is one of great importance, and, moreover, difficult to deal with, because it involves an internal conflict, and equally touches our vanity and our ease. It consists in the *tendency to deceive ourselves* regarding all we wish for, and the necessity of *resistance to these desires*.

It is impossible for any one who has not been constrained, by the course of his occupation and thoughts, to a habit of continual self-correction, to be aware of the amount of error in relation to judgment arising from this tendency. The force of the temptation which urges us to seek for such evidence and appearances as are in favour of our desires, and to disregard those which oppose them, is wonderfully great. In this respect we are all, more or less, active promoters of error. In place of practising wholesome self-abnegation, we ever make the wish the father to the thought: we receive as friendly that which agrees with, we resist with dislike that which opposes us; whereas the very reverse is required by every dictate of common sense. Let me illustrate my meaning by a case where the proof being easy, the rejection of it under the temptation is the more striking. In old times, a ring or a button would be tied by a boy to one end of a long piece of thread, which he would then hold at the other end, letting the button hang within a glass, or over a piece of slate-pencil, or sealing-wax, or a nail; he would wait and observe whether the button swung, and whether in swinging it tapped the glass as many times as the clock struck last, or moved along or across the slate-pencil, or in a circle or oval. In late times, parties in all ranks of life have renewed and repeated the boy's experiment.

They have sought to ascertain a very simple fact—namely, whether the effect was as reported ; but how many were unable to do this ? They were sure they could keep their hands immoveable,—were sure they could do so whilst watching the result,—were sure that accordance of swing with an expected direction was not the result of their desires or involuntary motions. How easily all these points could be put to the proof by *not looking at the objects*, yet how difficult for the experimenter to deny himself that privilege. I have rarely found one who would freely permit the substance experimented with to be screened from his sight, and then its position changed.

When engaged in the investigation of table-turning, I constructed a very simple apparatus,\* serving as an index, to show the unconscious motions of the hands upon the table. The results were either that the index moved before the table, or that neither index nor table moved ; and in numerous cases all moving power was annihilated. A universal objection was made to it by the table-turners. It was said to paralyze the powers of the mind ;—but the experimenters need not see the index ; they may leave their friends to watch that, and their minds may revel in any power that their expectation or their

\* *Athenæum*, July 2, 1853.—Newman, Philosophical Instrument Maker, 122, Regent Street.



imagination can confer. So restrained, a *dislike* to the trial arises; but what is that except a proof that whilst they trust themselves they doubt themselves, and are not willing to proceed to the decision, lest the trust which they like should fail them, and the doubt which they dislike rise to the authority of truth.

Again, in respect of the action of magnets on the body, it is almost impossible for an uninstructed person to enter profitably upon such an inquiry. He may observe *any* symptom which his expectation has been accidentally directed to:—yet be unconscious of any, if unaware of his subjection to the magnetic force, or of the conditions and manner of its application.

As a proof of the extent of this influence, even on the minds of those well aware of its force, and desirous under every circumstance to escape from it, I will mention the practice of the chemist, who, dealing with the balance, that impartial decider which never fails in its indication, but offers its evidence with all simplicity, durability, and truth, still remembers he should doubt himself; and, with the desire of rendering himself inaccessible to temptation, takes a counterpoised but unknown quantity of the substance for analysis, that he may remain ignorant of the proportions which he ought to obtain, and only at last compares the sum of his products with his counterpoise.

The *inclination* we exhibit in respect of any report or opinion that harmonises with our preconceived notions, can only be compared in degree with the *incredulity* we entertain towards everything that opposes them; and these opposite and apparently incompatible, or at least inconsistent, conditions are accepted simultaneously in the most extraordinary manner. At one moment a departure from the laws of nature is admitted without the pretence of a careful examination of the proof; and at the next, the whole force of these laws, acting undeviatingly through all time, is denied, because the testimony they give is disliked.

It is my firm persuasion, that no man can examine himself in the most common things, having any reference to him personally, or to any person, thought, or matter related to him, without being soon made aware of *the temptation* and the difficulty of opposing it. I could give you many illustrations personal to myself, about atmospheric magnetism, lines of force, attraction, repulsion, unity of power, nature of matter, &c.; or in things more general to our common nature, about likes and dislikes, wishes, hopes, and fears; but it would be unsuitable and also unnecessary, for each must be conscious of a large field sadly uncultivated in this respect. *I will simply express my strong belief, that that point of self-education which consists in teaching the mind to*

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*resist its desires and inclinations, until they are proved to be right, is the most important of all, not only in things of natural philosophy, but in every department of daily life.*

There are numerous precepts resulting more or less from the principles of mental discipline already insisted on as essential, which are very useful in forming a judgment about matters of fact, whether among natural things or between man and man. Such a precept, and one that should recur to the mind early in every new case is, to *know the conditions* of the matter, respecting which we are called upon to make a judgment. To suppose that any would judge before they professed to know the conditions would seem to be absurd; on the other hand, to assume that the community *does wait* to know the conditions before it judges, is an assumption so large that I cannot accept it. Very few search out the conditions; most are anxious to sink those which oppose their preconceptions; yet none can be left out if a right judgment is to be formed. It is true that many conditions must ever remain unknown to us, even in regard to the simplest things in nature: thus as to the wonderful action of gravity, whose law never fails us, we cannot say whether the bodies are acting truly at a distance, or by a physical line of force as a connecting link between them. The

great majority think the former is the case; Newton's judgment is for the latter.\* But of the conditions which are within our reach we should search out all; for in relation to those which remain unknown or unsuspected, we are in that very ignorance (regarding judgment) which it is our present object, first to make manifest, and then to remove.

One exercise of the mind, which largely influences the power and character of the judgment, is the habit of forming *clear and precise ideas*. If, after considering a subject in our ordinary manner, we return upon it with the special purpose of noticing the condition of our thoughts, we shall be astonished to find how little precise they remain. On recalling the phenomena relating to a matter of fact, the circumstances modifying them, the kind and amount of action presented, the real or probable result, we shall find that the first impressions are scarcely fit for the foundation of a judgment, and that the second thoughts will be best. For the acquirement of a good condition of mind in this respect, the thoughts should be trained to a habit of clear and precise formation, so that vivid and distinct impressions of the matter in hand, its circumstances and consequences, may remain.

\* *Newton's Works*. Horsley's Edition, 1783, iv. p. 438.—or the Third Letter to Bentley.



Before we proceed to consider any question involving physical principles, we should set out with *clear ideas* of the naturally possible and impossible. There are many subjects uniting more or less of the most sure and valuable investigations of science with the most imaginary and unprofitable speculation, that are continually passing through their various phases of intellectual, experimental, or commercial development: some to be established, some to disappear, and some to recur again and again, like ill weeds that cannot be extirpated, yet can be cultivated to no result as wholesome food for the mind. Such, for instance, in different degrees, are the caloric engine, the electric light, the Pasilalinic sympathetic compass,\* mesmerism, homœopathy, odylism, the magneto-electric engine, the perpetual motion, &c.: all hear and talk of these things; all use their judgment more or less upon them, and all might do that effectively, if they were to instruct themselves to the extent which is within their reach. I am persuaded that natural things offer an admirable school for self-instruction, a most varied field for the necessary mental practice, and that those who exercise themselves therein may easily apply the habits of thought thus formed to a social use. As a first step in such practice, clear ideas should be

\* See *Chambers's Journal*, 1851. Feb. 15th, p. 105.

obtained of what is possible and what is impossible. Thus, it is impossible to *create* force. We may employ it; we may evoke it in one form by its consumption in another; we may hide it for a period; but we can neither *create* nor *destroy* it. We may cast it away; but where we dismiss it, there it will do its work. If, therefore, we desire to consider a proposition respecting the employment or evolution of power, let us carry our judgment, educated on this point, with us. If the proposal include the double use of a force with only one excitement, it implies a creation of power, and that *cannot be*. If we could by the fingers draw a heavy piece of wood or stone upward without effort, and then, letting it sink, could produce by its gravity an effort equal to its weight, that would be a creation of power, and *cannot be*.

So again we cannot *annihilate* matter, nor can we *create* it. But if we are satisfied to rest upon that dogma, what are we to think of table-lifting? If we could make the table to cease from acting by gravity upon the earth beneath it, or by reaction upon the hand supposed to draw it upwards, we *should annihilate it*, in respect of that very property which characterises it as matter.

Considerations of this nature are very important aids to the judgment; and when a statement is made claiming our assent, we should endeavour to reduce

it to some consequence which can be immediately compared with, and tried by, these or like compact and never failing truths. If incompatibility appears, then we have reason to suspend our conclusion, however attractive to the imagination the proposition may be, and pursue the inquiry further, until accordance is obtained ; it must be a most uneducated and presumptuous mind that can at once consent to cast off the tried truth and accept in its place the mere loud assertion. We should endeavour to separate the points before us, and concentrate each, so as to evolve a clear type idea of the ruling fact and its consequences ; looking at the matter on every side, with the great purpose of distinguishing the constituent reality, and recognising it under every variety of aspect.

In like manner we should accustom ourselves to clear and definite language, especially in physical matters, giving to a word its true and full, but measured meaning, that we may be able to convey our ideas clearly to the minds of others. Two persons cannot mutually impart their knowledge, or compare and rectify their conclusions, unless both attend to the true intent and force of language. If by such words as attraction, electricity, polarity, or atom, they imply different things, they may discuss facts, deny results, and doubt consequences for an indefinite time without any advantageous progress. I

hold it as a great point in self-education that the student should be continually engaged in forming exact ideas, and in expressing them clearly by language. Such practice insensibly opposes any tendency to exaggeration or mistake, and increases the sense and love of truth in every part of life.

I should be sorry, however, if what I have said were understood as meaning that education for the improvement and strengthening of the judgment is to be altogether repressive of the imagination, or confine the exercise of the mind to processes of a mathematical or mechanical character. I believe that, in the pursuit of physical science, the imagination should be taught to present the subject investigated in all possible, and even in impossible views; to search for analogies of likeness and (if I may say so) of opposition—inverse or contrasted analogies; to present the fundamental idea in every form, proportion, and condition; to clothe it with suppositions and probabilities, that all cases may pass in review, and be touched, if needful, by the Ithuriel spear of experiment. But all this must be *under government*, and the result must not be given to society until the judgment, educated by the process itself, has been exercised upon it. Let us construct our hypotheses for an hour, or a day, or for years; they are of the utmost value in the elimination of



truth, 'which is evolved more freely from error than from confusion ;' but, above all things, let us not cease to be aware of the temptation they offer, or, because they gradually become familiar to us, accept them as established. We could not reason about electricity without thinking of it as a fluid, or a vibration, or some other existent state or form. We should give up half our advantage in the consideration of heat if we refused to consider it as a principle, or a state of motion. We could scarcely touch such subjects by experiment, and we should make no progress in their practical application, without hypothesis ; still it is absolutely necessary that we should learn to doubt the conditions we assume, and acknowledge we are uncertain, whether heat and electricity are vibrations or substances, or either.

When the different data required are in our possession, and we have succeeded in forming a clear idea of each, the mind should be instructed to *balance them* one against another, and not suffered carelessly to hasten to a conclusion. This reserve is most essential ; and it is especially needful that the reasons which are adverse to our expectations or our desires should be carefully attended to. We often receive truth from unpleasant sources ; we often have reason to accept unpalatable truths. We are never freely willing to admit information having this

unpleasant character, and it requires much self-control in this respect, to preserve us even in a moderate degree from errors. I suppose there is scarcely one investigator in original research who has not felt the temptation to disregard the reasons and results which are against his views. I acknowledge that I have experienced it very often, and will not pretend to say that I have yet learned on all occasions to avoid the error. When a bar of bismuth or phosphorus is placed between the poles of a powerful magnet, it is drawn into a position across the line joining the poles; when only one pole is near the bar, the latter recedes; this and the former effect is due to repulsion, and is strikingly in contrast with the attraction shown by iron. To account for it, I at one time suggested the idea that a polarity was induced in the phosphorus or bismuth the reverse of the polarity induced in iron, and that opinion is still sustained by eminent philosophers. But observe a necessary result of such a supposition, which appears to follow when the phenomena are referred to elementary principles. *Time* is shown, by every result bearing on the subject, to be concerned in the coming on and passing away of the inductive condition produced by magnetic force, and the consequence, as Thomson pointed out, is, that if a ball of bismuth could be suspended

between the poles of a magnet, so as to encounter no resistance from the surrounding medium, or from friction or torsion, and were once put in motion round a vertical axis, it would, because of the assumed polar state, go on for ever revolving, the parts which at any moment are axial moving like the bar, so as to become the next moment equatorial. Now, as we believe the mechanical forces of nature tend to bring things into a stable, and not into an unstable condition; as we believe that a perpetual motion is impossible; so because both these points are involved in the notion of the reverse polarity, which itself is not supposed to be dependant on any consumption of power, I feel bound to hold the judgment balanced, and therefore hesitate to accept a conclusion founded on such a notion of the physical action; the more especially as the peculiar test facts\* which prove the polarity of iron are not reproduced in the case of diamagnetic bodies.

As a result of this wholesome mental condition, we should be able to form a *proportionate judgment*. The mind naturally desires to settle upon one thing or another; to rest upon an affirmative or a negative; and that with a degree of absolutism which is irrational and improper. In drawing a conclusion it is very difficult, but not the less necessary, to

\* *Experimental Researches in Electricity*, paragraphs 2657—2681.

make it *proportionate* to the evidence : except where certainty exists (a case of rare occurrence), we should consider our decisions as probable only. The probability may appear very great, so that in affairs of the world we often accept such as certainty, and trust our welfare or our lives upon it. Still, only an uneducated mind will confound probability with certainty, especially when it encounters a contrary conclusion drawn by another from like data. This suspension in degree of judgment will not make a man less active in life, or his conclusions less certain as truths ; on the contrary, I believe him to be the more ready for the right amount and direction of action on any emergency ; and am sure his conclusions and statements will carry more weight in the world than those of the incautious man.

When I was young, I received from one well able to aid a learner in his endeavours toward self-improvement, a curious lesson in the mode of estimating the amount of belief one might be induced to attach to our conclusions. The person was 'Dr. Wollaston, who, upon a given point, was induced to offer me a wager of two to one on the affirmative. I rather impertinently quoted Butler's well-known lines\* about the kind of persons who use wagers for

\* 'Quoth she, 'I've heard old cunning stagers,  
Say fools for arguments use wagers.'



argument, and he gently explained to me, that he considered such a wager not as a thoughtless thing, but as an expression of the amount of belief in the mind of the person offering it; combining this curious application of the wager, as a *meter*, with the necessity that ever existed of drawing conclusions, not absolute but proportionate to the evidence.

Occasionally and frequently the exercise of the judgment ought to end in *absolute reservation*. It may be very distasteful, and great fatigue, to suspend a conclusion, but as we are not infallible, so we ought to be cautious; we shall eventually find our advantage, for the man who rests in his position is not so far from right as he who, proceeding in a wrong direction, is ever increasing his distance. In the year 1824, Arago discovered\* that copper and other bodies placed in the vicinity of a magnet, and having no direct action of attraction or repulsion upon it, did affect it when moved, and was affected by it. A copper plate revolving near a magnet carried the magnet with it; or if the magnet revolved, and not the copper, it carried the copper with it. A magnetic needle vibrating freely over a disc of glass or wood, was exceedingly retarded in its motion when these were replaced by a disc of copper. Arago stated most clearly all the conditions, and resolved

\* *Annales de Chimie*, xxviii. 325.

the forces into three directions, but not perceiving the physical cause of the action, exercised a most wise and instructive reservation as to his conclusion. Others, as Haldat, considered it as the proof of the universality of a magnetism of the ordinary kind, and held to that notion though it was contradicted by the further facts ; and it was only at a future period that the true physical cause, namely, magneto-electric currents induced in the copper, became known to us.\* What an education Arago's mind must have received in relation to philosophical reservation ; what an antithesis he forms with the mass of table turners ; and what a fine example he has left us of that condition of judgment to which we should strive to attain !

If I may give another illustration of the needful reservation of judgment, I will quote the case of oxygen and hydrogen gases, which, being mixed, will remain together uncombined for years in contact with glass, but in contact with spongy platinum combine at once. We have the same fact in many forms, and many suggestions have been made as to the mode of action, but as yet we do not know *clearly* how the result comes to pass. We cannot tell whether electricity acts or not. Then we should suspend our conclusions. Our knowledge of the

\* *Philosophical Transactions*, 1832, p. 146.

fact itself, and the many varieties of it, is not the less abundant or sure; and when the truth shall hereafter emerge from the mist, we ought to have no opposing prejudice, but be prepared to receive it.

The education which I advocate will require *patience* and *labour of thought* in every exercise tending to improve the judgment. It matters not on what subject a person's mind is occupied, he should engage in it with the conviction that it will require mental labour. A powerful mind will be able to draw a conclusion more readily and more correctly than one of moderate character, but both will surpass themselves if they make an earnest, careful investigation, instead of a careless or prejudiced one; and education for this purpose is the more necessary for the latter, because the man of less ability may, through it, raise his rank and amend his position. I earnestly urge this point of self-education, for I believe it to be more or less in the power of every man greatly to improve his judgment. I do not think that one has the complete capacity for judgment which another is naturally without. I am of opinion that all may judge, and that we only need to declare on every side the conviction that mental education is wanting, and lead men to see that through it they hold, in a large degree, their welfare and their character in their own hands, to cause in future years

an abundant development of right judgment in every class.

This education has for its first and its last step *humility*. It can commence only because of a conviction of deficiency; and if we are not disheartened under the growing revelations which it will make, that conviction will become stronger unto the end. But the humility will be founded, not on comparison of ourselves with the imperfect standards around us, but on the increase of that internal knowledge which alone can make us aware of our internal wants. The first step in correction is to learn our deficiencies, and having learned them, the next step is almost complete: for no man who has discovered that his judgment is hasty, or illogical, or imperfect, would go on with the same degree of haste, or irrationality, or presumption as before. I do not mean that all would at once be cured of bad mental habits, but I think better of human nature than to believe, that a man in any rank of life, who has arrived at the consciousness of such a condition, would deny his common sense, and still judge and act as before. And though such self-schooling must continue to the end of life to supply an experience of deficiency rather than of attainment, still there is abundant stimulus to excite any man to perseverance. What he has lost are things imaginary, not real;



what he gains are riches before unknown to him, yet invaluable; and though he may think more humbly of his own character, he will find himself at every step of his progress more sought for than before, more trusted with responsibility and held in pre-eminence by his equals, and more highly valued by those whom he himself will esteem worthy of approbation.

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And now a few words upon the mutual relation of two classes, namely, *those* who decline to educate their judgments in regard to the matters on which they decide, and those who, by self-education, have endeavoured to improve themselves; and upon the remarkable and somewhat unreasonable manner in which the latter are called upon, and occasionally taunted, by the former. A man who makes assertions, or draws conclusions, regarding any given case, ought to be competent to investigate it. He has no right to throw the onus on others, declaring it their duty to prove him right or wrong. His duty is to demonstrate the truth of that which he asserts, or to cease from asserting. The men he calls upon to consider and judge have enough to do with themselves, in the examination, correction, or verification of their own views. The world little knows how many of the thoughts and theories which have passed through the mind of a scientific investigator have

been crushed in silence and secrecy by his own severe criticism and adverse examination; that in the most successful instances not a tenth of the suggestions, the hopes, the wishes, the preliminary conclusions have been realised. And is a man so occupied to be taken from his search after truth in the path he hopes may lead to its attainment, and occupied in vain upon nothing but a broad assertion?

Neither has the assertor of any new thing a right to claim an answer in the form of *Yes* or *No*; or think, because none is forthcoming, that he is to be considered as having established his assertion. So much is unknown to the wisest man, that he may often be without an answer: as frequently he is so, because the subject is in the region of hypothesis, and not of facts. In either case he has the right to refuse to speak. I cannot tell whether there are two fluids of electricity or any fluid at all. I am not bound to explain how a table tilts any more than to indicate how, under the conjurer's hands, a pudding appears in a hat. The means are not known to me. I am persuaded that the results, however strange they may appear, are in accordance with that which is truly known, and if carefully investigated would justify the well-tried laws of nature; but, as life is limited, I am not disposed to occupy the time it is made of in the investigation of matters which, in what is known to

me of them, offer no reasonable prospect of any useful progress, or anything but negative results. We deny the right of those who call upon us to answer their speculations '*if we can,*' whilst we have so many of our own to develope and correct; and claim the right for ourselves of withholding either our conclusions or the reasons for them, without in the least degree admitting that their affirmations are unanswerable. We are not even called upon to give an answer to the best of our belief: nor bound to admit a bold assertion because we do not *know* to the contrary. No one is justified in claiming our assent to the spontaneous generation of insects, because we cannot circumstantially explain how a mite or the egg of a mite has entered into a particular bottle. Let those who affirm the exception to the general law of nature, or those others who upon the affirmation accept the result, work out the experimental proof. It has been done in this case by Schulze,\* and is in the negative; but how few among the many who make, or repeat, the assertion, would have the requisite self-abnegation, the subjected judgment, the perseverance, and the precision which has been displayed in that research.

When men, more or less marked by their advance, are led by circumstances to give an opinion adverse to

\* MÜLLER'S *Physiology*, or POGGENDORF'S *Annalen*, 1836, xxxix. p. 487.

any popular notion, or to the assertions of any sanguine inventor, nothing is more usual than the attempt to neutralize the force of such an opinion by reference to the mistakes which like educated men have made; and their occasional misjudgments and erroneous conclusions are quoted, as if they were less competent than others to give an opinion, being even disabled from judging like matters to those which are included in their pursuits by the very exercise of their minds upon them. How frequently has the reported judgment of Davy, upon the impossibility of gas-lighting on a large scale, been quoted by speculators engaged in tempting monied men into companies, or in the pages of journals occupied with the popular fancies of the day; as if an argument were derivable from that in favour of some special object to be commended. Why should not men taught in the matter of judgment far beyond their neighbours, be expected to err sometimes, since the very education in which they are advanced can only terminate with their lives? What is there about them, derived from *this education*, which sets up the shadow of a pretence to perfection? Such men cannot learn all things, and may often be ignorant. The very progress which science makes amongst them as a body is a continual correction of ignorance—*i. e.*, of a state which is ignorance in relation to the future, though wisdom



and knowledge in relation to the past. In 1823, Wollaston discovered that beautiful substance which he called Titanium, believing it to be a simple metal : and it was so accepted by all philosophers. Yet this was a mistake, for Wöhler,\* in 1850, showed the substance was a very compound body. This is no reproach to Wollaston or to those who trusted in him ; he made a step in metallurgy which advanced knowledge, and perhaps we may hereafter, through it, learn to know that metals are compound bodies. Who, then, has a right to quote his mistake as a reproach against him ? Who could correct him but men intellectually educated as he himself was ? Who does not feel that the investigation remains a bright gem in the circlet that memory offers to his honour ?

If we are to estimate the utility of an educated judgment, do not let us hear merely of the errors of scientific men, which have been corrected by others taught in the same careful school ; but let us see what, as a body, they have produced, compared with that supplied by their reproachers. Where are the established truths and triumphs of ring-swingers, table-turners, table-speakers ? What one result in the numerous divisions of science or its applications can be traced to their exertions ? Where is the investigation completed, so that, as in gas-lighting, all

\* *Annales de Chimie*, xxix. p. 166.

may admit that the principles are established and a good end obtained, without the shadow of a doubt?

If we look to electricity, it, in the hands of the careful investigator, has advanced to the most extraordinary results: it approaches at the motion of his hand; bursts from the metal; descends from the atmosphere; surrounds the globe: it talks, it writes, it records, it appears to him (cautious as he has learned to become) as a universal spirit in nature. If we look to photography, whose origin is of our own day, and see what it has become in the hands of its discoverers and their successors, how wonderful are the results! The light is made to yield impressions upon the dead silver or the coarse paper, beautiful as those it produced upon the living and sentient retina: its most transient impression is rendered durable for years; it is made to leave a visible or an invisible trace; to give a result to be seen now or a year hence; made to paint all natural forms and even colours; it serves the offices of war, of peace, of art, science, and economy: it replaces even the mind of the human being in some of its lower services; for a little camphine lamp is set down and left to itself, to perform the duty of watching the changes of magnetism, heat, and other forces of nature, and to record the results, in pictorial curves, which supply an enduring record of their most transitory actions.

What has clairvoyance, or mesmerism, or table-rapping done in comparison with results like these? What have the snails at Paris told us from the snails at New York? What have any of these intelligences done in *aiding* such developments? Why did they not inform us of the possibility of photography? or when that became known, why did they not favour us with some instructions for its improvement? They all profess to deal with agencies far more exalted in character than an electric current or a ray of light: they also deal with mechanical forces; they employ both the bodily organs and the mental; they profess to lift a table, to turn a hat, to see into a box, or into the next room, or a town:—why should they not move a balance, and so give us the element of a new mechanical power? take cognizance of a bottle and its contents, and tell us how they will act upon those of a neighbouring bottle? either see or feel into a crystal, and inform us of what it is composed? Why have they not added one metal to the fifty known to mankind, or one planet to the number daily increasing under the observant eye of the astronomer? Why have they not corrected one of the *mistakes* of the philosophers? There are no doubt very many that require it. There has been plenty of time for the development and maturation of some of the numerous public pretences that have risen up in connexion with

these supposed agencies ; how is it that not one new power has been added to the means of investigation employed by the philosophers, or one valuable utilitarian application presented to society ?

In conclusion, I will freely acknowledge that all I have said regarding the great want of judgment manifested by society as a body, and the high value of any means which would tend to supply the deficiency, have been developed and declared on numerous occasions, by authority far above any I possess. The deficiency is known hypothetically, but I doubt if in reality ; the individual acknowledges the state in respect of others, but is unconscious of it in regard to himself. As to the world at large, the condition is accepted as a necessary fact ; and so it is left untouched, almost ignored. I think that education in a large sense should be applied to this state of the subject, and that society, though it can do little in the way of communicated experience, can do much, by a declaration of the evil that exists and of its remediable character ; by keeping alive a sense of the deficiency to be supplied ; and by directing the minds of men to the practice and enlargement of that self-education which every one pursues more or less, but which under conviction and method would produce a tenfold amount of good. I know that the multitude will always be behindhand in this education, and to



a far greater extent than in respect of the education which is founded on book learning. Whatever advance books make, they retain; but each new being comes on to the stage of life, with the same average amount of conceit, desires, and passions, as his predecessors, and in respect of self-education has all to learn. Does the circumstance that we can do little more than proclaim the necessity of instruction justify the ignorance? or our silence? or make the plea for this education less strong? Should it not, on the contrary, gain its strength from the fact that all are wanting more or less? I desire we should admit that, as a body, we are universally deficient in judgment. I do not mean that we are utterly ignorant, but that we have advanced only a little way in the requisite education, compared with what is within our power.

If the necessity of the education of the judgment were a familiar and habitual idea with the public, it would often afford a sufficient answer to the statement of an ill-informed or incompetent person; if quoted to recall to his remembrance the necessity of a mind instructed in a matter, and accustomed to balance evidence, it might frequently be an answer to the individual himself. Adverse influence might, and would, arise from the careless, the confident, the presumptuous, the hasty, and the dilatory man,

perhaps extreme opposition ; but I believe that the mere acknowledgment and proclamation of the ignorance, by society at large, would, through its moral influence, destroy the opposition, and be a great means to the attainment of the good end desired : for if no more be done than to lead such to turn their thoughts inwards, a step in education is gained : if they are *convinced* in any degree, an important advance is made ; if they learn only to *suspend* their judgment, the improvement will be one above price.

It is an extraordinary thing that man, with a mind so wonderful that there is nothing to compare with it elsewhere in the known creation, should leave it to run wild in respect of its highest elements and qualities. He has a power of comparison and judgment, by which his final resolves, and all those acts of his material system which distinguish him from the brutes, are guided :—shall he omit to educate and improve them when education can do much ? Is it towards the very principles and privileges that distinguish him above other creatures, he should feel indifference ? Because the education is internal, it is not the less needful ; nor is it more the duty of a man that he should cause his child to be taught than that he should teach himself. Indolence may tempt him to neglect the self-examination and experience which form his school, and weariness may induce

the evasion of the necessary practices ; but surely a thought of the prize should suffice to stimulate him to the requisite exertion : and to those who reflect upon the many hours and days, devoted by a lover of sweet sounds, to gain a moderate facility upon a mere mechanical instrument, it ought to bring a correcting blush of shame, if they feel convicted of neglecting the beautiful living instrument, wherein play all the powers of the mind.

I will conclude this subject ;—believe me when I say I have been speaking from self-conviction. I did not think this an occasion on which I ought to seek for flattering words regarding our common nature ; if so, I should have felt unfaithful to the trust I had taken up ; so I have spoken from experience. In thought I hear the voice, which judges me by the precepts I have uttered. I know that I fail frequently in that very exercise of judgment to which I call others ; and have abundant reason to believe that much more frequently I stand manifest to those around me, as one who errs, without being corrected by knowing it. I would willingly have evaded appearing before you on this subject, for I shall probably do but little good, and may well think it was an error of judgment to consent : having consented, my thoughts would flow back amongst the events and reflections of my past life, until I found nothing present itself but an

open declaration, almost a confession, as the means of performing the duty due to the subject and to you.

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NOTE REFERRED TO, p. 54.

As an illustration of the present state of the subject, I will quote one letter from among many like it which I have received.—M. F.

———‘*April 5, 1854.*

‘SIR,—I am one of the clergymen of this parish, and have had the subject of table-turning brought under my notice by some of my younger parishioners ; I gave your solution of it as a sufficient answer to the mystery. The reply was made, that you had since seen reason to alter your opinion. Would you have the politeness to inform me if you have done so ? With many apologies for troubling you,

‘I am, your obedient servant,

‘—————.’



ON THE  
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF PHYSICS AS  
A BRANCH OF EDUCATION FOR  
ALL CLASSES:

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION  
OF GREAT BRITAIN.

BY  
PROFESSOR TYNDALL, F.R.S.



ON THE  
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF  
PHYSICS

AS A BRANCH OF EDUCATION.

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THERE is a word in the title of this Lecture which does not clearly convey the idea by which I shall be guided in its delivery. I hold in my hand a soiled proof of the syllabus of the present course, and the title of the present lecture is there stated to be ‘On the Importance of the Study of Physics as a *Means* of Education.’ The corrected proof, however, contains the following title:—‘On the Importance of the Study of Physics as a *Branch* of Education.’ Small as the alteration may seem from means to branch, the two words appear to me to suggest two radically distinct modes of viewing the subject before us. The term Education is sometimes applied to a single faculty or organ, and if we know wherein the education of a single organ or faculty consists, this knowledge will enable us to form a clearer notion re-

garding the education of the sum of all the faculties, or of the mind. When, for example, we speak of the education of the voice, what do we mean? There are certain membranes at the top of the windpipe which are capable of being thrown into vibration by the air forced between them from the lungs, and thus caused to produce sound. These membranes are, to some extent, under the control of the will: it is found that they can be so modified by exercise as to produce notes of a clearer and more melodious character, and this exercise we call the education of the voice. We may choose for our exercise a new song or an old song, a festive song or a solemn chant; and, the education of the voice being the object we have in view, the songs may be regarded as the *means* by which this education is accomplished. I think this expresses the state of the case more clearly than if we were to call the songs a *branch* of education. Regarding also the education of the human mind as the improvement and development of the mental faculties, I consider the study of Physics to be a means towards the attainment of these objects. Of course, from this point of view, I degrade Physics into an implement of culture, and I mean to do so, to a great extent; for the general expansion of the intellectual powers implies both the acquisition of specific knowledge and the ability to render it



productive. There is this great difference between those who pursue a thing as a branch and those who use it as a means: in the latter case the knowledge imparted is truly power; whereas, in the former case, it may be the reverse. Viewing, then, the development of the mental faculties as the end of mental education, it will be my endeavour to state to you some of the claims of Physical Science as a means towards the attainment of this end.

I do not think that it is the mission of this age, or of any other particular age, to lay down a system of education which shall hold good for all ages. The basis of human nature is, perhaps, permanent, but not so the forms under which the spirit of humanity manifests itself. It is sometimes peaceful, sometimes warlike, sometimes religious, sometimes sceptical, and history is simply the record of its mutations.

‘The eternal Pan  
Who layeth the world’s incessant plan  
Halteth never in one shape,  
But for ever doth escape  
Into new forms.’

This appears to be the law of things throughout the universe, and it is therefore no proof of fickleness or destructiveness, properly so called, if the implements of human culture change with the times, and the requirements of the present age be found different

from those of the preceding. Unless you can say to me that the past world, or some portion of it, has been the final expression of human competency; that the wisdom of man has already reached its climax; that the intellect of to-day possesses feeblor powers, or a narrower scope than the intellect of earlier times; you cannot, with reason, demand from me an unconditional acceptance of the systems of the past, nor are you justified in divorcing me from the world and times in which I live, and confining my conversation to the times gone by. Who can blame me if I cherish the belief that the world is still young; that there are great possibilities in store for it; that the Englishman of to-day is made of as good stuff, and has as high and independent a vocation to fulfil, as had the ancient Greek or Roman. While thankfully accepting what antiquity has to offer, let us never forget that the present century has just as good a right to its own forms of thought and methods of culture as any former centuries had to theirs, and that the same sources of power are open to us to-day as were ever open to man in any age of the world.

In the earliest religious writings, we find man described as a mixture of the earthy and the divine. The existence of the latter implies, in his case, that of the former: and hence the holiest and most self-denying saint must, to a certain extent, protect him-

self against hunger and cold. But every attempt to restrict man to the dominion of the senses has failed, and will continue to fail. He is the repository of forces which push him beyond the world of sense. He has an intellect as well as a palate, and the demands of the latter being satisfied, the former inevitably puts in its claim. We cannot quench these desires of the intellect. They are stimulated by the phenomena which surround us in our present state of existence as the body is by oxygen; and in the presence of these phenomena man thirsts for knowledge as an Arab longs for water when he smells the Nile. The Chaldean shepherds could not rest contented with their bread and milk, but made the discovery that man had other wants to satisfy. The stars shed their light upon the shepherd and his flock, but in both cases with very different results. The quadruped cropped the green herbage and slept contented; but that power which had already made man the lord of the quadruped was appealed to night after night, and thus the intellectual germ which lay in the nature of these Chaldeans was stimulated and developed. Surely, if man be not made, and stars scattered, by guess-work, there is strong reason for assuming that it was intended that mental power should be developed in this way. As the nurse holds her glittering toy before the infant that she

would encourage to take its first step, so it would appear as if one of the ends of the Creator, in setting those shining things in heaven, was to woo the attention and excite the intellectual activity of his earthborn child. But if this be granted, then it must be admitted that we have the very highest sanction for the prosecution of physical research. Sanction, indeed, is a term too weak to express the inference suggested by a comparison of Man's powers with his position upon earth; it points to an imperative command to search and to examine, rather than to a mere toleration of physical inquiry.

The term *Physics*, as made use of in the present Lecture, refers to that portion of natural science which lies midway between astronomy and chemistry. The former, indeed, is *Physics* applied to masses of enormous weight, while the latter is *Physics* applied to atoms and molecules. The subjects of *Physics* proper are, therefore, those which lie nearest to human perception:—the light and heat of the sun, colour, sound, motion, the loadstone, electrical attractions and repulsions, thunder and lightning, rain, snow, dew, and so forth. The senses of Man stand between these phenomena, between the external world, and the world of thought. He observes the fact, but is not satisfied with the mere act of observation: he must render an account of the fact: he



takes his images from Nature and transfers them to the domain of thought: he looks at them, compares them, observes their mutual relations and connexions, and thus brings them clearer and clearer before his mental eye, until, finally, he alights upon the cause which unites them. This is the last act of the mind, in this centripetal direction, in its progress from the multiplicity of facts to the central cause on which they depend. But, having guessed the cause, he is not yet contented: he now sets out from his centre and travels in the other direction: he sees that if his guess be true, certain consequences must follow from it, and he appeals to the law and testimony of experiment whether the thing is so. Thus he completes the circuit of thought,—from without inward, from multiplicity to unity, and from within outward, from unity to multiplicity. He traverses the line between cause and effect both ways, and, in so doing, calls all his reasoning powers into play. For the mental effort involved in these processes may be justly compared to those exercises of the body which invoke the co-operation of every muscle, and thus confer upon the whole frame the benefits of healthy action.

The first experiment a man makes is a physical experiment: he is a natural philosopher by instinct, and the suction-pump is but an imitation of the first act of every new-born infant. Nor do I think it

calculated to lessen that infant's reverence, or to make him a worse citizen, when his riper experience shows him that the atmosphere was his helper in extracting the first draught from his mother's breast. The child grows, but is still an experimenter: he grasps at the moon, and his failure teaches him to respect distance. At length his little fingers acquire sufficient mechanical tact to lay hold of a spoon. He thrusts the instrument into his mouth; hurts his little gums, and thus learns the impenetrability of matter. He lets the spoon fall, and jumps with delight to hear it rattle against the table. The experiment made by accident is repeated with intention, and thus the young Newton receives his first lessons upon sound and gravitation. There are pains and penalties, however, in the path of the young inquirer: he is sure to go wrong, and Nature is just as sure to inform him of the fact. He falls down stairs, burns his fingers, cuts his hand, scalds his tongue, and in this way learns the conditions of his physical well being. This is Nature's way of proceeding, and it is wonderful what progress her pupil makes. His enjoyments for a time are physical, and the confectioner's shop occupies the foreground of human happiness; but the blossoms of a finer life are already beginning to unfold themselves, and the relation of cause and effect dawns upon the boy.

He begins to see that the present condition of things is not final, but depends upon one that has gone before, and will be succeeded by another. He becomes a puzzle to himself; and to satisfy his newly-awakened curiosity, asks all manner of inconvenient questions. The needs and tendencies of human nature express themselves through these early yearnings of the child. He desires to know the character and causes of the phenomena presented to him; and unless this desire has been granted for the express purpose of having it repressed, unless the attractions of natural phenomena be like the blush of the forbidden fruit, conferred merely for the purpose of exercising our self-denial by letting them alone; then I claim for the study of Physics the recognition that it answers to an impulse implanted by nature in the human constitution, and he who would oppose such study must be prepared to exhibit the credentials which authorize him to contravene Nature's manifest designs. Such credentials were never given; and the opposition, where it exists, is in most, if not in all cases due to the fact, that at the time when the opponent of Science was beginning to inquire like the little boy, it was so arranged by human institutions that the train of thought suggested by natural objects should, in his case, be supplanted by another. But is this unavoidable? Is, for ex-

ample, the knowledge of grammatical concord and government so utterly antagonistic to the scientific discernment of the same two principles in Nature, as to render the complete extrusion of the one necessary to the existence of the other? A few days ago, a Master of Arts, who is still a young man, and therefore the recipient of a modern education, stated to me that until he had reached the age of twenty years he had never been taught anything regarding Light, Heat, Magnetism, or Electricity: twelve years of his life previously had been spent among the ancients, all connexion being thus severed between him and natural phenomena. Now, we cannot, without prejudice to humanity, separate the present from the past. The nineteenth century strikes its roots into the centuries gone by, and draws nutriment from them. The world cannot afford to lose the record of any great deed or utterance; for such deeds and such utterances are prolific throughout all time. We cannot yield the companionship of our loftier brothers of antiquity,—of our Socrates and Cato,—whose lives provoke us to sympathetic greatness across the interval of two thousand years. As long as the ancient languages are the means of access to the ancient mind, they must ever be of priceless value to humanity; but it is as the avenues of ancient thought, and not as the instruments of



modern culture, that they are chiefly valuable to Man. Surely these avenues might be kept open without making such sacrifices as that above referred to, universal. We have conquered and possessed ourselves of continents of land, concerning which antiquity knew nothing; and if new continents of thought reveal themselves to the exploring human spirit, shall we not possess them also? In these latter days, the study of Physics has given us glimpses of the methods of Nature which were quite hidden from the ancients, and it would be treason to the trust committed to us, if we were to sacrifice the hopes and aspirations of the Present out of deference to the Past.

I dare say the bias of my own education manifests itself in a desire I always feel to seize upon every possible opportunity of checking my assumptions and conclusions by experience. I might, it is true, appeal directly to your own consciousness in proof of the tendency of the human mind to inquire into the phenomena presented to the senses; but I trust you will excuse me if, instead of doing this, I take advantage of the facts which have fallen in my own way through life, referring to your judgment to decide whether such facts are truly representative and general, and not merely individual and local. At an agricultural college in Hampshire, with which I was connected for some time, and which is now

converted into a school for the general education of youth, a Society was formed among the boys, which met weekly for the purpose of reading reports and papers upon various subjects. The Society had its president and treasurer; and abstracts of its proceedings were published in a little monthly periodical issuing from the school press. One of the most remarkable features of these weekly meetings was, that after the general business had been concluded, each member of the Society enjoyed the right of asking questions on any subject on which he desired information. The questions were either written out previously in a book devoted to the purpose, or, if a question happened to suggest itself during the meeting, it was written upon a slip of paper and handed in to the Secretary, who afterwards read all the questions aloud. A number of teachers were usually present, and they and the boys made a common stock of their wisdom in furnishing replies. As might be expected from an assemblage of eighty or ninety boys, varying from eighteen to eight years old, many extraordinary questions were proposed. To the eye which loves to detect in the tendencies of the young the instincts of humanity generally, such questions are not without a certain philosophic interest, and I have therefore thought it not derogatory to the present course of Lectures to copy a few

of these questions, and to introduce them here. They run as follows :—

What are the duties of the Astronomer Royal ?

What is frost ?

Why are thunder and lightning more frequent in summer than in winter ?

What occasions falling stars ?

What is the cause of the sensation called ‘ pins and needles ’ ?

What is the cause of waterspouts ?

What is the cause of hiccup ?

If a towel be wetted with water, why does the wet portion become darker than before ?

What is meant by Lancashire witches ?

Does the dew rise or fall ?

What is the principle of the hydraulic press ?

Is there more oxygen in the air in summer than in winter ?

What are those rings which we see round the gas and sun ?

What is thunder ?

How is it that a black hat can be moved by forming round it a magnetic circle, while a white hat remains stationary ?

What is the cause of perspiration ?

Is it true that men were once monkeys ?

What is the difference between the *soul* and the *mind* ?

Is it contrary to the rules of Vegetarianism to eat eggs?

In looking over these questions, which were wholly unprompted, and have been copied almost at random from the book already alluded to, we see that many of them are suggested directly by natural objects, and are not such merely as had an interest conferred on them by previous culture. Now the fact is beyond the boy's control, and so certainly is the desire to know its cause. The sole question then is, is this desire to be gratified or not? Who created the fact? Who implanted the desire? Certainly not Man—and will any man undertake to place himself between the mind and the fact, and proclaim a divorce between them? Take, for example, the case of the wetted towel, which at first sight appears to be one of the most unpromising questions in the list. Shall we tell the proposer to repress his curiosity, as the subject is improper for him to know, and thus interpose our wisdom to rescue the boy from the consequences of Nature's atrocity in implanting a desire which acts to his prejudice? Or, recognising the propriety of the question, how shall we answer it? It is impossible to answer it without reference to the laws of optics—impossible to answer it without making the boy to some extent a natural philosopher. You may say that the effect



is due to the reflection of light at the common surface of two media of different refractive indices. But this answer presupposes on the part of the boy a knowledge of what reflection and refraction are, or reduces you to the necessity of explaining them. On looking more closely into the matter, we find that our wet towel belongs to a class of phenomena exhibited by tabasheer and hydrophane, which have long excited the interest of philosophers. These bodies are opaque when dry, but when dipped into water or beech-nut oil they become transparent. The towel is white for the same reason that snow is white, that foam is white, that pounded granite or glass is white, and that the salt we use at table is white. On quitting one medium and entering another, a portion of light is always reflected, but with this restriction, the media must possess different refractive indices. Thus, when we immerse glass in water, light is reflected from the common surface of both, and it is this light which enables us to see the glass. But take a transparent solid and immerse it in a liquid of the same refractive index as itself, it will immediately disappear. I remember once dropping the eyeball of an ox into water; it vanished as if by magic, with the exception of the crystalline lens, and the surprise was so great as to cause a bystander to suppose that the mass had been in-

stantly dissolved. This, however, was not the case, and a comparison of the refractive index of the vitreous humour with that of water cleared up the whole matter. The indices were identical, and hence the light pursued its way through both bodies as if they formed one continuous mass. In the case of snow, powdered quartz, or salt, we have a transparent solid body mixed with air; at every transition from solid to air, or from air to solid, a portion of light is reflected; this takes place so often that the light is wholly intercepted, and thus from the mixture of two transparent bodies we obtain an opaque one. Now the case of the towel is precisely similar. The tissue is composed of semi-transparent vegetable fibres, with the interstices between them filled with air; repeated reflection takes place at the limiting surfaces of air and fibre, and hence the towel becomes opaque like snow or salt. But if we fill the interstices of the towel with water, we diminish the reflection; a portion of the light enters the mass, and the darkness of the towel is due to its increased transparency. Thus the hydrophane, tabasheer, the tracing paper used by engineers, and many other considerations of the highest scientific interest, are involved in the simple enquiry of this unsuspecting little boy.

Again, take the question regarding the rising or

falling of the dew—a question long agitated, and finally set at rest by the beautiful researches of Wells and Melloni. I do not think that any boy of average intelligence will be satisfied with the simple answer that the dew falls. He will wish to learn how you know that it falls, and, if acquainted with the notions of the middle ages, may refer to the opinion of Father Laurus, that, if you fill a goose egg with the morning dew and expose it to the sun, it will rise like a balloon—a swan's egg being better for the experiment than a goose egg. It is impossible to give the boy a clear notion of the beautiful phenomenon to which his question refers, without first making him acquainted with the radiation and conduction of heat. Take, for example, a blade of grass, from which one of these orient pearls is depending. During the day the grass, and the earth beneath it, possess a certain amount of warmth imparted by the sun; during a serene night, heat is radiated from the surface of the grass into space, and to supply the loss, there is a flow of heat from the interior portions of the blade towards its surface. Thus the surface loses heat by radiation, and gains heat by conduction. Now, in the case before us, the power of radiation is great, whereas the power of conduction is small; the consequence is that the blade loses more than it gains, and hence becomes

more and more refrigerated. The light vapour floating around the surface so cooled is precipitated upon it, and there accumulates to form the little pearly globe which we call a dew-drop.

Thus the boy finds the simple and homely fact which addressed his senses to be the outcome and flower of the deepest laws. The fact becomes, in a measure, sanctified as an object of thought, and invested for him with a beauty for evermore. He thus learns that things which, at first sight, seem to stand isolated and without apparent brotherhood in Nature are united by their causes, and finds the detection of these analogies a source of perpetual delight. To enlist pleasure on the side of intellectual performance is a point of the utmost importance; for the exercise of the mind, like that of the body, depends for its value upon the spirit in which it is accomplished. Every physician knows that something more than mere mechanical motion is comprehended under the idea of healthful exercise—that, indeed, being most healthful which makes us forget all ulterior ends in the mere enjoyment of it. What, for example, could be substituted for the jubilant shout of the playground, where the boy plays for the mere love of playing, and without reference to physiological laws; while kindly Nature accomplishes her ends unconsciously, and makes his very indifference benefi-



cial to him. You may have more systematic motions, you may devise means for the more perfect traction of each particular muscle, but you cannot create the joy and gladness of the game, and where these are absent, the charm and the health of the exercise are gone. The case is similar with mental education; but the extent to which this has been, and continues to be forgotten, would justify us in doubting whether Nature is so sparing of her gifts as to cause those souls which mark epochs in human history to be separated from each other by centuries, or whether the fact be not attributable to human mismanagement, by which the gifts referred to are squandered and misapplied. Why should the mind of youth be so completely warped from its healthful and happy action, so utterly withdrawn from those studies to which its earliest tendencies point, and in the cultivation of which the concurrence of its ardour would powerfully tend to the augmentation of its strength, as to leave the man in after-life, unless enlightened by his visits to an institution such as that in which we are now assembled, in absolute ignorance as to whether the material world is governed by law or chance, or indeed whether those phenomena which excited his youthful questionings be not really the jugglery of Scandinavian Jotuns, or some similar demonic power?

The study of Physics, as already intimated, consists of two processes, which are complementary to each other—the tracing of facts to their causes, and the logical advance from the cause to the fact. In the former process, called *induction*, certain moral qualities come into play. It requires patient industry, and an humble and conscientious acceptance of what Nature reveals. The first condition of success is an honest receptivity and a willingness to abandon all preconceived notions, however cherished, if they be found to contradict the truth. Believe me, a self-renunciation which has something noble in it, and of which the world never hears, is often enacted in the private experience of the true votary of science. And if a man be not capable of this self-renunciation—this loyal surrender of himself to Nature, he lacks, in my opinion, the first mark of a true philosopher. Thus the earnest prosecutor of science, who does not work with the idea of producing a sensation in the world, who loves the truth better than the transitory blaze of to-day's fame, who comes to his task with a single eye, finds in that task an indirect means of the highest moral culture. And although the virtue of the act depends upon its privacy, this sacrifice of self, this upright determination to accept the truth, no matter how it may present itself—even at the hands of a scientific foe, if neces-

sary—carries with it its own reward. When prejudice is put under foot and the stains of personal bias have been washed away—when a man consents to lay aside his vanity and to become Nature's organ—his elevation is the instant consequence of his humility. I should not wonder if my remarks provoked a smile, for they seem to indicate that I regard the man of science as a heroic, if not indeed an angelic, individual; and cases may occur to you which seem to indicate the reverse. You may point to the quarrels of scientific men, to their struggles for priority, to that unpleasant egotism which screams around its little property of discovery like a scared plover about its young. I will not deny all this; but let it be set down to its proper account, to the weakness—or, if you will—to the selfishness of Man, but not to the charge of Physical Science.

The second process in physical investigation is *deduction*, or the advance of the mind from fixed principles to the conclusions which flow from them. The rules of logic are the formal statement of this process, which, however, was practised by every healthy mind before ever such rules were written. In the study of Physics, induction and deduction are perpetually married to each other. The man observes, strips facts of their peculiarities of form, and tries to unite them by their essences; having effected

this, he at once deduces, and thus checks his induction. Here the grand difference between the methods at present followed, and those of the ancients, becomes manifest. They were one-sided in these matters : they omitted the process of induction, and substituted conjecture for observation. They do not seem to have possessed sufficient patience to watch the slow processes of Nature, and to make themselves acquainted with the conditions under which she operates. They could never, therefore, fulfil the mission of Man given at the commencement, " Replenish the earth, and subdue it." The subjugation of Nature is only to be accomplished by the penetration of her secrets and the mastery of her laws. This not only enables us to turn her forces against each other, so as to protect ourselves from their hostile action, but makes them our slaves. By the study of Physics we have indeed opened to us treasuries of power of which antiquity never dreamed : we lord it over Matter, and in so doing have become better acquainted with the laws of Mind ; for to the mental philosopher the study of Physics furnishes a screen against which the human spirit projects its own image, and thus becomes capable of self-inspection.

Thus, then, as a means of intellectual culture, the study of Physics exercises and sharpens observation :



it brings the most exhaustive logic into play : it compares, abstracts, and generalizes, and provides a mental scenery admirably suited to the conducting of these processes. The strictest precision of thought is everywhere enforced, and prudence, foresight, and sagacity are demanded. By its appeals to experiment, it continually checks itself, and thus walks on a foundation of facts. Hence the exercise it invokes does not end in a mere game of intellectual gymnastics, such as the ancients delighted in, but tends to the mastery of natural agents. This gradual conquest of the external world, and the consciousness of augmented strength which accompanies it, render the study of Physics as delightful as it is important. Its effects upon the imagination I have not observed closely, but certain it is that the cool results of physical induction furnish conceptions which transcend most of those of imagination proper. Take for example the idea of an all-pervading ether which transmits a tingle, so to speak, to the finger ends of the universe every time a street lamp is lighted. The little billows of this ether can be measured with the same ease and certainty as that with which an engineer measures a base and two angles, and from these finds the distance across the Thames. Now there is just as much poetry in the measurement of the river as in that of an ethereal undulation ; for

the intellect, during the acts of measurement and calculation, destroys those notions of size which appeal to the poetic faculty. It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Young, that

‘An undevout astronomer is mad ;’

there being no necessary connexion between a devout state of mind and the observations and calculations of a practical astronomer. For it is not until the man withdraws from his calculation, as a painter from his work, and thus realizes the great idea at which he has been engaged, that imagination and wonder are excited. Now here, I confess, is a possible danger. If the arithmetical processes of science be too exclusively pursued, they may, I think, impair the imagination, and thus the study of Physics is open to the same objection as philological, theological, or political studies, when carried to excess. But even in this case, the injury done is to the investigator himself: it does not reach the mass of mankind. Indeed, the conceptions furnished by his cold unimagined reckonings may furnish themes for the poet, and excite in the highest degree that sentiment of wonder which, notwithstanding all its foolish vagaries, table-turning included, I, for my part, should be sorry to see banished from the world.

I have thus far dwelt upon the study of Physics as an agent of intellectual culture ; but like other

things in Nature, this study subserves more than a single end. The colours of the clouds delight the eye, and, no doubt, accomplish moral purposes also, but the self-same clouds hold within their fleeces the moisture by which our fields are rendered fruitful. The sunbeams excite our interest and invite our investigation; but they also extend their beneficent influences to our fruits and corn, and thus accomplish, not only intellectual ends, but minister, at the same time, to our material necessities. And so it is with scientific research. While the love of science is a sufficient incentive to the pursuit of science, and the investigator, in the prosecution of his inquiries, is raised above all material considerations, the results of his labours may exercise a potent influence upon the physical condition of Man. This is the arrangement of Nature, and not that of the scientific investigator himself; for he usually pursues his object without regard to its practical applications. And let him who is dazzled by such applications—who sees in the steam-engine and the electric telegraph the highest embodiment of human genius and the only legitimate object of scientific research, beware of prescribing conditions to the investigator. Let him beware of attempting to substitute for that simple love with which the votary of science pursues his task, the calculations of what he is pleased to

call utility. The professed utilitarian is unfortunately, in most cases, the very last man to see the occult sources from which useful results are derived. He admires the flower, but is totally ignorant of the conditions of its growth. The scientific man must approach Nature in his own way ; for if you invade his freedom by your so-called practical considerations, it may be at the expense of those qualities on which his success as a discoverer depends. Let the self-styled practical man look to those from the fecundity of whose thought he, and thousands like him, have sprung into existence. Were they inspired in their first inquiries by the calculations of utility ? Not one of them. They were often forced to live low and lie hard, and to seek a compensation for their penury in the delight which their favourite pursuits afforded them. In the words of one well qualified to speak upon this subject, ‘ I say not merely look at the pittance of men like John Dalton, or the voluntary starvation of the late Graff ; but compare what is considered as competency or affluence by your Faradays, Liebig's, and Herschels, with the expected results of a life of successful commercial enterprise : then compare the amount of mind put forth, the work done for society in either case, and you will be constrained to allow that the former belong to a class of workers who, properly speaking,



are not paid, and cannot be paid for their work, as indeed it is of a sort to which no payment could stimulate.'

But while the scientific investigator, who, standing upon the frontiers of human knowledge, and aiming at the conquest of fresh soil from the surrounding region of the unknown, makes the *discovery* of truth his exclusive object for the time, he cannot but feel the deepest interest in the practical application of the truth discovered. There is something ennobling in the the triumph of Mind over Matter : apart even from its uses to society, there is something sublime in the idea of Man having tamed that wild force which rushes through the telegraphic wire, and made it the minister of his will. Our attainments in these directions appear to be commensurate with our needs. We had already subdued horse and mule, and obtained from them all the service which it was in their power to render : we must either stand still, or find more potent agents to execute our purposes. To stand still, however, was not in the plan of Him who made motion a condition of life, and, as if by His high arrangement, the steam-engine appeared. Remember that these are but new things ; that it is not long since we struck into the scientific methods which have produced these extraordinary results. We cannot for an instant regard them as the final

achievements of Science, but rather as an earnest of what she is yet to do. They mark our first great advances upon the dominion of Nature. Animal strength fails, but here are the forces which hold the world together, and the instincts and successes of Man assure him that these forces are his when he is wise enough to command them. Is it not an object worthy the contemplation of a philosopher, to see a man experimenting in a corner, pondering in a closet, and gathering, by slow degrees, the mighty agencies of Nature into the sphericity of his little head: to see him come forth, and, in the application of his private thought, realize morally the physical dream of Archimedes, by lifting at an effort the whole world to a higher level. This has been done, and will probably be done again; but the study of Physics always was, and ever must remain, the forerunner of such achievements.

In the title of this Lecture, the study of Physics as a branch of education 'for all classes' is spoken of. I am not quite sure that I understand the meaning intended to be conveyed by the words 'all classes;' and I have regarded the question with reference to those mental qualities which God has distributed without reference to class. As an instrument of intellectual culture, the study of Physics is profitable to all: as bearing upon special functions,

its value, though not so great, is still more tangible. Why, for example, should Members of Parliament be ignorant of the subjects concerning which they are called upon to legislate? In this land of practical physics, why should they be unable to form an independent opinion upon a physical question? Why should the senator be left at the mercy of interested disputants when a scientific question is discussed, until he deems the nap a blessing which rescues him from the bewilderments of the committee-room? The education which does not supply the want here referred to, fails in its duty to England. I state nothing visionary, when I say that in a country like ours, whose greatness depends so much upon the applications of physical science, it would be a wholesome and rational test to make admission to the House of Commons contingent on a knowledge of the principles of Natural Philosophy. With regard to our working people, in the ordinary sense of the term working, the study of Physics would, I imagine, be profitable, not only as a means of mental culture, but also as a moral influence to woo these people from pursuits which now degrade them. A man's reformation oftener depends upon the indirect, than upon the direct action of the will. The will must be exerted in the choice of employment which shall break the force of temptation by erecting a barrier against it. The drunkard,

for example, is in a perilous condition if he content himself merely with saying, or swearing, that he will avoid strong drink. His thoughts, if not attracted by another force, will revert to the public-house, and to rescue him permanently from this, you must give him an equivalent. It would certainly be worth experiment to try what the study of Physics would do here. By investing the objects of hourly intercourse with an interest which prompts reflection, new enjoyments would be opened to the working man, and every one of these would be a point of force to protect him against temptation. Besides this, our factories and our foundries present an extensive field of observation, and were those who work in them rendered capable, by previous culture, of appreciating what they see, the results to science would be incalculable. Who can say what intellectual Samsons are at the present moment toiling with closed eyes in the mills and forges of Manchester and Birmingham? Grant these Samsons sight, give them some knowledge of Physics, and you multiply the chances of discovery, and with them the prospects of national advancement. In our multitudinous technical operations we are constantly playing with forces where our ignorance is often the cause of our destruction. There are agencies at work in a locomotive of which the maker of it probably never dreamed, but which



nevertheless may be sufficient to convert it into an engine of death. Again, when we reflect on the intellectual condition of the people who work in our coal mines, those terrific explosions which occur from time to time need not astonish us. If these men possessed sufficient physical knowledge, I doubt not, from the operatives themselves would emanate a system by which these shocking accidents might be effectually avoided. If they possessed the knowledge, their personal interests would furnish the necessary stimulus to its practical application, and thus two ends would be served at the same time—the elevation of the men and the diminution of the calamity.

Before the present Course of Lectures was publicly announced, I had many misgivings as to the propriety of my taking a part in them. I felt that my place might be better filled by an older man, whose experience would be more entitled to respect. Small as my experience was, however, I resolved to adhere to it, and in what I have said regarding mental processes, I have described things as they reveal themselves to my own eyes, and have been enacted in my own limited practice. In doing this, I have been supported by the belief that there is one mind common to us all; and that if I be true to the expression of this mind, even in a small parti-

cular, the truth will attest itself by a response in the convictions of my hearers. There may be the same difference between the utterance of two individuals of different ranges of intellectual power and experience on a subject like the present, as between 'The Descent from the Cross,' by Rubens, and the portrait of a spaniel dog. Nevertheless, if the portrait of the spaniel be true to nature, it recommends itself as truth to the human mind, and excites, in some degree, the interest that truth ever inspires. Thus far I have endeavoured to keep all tints and features which really do not belong to the portrait of my spaniel, apart from it, and I ask your permission to proceed a little further in the same manner, and to refer to a fact or two in addition to those already cited, which presented themselves to my notice during my brief career as a teacher in the establishment already alluded to. The facts, though extremely humble, and deviating in some slight degree from the strict subject of the present discourse, may yet serve to illustrate an educational principle.

One of the duties which fell to my share, during the period to which I have referred, was the instruction of a class in mathematics, and I usually found that Euclid and the ancient geometry generally, when addressed to the understanding, formed a very attractive study for youth. But it was my habitual

practice to withdraw the boys from the routine of the book, and to appeal to their self-power in the treatment of questions not comprehended in that routine. At first, the change from the beaten track usually excited a little aversion: the youth felt like a child amid strangers; but in no single instance have I found this aversion to continue. When utterly disheartened, I have encouraged the boy by that anecdote of Newton, where he attributes the difference between him and other men, mainly to his own patience; or of Mirabeau, when he ordered his servant, who had stated something to be impossible, never to use that stupid word again. Thus cheered, he has returned to his task with a smile, which perhaps had something of doubt in it, but which, nevertheless, evinced a resolution to try again. I have seen the boy's eye brighten, and, at length, with a pleasure of which the ecstasy of Archimedes was but a simple expansion, heard him exclaim, 'I have it, sir.' The consciousness of self-power, thus awakened, was of immense value; and, animated by it, the progress of the class was truly astonishing. It was often my custom to give the boys their choice of pursuing their propositions in the book, or of trying their strength at others not to be found there. Never in a single instance have I known the book to be chosen. I was ever ready to assist when I

deemed help needful, but my offers of assistance were habitually declined. The boys had tasted the sweets of intellectual conquest and demanded victories of their own. I have seen their diagrams scratched on the walls, cut into the beams upon the playground, and numberless other illustrations of the living interest they took in the subject. For my own part, as far as experience in teaching goes, I was a mere fledgling: I knew nothing of the rules of pedagogics, as the Germans name it; but I adhered to the spirit indicated at the commencement of this discourse, and endeavoured to make geometry a *means* and not a *branch* of education. The experiment was successful, and some of the most delightful hours of my existence have been spent in marking the vigorous and cheerful expansion of mental power, when appealed to in the manner I have described.

And then again, the pleasure we all experienced was enhanced when we applied our mathematical knowledge to the solution of physical problems. Many objects of hourly contact had thus a new interest and significance imparted to them. The swing, the see-saw, the tension of the giant-stride ropes, the fall and rebound of the football, the advantage of a small boy over a large one when turning short, particularly in slippery weather; all became subjects of investigation. Supposing a lady



to stand before a looking-glass, of the same height as herself, it was required to know how much of the glass was really useful to the lady? and we learned, with great pleasure, the economic fact that she might dispense with the lower half and see her whole figure notwithstanding. It was also very pleasant to prove the angular velocity of a reflected beam to be twice that of the mirror which reflects it; we also felt deep interest in ascertaining from the hum of a bee the number of times the little insect flaps its wings in a second. Following up our researches upon the pendulum, we were interested to learn how Colonel Sabine had made it the means of determining the figure of the earth; and we were also startled by the inference which the pendulum enabled us to draw, that if the diurnal velocity of the earth were seventeen times its present amount, the centrifugal force at the equator would be precisely equal to the force of gravitation, and hence an inhabitant of those regions would have the same tendency to fall upwards as downwards. All these things were sources of wonder and delight to us: we could not but admire the perseverance of Man which had accomplished so much; and then when we remembered that we were gifted with the same powers, and had the same great field to work in, our hopes arose that at some future day we might possibly push the subject a little further,

and add our own victories to the conquests already won.

I know I ought to apologize to you for dwelling so long upon this subject. But the days I spent among these youthful philosophers made a deep impression on me. I learned among them something of myself and of human nature, and obtained some notion of a teacher's vocation. If there be one profession in England of paramount importance, I believe it to be that of the schoolmaster; and if there be a position where selfishness and incompetence do most serious mischief, by lowering the moral tone and exciting contempt and cunning where reverence and noble truthfulness ought to be the feelings evoked, it is that of the governor of a school. When a man of enlarged heart and mind comes among boys,—when he allows his being to stream through them, and observes the operation of his own character evidenced in the elevation of theirs,—it would be idle to talk of the position of such a man being honourable. It is a blessed position. The man is a blessing to himself and to all around him. Such men, I believe, are to be found in England, and it behoves those who busy themselves with the mechanics of education at the present day, to seek them out. For no matter what means of culture may be chosen, whether physical or philolo-

gical, success must ever mainly depend upon the amount of life, love, and earnestness, which the teacher himself brings with him to his vocation.\*

\* The following extract from a journal is, I think, too good to be omitted here. The writer of it—a pupil of Dirichlet and Steiner—would doubtless have felt himself more at home in dealing with elliptic functions than with the definitions of Euclid. But the manner in which he contrived to render the latter mysteries evident to a light-headed little boy, does credit to another faculty than his mere mathematical one, and will, I trust, prove as pleasant to the reader as it has to me. ‘K—— stammers distressingly, and this has impeded his progress very much. I have often passed him in the class, knowing that I could not get any intelligible answer from him, and had it not been for his eloquent eyes, which said, ‘I know it, Sir, if I could but speak,’ I might have mistaken him for a dunce, and thus done him great injustice. Through his love of mischief, however, and his inability to cope with his schoolfellows, on account of his defective utterance, it was evident that he was losing interest in his work, or rather that he had never felt much interest in it, and it became necessary to awaken him. One day, after he had been more noisy and mischievous than usual, I told him rather sternly to put on his cap and follow me. He did so, and I walked forward, while he, in a state of anxious suspense, walked behind me. After some moments’ silence, I asked, ‘Do you know, K——, what I am going to do with you?’ ‘Ne—ne—ne—no, Sir,’ he replied. ‘Well,’ I said, ‘I will tell you. I have spoken to you often enough, to no purpose, and now I intend to make you do better for the future.’ We walked forward for some distance, and at length, putting my arm quietly around his neck, I broke silence once more. ‘Can you tell me what an angle is, my boy?’ ‘Ye—ye—ye—yes, Sir, an angle is a—a—a—a—,’ he could get no further, and turned his eyes upon me beseechingly. ‘Well,’ I replied to this silent appeal, ‘go and pull two stalks of grass, and show me what an angle is.’ This he did, and with the grass stalks continued to answer my questions on the geometrical definitions. We turned into a stubble field—by this time he had lost all fear, and could speak quite distinctly—‘What is a right angled triangle?’ I asked. ‘It has all its angles right angles, Sir,’ ‘Indeed,’ I replied, taking my arm from around his

Such are some of the thoughts which have floated before me, in a more or less distracted manner, in reference to the present hour; and nobody can be more conscious of their manifold imperfections than I am myself. Apart from other disadvantages, I have had the pressure of various duties interfering with the revival of my consciousness upon these matters, and thus preventing me from making the discourse as true a record of my own experience as I could wish it to be. I have throughout been less anxious to make out a case for Physics than to state the truth; and I confess that the Lecture of this day week causes me to doubt, whether you are not entitled to expect from me a more emphatic statement of the claims of the science which I now represent, than that which I have laid before you. When I saw your Lecturer reduced to the necessity of

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neck, 'it has three right angles, has it? will you just kneel down?' He saw his mistake, stammered 'two,' looked at me piteously and hesitated. 'On your knees, Sir,' I cried, and he knelt down, while I, falling on my knees beside him, said, 'Now pull up some stubble, and make me a triangle having either two or three right angles.' At once he saw his error, and the absurdity of our position, as we knelt together, making geometrical diagrams with stubble. Springing to his feet, he shook with laughter—'It has only one right angle, Sir—only one, of course!' I responded, 'Of course.' With my arm round his neck, we turned homewards, and continued our lesson successfully. 'This is the punishment I had in store for you,' I said, when we reached home. 'Now go, and transgress no more,' to which his eyes responded, 'I will, Sir.'



pleading for science, and meekly claiming for it, from the Institution which we are accustomed to regard as the highest in this land, a recognition equal to that accorded to philology, I confess that the effect on me was to excite a certain revolutionary tendency in a mind which is usually tranquil almost to apathy in these matters. Science behind Philology ! The knowledge of the laws by which God's universe is sustained, and the perpetual advancement of humanity secured, inferior to that of the manner in which ancient and savage tribes put their syllables together, and express the varieties of mood, tense, and case ! As the pole of a magnet acting upon soft iron induces in the latter a condition opposed to its own, so the irrationality of those who cast this slight upon Science tends, no doubt, to excite an opposite error on the part of their antagonists, and to cause them, in retaliation, to underrate the real merits of Philology. But is there no mind in England large enough to see the value of both, and to secure for each of them fair play ? Oh ! let us not make this a fight of partisans—let the gleaned wealth of antiquity be showered into the open breast ; but while we ‘unsphere the spirit of Plato’ and listen with delight to the lordly music of the past, let us honour by adequate recognition the genius of our own time. Let me again remind you

that the claims of that science which finds in me to-day its unripened advocate, are the claims of God's workmanship upon the attention of his creatures, and that its exercises, as an agent of culture, are based upon the natural relations subsisting between Man and the world in which he dwells. Here, on the one side, we have the apparently lawless shifting of phenomena; on the other side, mind, which requires law for its equilibrium, and in obedience to its own indestructible instincts, believes that these phenomena are reducible to law. To chasten this apparent chaos is a problem which man's Creator has set before him. The world was built in order: it is the visual record of the Creator's logic, and to us he has trusted the will and power to follow him through this great argument. By the manifestations of Nature which He has ordained, He appeals to the faculties which He has implanted, and surrounds them from the cradle to the grave with objects which provoke them to inquiry. Descending for a moment from this high plea to considerations which lie closer to us as a nation—as a land of gas and furnaces, of steam and electricity: as a land which science, practically applied, has made great in peace and mighty in war:—I ask you whether this 'land of old and just renown,' which may God keep unimpaired, has not a right to expect from her institutions a culture

more in accordance with her present needs than that supplied by declension and conjugation? And if the tendency should be to lower the estimate of science, by regarding it exclusively as the instrument of material prosperity, let it be their high mission to furnish the proper counterpoise by pointing out its nobler uses, and lifting the national mind to the contemplation of it as the last development of that 'increasing purpose' which runs through the ages and widens the thoughts of men.









J.R. 3/2/45

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